Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 1 of 17
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`FITBIT LLC,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT FITBIT LLC’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO JOINT OR INDUCED INFRINGEMENT
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,277,377
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 2 of 17
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Pages
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ..................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Facts Pertinent To The Entire Motion .....................................................................2
`
`Facts Pertinent To No Joint Infringement ................................................................3
`
`Facts Pertinent To No Induced Infringement...........................................................4
`
`LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .....................................................5
`
`FITBIT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO DIVIDED
`INFRINGEMENT BECAUSE FITBIT DOES NOT CONDITION A BENEFIT
`ON PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS ACCUSED OF INFRINGEMENT ......................6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Relevant Legal Standards For Divided Infringement ..............................................6
`
`Argument .................................................................................................................7
`
`Conclusion ...............................................................................................................8
`
`V.
`
`FITBIT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INDUCED
`INFRINGEMENT BECAUSE FITBIT’S USERS DO NOT DIRECTLY
`INFRINGE ...........................................................................................................................9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Relevant Legal Standards For Induced Infringement ..............................................9
`
`Argument .................................................................................................................9
`
`Conclusion .............................................................................................................11
`
`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................11
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 3 of 17
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Pages
`
`Cases
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
` 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015)...................................................................................... 6, 9
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd.,
`216 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000)........................................................................................... 6
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 5
`
`DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.,
` 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`ESW Holdings, Inc. v. Roku, Inc.,
` 2021 WL 1069047 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2021) ................................................................. 7
`
`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc.,
`6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993)........................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`843 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................. 8
`
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC,
`571 U.S. 191 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC,
`883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................... 7
`
`Sapphire Crossing LLC v. Abbyy USA Software House, Inc.,
`497 F. Supp. 3d 762 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ................................................................................ 7
`
`Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
` 247 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).......................................................................................... 5
`
`Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. LP,
` 15 F.4th 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2021) .......................................................................................... 6
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................................................... 2
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 4 of 17
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
`
`Pages
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................................................... 2, 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ....................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Local Rule 56.1 ............................................................................................................................... 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 5 of 17
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`While Philips presents a joint infringement theory and an induced infringement theory for
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,277,377 (the “’377 patent”), its own technical expert, Dr. Martin, admitted
`
`during his deposition that Philips is entirely lacking evidence of at least one essential element of
`
`each theory. Therefore, Fitbit requests summary judgment of no joint infringement and summary
`
`judgment of no induced infringement.
`
`With respect to joint infringement, Dr. Martin tacitly admitted at his deposition that Philips’
`
`theory does not meet the applicable legal test, which requires, among other things, proof that the
`
`alleged infringer has conditioned participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit on practicing
`
`the infringing method. Specifically, Dr. Martin acknowledged that Fitbit’s users can participate
`
`in or obtain the only allegedly conditioned activity or benefit in Philips’ joint infringement
`
`theory—viewing Fitbit metrics referred to as “Cardio Fitness Score” and “Cardio Fitness Level”—
`
`without practicing the method of claim 1. Therefore, Dr. Martin’s opinion does satisfy the legal
`
`test for joint infringement because the allegedly conditioned participation in an activity or receipt
`
`of a benefit can be obtained without practicing the allegedly infringing method. Since Philips
`
`cannot satisfy this essential element of joint infringement, Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment.
`
`With respect to Philips’ theory of induced infringement, Dr. Martin tacitly admitted at his
`
`deposition that there is no underlying act of direct infringement supporting this theory. In
`
`particular, while Dr. Martin’s expert report generally alleged that Fitbit’s users perform the
`
`underlying acts of direct infringement supporting Philips’s induced infringement theory, Dr.
`
`Martin admitted at deposition that Fitbit (via the Fitbit application), and not Fitbit’s users, allegedly
`
`practice claim element 1.c—“rendering a user interface.” Because an underlying act of direct
`
`infringement is an essential element of induced infringement, and Dr. Martin tacitly admitted that
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 6 of 17
`
`
`
`Fitbit’s users committed no such underlying act of direct infringement because they do not literally
`
`practice all of the method steps, Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment.
`
`The present Motion is case dispositive with respect to the ’377 patent, because Philips and
`
`Dr. Martin’s only remaining theories of infringement for that patent are joint infringement and
`
`induced infringement.1
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
`
`Fitbit presents the following numbered statement of undisputed material facts pursuant to
`
`Local Rule 56.1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Fitbit may present additional
`
`undisputed material facts or reply to Philips’ allegations regarding Fitbit’s statement of undisputed
`
`material facts in its reply brief, if appropriate.
`
`A.
`
`1.
`
`Facts Pertinent To The Entire Motion
`
`The ’377 patent is the only remaining, non-stayed asserted patent in this case. (See,
`
`e.g., Dkt. 112 (Second Amended Complaint, asserting ’007, ’233, and ’377 patents); Dkt. 212 at
`
`12-21 (finding asserted ’007 claims invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112); Dkt. 251
`
`(stipulating to stay proceedings with respect to ’233 patent given PTAB’s final written decision
`
`that all asserted claims of the ’233 patent are unpatentable).)
`
`2.
`
`’377 patent claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are the only remaining asserted claims in
`
`this case. (See, e.g., Ex. 2,2 ¶ 2.)
`
`3.
`
`’377 patent claim 1 is a method claim and the only remaining asserted independent
`
`claim in this case. (See, e.g., Ex. 2, ¶ 2 (listing asserted claims); Ex. 3 at cls. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
`
`4.
`
`’377 patent claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are each method claims that depend, directly
`
`or indirectly, from claim 1. (Ex. 3 at cls. 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
`
`
`1 Philips agreed to withdraw its allegations of contributory infringement on March 1, 2022.
`2 All cited exhibits are attached to the Declaration of David J. Shaw, filed concurrently herewith.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 7 of 17
`
`
`
`5.
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin maintain two specific infringement theories regarding
`
`claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 of the ’377 patent: (1) Fitbit directly infringes via “divided” or “joint”
`
`infringement and (2) Fitbit indirectly infringes by inducing its users’ underlying acts of direct
`
`infringement. (Ex. 1 at 159:24-163:2; see also, generally, Ex. 2.)
`
`6.
`
`Dr. Martin alleges that the use of a Fitbit wearable in combination with a
`
`smartphone running the Fitbit application is required to infringe the claims. (Ex. 2, ¶ 45.) The
`
`nine accused Fitbit wearables are the Fitbit Alta HR, Blaze, Charge 2, Charge 3, Inspire HR, Ionic,
`
`Versa, Versa 2, and Versa Lite. (Ex. 2, ¶ 45 and Ex. A.)3
`
`7.
`
`Dr. Martin opines that direct infringement of ’377 patent claim 1 requires all of the
`
`following: (1) downloading the Fitbit application onto a smartphone (element 1.a), (2) pairing the
`
`accused Fitbit wearable to a smartphone (element 1.b), (3) syncing the accused Fitbit wearable
`
`with the Fitbit application while the accused Fitbit wearable is worn by the user during exercise
`
`(elements 1.d, 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h), and (4) displaying the user’s Cardio Fitness Score page (which
`
`includes Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level) on the Fitbit application on the user’s
`
`smartphone (elements 1.c and 1.i). (Ex. 2, ¶¶ 188; see also Ex. 1 at 149:13-150:1.)
`
`B.
`
`8.
`
`Facts Pertinent To No Joint Infringement
`
`Philips and its expert, Dr. Martin, accuse Fitbit of joint infringement. (See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. 1 at 160:6-13.)
`
`9.
`
`The only alleged conditioned participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit to
`
`which Dr. Martin points in support of his joint infringement theory is a Fitbit user’s ability to view
`
`their Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level. (Ex. 1 at 252:15-253:20; Ex. 2, ¶¶ 259-264.)
`
`
`3 Dr. Martin refers to the nine accused Fitbit wearables as “the ’377 Devices” (see Ex. 2, ¶ 45 and
`Ex. A) and refers to the Fitbit application as “the Fitbit App” (see, e.g., Ex. 2, ¶¶ 50-56).
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 8 of 17
`
`
`
`10.
`
`Fitbit’s users can view their Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level in the
`
`Fitbit application on an iPad or Android tablet using all nine accused Fitbit wearables. (Ex. 4, ¶
`
`21; see also Ex. 10, ¶¶ 161, 163.)
`
`11.
`
` Fitbit’s users can view their Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level in the
`
`Fitbit application on a Windows 10 PC using eight of the accused Fitbit wearables—the Alta HR,
`
`Blaze, Charge 2, Charge 3, Inspire HR, Ionic, Versa, and Versa Lite. (Ex. 4, ¶ 22; see also Ex. 10,
`
`¶¶ 162, 163.)
`
`12.
`
`Fitbit’s users can view their Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level on the
`
`face of the Ionic, Versa, Versa Lite, and Versa 2. (Ex. 1 at 240:11-18; Ex. 10, ¶ 164.)
`
`13.
`
`Viewing a Cardio Fitness Score or Cardio Fitness Level on a tablet, PC, or the face
`
`of a Fitbit wearable does not infringe the ’377 patent. (Ex. 1 at 238:20-241:24, 249:18-250:3.)
`
`C.
`
`14.
`
`Facts Pertinent To No Induced Infringement
`
`Philips and its expert, Dr. Martin, allege that Fitbit induces infringement of claims
`
`1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 of the ’377 patent. (Ex. 1 at 160:19-161:20; Ex. 2, ¶ 46.)
`
`15. With respect to their induced infringement allegations, Philips and Dr. Martin
`
`allege that Fitbit’s users perform the underlying act of literal direct infringement by practicing each
`
`and every limitation of the asserted method claims. (Ex. 1 at 157:20-158:14; Ex. 2, ¶¶ 238-258.)
`
`16.
`
`’377 patent claim element 1.c reads: “rendering a user interface on the web-enabled
`
`wireless phone.” (Ex. 3, cl 1.)
`
`17.
`
`Dr. Martin and Philips point to rendering the Fitbit application’s user interface on
`
`a user’s mobile phone as satisfying ’377 patent claim element 1.c in the accused method. (Ex. 2,
`
`¶¶ 72-75.)
`
`18.
`
`The Fitbit application, not the user, renders the Fitbit application’s user interface
`
`on a user’s mobile phone:
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 9 of 17
`
`
`
`***
`
`Right. And my question is: It’s the Fitbit App that renders
`Q.
`the user interface on an iPhone or an Android phone. Right?
`
`Right. You know, as that sentence says, the user interface
`A.
`that is rendered by the Fitbit App, you know, on the Apple phone
`running iOS and a phone running Android.
`
`(Ex. 1 at 178:17-179:11 (discussing ¶ 73 of Dr. Martin’s corrected amended opening report); Ex.
`
`2, ¶ 73; see also Ex. 1 at 121:5-19 (discussing element 1.c generally: “Q …And your point is that
`
`the user interface is rendered by the application? A. Yes. That’s correct.”); Dkt. 286 at 12-13
`
`(Philips itself arguing “Fitbit misstates Dr. Martin’s testimony by arguing that this means that Dr.
`
`Martin is purporting that the Fitbit customer is somehow literally rendering a user interface on the
`
`web-enabled wireless phone themselves instead of opening the Fitbit App, which does the actual
`
`rendering.”).)
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
`
`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 56(a). The movant can succeed by citing to affirmative evidence or by showing that the
`
`non-movant cannot establish a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When the party seeking
`
`summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute over any material fact, the
`
`burden shifts to the non-movant to show that there is a genuine factual issue for trial. Celotex
`
`Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
`
`“Summary judgment of noninfringement is appropriate where the patent owner’s proof is
`
`deficient in meeting an essential part of the legal standard for infringement, since such failure will
`
`render all other facts immaterial.” Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316,
`
`1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Conclusory expert testimony and attorney argument cannot establish a
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 10 of 17
`
`
`
`genuine issue of fact. See, e.g., Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. LP, 15 F.4th 1121,
`
`1130-32 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2000). The patentee carries the ultimate burden of persuasion to show infringement by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191,
`
`203 (2014). Summary judgment of noninfringement should be entered where no reasonable jury
`
`could find that the patent owner (here Philips) has met that burden. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
`
`Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must
`
`view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.”).
`
`IV.
`
`FITBIT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO DIVIDED
`INFRINGEMENT BECAUSE FITBIT DOES NOT CONDITION A BENEFIT ON
`PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS ACCUSED OF INFRINGEMENT
`
`A.
`
`Relevant Legal Standards For Divided Infringement
`
`“Direct infringement under § 271(a) occurs where all steps of a claimed method are
`
`performed by or attributable to a single entity.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`
`797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015). When one party does not perform all the steps of the claimed
`
`method, it may still directly infringe by joint infringement if the party is responsible for others’
`
`performance of the method steps that the party does not perform itself. Id. “[A]n entity is
`
`responsible for others’ performance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where the
`
`entity directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.”
`
`Id.4
`
`An entity directs or controls another’s performance when the entity “conditions
`
`participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented
`
`method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.” Id. at 1023. In this context,
`
`
`4 Philips and Dr. Martin do not allege that Fitbit is engaged in a joint enterprise. (See generally
`Ex. 2.)
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 11 of 17
`
`
`
`“conditioning” requires that the conditioned participation in an activity or conditioned benefit can
`
`only be obtained by performing the claim step, and not some other way. Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod,
`
`LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Mere instruction or encouragement cannot
`
`establish direction or control. See, e.g., ESW Holdings, Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 2021 WL 1069047, at
`
`*5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2021). Likewise, an entity does not direct or control another’s
`
`performance merely by providing the accused product. See, e.g., Sapphire Crossing LLC v. Abbyy
`
`USA Software House, Inc., 497 F.Supp.3d 762, 768 (N.D. Cal. 2020). Rather, direction or control
`
`requires real world, offline control. See id.
`
`B.
`
`Argument
`
`Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment of noninfringement under Philips and Dr. Martin’s
`
`joint infringement theory, because Fitbit does not condition participation in an activity or receipt
`
`of a benefit on performance of the acts accused of infringement.
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin’s infringement analysis applies to a highly specific process whereby
`
`a Fitbit user must: (1) download the Fitbit application onto a smartphone (element 1.a), (2) pair
`
`the accused Fitbit wearable to a smartphone (element 1.b), (3) sync the accused Fitbit wearable
`
`with the Fitbit application while the accused Fitbit wearable is worn by the user during exercise
`
`(elements 1.d, 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h), and (4) display the user’s Cardio Fitness Score page (which
`
`includes Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level) on the Fitbit application on the user’s
`
`smartphone (elements 1.c and 1.i). (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUF”), ¶ 7.) Philips
`
`and Dr. Martin contend that Fitbit’s users perform all of these steps. (SUF, ¶¶ 7, 15.)
`
`The only alleged conditioned participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit to which
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin point is the Fitbit user viewing their Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness
`
`Level. (SUF, ¶ 9.) And the method of doing so that is accused of infringing by Philips and Dr.
`
`Martin requires the user to view their Cardio Fitness Score or Cardio Fitness Level in the Fitbit
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 12 of 17
`
`
`
`application on their smartphone. (SUF, ¶ 7.) However, there are multiple ways that a user may
`
`view their Cardio Fitness Score or Cardio Fitness Level without using the specific method that Dr.
`
`Martin and Philips accuse of infringement, including via a tablet for all nine accused Fitbit
`
`wearables (SUF, ¶ 10, 13), via a Windows 10 PC for eight of nine accused Fitbit wearables (SUF,
`
`¶ 11, 13), and on the face of the Fitbit device itself for four of nine accused Fitbit wearables (SUF,
`
`¶ 12, 13). Therefore, this activity or benefit is not conditioned on the user performing the accused
`
`method steps.
`
`Thus, Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment of no joint infringement, because there is no
`
`genuine dispute that Fitbit does not condition participation in the activity or receipt of the benefit
`
`of viewing a Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level on its users’ performance of the
`
`method accused of infringement by Dr. Martin and Philips. See, e.g., Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic,
`
`Inc., 843 F.3d 942, 948-49 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment of no joint infringement
`
`where patentee lacked any evidence that accused infringer conditioned a benefit on another’s
`
`performance of claim steps).
`
`C.
`
`Conclusion
`
`There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Fitbit’s users can view their Cardio Fitness
`
`Score or Cardio Fitness Level without performing the acts accused of infringement—Philips’ own
`
`expert, Dr. Martin, admits as much. Therefore, Fitbit does not condition participation in this
`
`activity or receipt of this benefit on performing the allegedly infringing method, and Fitbit is
`
`entitled to summary judgment of no joint infringement.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 13 of 17
`
`
`
`V.
`
`FITBIT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INDUCED
`INFRINGEMENT BECAUSE FITBIT’S USERS DO NOT DIRECTLY INFRINGE
`
`A.
`
`Relevant Legal Standards For Induced Infringement
`
`“[T]he patentee always has the burden to show direct infringement for each instance of
`
`indirect infringement.” DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`
`(citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Liability for either active
`
`inducement of infringement or contributory infringement is dependent upon the existence of direct
`
`infringement.”). An underlying act of direct infringement requires that “all steps of a claimed
`
`method are performed by or attributable to a single entity.” Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022.
`
`B.
`
`Argument
`
`Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment regarding Philips and Dr. Martin’s induced
`
`infringement theory, because Dr. Martin tacitly admitted at his deposition that there is no one party
`
`who performs all of the steps of the underlying method he accuses of directly infringing claim 1.
`
`’377 patent claim element 1.c reads: “rendering a user interface on the web-enabled
`
`wireless phone.” (SUF, ¶ 16.) Dr. Martin points to Fitbit’s users as the alleged direct infringers
`
`underlying his induced infringement theory. (SUF, ¶ 15.) And Dr. Martin and Philips claim that
`
`rendering the Fitbit application’s user interface on a user’s mobile phone satisfies ’377 patent claim
`
`element 1.c in the accused method. (SUF, ¶ 17.) However, Fitbit, not Fitbit’s users, render the
`
`Fitbit application’s user interface on a user’s mobile phone—Dr. Martin and Philips admit as
`
`much. (SUF, ¶ 18; see also Ex. 1 at 121:5-19, 178:17-179:11; Ex. 2, ¶ 73; Dkt. 286 at 12-13.)
`
`
`
`This is a classic case where summary judgment is appropriate. The patentee’s expert
`
`witness agrees that Fitbit’s users do not render the Fitbit application’s user interface on a user’s
`
`mobile phone. (See SUF, ¶ 18.) The only remaining question for the Court to decide is the legal
`
`import of that undisputed fact. Here, because Philips and Dr. Martin allege that Fitbit’s users
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 14 of 17
`
`
`
`perform the act of direct infringement underlying their induced infringement theory, and because
`
`the undisputed facts establish that Fitbit’s users do not perform the act accused of satisfying
`
`element 1.c, Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment of no induced infringement. Philips and Dr.
`
`Martin cannot show an underlying act of direct infringement.
`
`In opposition, Philips will likely argue that when a Fitbit user opens the Fitbit application
`
`on their mobile phone, that action causes the Fitbit application’s user interface to be rendered.
`
`That argument may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to defeat Fitbit’s motion
`
`for summary judgment. In particular, claim element 1.c does not require “causing a user interface
`
`to be rendered on the web-enabled wireless phone,” which is the most that Fitbit’s users do.
`
`Rather, the claim element requires literally “rendering a user interface on the web-enabled
`
`wireless phone.” (SUF, ¶ 16 (emphasis added).) And Dr. Martin, plus Philips itself, agree that
`
`Fitbit’s users do not “render” the Fitbit application’s user interface on their mobile phones. (SUF,
`
`¶ 18.) In fact, Philips recently argued to this Court that “Fitbit misstates Dr. Martin’s testimony
`
`by arguing that this means that Dr. Martin is purporting that the Fitbit customer is somehow
`
`literally rendering a user interface on the web-enabled wireless phone themselves instead of
`
`opening the Fitbit App, which does the actual rendering.” (Dkt. 286 at 12-13.)
`
`Because there is no genuine dispute that an underlying act of direct infringement has not
`
`occurred, Fitbit is entitled to summary judgment of no induced infringement. DSU, 471 F.3d at
`
`1303 (“[T]he patentee always has the burden to show direct infringement for each instance of
`
`indirect infringement.”); Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at 774 (“Liability for either active inducement of
`
`infringement or contributory
`
`infringement
`
`is dependent upon
`
`the existence of direct
`
`infringement.”).
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 15 of 17
`
`
`
`C.
`
`Conclusion
`
`There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Fitbit’s users do not actually “render” the
`
`Fitbit application’s user interface on their mobile phones—Philips and its own expert, Dr. Martin,
`
`admit as much. Therefore, Fitbit’s users do not perform the alleged act of direct infringement
`
`underlying Philips and Dr. Martin’s induced infringement theory. Fitbit is entitled to summary
`
`judgment of no induced infringement.
`
`VI. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Fitbit respectfully requests that the Court grant summary
`
`judgment of that Fitbit does not jointly infringe and does not induce infringement of the ’377
`
`patent.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 16 of 17
`
`
`
`By:
`
`Dated: March 2, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`/s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw (pro hac vice)
`dshaw@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 200
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 451-4900
`Facsimile: (202) 451-4901
`
`Leslie M. Spencer (pro hac vice)
`lspencer@desmaraisllp.com
`Karim Z. Oussayef (pro hac vice)
`koussayef@desmaraisllp.com
`Brian D. Matty (pro hac vice)
`bmatty@desmaraisllp.com
`Henry Ard (pro hac vice)
`hard@desmaraisllp.com
`Eric G. Speckhard
`especkhard@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`230 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10169
`Telephone: (212) 351-3400
`Facsimile: (212) 351-3401
`
`Ameet A. Modi (pro hac vice)
`amodi@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`101 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 573-1900
`Facsimile: (415) 573-1901
`
`Gregory F. Corbett (BBO #646394)
`gcorbett@wolfgreenfield.com
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco (BBO #681921)
`edimarco@wolfgreenfield.com
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02110
`Telephone: (617) 646-8000
`Facsimile: (617) 646-8646
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Fitbit LLC
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 337 Filed 03/02/22 Page 17 of 17
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 7.1(A)(2)
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Fitbit conferred with counsel for Philips
`and attempted in good faith to resolve or narrow the issues in dispute on February 28, 2022, but
`was unable to do so.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw
`
`
`CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 37.1
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Fitbit has complied with the provisions
`of Local Rule 37.1.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I certify that this document is being filed through the Court’s electronic filing system,
`
`which serves counsel for other parties who are registered participants as identified on the Notice
`of Electronic Filing (NEF). Any counsel for other parties who are not registered participants are
`being served by first class mail on the date of the electronic filing.
`
`
`
`/s/ Elizabeth A. DiMarco
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`