Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 46653
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`f/k/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A. No. 12-1601-LPS
`
`Original Version Filed: May 6, 2021
`Public Version Filed: May 13, 2021
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
`
`Original Version Filed: May 6, 2021
`Public Version Filed: May 13, 2021
`
`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`Of Counsel:
`Seth Ard
`Beatrice Franklin
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`bfranklin@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 2 of 27 PageID #: 46654
`
`John Lahad
`Ibituroko-Emi Lawson
`Burton DeWitt
`Robert Travis Korman
`Brenda Adimora
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`elawson@susmangodfrey.com
`bdewitt@susmangodfrey.com
`tkorman@susmangodfrey.com
`badimora@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kalpana Srinivasan
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kemper Diehl
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101-3000
`kdiehl@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: May 6, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 3 of 27 PageID #: 46655
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1
`
`1. 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estops Defendants’ asserted invalidity grounds. ............................. 1 
`
`  Defendants bear the burden of showing it could not reasonably have raised the
`identified references during IPR. .................................................................................. 1 
`
`  Arendi has not waived the application of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). ....................................... 2 
`
`  Defendants cannot skirt estoppel by introducing cumulative evidence. ......................... 3 
`
`  Estoppel applies to combinations including noninstituted references. ......................... 10 
`
`  Combinations including the remaining references are subject to estoppel. .................. 11 
`
`  Defendants offer no facts to rebut Arendi’s showing that they reasonably could have
`raised each reference, including those cumulative of systems. .................................... 12 
`
`2.  Defendants offer no evidence that their Apple Data Detectors, LiveDoc, Selection
`Recognition Agent and Eudora amalgamations existed as unitary system. ...................... 14 
`
`3.  No evidence shows that the demonstration laptops reproduce prior art systems. ............. 19 
`
`4.  Arendi is entitled to summary judgment on the challenged affirmative defenses ............ 20 
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20
`
`
`
`
`
` 
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 4 of 27 PageID #: 46656
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd.,
`No. 16-3714-GW, 2019 WL 8192255 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) ..............................................3
`
`CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
`526 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................7
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`No. 12-2533, 2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) ....................................................13
`
`Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prod. LLC,
`No. 14-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017) .............................................1
`
`Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................4
`
`Eddy v. Virgin Island Water & Power Auth.,
`256 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................2
`
`Epstein, 322 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994)..............................................................................15
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`No. 10-593-GMS, 2013 WL 5302560 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2013) ..............................................16
`
`Forman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) ...................................................................................................................2
`
`f’real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc.,
`No. 16-41-CFC, 2019 WL 1558486 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2019) ....................................................1
`
`Good Tech. Corp. v. Mobileiron, Inc.,
`No. 12-05826-PSG, 2015 WL 4197554, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 2015) .........................................15
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 13-1632-LPS, 2017 WL 3723934 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2017) ..............................................20
`
`INVISTA N. Am. S.à.r.l. v. M&G USA Corp.,
`No. 11-1007-LSR-CJB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88633 (D. Del. June 25, 2013) ......................3
`
`Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma,
`No. CV1707639SJORAOX, 2018 WL 1470594 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018) ..............................3
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 5 of 27 PageID #: 46657
`
`Lab’y Skin Care, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc.,
`No. 06-601-JJF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72853 (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2009) .................................2
`
`Mayes v. City of Hammond,
`No. 03-379-PRC, 2006 WL 2054377 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 2006) ...............................................3
`
`Medline Indus., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`No. 17 C 7216, 2020 WL 5512132 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2020) ...........................................4, 5, 9
`
`Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Aptiv Svcs US LLC,
`No. 17-1194-JDW, 2020 WL 4335519 (D. Del. July 28, 2020) ...............................................2
`
`Open Text S.A. v. BOX, Inc.,
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16901 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) .......................................................16
`
`Palomar Techs., Inc. v. MRSI Sys., LLC,
`No. 18-10236-FDS, 2020 WL 2115625 (D. Mass. May 4, 2020) ...................................1, 2, 14
`
`In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
`35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).......................................................................................................13
`
`Princeton Digit. Image Corp. v. Ubisoft Ent. SA,
`No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2019 WL 410432 (D. Del. Feb. 1, 2019) ............................................10
`
`SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K,
`330 F. Supp. 3d 574 (D. Mass. 2018) ........................................................................................2
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc.,
`432 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Del. 2020) .............................................................................2, 4, 9, 13
`
`Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`421 F. Supp. 3d 911 (S.D. Cal. 2019) ................................................................................12, 13
`
`Willis Elec. Co. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd.,
`No. 15-3443-WMW-KMM, 2019 WL 5541407 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2019) ............................12
`
`Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC,
`683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................15
`
`Zimmer Surgical, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`365 F. Supp. 3d 466 (D. Del. 2019) .........................................................................................14
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 288 ..............................................................................................................................20
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e) ................................................................................................................. passim
`
`
`
`iii
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`
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 6 of 27 PageID #: 46658
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ...........................................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 ...............................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 .............................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 .............................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .............................................................................................................3, 7, 13, 14
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 .............................................................................................................................3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 .....................................................................................................................17, 20
`
`Other Authorities
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S1360-94157 Cong. Rec. S1360-94 .....................................................................14
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 7 of 27 PageID #: 46659
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`Defendants raise no fact questions that preclude granting summary judgment. They took
`
`their best shot at the validity of the asserted claims during IPR and failed. Now they assail Arendi’s
`
`patents with systems that they cannot show existed and arguments that they previously declined to
`
`raise. Defendants do not get a mulligan. Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prod. LLC, No. 14-
`
`886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017) (“If the defendant pursues the IPR
`
`option, it cannot expect to hold a second-string invalidity case in reserve . . . .”).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`1. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estops Defendants’ asserted invalidity grounds.
` Defendants bear the burden of showing it could not reasonably have
`raised the identified references during IPR.
`
`Defendants assert without analysis that Arendi bears the burden of “proving IPR estoppel,”
`
`i.e., showing that references reasonably could have been raised. D.I. 348 at 10.1 In fact, the issue
`
`is undecided. Palomar Techs., Inc. v. MRSI Sys., LLC, No. 18-10236-FDS, 2020 WL 2115625, at
`
`*4 (D. Mass. May 4, 2020) (noting neither statute nor Federal Circuit has assigned burden). The
`
`more logical approach requires the IPR petitioner to show it could not have raised the ground:
`
`As a matter of fairness, surely the party that failed to assert the reference ought to
`be compelled to prove why the exception [to IPR estoppel] ought to apply. It also
`addresses a serious problem with placing the burden of proof on the party seeking
`to invoke the estoppel bar. In most instances, a principal focus of the inquiry will
`be the reasonableness of any prior-art search that was actually performed on behalf
`of the IPR petitioner. That search will be relevant to both the subjective prong (to
`ascertain whether the actual search identified the reference) and the objective prong
`(how the actual search was conducted is likely to be evidence bearing on the
`question of how a reasonable search would have been conducted).
`
`Id. The situation mirrors the discovery rule, which requires the party against whom the limitations
`
`period is asserted to show i) that it did not know of the injury and ii) that it could not reasonably
`
` 
`1 Defendants cite one case, f’real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., which dispensed
`with the unargued issue in just one sentence. No. 16-41-CFC, 2019 WL 1558486, at *1 (D. Del.
`Apr. 10, 2019) (“It is undisputed that Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing estoppel.”).
`
`1
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 8 of 27 PageID #: 46660
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`have discovered the injury. Id. at *3-4. This approach accords with the language of section
`
`315(e)(2). That section states that the petitioner “may not assert” the specified invalidity grounds—
`
`automatically narrowing the permitted scope of the petitioner’s invalidity defense.
`
`
`
`Regardless, Defendants advance no evidence regarding their knowledge of or ability to
`
`find the estopped references. Arendi, in contrast, identified evidence that they could have raised
`
`each one. Thus, no matter who bears the burden of proof, Arendi is entitled to summary judgment.
`
` Arendi has not waived the application of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
`
`Defendants assert that Arendi waived estoppel by raising it at summary judgment. D.I. 348
`
`at 9-11. Their position lacks support and is no more than an attempt to shield their own failure to
`
`raise arguments during IPR. Courts regularly adjudicate IPR estoppel at summary judgment. E.g.,
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 448, 451-55 (D. Del. 2020); Microchip
`
`Tech. Inc. v. Aptiv Svcs US LLC, No. 17-1194-JDW, 2020 WL 4335519, at *3-4 (D. Del. July 28,
`
`2020); SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K, 330 F. Supp. 3d 574, 600-01 (D. Mass. 2018).
`
`Defendants cite inapposite cases. Eddy v. Virgin Island Water & Power Authority
`
`concerned failure to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. 256 F.3d 204, 209 (3d
`
`Cir. 2001). Because of Rule 8(c), raising that defense required amending the answer under Rule
`
`15(a)(2) and a corresponding analysis for bad faith and undue prejudice, as well as consideration
`
`of a scheduling order to determine Rule 16’s applicability. Id. at 209-10; see also Forman v. Davis,
`
`371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (directing leave to amend absent, inter alia, bad faith or undue
`
`prejudice); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (requiring good cause to modify schedule). Defendants do not
`
`assert that IPR estoppel is an affirmative defense or must appear in a complaint; thus, Rules 15
`
`and 16 do not apply. Defendants’ second case, Laboratory Skin Care, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc.,
`
`did not mention waiver. It instead barred an affirmative defense of inequitable conduct not pleaded
`
`with particularity in the defendant’s answer per Rule 9(b). No. 06-601-JJF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`2
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 9 of 27 PageID #: 46661
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`72853, at *7 (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2009). Again, Defendants cite no authority requiring IPR estoppel
`
`to be pleaded in Arendi’s complaint—let alone with particularity.
`
`Defendants’ final authority, INVISTA North America S.à.r.l. v. M&G USA Corp., granted
`
`a motion under Rules 26 and 37 to strike a supplemental expert declaration and supplemental
`
`interrogatory response submitted for summary judgment. No. 11-1007-LSR-CJB, 2013 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 88633, at *16-20 (D. Del. June 25, 2013). The supplemental submissions reversed critical
`
`representations in defendant’s verified integratory responses and identified deponent’s testimony
`
`that its expert had never questioned. Id. at *16-19. In raising IPR estoppel, Arendi has not
`
`contradicted any representations. Arendi raises a statutory bar—not a factual one. Defendants also
`
`have not moved to strike Arendi’s pleadings. Their cases do not speak to the issues at hand.2
`
` Defendants cannot skirt estoppel by introducing cumulative evidence.
`
`Defendants do not contest that IPR estoppel extends to systems cumulative of printed
`
`references. D.I. 348 at 12-14; see also, e.g., D.I. 282 at 7-8 (discussing standards for same). Their
`
`mixing of printed references with duplicative (or irrelevant) evidence from depositions or devices
`
`impermissibly seeks to skirt IPR estoppel. Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 16-3714-
`
` 
`2 Defendants also have not explained how enforcing IPR estoppel unfairly prejudices them. Arendi
`only opposes grounds that they are statutorily prohibited from raising. Defendants had notice of
`the estoppel bar when they petitioned for IPR in 2014, see D.I. 35 at 5, and Arendi raised its
`application to this case on April 29, 2019. D.I. 349, Ex. 6 at 2. Defendants pursued estopped
`references at their own risk. Their two cases do not establish undue prejudice. Mayes struck use of
`a DNA analysis because the plaintiff had not retained an expert to introduce it into evidence. Mayes
`v. City of Hammond, No. 03-379-PRC, 2006 WL 2054377, at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 2006). The
`Court also noted that with the case “days from trial” the prejudice to defendants of permitting a
`new expert would be too great. Id. In contrast, Arendi has no trial date, no motion to strike evidence
`is pending, and sufficient evidence is in the record. Meanwhile, Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite
`Pharma dismissed defendant’s (former IPR petitioner’s) conclusory invalidity counterclaim for
`lack of notice under Rule 8. No. CV1707639SJORAOX, 2018 WL 1470594, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
`8, 2018). Failure to disclose the claim’s bases prejudiced the plaintiffs by delaying the ability to
`assert estoppel. Id. Juno was concerned that a defendant might burden the plaintiff with estopped
`invalidity grounds, not that defendants would incur expenses improperly litigating them.
`
`3
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`
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 10 of 27 PageID #: 46662
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`GW(AGRX), 2019 WL 8192255, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (condemning “swapping labels”
`
`to “‘skirt’ estoppel”). They assert that their expert, Dr. Fox, “detailed how each prior art system is
`
`independent from any related publication” but do not identify where he does so. See D.I. 348 at 13
`
`(citing all of section VIII and eight exhibits from Dr. Fox’s report (1,195 pp.) that allegedly show
`
`the “prior art systems are not entirely cumulative”). Even had he opined on the topic, his opinions
`
`could not defeat summary judgment absent an evidentiary basis for them. See, e.g., Dynacore
`
`Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“expert’s unsupported
`
`conclusion on the ultimate issue of infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
`
`fact” and “a party may not avoid that rule simply by framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion
`
`that a particular critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.”).
`
`Defendants attack what they describe as the “unreasonable” expectation that they “should
`
`have cobbled together” publications describing the same alleged system. As an initial matter,
`
`although Arendi cites multiple disclosures for certain systems, that does not mean that individual
`
`references do not disclose pertinent functionality. Second, Defendants themselves “cobbled
`
`together” the same references in support of their invalidity case, thus negating any complaints
`
`about reasonableness. Finally, Medline, the sole case cited by Defendants on this point, did not
`
`consider whether multiple references could be cumulative of a single system. Rather, Medline took
`
`a position inconsistent with the reasoning in numerous cases, including Wasica (which Medline
`
`expressly rejected), and held section 315 does not apply to “any invalidity theory relying upon [a]
`
`product.” Medline Indus., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 17 C 7216, 2020 WL 5512132, at *4 (N.D.
`
`Ill. Sept. 14, 2020).3 Medline is thus not instructive in determining when systems are cumulative.
`
` 
`3 Even Medline barred plainly relabeling references as systems without relying on the systems
`themselves as evidence. 2020 WL 5512132, at *5.
`
`4
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`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 11 of 27 PageID #: 46663
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`CyberDesk: As Arendi explained, Defendants’ CyberDesk system is a repackaging of
`
`printed references. D.I. 282 at 11-13. There is no extant CyberDesk system. D.I. 348 at 14 n.6.
`
`Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Dr. Fox does not “lay out in great detail how the CyberDesk
`
`System cannot adequately be captured . . . by any of its related publications.” D.I. 348 at 14. The
`
`cited paragraph of his report simply lists sources of evidence. His conclusory assertion that “no
`
`single material accurately captures” CyberDesk is unaccompanied by any identification of features
`
`omitted from printed references. Arendi has acknowledged the listed items and explained why they
`
`are cumulative. D.I. 282 at 11-13. Defendants point to Dr. Fox’s report only twice more, asserting
`
`without elaboration that it “show[s] the particular import of the testimony of Dr. Anind Dey.” D.I.
`
`348 at 15; see also id. at 17 (asserting without citation that per Dr. Fox features “often are disclosed
`
`only in Dr. Dey’s testimony or in other evidence that became available only through” discovery).
`
`The remainder of Defendants’ argument points to Dr. Dey’s transcript without explaining
`
`its pertinence or else showing that it is non-cumulative. Defendants first assert that his testimony
`
`reveals germane distinctions between versions of CyberDesk. It does not. His statements that there
`
`were multiple instantiations of CyberDesk tracks the publications. Compare D.I. 349, Ex. 18 at
`
`101:23-102:6 with, e.g., D.I. 298-2 (Ex. 52) at ARENDI-DEFS00021048 (describing “chaining”
`
`as an “extension” to address a “shortcoming with the initial system”). Defendants also cite Dr.
`
`Dey’s testimony that he used different versions on and off campus, D.I. 349, Ex. 18 at 144:17-
`
`145:14; however, they do not identify a germane distinction between these versions or suggest that
`
`printed publications only described one of the versions. Defendants next point to testimony that
`
`the second instantiation expanded the functionality available in the first. D.I. 349, Ex. 18 at 96:15-
`
`17. Again, the publications expand on that general statement. E.g., D.I. 298-2 (Ex. 52) at ARENDI-
`
`DEFS00021048. Finally, Defendants note testimony that a later version of CyberDesk could
`
`
`5
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`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 12 of 27 PageID #: 46664
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`analyze a full email rather than highlighted text. But their attempt to explain its relevance
`
`backfires. Defendants (not Arendi) have argued that only the first information can be analyzed.
`
`See D.I. 270 at 7-9 (moving to exclude such opinions). If Defendants are correct, then analyzing
`
`the entire email would be non-anticipatory and irrelevant. If Arendi is correct, the testimony is
`
`cumulative because analyzing a selection or an entire email would be equally acceptable. See, e.g.,
`
`D.I. 295-2 (Ex. 22) at AREDNI-DEFS00001155 (explaining operation of type converters on text
`
`selection). Defendants, moreover, have not shown that Dr. Fox relied on this testimony.
`
`Defendants next turn to Dr. Dey’s cumulative testimony describing the implementation of
`
`“chaining.” Dr. Dey first describes the selection of a “Lookup Name using Contact Manager”
`
`without chaining, D.I. 349, Ex. 18 at 63:16-25, which tracks the disclosure of the same feature in
`
`the publications he was being asked to describe, e.g., D.I. 294-6 (Ex. 15), at AHL0122289-90. Dr.
`
`Dey then describes chaining, see D.I. 348 at 16, which multiple references document, e.g., D.I.
`
`295-2 (Ex. 22), at ARENDI-DEFS00001157-58; D.I. 294-9 (Ex. 18), at AHL0122312-13.
`
`Defendants posit only two examples of demonstrated features that they allege the
`
`publications did not disclose. First, they identify Dr. Dey’s testimony concerning Llamashare and
`
`the use of a Newton, D.I. 348 at 17; Straus Decl. Ex. 1 at 168:5-170:20. This feature is detailed in
`
`the references. E.g., D.I. 294-10 (Ex. 19) at AHL0121557-58; see also D.I. 293-9 (Ex. 9, Fox
`
`Opening Report) at Ex. D, pp. 4, 9-10, 20-21 (quoting references discussing the feature).
`
`Defendants
`
`also
`
`cite
`
`testimony
`
`regarding
`
`a
`
`feature
`
`that
`
`allegedly
`
`“push[ed]
`
`information . . . directly into the text editor.” D.I. 348 at 17; D.I. 349, Ex. 18 at 177:11-14. Neither
`
`Defendants nor Dr. Fox explain its relevance. If it is based on a belief that the claims require
`
`inserting information into the document, that belief is false. D.I. 346-2 (Ex. 29), at 5 [of 18].
`
`Moreover, the testimony lacks details regarding the feature and, to the extent it is uncorroborated,
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 13 of 27 PageID #: 46665
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`it cannot invalidate the claims. CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 526 F. App’x 966, 969 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (“[C]orroboration is required of any witness whose testimony alone is asserted to
`
`invalidate a patent”).
`
`Defendants reference “unpublished ‘Network Services,’” D.I. 348 at 18, but they identify
`
`no evidence regarding the services’ operation. Without such evidence, the services cannot
`
`invalidate the claims. Defendants also suggest that Mike Pinkerton could testify to additional
`
`functionality. Id. They declined, however, to depose him or to obtain an affidavit from him. Rule
`
`26 requires Defendants to point to facts in the record—not to speculate about hoped-for testimony.
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`Newton: Defendants fail to identify relevant evidence of the Newton that is not cumulative
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`of printed disclosures. They point only to deposition testimony of
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`4 and the Newton
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`device inspected by Dr. Fox.
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` Their brief associates this testimony only with claims 8 and 30, suggesting no way in which
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`it is germane to claims 1 or 23, which lack a “providing a prompt for updating the information
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`source” limitation. See id. (citing Dr. Fox’s claim chart for claim 8). Thus, even if non-cumulative
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`4 Defendants cannot even rely on non-cumulative testimony. CEATS, Inc., 526 F. App’x at 969.
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`7
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 14 of 27 PageID #: 46666
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 14 of 27 PageID #: 46666
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`(which it is not),— has no bearing on estoppel vis—a-vis claims 1 and 23.5
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`The User Manual discloses the same features: It offers the
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`example of typing “call Alice” and tapping Assist, which causes
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`appear with “some information already entered” and allows the user to “[e]nter other
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`necessary infmmation” such as the phone number and then initiate the call. D.I. 299—2 (Ex. 62) at
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`ARENDI-DEF800005189-90; see also D.I. 299-8 (Ex. 64), at ARENDI—DEFSOOOO4298 (noting
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`if no matching phone number found. user must add one). The guide also discloses that after placing
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`the call, “to add [the recipient] to y01n' Name File, tap the Add to Names button.” D.I. 299-2 (Ex.
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`62) at ARENDI—DEFSOOOOS 1 l4.
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`Defendants note that Dr. Fox inspected a Newton device but fail to identify resulting
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`noncumulative evidence. They point only to his “similar screenshots”—
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`D1. 348 at 19. Compounding cumulative evidence does not help Defendants’ case. His first two
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`images duplicate
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`Th(D
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`following image reflects pressing “Name” to select or add a phone nlunber, as disclosed in the
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`User Guide. Compare id. at 98 with D.I. 299—2 (Ex. 62) at ARENDI—DEFSOOOOSIB. Adding
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`names to the name list, apparently shown in the fmal images. is also docmnented. Compare D.I.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 15 of 27 PageID #: 46667
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`349, Ex. 8 at Ex. I, pp. 98-101 with D.I. 299-2 (Ex. 62) at ARENDI-DEFS00005066, ’5069, ’5044
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`(noting tap on “New” creates entry); id. at ’5044-45 (documenting saving contact information).
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`Finally, contrary to Defendants’ argument, Dr. Sacerdoti’s use of device testing is not
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`pertinent. Defendants provide no authority holding that analysis of an improperly asserted system
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`by a patentee’s expert waives estoppel. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) bars the petitioner from asserting
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`“that the claim[s are] invalid on any grounds that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have
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`raised during” IPR. The statute limits Defendants and looks to the grounds of invalidity they raised.
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`Their invalidity grounds based on the Newton device are cumulative of printed disclosures.
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`Eudora: Defendants present no evidence of Eudora beyond publications. Asserting that
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`Eudora is “greater than the sum of its publications” means nothing and provides no factual basis
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`to deny summary judgment. D.I. 348 at 21. Defendants’ suggestion that they could not have relied
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`on multiple references during IPR ignores i) their ability to raise those references as an obviousness
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`combination; ii) that they also cannot merge the Mac and Windows-based Eudora manuals in this
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`case; and iii) their subsequent argument that there was only one Eudora system, see D.I. 348 at 38.
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`Word 97: Defendants identify no feature that is not cumulative of printed works. They do
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`not even try. Instead, they point generally to Dr. Fox’s invalidity chart for Microsoft Word that
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`“consists almost entirely of screenshots.” D.I. 348 at 21. Noting that Dr. Fox included screenshots
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`of Word does not address whether the features depicted are disclosed in publications. Defendants
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`cite Medline for the proposition that simply relying on a physical product skirts IPR estoppel. As
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`already discussed, Medline is out of step with the superior rationale of cases like Wasica.
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`Outlook 97: Defendants assert that “Outlook 97’s functionality is shown only partially by
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`its associated publications,” but they decline to identify a single feature that its publications do not
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`9
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 16 of 27 PageID #: 46668
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`disclose. D.I. 348 at 22. Defendants instead assert, without justification, that Outlook 97 “requires
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`consideration” of screenshots in Dr. Fox’s chart. Id. They add, “[A]ny argument by Arendi to the
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`contrary merely presents a factual dispute.” Id. But Defendants fail to identify any facts in dispute.
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`Selection Recognition Agent: Defendants remarkably argue, “[a]lthough [Selection
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`Recognition Agent’s] only related evidence in the record is published materials,” it is not estopped
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`because Selection Recognition Agent “is not adequately disclosed by either associated
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`publication.” Id. Defendants again do not identify evidence unavailable during IPR and worse,
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`have effectively admitted that their Selection Recognition Agent art is not enabling.
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` Estoppel applies to combinations including noninstituted references.
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`Defendants argue that petitioned but noninstituted grounds are not subject to estoppel. That
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`is not this case. Defendants did not petition for IPR on the basis of any combination including
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`Miller, Luciw or their merged “LiveDoc/DropZones” references. D.I. 293-1 (Ex. 1). Rather, they
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`asserted that Miller, Luciw, or “LiveDoc/DropZones” on its own invalidated the Asserted Claims.
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`D.I. 293-1 (Ex. 1) at 35-48.6 Conversely, Defendants do not assert Miller, Luciw, LiveDoc or
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`DropZones as independent grounds of invalidity in this case. Miller, Luciw, LiveDoc and
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`DropZones in combination with other estopped references (including those cumulative of systems)
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`are thus nonpetitioned grounds that reasonably could have been raised during IPR.
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`Defendants’ alternative argument that these references avoid estoppel as “evidence of
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`related prior art systems” or in obviousness combinations with “non-estopped” systems fares no
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`better. D.I. 348 at 25. Defendants incidental use of these references as evidence of systems does
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`not license their independent use. See, e.g., D.I. 293-9 (Ex. 9, Fox Report) ¶ 186 (asserting
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`6 Defendants’ Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Ubisoft Ent. SA case held that IPR estoppel did
`not apply to noninstituted claims. No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2019 WL 410432 at *2-3 (D. Del. Feb.
`1, 2019). The PTAB did institute IPR of each asserted claim. D.I. 293-7 (Ex. 7) at 2.
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`10
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 377 Filed 05/13/21 Page 17 of 27 PageID #: 46669
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`“CyberDesk System + LiveDoc System [and/or specific publications describing aspects of the
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`LiveDoc System]”). Their argument also rests on the false premise that these references appear
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`only “in combination with a non-estopped prior art system.” As Arendi shows, Defendants assert
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`systems that are cumulative of printed references. E.g., D.I. 336, at 9 n.3.
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` Combinations including the remaining references are subject to estoppel.
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`Pandit: Arendi is entitled to summary judgment against Defendants’ Pandit-based
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`combinations. Defendants state, “The specific combinations including Pandit offered by
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`Defendants and Dr. Fox are: (1) Pandit + CyberDesk System; (2) Pandit + Eudora System; (3)
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`Pandit + Apple