Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 13
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FITBIT LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
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`DEFENDANT FITBIT LLC’S SUR-REPLY REGARDING PHILIPS’
`MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE NOVEMBER 16, 2021
`EXPERT REPORT OF JOSEPH A. PARADISO (DKT. 259)
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 2 of 13
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`II.
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`DR. PARADISO’S RELIANCE ON VAISANEN SHOULD NOT BE
`STRICKEN ..........................................................................................................................1
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`DR. PARADISO’S RELIANCE ON THE OTHER DISPUTED REFERENCES
`SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN .........................................................................................2
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`Local Rule 16.6 Only Requires Disclosure Of References Asserted As
`Anticipating Or As Part Of An Obviousness Combination .....................................2
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`Allergan’s Jury Confusion Test Does Not Favor Striking The Other
`Disputed References ................................................................................................3
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`III.
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`DR. PARADISO’S INDEFINITENESS THEORY SHOULD NOT BE
`STRICKEN ..........................................................................................................................5
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`Philips’ Infringement Contentions Never Referenced Apple Or Google
`Servers......................................................................................................................5
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`Fitbit Should Not Be Found To Have Waived Its Indefiniteness Argument
`At This Juncture .......................................................................................................6
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................8
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`i
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 3 of 13
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`CASES
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`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ......................... passim
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`Better Mouse Co., LLC v. SteelSeries ApS, No. 2:14-CV-198-RSP, 2016 WL 3611560
`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) .................................................................................................. 5, 6
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`BioCell Tech. LLC v. Arthro-7, No. SACV 12-00516-JVS (RNBx)., 2013 WL 12131282
`(C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013).................................................................................................... 8
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`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, 700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..................................................... 8
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`Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 2006 WL 1330003
`(N.D.Cal., 2006).............................................................................................................. 1, 2
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`INAG, Inc. v. Richar, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00722-RFB-EJY, 2021 WL 4509165 (D. Nev.
`Sept. 30, 2021) .................................................................................................................... 8
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`INAG, Inc. v. Richar, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00722-RFB-EJY, 2021 WL 1582766 (D. Nev.
`Apr. 22, 2021) ..................................................................................................................... 8
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`Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-CV-00036-RWS, 2021 WL 3021253 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
`26, 2021) ......................................................................................................................... 3, 4
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014) ..................................................... 8
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`O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................. 7, 8
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`RULES
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`L.R. 16.6(d)(1)(A)........................................................................................................................... 7
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`L.R. 16.6(d)(4)(E) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 3
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`L.R. 16.6(d)(4)(F) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 3
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`L.R. 16.6(d)(5) ................................................................................................................................ 8
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`L.R.16.6 .......................................................................................................................................... 2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 4 of 13
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`Philips’ Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of November 16,
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`2021 Expert Report of Joseph A. Paradiso (the “Paradiso Report”) (Dkt. 284; “Philips’ Reply”)
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`does little more than rehash the arguments in Philips’ original Memorandum. Indeed, Philips
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`effectively ignores Fitbit’s Opposition in many respects. Fitbit requests that the Court deny
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`Philips’ Motion.1
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`I.
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`DR. PARADISO’S RELIANCE ON VAISANEN SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN
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`With respect to Vaisanen, Philips omits the most important fact—Philips’ expert, Dr.
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`Martin, does not dispute that Vaisanen discloses the additional element of dependent claim 6—the
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`only element for which Dr. Paradiso applied Vaisanen. (Ex. 1 (Martin Rebuttal Report) at ¶ 139
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`(“However, regardless of the outcome of that motion, because Hickman in view of Theimer do not
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`render claim 1 obvious, the combination of Hickman in view of Theimer and Vaisanen does not
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`render dependent [claims] invalid as obvious.”); see generally id. at §§ VIII.B.6, VIII.D.1,
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`VIII.D.3) Thus, Dr. Paradiso’s use of Vaisanen had no effect on Dr. Martin’s ability to respond
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`to Dr. Paradiso’s opinions—Dr. Martin had every opportunity to address Vaisanen and decided
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`against it. And contrary to Philips’ arguments, Fresenius Med. Care Holdings Inc. v. Baxter Int’l,
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`Inc. supports Fitbit. See No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90856, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal.
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`May 15, 2006).
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`The Fresenius court primarily denied the patentee’s motion to strike because “the parties
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`[had] already engaged in extensive discovery pertaining to [the] affirmative defense” the patentee
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`sought to strike. Fresenius, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90856, at *21-22. Consequently, the Fresenius
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`court found that the “[Patentee] does not appear to have been prejudiced by [the accused
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`1 Philips’ arguments in Section III of its Reply regarding Fitbit’s disclosures of the disputed prior
`art do not merit further discussion. Fitbit rests on its Opposition on this issue. (See Dkt. 265 at
`11-12.)
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`1
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`infringer’s] technical failure to comply with the Local Rules.” Id. Similarly here, Fitbit provided
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`its invalidity theory involving Vaisanen in its IPR petition and Philips provided its rebuttal in its
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`Patent Owner Preliminary Response. (See, e.g., Dkt. 265-5 at 75-82; Dkt. 265-6 at 60). Philips
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`does not even claim prejudice. Given that “district courts are strongly encouraged to decide issues
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`pertaining to invalidity when presented,” the Court should deny Philips’ Motion with respect to
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`Vaisanen. See FreseniusError! Bookmark not defined. Med. Care, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90856,
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`at *22.
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`II.
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`DR. PARADISO’S RELIANCE ON THE OTHER DISPUTED REFERENCES
`SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN
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`With respect to the disputed references other than Vaisanen (the “other disputed
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`references”), Philips’ arguments are misleading and incorrect, and its Motion should be denied.
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`Local Rule 16.6 Only Requires Disclosure Of References Asserted As
`Anticipating Or As Part Of An Obviousness Combination
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`Philips never addresses Fitbit’s argument and supporting case law that a party’s contentions
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`need not disclose references that describe the state of the art for § 103 obviousness, which is one
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`way that Dr. Paradiso uses the other disputed references. (See Dkt. 265 at 7-8; Dkt. 284.)2 Instead,
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`Philips argues that Local Rule 16.6 requires disclosure of references used to show that the claim
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`elements were conventional, routine, and well-known—i.e., to show the state of the art for § 101
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`patent ineligibility, which is the other way Dr. Paradiso uses the other disputed references. (Dkt.
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`284 at 2-5.) Philips’ argument regarding § 101 remains incorrect.
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`The plain language of Local Rule 16.6(d)(4)(E) and (F) requires disclosure of references
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`used as anticipating references or in an obviousness combination; it does not require disclosure of
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`2 Thus, use of the other disputed references to show the state of the art for obviousness should not
`be stricken.
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`2
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`references supporting a § 101 argument that the claim elements were conventional, routine, and
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`well-known. Compare L.R. 16.6(d)(4)(E) (requiring early identification of references used as
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`anticipating references or in an obviousness combination) with L.R. 16.6(d)(4)(F) (requiring
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`disclosure of invalidity theories under §§ 101 and 112 without mentioning disclosure of
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`references). Despite Philips’ claims to the contrary, Fitbit proffered this same interpretation in its
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`Opposition. (Compare Dkt. 265 at 7-8 with Dkt. 284 at 2-3.)
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`Further, contrary to Philips’ assertion, neither Maxell Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 136283, at *16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2021) nor Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
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`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041 at *14 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) supports Philips’ position. The
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`Allergan court determined that the majority of district courts deny motions like Philips’. Allergan,
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`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041 at *14-22. The majority rule identified in Allergan is applied by
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`districts with local rules ranging from more lenient to more stringent. See Allergan, 2017 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 225041 at *14-22; Maxell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283, at *16.
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`Further, contrary to Philips’ assertion, Maxell does not “suggest[] that disclosure of § 101
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`prior art is mandatory in Districts” with rules similar to Local Rule 16.6(d)(4)(F). (See Dkt. 284
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`at 4 (citing Maxell 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283, at *16).) Indeed, Maxell repeatedly cites
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`Allergan for support, suggesting the opposite. See, e.g., Maxell 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283,
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`at *16. Philips fails to mention that the supporting case law proffered by the patentee in Maxell—
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`the very same cases highlighted by the Allergan court as unpersuasive—do not concern § 101
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`disclosure requirements. (See Ex. 2 (plaintiff’s memorandum from Maxell) at 3-5.) Allergan,
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`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041 at *7. Thus, Philips’ interpretation of Local Rule 16.6 lacks merit.
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`Allergan’s Jury Confusion Test Does Not Favor Striking The Other Disputed
`References
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`According to Philips, the Allergan court’s jury confusion test supports striking the sections
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`3
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`of the Paradiso Report that rely on the other disputed references. First, this argument was not
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`included in Philips’ opening brief (see Dkt. 260) and thus, is untimely and should not be
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`considered. However, to the extent it is considered, Fitbit disagrees.
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`In deciding whether to strike sections of a technical expert’s report that rely on allegedly
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`undisclosed references, the Allergan court provided a list of the factors to consider: (1) the nature
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`of the reference, (2) the underlying reason(s) for inclusion of the reference, and (3) the chances of
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`jury confusion. Allergan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041 at *22-23.
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`Philips does not argue that the first Allergan factor favors striking the portions of the
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`Paradiso Report that rely on the three other disputed references that are not patents (i.e., NASA
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`Bis, DARPA research, and 1999 Bluetooth specification). As for patents, Philips’ reliance on
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`Allergan and the Better Mouse Co., LLC v. SteelSeries ApS case that Allergan cites is misplaced
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`because Philips’ expert has already considered and addressed the disputed reference.
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`However, when an accused infringer also relies on unelected patents
`and patent applications to discuss the state of the art, the patentee’s
`expert will not be prepared to address the unelected patent and patent
`applications at trial. The inability of the patentee’s expert to address
`the unelected patent and patent applications gives rise to the
`substantial risk that jurors will perceive those patents and patent
`applications as similar to the elected patent and patent applications
`and thus as unrebutted evidence of invalidity.
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`Better Mouse, No. 2:14-cv-198, 2016 WL 3611560, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016). Philips’
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`technical expert witness, Dr. Thomas Martin, already considered and addressed each of the other
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`disputed references. (See Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 214-217, 219-222, 235, 240-41, 273-76.) Consequently, the
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`first Allergan factor does not favor striking any portion of Dr. Paradiso’s report.
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`With respect to the second Allergan factor, Philips misleadingly claims that Dr. Paradiso
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`discussed the other disputed references in “a transparent effort at inserting a backdoor obviousness
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`challenge.” (Dkt. 284 at 5.) Dr. Paradiso’s report does not rely on the other disputed references
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`in any obviousness combinations, and Fitbit already said in its Opposition that Dr. Paradiso will
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`not rely on the other disputed references in any obviousness combination. (Dkt. 265 at 7.) Thus,
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`the second Allergan factor does not favor striking any portion of Dr. Paradiso’s report.
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`Lastly, the jury trial in this case is not dispositive of the third Allergan factor, as Philips
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`suggests. If an expert’s discussion of the state of the art necessarily caused jury confusion in every
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`case, then experts would never be permitted to present the state of the art to the jury. And Philips’
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`reliance on Better Mouse for support is again misplaced, because in Better Mouse the potential for
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`jury confusion arose from the fact that the opposing expert had no opportunity to address the
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`challenged references, whereas here, as discussed above, Philips’ expert Dr. Martin has addressed
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`all of the other disputed references. (See, e.g., Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 214-217, 219-222, 235, 240-41, 273-
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`76.) See Better Mouse, 2016 WL 3611560, at *1. Consequently, the third Allergan factor also
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`does not support Philips’ Motion.
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`Because none of the three Allergan factors support Philips’ Motion, that Motion should be
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`denied.
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`III. DR. PARADISO’S INDEFINITENESS THEORY SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN
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`Finally, Philips’ arguments regarding Dr. Paradiso’s indefiniteness theory remain
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`unsupported.
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`Philips’ Infringement Contentions Never Referenced Apple Or Google
`Servers
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`Philips repeats its claim that its infringement contentions must have been sufficiently clear,
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`otherwise the Paradiso Report could not have included its indefiniteness theory. (Dkt. 284 at 7.)
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`Specifically, Philips argues that the screenshots in its infringement contentions “clearly
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`demonstrated that Philips was accusing the downloading of the Fitbit App from the Apple App
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`Store or the Google Play Store as meeting limitation l (a)” and “with regard to limitations 1 (g)
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`and 1 (h) clearly demonstrated that Philips was accusing Fitbit’s servers.” (Dkt. 284 at 8.)
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`But even now in its reply, Philips cannot identify any Apple or Google server as the alleged
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`“remote server” of claim element 1.a. (See Dkt. 284 at 7-8.) Philips’ infringement contentions
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`also failed to identify any Apple or Google server. (E.g., Dkt. 261-05 at 2.) The inclusion in
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`Philips’ contentions of screenshots with ambiguous red boxes and no explanation of what the
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`screenshots or boxes were intended to show with respect to the asserted claim elements provided
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`little clarity.
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`The fact that Dr. Paradiso, an expert with approximately 40 years of experience in the field,
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`was able to determine that Philips might be pointing to multiple servers to satisfy claim 1, does
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`not mean that Philips’ contentions were clear. (Dkt. 261-3 at ¶ 1030 (“Philips’s infringement
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`contentions seem to suggest that Philips may be reading claim 1 to cover a situation where elements
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`1.a, 1.g, and 1.h are not all met by the same server.”).) Indeed L.R. 16.6(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) required
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`Philips to provide infringement claim charts “identifying, with as much specificity as reasonably
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`possible…an element-by-element description of where and how each element of each asserted
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`claim is found in each accused product or method.” The purpose of Local Rule 16.6’s mandatory
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`initial disclosures is to “require parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in litigation
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`and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic
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`Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 n. 12 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`Fitbit Should Not Be Found To Have Waived Its Indefiniteness Argument At
`This Juncture
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`Finally, even if the Court finds that Fitbit did not timely disclose its indefiniteness defense,
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`Fitbit should not be found to have “waived” this argument. (See Dkt. 284 at 10.)
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`First, as described above, Fitbit had no opportunity to raise this argument during fact
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`discovery given Philips’ deficient infringement contentions. Second, if the Court ultimately
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`construes the “server” terms of claim 1,3 Fitbit is permitted to raise this defense under Local Rule
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`16.6(d)(5) if it is necessitated by the Court’s ultimate construction. Contrary to Philips’ claim,
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`Local Rule 16.6(d)(5) is not limited to orders rendered after a first claim construction proceeding.
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`Philips’ reliance on INAG, Inc. v. Richar, LLC and BioCell Technologies LLC v. Arthro-7
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`is equally misplaced. In INAG, Inc. v. Richar, LLC, the alleged infringer voluntarily dropped its
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`indefiniteness challenge. 2021 WL 1582766, at *8, n.16 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2021). In BioCell
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`Technologies LLC v. Arthro-7, the Court found that defendant had appeared to drop its
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`indefiniteness challenge after stipulating to the construction of two particular terms during
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`Markman proceedings. 2013 WL 12131282, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). The defendant,
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`however, then did an about-face during expert discovery by unexpectedly reasserting its
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`indefiniteness challenge based entirely on the same two terms with stipulated constructions. Id.
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`Neither opinion concerns an O2 Micro situation where a claim term was construed after the first
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`claim construction proceeding, giving rise to an indefiniteness argument.
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`Moreover, Philips’ argument that the ePlus, Inc. and Nautilus cases are irrelevant given
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`that both “fail[] to disclose an indefiniteness theory” is misdirection. (Dkt. 284 at 10.) Fitbit relied
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`on these cases for the proposition that indefiniteness is a question of law with underlying factual
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`determinations based on expert, not fact, discovery (Dkt. 265 at 19-20), and Philips does not
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`dispute that they stand for that proposition.
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`Furthermore, Philips’ argument that Fitbit should have moved to amend its contentions
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`(Dkt. 284 at 1) puts the cart before the horse. Dr. Paradiso raised this indefiniteness theory only
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`to the extent that claim 1 is ultimately construed to encompass more than one server. (See Dkt.
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`3 The Court recently denied Fitbit’s request to construe these terms “without prejudice” to Fitbit
`re-raising that request after the resolution of any motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 294.)
`Fitbit intends to re-raise the issue at that time, if necessary and appropriate.
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`261-3 at ¶ 1031 (“If claim 1 is, in fact, interpreted such that it can be performed by more than one
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`server (i.e., two or more servers)—as it appears Philips may believe—then, in my opinion, claim
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`1 is indefinite.”).) Thus, Fitbit will move to amend its contentions, if necessary, if and when the
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`Court construes claim 1 to encompass more than one server. Before that, such a motion to amend
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`is not ripe. Dr. Paradiso merely included the indefiniteness theory in his report to give Philips as
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`much notice of it as possible while the claim construction dispute plays out.
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`Finally, Philips misses the mark in its attempts to distinguish Apple, Inc. v. Samsung
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`Electronics Co., Ltd., because both this case and that one concern indefiniteness challenges
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`dependent on the construction of claim terms not previously construed. 932 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1079
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`(N.D. Cal. 2013).
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Fitbit respectfully requests that the Court deny Philips’s Motion.
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`Dated: February 4, 2022
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`By:
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` /s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw (pro hac vice)
`dshaw@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 200
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 451-4900
`Facsimile: (202) 451-4901
`
`Karim Z. Oussayef (pro hac vice)
`koussayef@desmaraisllp.com
`Leslie M. Spencer (pro hac vice)
`lspencer@desmaraisllp.com
`Brian D. Matty (pro hac vice)
`bmatty@desmaraisllp.com
`Henry L. Ard (pro hac vice)
`hard@desmaraisllp.com
`Eric G. Speckhard (pro hac vice)
`especkhard@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`230 Park Avenue
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 12 of 13
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`New York, NY 10169
`Telephone: (212) 351-3400
`Facsimile: (212) 351-3401
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`Ameet A. Modi (pro hac vice)
`amodi@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`101 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 573-1900
`Facsimile: (415) 573-1901
`
`Gregory F. Corbett (BBO #646394)
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco (BBO #681921)
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02110
`Telephone: (617) 646-8000
`Facsimile: (617) 646-8646
`gcorbett@wolfgreenfield.com
`edimarco@wolfgreenfield.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Fitbit LLC
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 296 Filed 02/04/22 Page 13 of 13
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`CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 37.1
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Fitbit has complied with the provisions
`of Local Rule 37.1.
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`/s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that this document is being filed through the Court’s electronic filing system,
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`which serves counsel for other parties who are registered participants as identified on the Notice
`of Electronic Filing (NEF). Any counsel for other parties who are not registered participants are
`being served by first class mail on the date of the electronic filing.
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`/s/ Elizabeth A. DiMarco
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco
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