At step four, the ALJ found that, through her DLI, plaintiff had the RFC to perform her past relevant work as a service clerk, and thus she was not disabled.

Dr. Osafo’s report, as interpreted by the ALJ, 2 states that plaintiff can sit, stand, or walk for twenty minutes at a time and a total of two hours of an eight-hour workday.

However, the ALJ said, the limitations contained in Dr. Osafo’s report were not supported by his own examination, which found that plaintiff had “normal strength ... with no indication of muscle atrophy,” “normal reflex responses and normal sensation responses in her bilateral lower extremities.” (R. 45; see R. 42 (citing Dr. Osafo’s report and stating that “[plaintiff] exhibited full range of motion of her bilateral hip, knee, ankle, and foot,” “5/5 muscle strength,” “a normal gait and stance, and ... was able to walk 50 feet without assistance.”).)

The ALJ did not need to seek clarification because he viewed the report in plaintiff’s favor, i.e., assumed she was limited in her ability to sit, stand, and walk, and evaluated it on that basis.

In other words, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence he cited and his conclusion that Dr. Osafo’s report was entitled to no weight at all, an error that requires remand.

That onset date was upheld on reconsideration, and when plaintiff requested a hearing, the Appeals Council directed the Commissioner to consolidate the 2011 and 2014 claims.

At step five, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed, and thus he was not disabled.

An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if “it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011).

Ricca and Bajaj opined that plaintiff could not lift more than ten pounds, could not do repetitive twisting, turning, bending, climbing, squatting, kneeling, pushing, or pulling.

Finally, even if the treaters’ records state that plaintiff has normal neurological function and gait,1 the ALJ does not explain how those findings impugn their opinions about plaintiff’s ability to lift, twist, kneel, squat, bend, push, and pull.

Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 12, 2015, the application date.

The ALJ found at step five that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as eyeglass assembler, circuit board tester, and costume jewelry maker.

Reinaas v. Saul, 953 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]here are critical differences between keeping up with activities of daily living and holding down a full-time job.”) Moreover, the ALJ disregarded significant limitations Plaintiff has in performing routine tasks without assistance.

Third, the ALJ erred by repeatedly relying on her own observations during the hearing to discount Plaintiff’s allegations of pain, while failing to address relevant evidence that supports Plaintiff’s symptoms.

In support, the ALJ references a June 14, 2016 consultative examination which indicated that Plaintiff had given “poor effort” on her left-hand grip strength test and had full range of motion in her wrists.