Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 1 of 31 PageID #: 3389
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
`
`))))))))))
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`
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
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`
`Defendant.
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`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`ADDRESSING U.S. PATENT NUMBERS 7,917,843 AND 8,306,993
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS, LLP
`
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`Beth A. Swadley (No. 6331)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`bswadley@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Stephen Susman
`Seth Ard
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, New York 10019
`Tel: (212) 336-8330
`ssusman@susmangodfrey.com
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`John Lahad
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77002-5096
`Tel: (713) 651-9366
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: June 19, 2019
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 2 of 31 PageID #: 3390
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
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`IV.
`
`V.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`SUMMARY OF THE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY ....................................................... 2
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .................................................... 3
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ................................................................ 4
`
`DISPUTED TERMS ........................................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`Terms Common to Both Patents ............................................................................. 4
`
`1.
`
`“document” (all claims) .............................................................................. 4
`
`B.
`
`’843 Patent Claim Terms ...................................................................................... 11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`“first information” (’843 Patent, cl. 1, 8, 23, 30) ...................................... 11
`
`“computer program”/“first computer program”/“second
`computer program” ................................................................................... 12
`
`“providing an input device, configured by the first computer
`program” (’843 Patent, cl. 1, 23) .............................................................. 15
`
`“that allows a user to enter a user command to initiate an
`operation”(’843 Patent, cl. 1, 23) .............................................................. 16
`
`“to determine if the first information is at least one of a
`plurality of types of information that can be searched for” (’843
`Patent, cl. 1, 23) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`C.
`
`’993 Patent Claim Terms ...................................................................................... 21
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“while it is electronically displayed” (’993 Patent, cl. 1, 9. 17) ............... 21
`
`“providing for the user an input device configured so that a
`single execute command from the input device is sufficient to
`cause the performing” (’993 Patent, cl. 1, 9. 17) ..................................... 22
`
`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 3 of 31 PageID #: 3391
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
`616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................18
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................6, 10
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................10
`
`Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.,
`755 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................20
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................4, 20
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................19
`
`Blackbird Tech LLC v. ELB Elecs., Inc.,
`895 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................10, 11
`
`Cox Commc’ns, Inc., v. Sprint Commc’n Co. LP,
`838 F.3d 1224 (Fed Cir. 2016).................................................................................................20
`
`Curtis-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................14
`
`Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)..................................................................................3
`
`Endoheart AG v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp.,
`No. 14-CV-1473-LPS, 2016 WL 1270127 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) ...................................4, 16
`
`Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................6
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................15
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................ passim
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 4 of 31 PageID #: 3392
`
`HTC Corp. v. IP Com GmBH & Co., KG,
`667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................25
`
`Imaginal Systematic, LLC v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................7
`
`Info-Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp.,
`783 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................7
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 12-cv-193-LPS, 2015 WL 1393386 (D. Del. Mar. 24, 2015) ...........................................18
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`902 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................19
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................6, 7
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ...................................3, 13
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................25
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) .......................................................................................................19, 20
`
`One-E-Way, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................3
`
`Pragmatus Mobile, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 14-CV-436-LPS, 2015 WL 6348221 (D. Del. Oct. 16, 2015) ............................................7
`
`Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc.,
`543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................11
`
`Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc.,
`No. 15-CV-152-RGA, 2017 WL 382235 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2017) .............................................8
`
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................3
`
`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc.,
`413 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................15
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 5 of 31 PageID #: 3393
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am.,
`669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)....................................................................................7, 8
`
`UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`816 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................25
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`829 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................7, 9, 10, 11
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 6 of 31 PageID #: 3394
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`
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`In accordance with the Amended Scheduling Order and the Joint Stipulation Regarding
`
`Claim Construction Briefing, Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L. (“Arendi”) submits this Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief regarding disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,917,843 and 8,306,993.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Arendi alleges that LG Electronics Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc. and LG Electronics
`
`MobileComm U.S.A., Inc.; Blackberry Limited and Blackberry Corporation; Microsoft Mobile,
`
`Inc.; Motorola Mobility LLC, f/k/a Motorola Mobility Inc.; Sony Mobile Communications (USA)
`
`Inc. f/k/a Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications (USA) Inc., Sony Corporation, and Sony
`
`Corporation of America; Google LLC; Apple Inc.; Oath Holdings Inc., and Oath Inc., (collectively,
`
`“Defendants”) have infringed and continue to infringe certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,917,843
`
`(“the ’843 Patent”) and 8,306,993 (“the ’993 Patent”), collectively, “the patents-in-suit”.1
`
`Defendants attempt to avoid liability by proposing constructions that violate fundamental
`
`principles of claim construction. Many of their constructions are laden with limitations and
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`restrictions that rest solely on preferred embodiments and examples in the specification—
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`embodiments and examples that do not reflect an intent to narrow the scope of the claims.
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`Elsewhere, Defendants ignore the intrinsic record altogether, proposing constructions unsupported
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`by or inconsistent with the claim language, specification, and prosecution history. Defendants also
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`manufacture indefiniteness arguments where the claim language and specification provide more
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`than reasonable certainty as to the scope of the invention. As explained below, the Court should
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`adopt Arendi’s constructions and reject those offered by Defendants.
`
`
`1 Except for “document” and the “computer program” terms below, the claim construction disputes
`involving terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,496,854 and 7,921,356 (asserted against Google and Oath
`only) are addressed in Arendi’s separately-filed Opening Claim Construction Brief Addressing
`U.S. Patent Nos. 7,496,854 and 7,921,356.
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 7 of 31 PageID #: 3395
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`II.
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`SUMMARY OF THE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
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`The ’843 Patent is generally directed to methods and systems for information handling
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`between computer programs. According to one preferred embodiment, the claimed invention
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`analyzes a document containing textual information by seeking, for example, line separations and
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`formatting, address designators and abbreviations (street, avenue, drive, etc.), title designators and
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`abbreviations (Mr., Mrs., Dr., etc.), company designators and abbreviations (Inc., LLC, PC, etc.),
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`or common names (John, Jane, etc.). Ex. 1 at Col. 4 ll. 25-39. 2 The information identified in the
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`document—such as names, addresses, or phone numbers—is used by a second program to search
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`an external information management source, such as a database or contact management program
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`to determine if the information identified in the document or portion of that information exists in
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`the information source. Id. at Col. 3 ll. 48-54. If the program finds names or addresses in the
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`information source corresponding to the search terms identified in the document, the additional
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`information is automatically displayed or otherwise made available to the user. Id. at Col. 3 ll. 63-
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`65. The user then may update the information source with the identified information or ignore the
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`information.
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`Like the ’843 Patent, the claims of the ’993 Patent are generally directed to methods and
`
`systems for information handling between computer programs. The claims asserted in this case
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`focus on handling contact information, including at least one of a name, title, address, telephone
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`number and email address. See, e.g., Ex. 2 at Col. 13 ll. 25-28. The ’993 Patent discloses methods
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`and systems for analyzing text in a document to identify contact information in the document and,
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`if found, (a) searching a contact database to find additional, i.e., second, contact information
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`associated with the first contact information, and/or (b) using the identified information to initiate
`
`
`2 Exhibits 1-5A referenced herein refer to exhibits filed with the Joint Claim Chart.
`2
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 8 of 31 PageID #: 3396
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`electronic communication, such as sending an email, and/or (c) allowing the user to make a
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`decision to store the identified contact information in a contact database as an update to an existing
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`contact or as a new contact. Id. at Col. 13 ll. 34-55.
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`III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`A determination of patent infringement involves two steps. First, the patent claims are
`
`construed. Second, the claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device. Cybor Corp. v. FAS
`
`Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Claim construction is a legal question
`
`for the Court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
`
`aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
`
`Under Phillips v. AWH Corp., a claim term should be given “the meaning it would have to
`
`a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2005) (quotation omitted). The claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning
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`of the terms. Id. at 1314. The claims, however, must be read in light of the specification, of which
`
`they are part. Id. at 1315. Despite the weight given to the specification, care should be taken not
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`to import limitations from the specification into the claims. Id. at 1319-1320. As the Federal Circuit
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`has often said, reading a limitation from the written description into the claims is “one of the
`
`cardinal sins of patent law.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d
`
`1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`A court should also consider the patent’s prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
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`Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor
`
`understood the patent and “whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution,
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`making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.
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`Finally, to the extent Defendants argue claims are indefinite, it is their burden to prove such
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`indefiniteness by “offer[ing] clear and convincing evidence that a person of ordinary skill at the
`3
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 9 of 31 PageID #: 3397
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`time of the invention would lack reasonable certainty” regarding “the scope of the invention,”
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`Endoheart AG v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., No. 14-CV-1473-LPS, 2016 WL 1270127, at *3
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`(D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) (quotations omitted)—bearing in mind that “[r]easonable certainty does
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`not require absolute or mathematical precision.” BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d
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`1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Rather, so long as a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art would be able to understand the “relative meaning” of a term, it is not indefinite. One-E-
`
`Way, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 859 F.3d 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`IV.
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`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
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`For purposes of claim construction, Arendi submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`pertaining to the patents-in-suit at the time of the patents’ application would have at least a B.S. in
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`Computer Science or Electrical Engineering or a related field and approximately two years of
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`experience designing user applications or software modules. Significant industry experience can
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`serve as a substitute for a formal degree.
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`V.
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`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`Terms Common to Both Patents
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`1. “document” (all claims)
`
`Arendi’s Proposed Construction
`“electronic document containing textual
`information”
`
`This term is present in asserted claims in all four patents-in-suit. The parties’ constructions
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“a word processing or spreadsheet file into
`which text can be entered”
`
`reflect two disputes regarding the scope of this commonly understood term. First, the parties
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`dispute whether “document” should be limited to a word processing or spreadsheet file. Second,
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`they dispute whether the “document” must be one into which text is entered by the user, as opposed
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`to a file previously containing text.
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`4
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 10 of 31 PageID #: 3398
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`a.
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`“Document” Is Not Limited to a Word Processing or Spreadsheet File
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`Not only do Defendants improperly restrict the scope of the term to examples in the
`
`specification, i.e., a word processing or spreadsheet file, but they also ignore the specification’s
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`repeated declarations that these files are mere “exemplary embodiments of the present invention.”
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`Ex. 1, Col. 4, ll. 23-24. The specification describes the preferred embodiments saying, “In an
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`embodiment of the present invention, single button addressing is achieved … in a computer
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`program such as a word processing program, spreadsheet program, etc. (hereinafter called ‘word
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`processor’), for executing address handling therein.” Id. at Col. 3, ll. 35-41. If the patentee intended
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`to limit the invention to word processing and spreadsheet programs, there would be no reason to
`
`write “in a computer program” and “such as a word processing program, spreadsheet program,
`
`etc.” (emphasis added).
`
`The specification goes through various examples—labeled explicitly as “Examples”—of
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`how the invention could be implemented in various scenarios. The specification prefaces these
`
`examples with the following caveat:
`
`Referring now to the drawings, where like reference numerals designate identical
`corresponding parts throughout the several views, and more particularly to FIGS. 1
`and 2 thereof, there is illustrated flow charts of single button addressing, according
`to exemplary embodiments of the present invention.
`
`Id. at Col. 4, 19-24. Thus, the patentee made it abundantly clear that the figures, flow charts, and
`
`different views were merely examples and not limitations on the invention.
`
`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautioned against importing limitations from the
`
`specification into the claims. In Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014), the district court construed “datalink” as “a cable connected to the bed that carries
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`data.” The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court improperly limited “datalink” to
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`a wired connection. Id. The Court reiterated that “we do not read limitations from the embodiments
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 11 of 31 PageID #: 3399
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`in the specification into the claims.” Id. (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d
`
`898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court continued, “[E]ven when the specification describes only a
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`single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has
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`demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction.” Id. at 1372 (quotations omitted). Yet, the Court could find “no words of manifest
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`exclusion or restriction” in Hill-Rom’s patents:
`
`The patents-in-suit do not describe the invention as limited to a wired datalink.
`There is no disclosure that, for example, the present invention “is,” “includes,” or
`“refers to” a wired datalink and there is nothing expressing the advantages,
`importance, or essentiality of using a wired as opposed to wireless datalink. Nor is
`there language of limitation or restriction of the datalink. Nothing in the
`specification or prosecution history makes clear that the invention is limited to use
`of a cable as a datalink. Absent such language, we do not import limitations from
`the specification into the claims.
`
`Id. at 1372-1373; see also id. at 1373 (“[A]bsent some language in the specification of prosecution
`
`history suggesting that the wired connection is important, essential, necessary, or the ‘present
`
`invention,’ there is no basis to narrow the plain and ordinary meaning of the term datalink to one
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`type of datalink—a cable”).
`
`
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`Similarly, in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1375
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the claim term
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`“tagging” need not include a “prepending” limitation because “[t]he patent’s reference to preferred
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`embodiments where the virtual server host-name is prepended does not provide the clarity
`
`necessary to find that the patentees intended to limit the term tagging to the preferred
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`embodiment.” Notably, the only method of tagging described in the patent involved prepending a
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`virtual host name. Id. at 1376; accord Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338,
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`1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding district court “erred by importing the word ‘conventional’ from the
`
`preferred embodiments” into its construction of the term “drawing implement” because “there is
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`
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`6
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 12 of 31 PageID #: 3400
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`no clear indication in the intrinsic record suggesting that the claims are limited to ‘conventional’
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`drawing implements”); Imaginal Systematic, LLC v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 805 F.3d 1102, 1109
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s broad construction of “vision guidance system” because
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`“[n]othing in the claim language purports to restrict the term … to one particular system” and the
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`specification “does not express any manifest exclusion or restriction as it pertains specifically to
`
`the meaning of ‘vision guidance system’” (quotations omitted)); Info-Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media
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`Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing narrow construction because the
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`patent “does not consistently use the term ‘transmit’ in a way that necessarily restricts the term to
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`server-initiated communications”); Pragmatus Mobile, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 14-CV-436-
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`LPS, 2015 WL 6348221, at *7 (D. Del. Oct. 16, 2015) (rejecting limitation where defendants did
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`not identify “unmistakable disclaimer” (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am., 669 F.3d
`
`1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`
`The claim language of the patents-in-suit does not restrict the term “document” to a word
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`processing or spreadsheet document, and neither the specification nor the prosecution history
`
`reflects a clear intent to disclaim all documents other than those two types of files. To the contrary,
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`the specification’s repeated use of “such as” and “etc.” expand the realm of possible programs and
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`cannot be viewed as limiting examples. That the specification’s “Examples” describe word
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`processing and spreadsheet files as exemplary programs does not narrow the scope of the claims
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`in the absence of “a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words of manifest exclusion or
`
`restriction.’” Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1372 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co., 358 F.3d at 906);
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have repeatedly
`
`held that it is ‘not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a
`
`particular limitation’ to limit claims beyond their plain meaning.” (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at
`
`
`
`7
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 13 of 31 PageID #: 3401
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`1366)). Likewise, the intrinsic record does not state that word processing and spreadsheet files are
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`necessary or more advantageous to the claimed invention than other files or that the claimed
`
`invention only operates within the context of a word processor or spreadsheet file.3
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`Moreover, the specification itself militates against Defendants’ restrictive definition by
`
`explaining that “[t]he program may be extended also to store and retrieve other information, such
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`as telephone numbers, fax numbers, email addresses, etc. Once the program recalls the telephone
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`numbers, fax numbers, emails addresses, etc., the user can command the program to send e-mails,
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`faxes, etc.” Ex. 1, Col. 4 ll.12-18 (emphasis added). Word processing and spreadsheet programs
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`do not traditionally “send e-mails, faxes, etc.” See Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1377 (district court erred
`
`by construing “interface board including processor” to require a “wall interface unit” because “the
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`specification discloses an embodiment in which the interface board sends information to a remote
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`location without using a wall interface unit”); Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., No.
`
`15-CV-152-RGA, 2017 WL 382235, at *7 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2017) (rejecting limitation as
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`inconsistent with how “specification indicates that, at least sometimes,” invention operates). As in
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`those cases, Defendants’ present attempt to limit the claims should be rejected.
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`3 Defendants cite Arendi’s August 16, 2011 Response After Final Action in the prosecution history
`of the ’993 Patent, Defs. Ex. 6A at 26, in support of their construction, but in that Response, Arendi
`argued that a search screen could not be a document because it was not “configured for
`communication between people,” as required by the claims. In its September 9, 2011 Response
`Made in Amendment, Arendi amended the claims, changing “in a document configured for
`communication between people and comprising textual information” to “in a document configured
`to be stored with textual information for later retrieval.” Defs. Ex. 6B at 2. But this change neither
`amounts to a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope nor reflects an intent to limit the
`claims to a word processing or spreadsheet file. The notion that a document is stored for later
`retrieval is consistent with the idea that the document be used for communication between people.
`Emails and webpages, for example, are used for communication and are stored for later retrieval.
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`b.
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`“Document” Does Not Require the User to Enter Text
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`Defendants’ proposal that a “document” be limited to a file “into which text can be entered”
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`is another attempt to import a limitation from the specification into the claims. Defendants’
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`construction imposes a requirement, not found in the claims, that the software displaying the
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`document have certain abilities, namely letting the user enter text into the document. That would
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`mean that a document containing textual information falls within the scope of “document” when
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`opened or shown by a program that lets the user add further text the document, but the same
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`document would not fall within the scope of the claims if opened or shown by different software
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`that lacks such text-editing abilities (or the same software in read-only mode). This distinction is
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`unsupported by the intrinsic record.
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`The asserted claims do not require that the user enter text before the system performs its
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`information handling steps. The asserted claims set forth what is done with the document’s text,
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`and text must exist in the document prior to the analysis; however, contrary to the Defendants’
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`proposed construction, the claims do not limit how the document came to include text or even
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`whether text can be entered by the user while or after the steps of the claim are completed. For
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`example, claim 1 of the ’843 Patent describes a “method for finding data related to the contents of
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`a document” and requires, “while the document is being displayed, analyzing … first information
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`from the document.” Ex. 1 at Col. 10, ll. 38-48. At no point, however, does claim 1 mandate that
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`a user enter text into the document.
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`When the patentee intended to impose a requirement of user-entered text, he knew how to
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`do so. For example, claim 1 of the ’356 patent includes the step of “allowing a user to enter textual
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`information into a document using the document editing program.” Ex. 4 at Col. 10 ll. 47-48. In
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`Unwired Planet, 829 F.3d at 1358-1359, the Court held that the district court erred in its
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 120 Filed 06/19/19 Page 15 of 31 PageID #: 3403
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`construction of “voice input” as “speech provided over a voice channel” because “the patent
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`contains other claims … that specifically recite ‘establishing a voice communication channel,’ a
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`limitation not present in the asserted claims.” The Court added, “If the patentee intended to restrict
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`the claims-at-issue to require a voice input to travel over a particular type of channel, it could have
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`included that limitation.” Id. at 1359; see also Akamai Techs., 805 F.3d at 1375 (reversing
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`construction of “tagging” that included pre-pending in part because other nonasserted claims
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`expressly claimed the “pre-pending” aspect); Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 735
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that use of the phrase “application software program” in one claim
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`and “program” in another “tends to reinforce … adoption of the broad ordinary meaning of
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`‘program’ by itself”).
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`The specification’s references to “what the user has typed,” again, are descriptions of
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`preferred embodiments, which cannot serve to narrow the scope of the claims in the absence of
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`words of manifest exclusion or restriction. Even the reference to “what the user types” at col. 2 of
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`Exhibit 1 in the “Summary of the Invention” section of the specification does not clearly indicate
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`that the patentee intended to assign a definition to “document” that requires the user to type
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`information into that document. Statements that “the present invention includes” or “the present
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`invention is” can rise to the level of unmistakable disclaimer—see Unwired Planet, 829 F.3d at
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`1358—but the patentee here did not employ such statements and did not state that “what the user
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`types” reflects the invention as a whole or some critical advantage of the claimed invention.
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`In Blackbird Tech LLC v. ELB Electronics, Inc., 895 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the
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`Court held that the district court erred by construing the term “attachment surface” to be secured
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`to the ballast cover because “[t]here is no suggestion in the specification or prosecution history
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`that this fastener is important in any way” and the specification “never refers to this run-of-the-
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`mill fastener as the ‘present invention’ or ‘an essential element’ or uses any other language that
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`would cause the ordinarily skilled artisan to believe that this fastening mechanism is an important
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`component of the invention or that it is critical to the invention for any reason.” Id. The Court
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`added that in “cases where we have held limitations ou