`
`No. 19-291
`================================================================================================================
`
`In The
`Supreme Court of the United States
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`ANNE BLOCK,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioner,
`
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
`To The United States Court Of Appeals
`For The Ninth Circuit
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`KING COUNTY’S AND DEPUTY COBLANTZ’S
`BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`GEOFFREY M. GRINDELAND*
`NICOLE C. CARSLEY
`SEAMARK LAW GROUP PLLC
`400 Winslow Way E, Ste 230
`Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
`(206) 502-2511
`geoff@seamarklaw.com
`nikki@seamarklaw.com
`*Counsel of Record
`
`Counsel for Respondents
` King County and
` Deputy Coblantz
`
`================================================================================================================
`COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
`WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`
`1. Whether judges who are members of a state bar
`association may hear a case against the bar asso-
`ciation, because mere membership in the bar asso-
`ciation is not the type of interest that would
`reasonably call into question the judges’ impar-
`tiality.
`
`2. Whether Ms. Block’s retaliation claim against
`King County and Deputy Coblantz was properly
`dismissed, because she failed to plead sufficient
`facts to state a plausible claim against them.
`
`3. Whether Ms. Block’s petition for a writ of certio-
`rari is untimely, because it was neither dated nor
`served until two months after the 90-day deadline.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`Questions Presented ...............................................
`i
`Table of Contents ....................................................
`ii
`Table of Authorities ................................................
`iii
`Introduction ............................................................
`1
`Decisions Below ......................................................
`1
`Jurisdiction .............................................................
`2
`Statement of the Case ............................................
`2
`The Petition Should Be Denied ..............................
`3
`
`I. Membership in a bar association does not
`require judges to recuse themselves from
`hearing a case involving the bar associa-
`tion, because mere membership does not
`reasonably call into question the judges’ im-
`partiality ......................................................
` II. Ms. Block’s retaliation claim against King
`County and Deputy Coblantz was properly
`dismissed, because she failed to plead suffi-
`cient facts to state a plausible claim against
`them ..............................................................
` III. Ms. Block’s petition for a writ of certiorari is
`untimely, because it was neither dated nor
`served until nearly two months after the 90-
`day deadline .................................................
`Conclusion ...............................................................
`
`
`7
`8
`
`4
`
`5
`
`
`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`CASES
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................... 6
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
`(2007) ......................................................................... 6
`Denardo v. Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir.
`1992) .......................................................................... 4
`Hu v. American Bar Ass’n, 334 Fed. Appx. 17 (7th
`Cir. 2009) ................................................................... 4
`Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 Fed. Appx. 442 (6th Cir.
`2006) .......................................................................... 4
`N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498
`(1951) ......................................................................... 7
`Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 569 F.2d 1250
`(3d Cir. 1977) ............................................................. 4
`Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669 (Wash. 1997) ..................... 5
`United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ........... 3
`
`STATUTES
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................ 2
`28 U.S.C. § 455(a) .......................................................... 4
`
`RULES
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................... 3
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................... 5
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
`
`Page
`Sup. Ct. R. 10 ................................................................ 3
`Sup. Ct. R. 12.3 ............................................................. 7
`Sup. Ct. R. 13 ................................................................ 7
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Court of Appeals and the District Court cor-
`rectly decided that judges need not recuse themselves
`from a case involving a state bar association of which
`they are members, because mere membership in a bar
`association does not reasonably call into question a
`judge’s impartiality.
`
`Both courts also properly concluded that Peti-
`
`tioner Anne Block had not pleaded facts sufficient to
`state a plausible retaliation claim against King County
`or Deputy Coblantz.
`
`Neither of these decisions, which involved applica-
`
`tion of specific facts to well-settled law, merit review by
`this Court.
`
`Additionally, Ms. Block’s petition should be denied
`
`on the basis that it is untimely.
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`DECISIONS BELOW
`
`The Appendix submitted by Ms. Block is incom-
`plete. The District Court’s six orders denying her mo-
`tions to disqualify District Court judges may be found
`at Block v. Washington State Bar Ass’n, No. 2:15-cv-
`02018-RSM, ECF Nos. 25, 34, 36, 68, 134, and 151.
`
`The District Court’s order dismissing Ms. Block’s
`
`retaliation claim against King County and Deputy
`Coblantz may be found at Block v. Washington State
`Bar Ass’n, No. 2:15-cv-02018-RSM, ECF No. 122.
`
`
`
`2
`
`The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ order affirm-
`
`ing the District Court on both issues is available at
`Block v. Washington State Bar Ass’n, 761 Fed. Appx.
`729 (9th Cir. 2019).
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`JURISDICTION
`
`The Court of Appeals entered judgment on Febru-
`ary 11, 2019. Then on April 2, 2019, the Court of Ap-
`peals denied Ms. Block’s petition for rehearing.
`
`If Ms. Block’s petition had been timely filed and
`
`served, this Court would have jurisdiction under 28
`U.S.C. § 1254(1).
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
` Ms. Block sued the Washington State Bar Associ-
`ation and more than 50 other governmental entities
`and private individuals she alleged were part of a
`widespread conspiracy to retaliate against her. (See
`Block, ECF No. 122 at 2; Block, ECF No. 134 at 1.)
`
` Ms. Block then moved to disqualify all judges in
`the Western District of Washington, arguing they were
`biased because they were members of the bar associa-
`tion. (See Block, ECF No. 25 at 1.) Both District Court
`judges who considered this issue concluded mere mem-
`bership in the bar association was not disqualifying,
`because it did not reasonably call into question the
`judges’ impartiality. (See Block, ECF No. 151 at 1.)
`
`
`
`3
`
`King County and Deputy Coblantz moved to dis-
`
`miss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on
`the grounds that Ms. Block’s Amended Complaint con-
`tained only conclusory and speculative allegations
`against them. (See Block, ECF No. 122 at 10–11.) The
`Amended Complaint did not connect King County or
`Deputy Coblantz to any retaliatory act and did not al-
`lege any facts from which it could be inferred that King
`County or Deputy Coblantz had a retaliatory motive.
`(See id. at 12–14.) The District Court dismissed Ms.
`Block’s retaliation claim against King County and
`Deputy Coblantz on this basis. (Id. at 16.)
`
`In an unpublished order, the Ninth Circuit af-
`
`firmed the District Court on both issues. (Block, 761
`Fed. Appx. at 730–32.)
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED
` Ms. Block’s petition for a writ of certiorari should
`be denied, because there are no compelling reasons the
`Court should review the fact-specific decisions in this
`case. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. On the contrary, the Ninth Cir-
`cuit’s unpublished order is in harmony with decisions
`of this Court and other Circuits. And this Court does
`not grant certiorari merely “to review evidence and dis-
`cuss specific facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S.
`220, 227 (1925).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`I. Membership in a bar association does not re-
`quire judges to recuse themselves from hear-
`ing a case involving the bar association,
`because mere membership does not reasona-
`bly call into question the judges’ impartiality.
`
`Judges should recuse themselves when they have
`a personal interest in a matter or when the judge’s “im-
`partiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
`§ 455(a). For more than forty years, however, every fed-
`eral circuit to consider the issue has held that mem-
`bership in a bar association is not the type of interest
`that would require judges to recuse themselves from
`hearing a case involving the bar association. See Hu v.
`Am. Bar Ass’n, 334 Fed. Appx. 17, 19 (7th Cir. 2009) (“a
`judge’s membership in a bar association . . . does not
`create the type of relationship that would cause us to
`doubt his ability to preside impartially over a case in
`which the bar association is a party”); Lawrence v.
`Chabot, 182 Fed. Appx. 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2006) (“after
`more than thirty years from the date of the disqualifi-
`cation statute’s enactment, no case, at least of which
`we are aware, has held that judges who are members
`of a state bar may not hear cases concerning that state
`bar”); Denardo v. Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th
`Cir. 1992) (“The fact that a plaintiff sues a bar associ-
`ation does not require recusal of judges who are mem-
`bers of that bar association.”); Plechner v. Widener
`Coll., Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 1262 (3d Cir. 1977) (“mem-
`bership in the American Bar Association is not a finan-
`cial interest which requires that a judge disqualify
`himself where the ABA is a party”).
`
`
`
`5
`
`Consistent with this well-settled rule, the Ninth
`
`Circuit and the District Court correctly decided that
`mere membership in the Washington State Bar Asso-
`ciation did not reasonably call into question the impar-
`tiality of judges presiding over this action.
`
` Ms. Block’s reliance on Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669
`(Wash. 1997), is misplaced. That was a state-court de-
`cision that limited joint-and-several liability for a de-
`cision by an unincorporated homeowners’ association
`“to those members who violated the covenants by par-
`ticipating in or ratifying the unreasonable, arbitrary
`decision.” Id. at 683. The case has nothing to do with
`potential liability of members of a bar association or
`recusal of judges.
`
`Therefore, the Ninth Circuit correctly affirmed the
`
`District Court judges’ decisions not to recuse them-
`selves. And the lower courts’ application of these spe-
`cific facts to well-settled law does not merit review by
`this Court.
`
`
`II. Ms. Block’s retaliation claim against King
`County and Deputy Coblantz was properly
`dismissed, because she failed to plead suffi-
`cient facts to state a plausible claim against
`them.
`
`The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
`a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the
`claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint does not satisfy this
`standard if it contains only “labels and conclusions” or
`
`
`
`6
`
`a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
`action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In-
`stead, to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint
`must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
`true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
`face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
`544, 570 (2007)).
`
`A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff
`
`pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
`reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
`the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This
`requires more than a “sheer possibility” that the de-
`fendant is liable, and the plausibility standard is not
`satisfied by pleading facts that are “merely consistent
`with” the defendant’s liability. Id.
`
`A court should apply a two-step approach when
`
`evaluating whether claims have been adequately
`pleaded. Id. at 679. First, the court should identify and
`disregard all legal conclusions, as they are not entitled
`to an assumption of truth. Id. Second, the court should
`determine whether the factual allegations, which must
`be assumed to be true, “plausibly give rise to an enti-
`tlement to relief.” Id.
`
`In this case, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit
`
`correctly decided that Ms. Block’s Amended Complaint
`alleged no facts from which it could be reasonably
`inferred that King County, Deputy Coblantz, or any
`other defendant retaliated against her. Indeed, Ms.
`Block conceded that her retaliation claim against King
`
`
`
`7
`
`County was insufficiently pleaded. (See Block, ECF No.
`122 at 16.)
`
`Furthermore, a determination that a plaintiff
`
`failed to allege sufficient facts to meet the pleading
`standard is not generally the type of issue that merits
`review by this Court. See N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S.
`Co., 340 U.S. 498, 503 (1951) (“This is not the place to
`review a conflict of evidence nor to reverse a Court of
`Appeals because were we in its place we would find the
`record tilting one way rather than the other, though
`fair-minded judges could find it tilting either way.”).
`
`
`III. Ms. Block’s petition for a writ of certiorari
`is untimely, because it was neither dated
`nor served until nearly two months after the
`90-day deadline.
`
`A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
`within 90 days from either entry of judgment or denial
`of a petition for rehearing. See Sup. Ct. R. 13. The peti-
`tion must be accompanied by proof of service, and the
`petitioner must notify the other parties “promptly” of
`the filing. Sup. Ct. R. 12.3.
`
` Ms. Block’s motion for rehearing was denied by the
`Court of Appeals on April 2, 2019. (Pet. App. at 14–15.)
`So her petition was due by July 1.
`
`Although the docket indicates Ms. Block’s petition
`
`was filed on July 1, it is unclear what document was
`received by the Court that day, because the petition is
`actually dated August 30. Moreover, King County and
`
`
`
`8
`
`Deputy Coblantz were not served with a copy of the
`petition or otherwise informed of the filing until Sep-
`tember 4.
`
`Because Ms. Block’s petition was neither dated nor
`
`served until nearly two months after the 90-day dead-
`line, it is untimely. This is an additional reason the pe-
`tition should be denied.
`
`--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`This case was correctly decided by application of
`specific facts to well-settled law, and there are no com-
`pelling reasons the Court should grant review. Addi-
`tionally, Ms. Block’s petition was not timely. For each
`of these independent reasons, the Court should deny
`Ms. Block’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`GEOFFREY M. GRINDELAND*
`NICOLE C. CARSLEY
`SEAMARK LAW GROUP PLLC
`400 Winslow Way E, Ste 230
`Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
`(206) 502-2511
`geoff@seamarklaw.com
`nikki@seamarklaw.com
`*Counsel of Record
`Counsel for Respondents
` King County and
` Deputy Coblantz
`
`
`