throbber
trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`IPR2016-00055, Paper No. 33
`January 11, 2017
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`
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`RECORD OF ORAL HEARING
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`- - - - - -
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`- - - - - -
`TELIT WIRELESS SOLUTIONS INC., TELIT
`COMMUNICATIONS PLC, SIERRA WIRELESS AMERICA, INC.,
`SIERRA WIRELESS, INC., and RPX CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`M2M SOLUTIONS LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`- - - - - -
`Case IPR2016-00055
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
`Technology Center 2600
`
`
`Before: KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, JUSTIN T. ARBES,
`and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN (via video link), Administrative Patent Judges.
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Monday,
`December 5, 2016, at 1:33 p.m., Hearing Room A, taken at the U.S. Patent
`and Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`REPORTED BY RAYMOND G. BRYNTESON, RMR, CRR,
`
`RDR
`
`

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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER TELIT WIRELESS:
`
`DAVID A. LOEWENSTEIN, ESQ.
`
`
`MILO EADAN, Patent Agent
`
`Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP
`
`1500 Broadway, 12th Floor
`
`New York, New York 10036
`
`646-878-0800
`
`ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER SIERRA and RPX:
`
`JENNIFER HAYES, ESQ.
`
`Nixon Peabody LLP
`
`300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4100
`
`Los Angeles, California 90071-3151
`
`213-629-6000
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`JEFFREY N. COSTAKOS, ESQ.
`
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`
`777 East Wisconsin Avenue
`
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202-5306
`
`414-297-5782
`
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`Case IPR2016-00055
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`
`(1:33 p.m.)
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: You may be seated. All
`right. Welcome back, everybody. We are here now for
`IPR2016- 00055 concerning the same patent, Patent Number
`8,648,717. This is Telit Wireless v. M2M.
`Let's have our appearances. First who do we have
`from Petitioner?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I'm David Loewenstein. I
`represent the Petitioner, Telit Wireless. And this is my
`colleague, Milo Eadan, who is the brains of the operation. I
`like to think of him as the microcontroller.
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: Thank you.
`MR. COSTAKOS: Jeff Costakos, Foley & Lardner,
`for the Patent Owner, M2M Solutions LLC.
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: All right. Thank you.
`MS. HAYES: And good afternoon, Your Honors.
`Jennifer Hayes for Petitioners Sierra Wireless, Inc., Sierra
`Wireless America, and RPX Corp. who are joined into this IPR
`proceeding.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Just a quick matter of
`housekeeping. I guess we thought that Judge Galligan would
`be able to see this electronically. And I'm not sure if the
`version that you have has page numbers on it.
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`Case IPR2016-00055
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
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`JUDGE GALLIGAN: I have the slides you sent
`and let me see if they have page numbers. I have it open right
`now. I can just, if you tell me the PDF page, I will just go to
`that. That's fine.
`MR. EADAN: There's a cover page.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: We'll work it out.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Thank you.
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: In the name of
`housekeeping, let me finish my beginning speech. I'm Judge
`Deshpande. To my right is Judge Arbes and on the screen is
`Judge Galligan. This is all for transcript purposes.
`Petitioner bears the burden of proof. Each party
`has been granted an hour for arguments. Petitioner, you may
`reserve time for rebuttal. Once Petitioner has presented
`arguments, Patent Owner presents their arguments following,
`and then Petitioner can continue with the rebuttal if they
`choose.
`
`Are there any questions before we continue?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Now that you have
`reminded me, I wanted to reserve 15 minutes for rebuttal.
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: Okay. Why don't we go
`ahead and begin. Petitioner, you may begin when you are
`ready.
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`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
`Again, I'm David Loewenstein. I'm representing the
`Petitioners here. And we have prepared these demonstratives.
`The first couple is sort of introductory information
`about the technology at issue and sort of how this device sort
`of morphed into what we spoke about this morning, the hot
`link controller.
`And so the idea was to protect kids, right, and so
`you had this what they call incoming caller lists. And if, you
`know, the mother was on the list. She would call in and the
`number would get checked against the list. And if it was on
`the list, it was permitted and it went through. And so that
`would happen, you know, with any number of people who were
`on the list.
`And the idea, of course, was to protect the child
`from unwanted contact, which is what the patent refers to.
`And so that seems to be a fairly obvious situation. You have
`some unknown caller, that person is blocked. And the reason
`you have that on the incoming caller list is because there are
`tens, probably now hundreds of millions of cell phones or land
`lines, whatever, out there and you don't want them all
`arbitrarily calling your child.
`And so that's how this whole thing started. It
`started with this hot link thing. The concept is now changed
`in this patent to the outgoing caller list. And it is similar.
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`Case IPR2016-00055
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
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`The important part of this hot link device -- I'm trying to use
`the laser pointer which isn't showing up so well here -- but,
`anyway, there is a call button on the device. It has no keypad
`and it has no display.
`So if the kid is lost or in trouble or whatever, the
`kid just pushes one button, it looks to the list, and it makes
`that call. So there is not another level of screening that is
`required on the outbound calls. Right? There is one button,
`no keypad, and even if the kid wanted to call another number,
`the kid could not do it. And that carries through to this
`programmable controller.
`And I will show you in some later slides also the
`CELL-EYE reference. Neither of them had keypads. And so
`the possibility of making these sort of spurious calls,
`international calls, whatever, just doesn't exist. Right? This
`has no way to make these calls that are not on the list. These
`are just following rules. They are following instructions they
`have been programmed to follow. They call the number on the
`list, and that's that. So you don't need another level of
`screening.
`So there is our little animation and it shows that
`the call goes out. So, now, to program the list -- I think that
`Judge Galligan was following along here, so I'm on the next
`slide, Your Honor, called Program Outgoing Caller List. And
`the way this is described is the device starts with the
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`Case IPR2016-00055
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
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`programming transmitter. It then sends a coded number. And
`if that coded number is authenticated in this step down here --
`and for some reason the laser pointer doesn't work on that
`screen -- then it is allowed to pass.
`And you will see there are a number of phrases that
`you all have seen in the papers about one or more
`transmissions, plural, and at least one of the numbers contains
`the coded number. So there is no requirement, certainly no
`requirement that this is only a single transmission. And we
`will talk some more about that in a minute.
`And so this remote monitoring device is intended
`to be a flexible device. It is supposed to exist sort of in the
`space between, say, a home alarm and this remote device
`which could be a cell phone or a computer. So the
`programmable communicator sits in the middle there and on
`one side is some sort of monitored technical device, a house, a
`car, a vending machine, a refrigerator, whatever it is.
`And the point of these introductions is also to
`emphasize that this is all built with existing technology.
`There is nothing that the alleged inventor created here. This is
`pulling stuff from a parts bin. So the transmitter, the receiver,
`the ability to authenticate calls, SMS messages, everything,
`GPRS, that was all in the prior art.
`So I just put up a couple of slides. I'm sure you
`guys are familiar with the law but I will just repeat it.
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`Patent 8,648,717 B2
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`Briefly, the bedrock principle here is that the claims control.
`And the last sentence here, the last two, if you start including
`additional elements in the claim, who knows where to stop?
`And the claims that are in the patent are the sole measure of
`the grant. And so that has been the law for well over 100
`years.
`
`And this is a case that M2M has cited. And the
`last part is instructive because in this IPR proceeding the
`Board is not able to get into issues, 112 issues like written
`description and enablement. So you look at the claim
`language. If it is reasonably clear, like more than one
`transmission, or transmissions, plural, there is no reason to go
`to the specification and try to read the limitation in.
`And, again, these are a couple of cases that say the
`same thing a bit more succinctly. The analytical focus starts
`with the claims, is centered on the claims, and the ambiguity,
`undue breadth, vagueness, and so forth, are all 112 matters.
`So that leads us to the issue of one or more
`transmissions. And the claim language says what it says.
`Right? One or more transmissions, plural, and at least one
`transmission containing a coded number. Transmissions,
`plural, include the at least one telephone number. There is
`nothing in here that says this should be a single transmission.
`And the Board's decision was correct. I'm now on
`slide 17. This is entitled "Board's Decision." And there is no
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`reason that at least one telephone number or IP address and
`coded number needs to be in a single transmission. As the
`Patent Owner contends, we believe that is correct.
`And if you look at M2M's infringement contentions
`in the District Court, again, they say if one or more
`transmissions, or a device, you look to see by determining if
`they, plural, right, if they contain the required PIN2 password.
`And if it receives one or more of these AT commands, the
`TCP/IP transmissions that contain these AT commands, well,
`then you determine if at least one of those, plural,
`transmissions contains the PIN password coded number.
`So in the litigation they said, well, it could be
`more than one transmission. The language says more than one
`transmission. The Board says more than one transmission.
`And that's sort of the beginning and end of it.
`JUDGE ARBES: Counsel, I'm sorry, before you
`move on, can we talk about the litigation. Obviously we
`talked about it this morning, but the Defendants in the
`litigation took a different position than what you are taking
`today, correct?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Well, so what I recall
`happening in the litigation was we said that it was an
`exclusive list. And the reality of this, and going back to the
`introductory slides, the list that's in the device is the list for
`outbound calls --
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`JUDGE ARBES: I'm sorry, I was talking about the
`single wireless transmission, if we're talking about the
`transmission issue.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Oh, okay, right. So in that
`case I think we said that it could be more than one -- I think
`we said it was a single transmission and they said the
`opposite.
`
`So we switched positions, the two parties have
`switched, and we believe ours is correct because it is a broader
`reasonable interpretation. We say it could be single or
`multiple and that seems to be a broader interpretation based on
`the language of the claims.
`JUDGE ARBES: If I could point you to Exhibit
`1108 at page 4. It does seem, at least in the documents that
`we have, that Defendants proposed a single wireless
`transmission and M2M, the Plaintiff, agreed with the
`Defendants' proposed construction. Do I have that correct?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Right. And I think the way
`that shook out was that we said if you are going to make this
`into a broader claim than the 112 problem, and they then
`agreed with us and said it was a single transmission. But like
`I said before, we can't reach that issue here.
`JUDGE ARBES: Well, I guess I will ask you the
`same question I asked this morning: Why is there a difference
`between broadest reasonable interpretation and Phillips here?
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`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Well, I think the reason is
`because we looked at the claim language in this case and we
`did feel like we were constrained under 112 of the written
`description or enablement requirements. If we look at the
`plain language it says one or more transmissions, plural,
`throughout the claim. And you look at the language, then it is
`one or more transmissions.
`JUDGE ARBES: But why would that not apply
`under Phillips equally?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Well, in Phillips I think we
`have to deal with a presumption of validity. And ultimately I
`think we said if you take a broader transmission, then there is
`a 112 issue in the litigation.
`JUDGE ARBES: I guess what is, frankly,
`concerning me about some of these interpretations are that
`there are two diametrically opposed interpretations that are
`being proposed, one to the District Court and one to the Board.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I understand the concern. I
`don't think they are quite so diametrically different but I
`understand your point. I think that the issue was that we felt,
`and this is our group of Defendants, felt like we were
`constrained to take a narrower interpretation in the District
`Court, and we believe in the Patent Office that we are entitled
`to take a broader interpretation.
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`I would also like to point out, and I believe it is on
`page 12 of our petition, if we want to stick with the District
`Court interpretations, we are happy to do it, because in the
`District Court the Patent Owner took these extremely broad
`interpretations regarding capability.
`So it didn't matter that our device did something or
`didn't do something. There was no evidence that our device
`did any of this stuff. They found all of this information in a
`software manual, the AT manual, that has 500 different AT
`commands. And they said it doesn't matter if you do it or not.
`What matters is if the device is capable of doing it.
`So if you want to take an exceptionally broad
`interpretation like the Patent Owner did in the District Court,
`we're happy to do it, but they are now backed off that and they
`are now advancing very narrow interpretations here. So they
`are doing the inverse.
`So we think we are doing what the case law says is
`appropriate, which is to take a broader construction, and it
`may be different than the one in the District Court. But we're
`happy to deal with the capability arguments. If that's what the
`Patent Owner wants to stick with here, we'll deal with it.
`JUDGE ARBES: I would like to focus on just the
`claim language about the single transmission requirement for a
`while. I think you had said it is your belief that the plain
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`meaning, the plain language here allows for more than one
`transmission?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Right.
`JUDGE ARBES: But you also said the plain
`meaning goes to a single wireless transmission to the District
`Court. I mean, you are arguing plain meaning in both cases
`then.
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`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I think what we did in the
`District Court was we looked at the specification which talks
`about a single transmission. And we said if you want to have
`a valid claim in the District Court considering 112, it has to be
`a single transmission.
`And if the 112 issue were something that we could
`address here, we would point that out, that there is written
`description defect and perhaps enablement. But that's the
`rules that we were required to live under in the District Court.
`And we believe the broadest reasonable interpretation is either
`single or multiple and we believe that there is support in the
`claims as, you know, we just put up here that says it's multiple
`transmissions.
`And, in fact, if you think about it -- and I think
`this is one of the questions you asked earlier today -- how
`could they have made this clearer? Well, if they really wanted
`to have a single transmission, they would have said a single
`transmission with A and B. They didn't do it. They didn't say
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`this is a single transmission with a coded number and a phone
`number. They went through all of these other contortions to
`say at least one transmission, multiple transmissions, if at
`least one of the transmissions has some information in it.
`So it would have been a very simple matter really,
`if they wanted to protect a single transmission, to write the
`claim that way, and they obviously didn't do it and they did it
`for a reason.
`JUDGE ARBES: How exactly would they have
`written the claim?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: The codes are very simple,
`because it says a single transmission with a coded number and
`a telephone number. That would be a single transmission. But
`they didn't use that language and they did it for a reason.
`They tried to get broad claims so that they could use them for
`an infringement claim and now they are trying to get narrow
`claims to protect the invalidity.
`JUDGE ARBES: Where, if you have a copy of the
`claims, where would that have been inserted?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: They could have put it in a
`couple of different places. I mean, you know, a single
`transmission, so authenticating a single transmission sent from
`the programmable transmitter and received by the
`programmable communicator by determining if that single
`transmission had a coded number, and if the transmission
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`included the phone number and the IP address it would have
`been authenticated. So it would have been very easy to write
`that claim.
`JUDGE ARBES: I guess if we can focus on just
`the clause in 1d. If the processing module authenticates the at
`least one of the transmissions, including the at least one
`telephone number or IP address and the coded number, why
`does that not imply that we are talking about one transmission
`with both?
`I mean, I understand what you are saying,
`transmissions is plural, but doesn't the including clause refer
`to the at least one of the transmissions?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I think it relates to the
`previous word, the transmission, "if one of the transmissions
`including the."
`So, I mean, there are a number of places you could
`put in the language that I just mentioned, that it would be a
`single transmission. And the fact that they didn't write it in
`that way to me is strong evidence that they are really trying to
`cover something broader than that.
`If I could, I mean, I was about to discuss really the
`bottom line issue here, I think, which is that it is a design
`choice, so there is no contradictory evidence. Right?
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`JUDGE ARBES: I'm sorry, if I could just ask one
`more question on claim interpretation before we move on to
`the merits.
`There was, on page 7 of your reply brief, you had
`said that the claim language here is starkly contrasted with the
`parent, the '010 patent, which does explicitly recite a single
`transmission requirement. And the language there is the at
`least one transmission including a coded number and at least
`one telephone number or Internet Protocol, IP, address.
`Why is that language any different than the
`language we are talking about here?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I'm trying to find the
`language but I believe in that case it was in the singular tense.
`It says where there is one transmission, singular.
`JUDGE ARBES: Well, no, it does say the at least
`one transmission.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Right, but it still says
`transmission, singular, without the "s." It's not plural,
`transmissions.
`JUDGE ARBES: So it is your position that this
`argumen t comes down to the fact that the Patent Owner used
`the at least one of the transmissions instead of the at least one
`transmission?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I think that was the intent
`when they wrote the claim, was to change it from one
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`transmission to multiple transmissions. That's why they put
`the language in. It wasn't an accident.
`JUDGE ARBES: Is there any case law that you are
`aware of that there is a difference between someone saying at
`least one of something and at least one something?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I can't point to a case off
`the top of my head, but it seems to me as a matter of sort of
`grammatical construction, if you use the plural noun for some
`description, you are talking about more than one.
`So if you are talking about at least one of the
`transmissions, you are talking about more than one. If you are
`talking about at least one transmission, you could have six
`transmissions that have both pieces of information, the coded
`number and the phone number. If you are talking about at
`least one of the many transmissions, it means that the coded
`number could be in one and the phone number could be in
`another.
`
`I mean, I'm not sure if I have answered your
`question. If I haven't, then please let me know.
`JUDGE ARBES: No, I'm wondering if there is
`really any difference between the two. They both -- the scope
`of both is exactly the same, correct?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: It is not, though, if you
`consider that that plural form changes the meaning of the
`claim. Right? It is talking about at least one transmission.
`
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`And in the '010 patent it meant, as we understood it, to have
`both pieces of information. So the coded number together
`with the phone number or the IP address as a single
`transmission. At least one of those transmissions had the
`proper coded number and that would get authenticated.
`In this, again, it is not an accident that they put in
`the "s" six times, I mean not six times, but, whatever, three or
`four times, and if they had done it once maybe it would have
`been an accident. Maybe they didn't mean to do it. Maybe it
`was a typographical error.
`But this is a, you know, this is a well thought
`through thing. This is probably the sixth or seventh patent in
`the string of patents that they have gotten. So, you know,
`every time they file a new patent they tinker with the language
`and they wanted to get a broader interpretation.
`JUDGE ARBES: So just to make sure I understand
`your position correctly, if I have claim language that says at
`least one of the widgets and at least one widget, the scope of
`those individually is the same but how they are used in the
`claim with the surrounding language matters and that impacts
`whether this is a single transmission or not. Do I understand
`that correctly?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I think you are right. I
`think ultimately the question is can you read that language that
`is up on the board as requiring a single transmission, which I
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`think is what the Patent Owner is saying. And I don't see that.
`I don't see that, you know, it jumps off the paper at you and
`says, well, this must be a single transmission. I think what the
`Board said was right. It could be a single transmission or it
`could be more than one. And that's kind of where we're at
`here. Right? We have prior art that has more than one
`transmission and we believe that claim reads on it.
`JUDGE ARBES: Is there anything that you would
`point us to in the prosecution history of either patent that we
`are talking about that would illuminate this issue to say that
`there is some sort of difference between what the Patent
`Owner was claiming in the '010 patent and the '717 patent?
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I don't recall that in the
`'010 or in this patent that issue came up. In one of the
`predecessor patents, which I believe was the '802 patent, the
`Patent Examiner said that you can't have more than one
`transmission. And then they abandoned that and refiled it with
`the language we are looking at now. It is in one of the slides
`coming up and I believe it is in our papers as well.
`JUDGE ARBES: Okay.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Do we have a cite for the
`file history? We may have a cite for the statement in the file
`history that I've overlooked and my colleague may be able to
`alert you to. Shall I move on?
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: Go ahead.
`
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`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: I understand the dilemma
`between the single and the multiple transmissions, but the
`point I would like to make, the final point I think on this
`topic, is that ultimately this is really a design choice. So if
`you want to have a secure system, if you are protecting a bank
`or Fort Knox or something else, then you might want to have
`the password together with the phone number in each and
`every transmission.
`But that would require the user to enter the
`password every single time. And so that could be considered
`an inconvenience and somebody may not want to do that. So
`there is no technological impediment. There is no requirement
`of any of the pieces of this prior art device or the patent that
`allow or don't allow more than one transmission.
`So this is really just an engineer deciding that it
`makes more sense in some circumstances to have the coded
`number and the password -- and the phone number in one
`transmission or to spread it out.
`So maybe in some circumstances, like a car loan,
`for example, you don't need ultra secure transmissions. You
`put in the coded number of one and a minute later you add the
`phone number. And for that application maybe it is sufficient.
`But if you want to lock it down and you want to
`have a different application, you put both pieces of
`information in every transmission. That's a routine
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`engineering decision that people make all of the time. There
`is no contrary evidence to that.
`JUDGE DESHPANDE: Are you suggesting there is
`a reason why someone would actually put these in separate
`transmissions? It could be a design choice. We would want
`one or the other for different reasons.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Right. So suppose you
`want to make it more convenient. Suppose you just want to
`enter the password once, then you are sending ten subsequent
`messages. You don't want to enter it each time.
`And the inverse could be true, too. Right? If you
`are granted that somebody is going to hack into your
`communication, you may want to have the password and the
`coded number in every single transmission to prevent that.
`So there is no, again, there is no technological
`impediment to this. This is the kind of thing that people do all
`of the time. And we have our expert saying that. There is no
`expert testimony that is adverse to that, that is inconsistent to
`that.
`
`The next slide is a fellow that they used in the
`District Court named Konchitsky. He says he thinks, you
`know, having both pieces of information will provide better
`security. So there is no contradictory evidence, you know,
`that one form of the transmission is better or worse than the
`other. It is just a design choice. It is just, you know, what
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`somebody wanted to build into their system. It is not a
`patentable invention.
`I mean, you can envision a situation where I'm an
`inventor and I come to my, you know, patent lawyer and I say
`I've just come up with this great invention. I'm going to put
`the password in one transmission and the coded -- and the
`phone number in the other. I want to get a patent on that.
`You know, I would get laughed out of the office.
`That's not a patentable invention. You can't get a 17- year
`monopoly on having a password in one transmission together
`with the information or spread them apart. It is just not a
`patentable invention. It is not a patentable distinction.
`JUDGE ARBES: But, counsel, if there are
`particular reasons to do it that way that are well known.
`MR. LOEWENSTEIN: Right, if there are, but
`there aren't. I mean, there are plenty of reasons you would do
`it either way. And in the prior art that we cited it says that
`you send them separately. And if you read the claim language
`it says, you know, more than one transmission. It does not say
`a single transmission.
`I was going to move on to this other topic, the
`configured to and permitted to. Okay? So I'm on slide -- it
`looks like we are on 22. So we mentioned this in our papers
`here. Figure 2 is for incoming calls and that uses the term
`permitted caller. And I think I explained this in the
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`introduction. There is every reason to have call screening on
`the inbound calls. Really the genesis of it was to protect the
`child.
`
`For outbound calls you don't really have that
`problem. Right? The device has a list of phone numbers. If
`there is an alarm it follows the instruction and says call those
`numbers. So you don't need a second level of screening, if
`that is what is meant by exclusive or whatever, it's not in this
`patent. There is no hint in this patent that there is a second
`level of screening for outbound calls.
`So, again, we show that, you know, for the '717
`patent it talks about a change in status. It calls a number. The
`Van Bergen reference, which I will talk about in a little bit
`more detail, does the same thing. There is an alarm. You send
`outgoing messages to a stored number.
`A couple other points on this outgoing message
`situation is, the District Court mentioned it, there is no
`permitted -- there is no mention of permitted caller for the
`outbound calls. In their papers in this proceeding Patent
`Owner said the permitted caller term is not in the '717 patent.
`There is no reason for it. Right? There is no
`keypad. And the only reason you have a permitted caller on
`the inbound side is to prevent unwelcome contact, which is
`what the patent says, to the child. And this bit about
`preventing children from dialing overseas is really a function
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`of the lack of a keyboard. Right? You know, there is not any
`likelihood that somebody is goi

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