Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 1 of 21 PageID #: 3343
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
`
`)))))))))
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`
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`Beth A. Swadley (No. 6331)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`bswadley@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`ADDRESSING U.S. PATENT NUMBERS 7,496,854 AND 7,921,356
`
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Stephen Susman
`Seth Ard
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, New York 10019
`Tel: (212) 336-8330
`ssusman@susmangodfrey.com
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`John Lahad
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77002-5096
`Tel: (713) 651-9366
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: June 19, 2019
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: 3344
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`’356 Patent Claim Terms .........................................................................................1
`
`1.
`
`“providing an input device configured by the document editing
`program” (’356 Patent, cl. 1, 12) .................................................................1
`
`B.
`
`’854 Patent Claim Terms .........................................................................................2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`“first application program” ..........................................................................2
`
`“second application program”......................................................................5
`
`Indefiniteness Arguments ............................................................................5
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`e.
`
`“means for marking without user intervention the
`first information to alert the user that the first
`information can be utilized in the second
`application program” (cl. 13, 31) .........................................7
`
`“means for identifying without user intervention
`or designation the first information” (cl. 50, 79) .................7
`
`“[means for/computer readable medium …
`including program instructions for] using a first
`computer program to analyze the document,
`without direction from the operator, to identify
`text in the document that can be used to search
`for related information” (cl. 98, 101) ...................................7
`
`“means for responding to a user selection by
`inserting a
`second
`information
`into
`the
`document, the second information associated
`with
`the first
`information from a second
`application program” (cl. 13, 50) .........................................9
`
`“[means for/computer readable medium …
`including program instructions for] inserting the
`information located in (2) into the document” (cl.
`98, 101) ................................................................................9
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 3 of 21 PageID #: 3345
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`f.
`
`g.
`
`h.
`
`“wherein the means for inserting the second
`information into the document further comprises
`means for adding the second information to the
`first information in the document” (cl. 53) ........................12
`
`“means for initializing the second application
`program” (cl. 15) ................................................................12
`
`“means for responding to a user selection by
`performing an operation related to a second
`information, the second information associated
`with the first information from the second
`application program” (cl. 31, 79) .......................................14
`
`C.
`
`“document” and “computer program” ...................................................................15
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................15
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: 3346
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................4
`
`AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Comm’cns, Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................11
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................6
`
`Curtis-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................3
`
`Endoheart AG v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp.,
`No. 14-CV-1473-LPS, 2016 WL 1270127 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) .........................................6
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................11, 12
`
`Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.,
`279 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................10
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................3
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................4
`
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................6
`
`
`Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................6
`
`O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., Inc.,
`115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997)............................................................................................9, 10
`
`One-E-Way, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................10
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: 3347
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`Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc.,
`No. 15-CV-152-RGA, 2017 WL 382235 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2017) .............................................5
`
`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc.,
`
`413 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................3
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013)........................................................................................8, 9, 13
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................4
`
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`829 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: 3348
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`In accordance with the Amended Scheduling Order and the Joint Stipulation Regarding
`
`Claim Construction Briefing, Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L. (“Arendi”) submits this Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief regarding disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,496,854 and 7,921,356.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Arendi alleges that Google LLC (“Google”), Oath Holdings Inc., and Oath Inc.
`
`(collectively, “Oath”) infringe and have infringed claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,496,854 (“the ’854
`
`patent”) and that Google infringes and has infringed claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,921,356 (“the
`
`’356 patent”). Arendi also alleges that Google and Oath infringe and have infringed claims of U.S.
`
`Patent Nos. 7,917,843 (“the ’843 patent”) and 8,306,993 (“the ’993 patent”). Except as indicated
`
`below, the claim construction disputes involving terms in the ’843 and ’993 patents are addressed
`
`in Arendi’s separately filed Opening Claim Construction Brief (“’843/’993 Opening Brief”).1
`
`II.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`’356 Patent Claim Terms
`
`1.
`
`“providing an input device configured by the document editing
`program” (’356 Patent, cl. 1, 12)
`
`Arendi’s Proposed Construction
`“providing an input device, set up by the
`document editing program”
`
`The parties agree that this term from the ’356 patent should be construed similarly to the
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“providing an input device, set up by the
`document editing program for use”
`
`term “providing an input device, configured by the first computer program” in the ’843 patent. As
`
`discussed in Arendi’s ’843/’993 Opening Brief at Part IV.B.3, Google unnecessarily and
`
`incorrectly adds “for use” to its construction. The claim language states that the input device is
`
`configured by the document editing program “to allow the user to initiate an operation.” Ex. 42 at
`
`
`1 Arendi incorporates by reference the Summary of the Patented Technology, Legal Principles of
`Claim Construction, and Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art sections of its ’843/’993 Opening Brief.
`2 Exhibits referenced herein refer to exhibits filed with the Joint Claim Chart.
`
`1
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`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: 3349
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`Col. 10 ll. 61-62. That is the so-called “use” required by the claim. Google’s open ended “for use”
`
`is not required by the intrinsic record. As discussed in Arendi’s ’843/’993 Opening Brief, this
`
`addition raises more questions than it answers: “For use” by what or whom? What kind of “use”?
`
`This unhelpfulness counsels against including this verbiage. Indeed, the PTAB has said that this
`
`language constitutes “merely requiring that presence of the device.” Defs. Ex. 6DD at 9. The Court
`
`should adopt Arendi’s proposed construction.
`
`B.
`
`’854 Patent Claim Terms
`
`1.
`
`“first application program”
`
`Arendi’s Proposed Construction
`“a first independently executable computer
`application”
`
`The parties’ dispute involves two issues. First, whether this term should be construed
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“word processing or spreadsheet computer
`program”
`
`differently from the term “first computer program,” and second, whether the term should be limited
`
`to a word processing or spreadsheet computer program. The answer to both questions is “no.”
`
`The “application program” terms should have the same meaning as the “computer
`
`program” terms. The term “application program” does not appear in the specification of the ’854
`
`patent. The specification uses the term “computer program.” See, e.g., Ex. 3 at Col. 1 ll. 53-55
`
`(“Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to provide a method, system, and computer
`
`readable medium for address handling within a computer program.”); see also Arendi Ex. 5A at
`
`11 (Final Written Decision (recognizing that the “term ‘application program’ does not appear in
`
`the specification of the ’854 Patent”). Thus, the specification does not support or demand a
`
`construction unique to “application program.”
`
`Defendants presumably will argue claim differentiation in support of their proposed
`
`construction; however, claim differentiation “‘is not a hard and fast rule,’ but rather a presumption
`
`that will be overcome when the specification or prosecution dictates a contrary construction.”
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: 3350
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`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Seachange Int’l, Inc. v.
`
`C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). In GPNE, the patentee argued that the district
`
`court erred by construing the term “node” as “a pager.” The Federal Circuit rejected this argument
`
`because the specification consistently referred to “nodes” as “pagers,” the words “pager” and
`
`“pager units” appeared in the specification over 200 times, and “the specification repeatedly and
`
`exclusively uses these words to refer to the devices in the patented system.” Id. at 1370. The Court
`
`also rejected the patentee’s “weak” claim differentiation argument because “the specification and
`
`prosecution history so consistently describe ‘nodes’ as ‘pagers,’” and the Federal Circuit affirmed
`
`the district court’s construction of “nodes” as “pagers.” Id. at 1371; see also Curtis-Wright Flow
`
`Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Indeed this court has
`
`acknowledged that two claims with different terminology can define the exact same subject
`
`matter.”). In this case, the intrinsic evidence overcomes the claim differentiation presumption. The
`
`specification consistently and repeatedly speaks in terms of “computer program” and there is no
`
`evidence that “application” should be construed more narrowly.
`
`Defendants next argue that “computer application” should be limited to a word processing
`
`or spreadsheet program. As discussed in Arendi’s ’843/’993 Opening Brief, Defendants
`
`improperly seek to import limitations from the specification into the claims. Nothing in the
`
`specification or prosecution history makes clear that the invention is limited to these two types of
`
`computer programs. “Absent such language, we do not import limitations from the specification
`
`into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`To the contrary, the specification repeatedly describes word processing and spreadsheet programs
`
`as part of embodiments and examples, see, e.g., Ex. 3 at Col. 4 ll. 23-24, and “we do not read
`
`limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” Id. at 1371. Indeed, the
`
`3
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 3351
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`specification says, “In an embodiment of the present invention, single button addressing is
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`achieved … in a computer program such as a word processing program, spreadsheet program, etc.
`
`(hereinafter called ‘word processor’), for executing address handling therein.” Ex. 3 at Col. 3 ll.
`
`35-41. If the patentee intended to limit the invention to word processing and spreadsheet programs,
`
`there would be no reason to write “in a computer program” and “such as a word processing
`
`program, spreadsheet program, etc.” (emphasis added).
`
`It matters not that the preferred embodiments and examples in the patents refer to word
`
`processing or spreadsheet programs. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d
`
`1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing construction of “tagging” that included a “prepended”
`
`limitation even though the only method of tagging described in the patent involved prepending a
`
`host name); Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have
`
`repeatedly held that it is ‘not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain
`
`a particular limitation’ to limit claims beyond their plain meaning” (quoting Thorner v. Sony
`
`Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The ’854 patent specification’s
`
`embodiments and examples are just that, embodiments and examples, and do not limit the scope
`
`of the claims in the absence of “a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words of manifest
`
`exclusion or restriction.’” Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
`
`Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`
`Moreover, as with “document,” the specification negates Defendants’ attempt to narrow
`
`the term by describing programs that “send e-mails, faxes, etc.” Ex. 3, Col. 4 ll.12-18. Word
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`processing and spreadsheet programs do not “send e-mails, faxes, etc.,” and it would thus be
`
`incorrect to construe “application” so narrowly. Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1377 (district court erred
`
`by construing “interface board including processor” to require a “wall interface unit” because “the
`
`4
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: 3352
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`specification discloses an embodiment in which the interface board sends information to a remote
`
`location without using a wall interface unit”); see also Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics,
`
`Inc., No. 15-CV-152-RGA, 2017 WL 382235, at *7 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2017) (rejecting limitation
`
`as inconsistent with how “specification indicates that, at least sometimes,” invention operates).
`
`2.
`
`“second application program”
`
`Arendi’s Proposed Construction
`“a second independently executable computer
`application”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“contact management computer program”
`
`In addition to the question of whether “second application program” should be construed
`
`
`
`
`differently than its “second computer program” counterpart, the parties dispute whether this
`
`application is limited to a “contact management computer program.” The specification negates
`
`Defendants’ attempt to unduly narrow the scope of this claim term. According to the specification:
`
`Although the present invention is defined in terms of information management or
`is [sic] database programs, such as OUTLOOK™, etc., the present invention is
`applicable to all types of information management or database programs such as
`ACCESS™, ORACLE™, DBASE™, RBASE™, CARDFILE™, including “flat
`files,” etc., as will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art.
`
`Ex. 3 at 10:4-9. ACCESS, ORACLE, DBASE, RBASE, and CARDFILE do more than just
`
`manage contacts; they are fully-customizable database products that are used in a variety of
`
`contexts. Further, the term “flat file” connotes a simple database housing plain text files with little
`
`to no indexing between records. See https://techterms.com/definition/flatfile; see also Ex. 3 at Col.
`
`3 ll. 48-54 (referring to searching “a database, file, database program, contact management
`
`program, etc.”). Defendants’ construction is inconsistent with the specification.
`
`3.
`
`Indefiniteness Arguments
`
`Arendi asserts means-plus-function claims 13, 15, 31, 50, 53, 79, 98, and 101 of the ’854
`
`patent. Defendants argue that most of the means-plus-function limitations in these claims are
`
`indefinite. Defendants cannot meet their burden of showing by “clear and convincing evidence
`
`5
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 3353
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`that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would lack reasonable certainty”
`
`regarding “the scope of the invention,” Endoheart AG v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., No. 14-CV-
`
`1473-LPS, 2016 WL 1270127, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016) (quotation omitted)—bearing in mind
`
`that “[r]easonable certainty does not require absolute or mathematical precision.” BASF Corp. v.
`
`Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).
`
`In the context of computer-implemented means-plus-function limitations, the Federal
`
`Circuit requires that “the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general
`
`purpose computer or microprocessor.” Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012). Rather, the specification must “disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
`
`function.” Id. (quoting Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
`
`“The specification can express the algorithm in any understandable terms including as a
`
`mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient
`
`structure.” Id. (quotations omitted).
`
`Finally, Defendants notably do not argue indefiniteness for the following terms:
`
`• “means for searching, using the second application program, for the second information
`associated with the first information” (claim 15)
`
`• “means for using a second compute program and the text identified in (1) to search the
`database and to locate related information” (claim 101)
`
`
`
`• “computer-readable medium … including program instructions for … using a second
`computer program and the text identified in step (1) to search the database and to locate
`related information” (claim 98)
`
`
`Defendants Google and Oath (formerly Yahoo!) do not attack these limitations as indefinite
`
`because “searching” is foundational to their business. Google and Oath cannot in this litigation
`
`context credibly argue that they do not understand with reasonable certainty these “means for
`
`searching” limitations. But these limitations are no more definite than those challenged by
`
`6
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 12 of 21 PageID #: 3354
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`Defendants. Defendants challenge, for example, “means for marking without user intervention the
`
`first information,” but such means contemplates a narrower range of possibilities than “searching.”
`
`Defendants argue that “means for initializing the second application program” is indefinite. A
`
`person of ordinary skill would just as readily understand the scope of this claim term as she would
`
`“means for searching.” The Court should look askance at Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`“means for marking without user intervention the first information to alert
`the user that the first information can be utilized in the second application
`program” (cl. 13, 31)
`
`“means for identifying without user intervention or designation the first
`information” (cl. 50, 79)
`
`“[means for/computer readable medium … including program instructions
`for] using a first computer program to analyze the document, without
`direction from the operator, to identify text in the document that can be used
`to search for related information” (cl. 98, 101)
`
`Function
`“marking without user intervention the first information to alert the
`user that the first information can be utilized in the second
`application program”
`“identifying without user intervention or designation the first
`information”
`“[means for/computer readable medium … including program
`instructions for] for using a first computer program to analyze the
`document, without direction from the operator, to identify text in
`the document that can be used to search for related information”
`
`Structure
`“programming and logic
`configured to perform the
`algorithms disclosed at
`Col. 3 ll. 48-54, Col. 4 ll.
`32-49, and Col. 10 ll. 17-
`22 or its equivalent”
`
`For these related terms, the claims recite the function. The specification discloses
`
`
`
`
`algorithms for “marking” and “identifying” and sets forth the metes and bounds of what constitutes
`
`user intervention. First, the specification describes analyzing a document containing text to
`
`determine whether it contains types of information that can be searched:
`
`A program then executes and retrieves the typed information from the document,
`and searches an information management source, such as a database, file, database
`program, contact management program, etc. (hereinafter called “database”) to
`determine if the information, such as the name or part of the name typed and
`searched by the program exists in the database.
`
`7
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: 3355
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`Ex. 3 at Col. 3 ll. 48-54. Later, in the context of describing Figure 1, the specification explains:
`
`The program analyzes what the user has typed in the document at step 4, for
`example, by analyzing (i) paragraph/line separations/formatting, etc.; (ii) street,
`avenue, is [sic] drive, lane, boulevard, city, state, zip code, country designators and
`abbreviations, etc.; (iii) Mr., Mrs., Sir, Madam, Jr., Sr. designators and
`abbreviations, etc.; (iv) Inc., Ltd., P.C., L.L.C, designators and abbreviations, etc.;
`and (v) a database of common male/female names, etc.
`
`Id. at Col. 4 ll. 32-39; see also id. at Col. 4 ll. 40-46 (finding names and initials). Thus, the
`
`specification provides more than just a reference to black box software performing some function.
`
`The specification explains what the computer program does, i.e., identifying first information, and
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`how it does it, i.e., analyzing formatting, designators, abbreviations, and common names.
`
`
`
`Second, the specification explains what constitutes “user intervention,” which in turn
`
`provides certainty as to the scope of “without user intervention” or “without direction from the
`
`operator.” The specification states:
`
`Although the present invention is defined in terms of a program retrieving
`information from a document before searching a database, the user may select the
`information in the document to be searched by the program in the database (e.g.,
`by highlighting, selecting, italicizing, underlining, etc.), as will be readily apparent
`to those skilled in the art.
`
`Id. at Col. 10 ll. 17-22. If user selection though highlighting, italicizing, underlining, etc. qualify
`
`as user intervention, then “without user intervention” and “without direction from the operator”
`
`mean no highlighting, no italicizing, no underlining, etc.
`
`
`
`In TecSec, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the Federal Circuit reversed
`
`the district court’s ruling that fourteen computer-implemented means-plus-function terms in the
`
`asserted claims lacked sufficient corresponding structure in the specification. The Court held that
`
`“the specification discloses the specific software products and how to use those products to
`
`implement the claimed functions, which include ‘selecting an object to encrypt,’ ‘selecting an
`
`encryption algorithm,’ and ‘encrypting the object,’ among others.” Id. at 1349. The Court rejected
`
`8
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 3356
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`the argument that the specification disclosed only “generic software and not a specific algorithm,”
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`holding that “the examples here provide detailed prose that shows how the specific software
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`products operate to implement the claimed functions.” Id. In this case, the specification explains
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`through prose as well as figures how the software implements the claimed marking and identifying
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`without user intervention functions.
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`d.
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`e.
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`“means for responding to a user selection by inserting a second information
`into the document, the second information associated with the first
`information from a second application program” (cl. 13, 50)
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` “[means for/computer readable medium … including program instructions
`for] inserting the information located in (2) into the document” (cl. 98, 101)
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`Function
`“responding to a user selection by inserting a
`second information into the document, the second
`information associated with the first information
`from a second application program”
`[means for /computer readable medium …
`including program instructions for] inserting the
`information located in (2) into the document”
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`Structure
`“programming and logic configured to
`perform the algorithms disclosed at Col. 3
`ll. 63-66, Col. 4 ll. 46-49, Col. 4 ll. 46-51,
`Col. 5:67 – Col. 6 l. 4, Col. 7 ll. 5-6 and 11,
`Col. 7 ll. 48-49 or its equivalent”
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`As a threshold point, Arendi disagrees that the term in claim 98 should be construed as a
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`means-plus-function claim. Claim 98 is a computer method claim comprised of three steps and is
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`neither written in “step-for” or “step-plus” fashion nor uses any other nonce words. In O.I. Corp.
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`v. Tekmar Co., Inc., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Federal Circuit explained that §112,
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`paragraph 6 “is implicated only when steps plus function without acts are present” and that an
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`element in a method claim “may be recited as a step for performing a specified function without
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`the recital of acts in support of the function.” Id. The method claim at issue in Tekmar read:
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`9. A method for removing water vapor from an analyte slug passing between a
`sparge vessel, trap and gas chromatograph, comprising the steps of:
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`(a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a first temperature higher
`than ambient, as the analyte slug passes from the sparge vessel to the trap; and
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`9
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: 3357
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`(b) passing the analyte slug through the passage that is air cooled to a second
`temperature below said first temperature but not below ambient, as the analyte slug
`passes from the trap to the gas chromatograph.
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`Id. at 1579. The Court held that “[t]he steps of ‘passing’ are not individually associated in the claim
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`with functions performed by the steps of passing” and “[m]erely claiming a step without recital of
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`a function is not analogous to a means plus a function.” Id. at 1583.
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`In Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
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`2002), the Federal Circuit reiterated, “Merely claiming a step by itself, or a series of steps, without
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`recital of a function does not trigger the application of §112, paragraph 6.” In Epcon, the Federal
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`Circuit reversed the district court’s application of §112 and held that “[t]he claim includes no
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`words indicating ‘step plus function’ form, such as ‘step for’” and “recites a series of steps without
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`the recital of function.” Id. Claim 98, like the claims in Tekmar and Epcon, is a garden variety
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`process claim that does not recite step-plus-function element, and is not subject to §112,
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`paragraph 6.
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`Whether addressed as means-plus-function terms or otherwise, these terms are not
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`indefinite. “Inserting” information into an electronic document, based on user selection or
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`otherwise, is a basic form of data transfer that a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily
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`recognize and understand. Even so, the specification provides sufficient detail and context that
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`would enable a person of ordinary skill to understand the relative meaning of the term. One-E-
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`Way, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 859 F.3d 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding no indefiniteness
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`when “an understanding of the relative meaning of these terms is readily apparent”). The
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`specification states that in response to finding “name(s) and address(es) corresponding to the part
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`of the addressee’s name typed, this additional information is automatically entered into the user’s
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`word processor … .” Ex. 3 at Col. 3 ll. 63-66. The specification also provides several Examples of
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`second information being inserted into the document both with and without user selection.
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`10
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 119 Filed 06/19/19 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: 3358
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`Example 1 shows inserting second information into the document. Id. at Col. 5:67 – Col. 6 l. 4. In
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`Example 4, the specification describes searching the database for the name of an existing contact,
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`and then generating this screen of Figure 9:
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`According to the specification, “This screen includes a message 70 informing the user that the
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`contact already exists in the database with an existing address” and provides an option to “use
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`existing address in document selection 78,” meaning that the user selects this option to insert the
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`address into the document. Ex. 3 at Col. 7 ll. 5-6, 11. Similarly, the specification describes Figure
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`10, saying “At this point, the user may command the Choose button 86 to use the selected address
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`and return to the document… .” Col. 7 ll. 48-49; see also Col. 4 ll. 46-51 (“[A]t step 20 the program
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`displays menu choices [and] at step 22 the program inserts a correct address and name … .”); Col.
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`4 ll. 46-49 (“[T]he program displays menu choices to the user to let him choose an appropriate
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`answer … .”).
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`In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Federal
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`Circuit confirmed that “the sufficiency of the structure is viewed through the lens of a person of
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`skill in the art and without need to disclose structures well known in the art.” See also AllVoice
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`11
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`Case 1:13-cv-00