) Specifically, the City argues that even if the Court considered Defendants’ new evidence, none of the documents undermine her opinions offered in this case nor demonstrate any improper discrepancy with positions she has offered in ...

Ex. 1061, 33:19–34:15. None of that suggests the SP-304 result in Table 4 is not, in fact, significant.

The only portions of Exhibit 1067 that Petitioner relies upon, i.e., the letter briefs and an expert report submitted by counsel––not the EPO—are none of those things.

None of the authors listed on Liu are ostensibly affiliated with Patent Owner, nor does Liu suggest that their work was supported by Patent Owner.

Ex. 1061, 33:19–34:15. None of that suggests the SP-304 result in Table 4 is not, in fact, significant.

The only portions of Exhibit 1067 that Petitioner relies upon, i.e., the letter briefs and an expert report submitted by counsel––not the EPO—are none of those things.

None of the authors listed on Liu are ostensibly affiliated with Patent Owner, nor does Liu suggest that their work was supported by Patent Owner.

Foundation The City next argues Dr. Desvousges’ first opinion lacks foundation because none of the factual sources underpinning his opinion demonstrate the City has designated the LDW an “industrial sanctuary.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7.

Before: TINA E. HULSE, CYNTHIA M. HARDMAN, and MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

Patent Owner seeks authorization to submit an expert report served by Petitioner in a related district court proceeding (“the Zhou report”) as supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123.

Thus, any need for that information is substantially outweighed by the prejudice and burden of allowing Patent Owner to submit a several-hundred-page expert report, along with additional briefing from the parties regarding that report, less than a month before the statutory deadline for our final written decision.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request to file supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123 is denied.

Jad Mills Richard Torczon Nicole Stafford Dennis Gregory

) Specifically, Defendants identify Dr. Velleux’s references to the EPA employing a “descending order of risk” hierarchy in its evaluation of the LDW in the ROD as excludable because his opinions have none of the indicia of reliability ...

HASFORD: None from us, Your Honor.

None of Bausch's unexpected results demonstrate that there is significant or material difference as compared to the prior art.

None of those are 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 IPR2022-00722 Patent 7,041,786 B2 relevant to position 3 of uroguanylin because that's an unstructured position. None of those things are ...

Plaintiffs have also sought leave to file a Third Amended Complaint that removes the word dioxin and disclaims any claims and any damages based on exposure to Agent Orange and its toxic byproduct 2, 3, 7, 8- tetracholorodibenzoparadioxin [ECF No. 87].

Several other district courts have followed similar lines of reasoning, and this Court finds no reason to depart from the rationale behind those numerous rulings finding such claim disclaimers effective.2 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd., 2019 WL 12345572, at *4 (D. N.D. Dec. 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted 2020 WL 9848714 (D. N.D. January 8, 2020) (granting remand after plaintiffs filed express claim waivers specific to the factual allegations that one of the defendants asserts gave rise to a government contractor defense); Kelleher v. A.W.

July 30, 2014) (“When federal question jurisdiction is the only basis for a district court's authority to adjudicate, post-removal developments may cause remand not only to be proper, but even to be required.”); Schuh v. Crane Co., 2014 WL 280361, at *1–2 (E.D.

Case law clearly supports the proposition that a waiver filed after removal may operate to eliminate the bases of federal officer jurisdiction and justifies remand.

It is undisputed that Defendants did not file its notice of removal within thirty days from when this action was initially brought nearly three years ago in state court on September 11, 2020.

The City’s sole remaining cause of action alleges Defendants intentionally manufactured, distributed, marketed, and promoted PCBs in a manner that created a public nuisance harmful to the health and free use of the LDW and the City’s stormwater and drainage systems.

Opinion 5: The cost to expand existing community programs to reach additional ethnic groups and further reduce public health risk from unsafe fish consumption in the Lower Duwamish is $19 million.

Expert testimony is relevant where “the evidence logically advance[s] a material aspect of the party’s case.” Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

Specifically, Dr. Trapp’s fourth opinion employed the use of: (1) WinSLAMM, a stormwater model (used by the EPA and the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”)) to evaluate runoff volume in urban settings; and (2) a cost-estimating tool in the NCHRP Research Report 992 to estimate the total cost of his opined bioretention basins.9 (See id. at 32, 37.)

(Id.) Here, Dr. Trapp may rely on the City’s provided PCB goal in the way that he cites to it, i.e., that Washington State regulators expect concentrations of PCBs from City-owned outfalls will meet the LDW sediment cleanup objective of 130 ppb.

Having considered the Motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and will be granted only upon a “showing of manifest error in the prior ruling” or “new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.”

Defendants argue that they remain entitled to assert those defenses to the extent the City seeks to recover for alleged harm to its proprietary interests.

This Court previously noted that “[i]n this action to restore the purity of its waterways, Seattle acts in its sovereign capacity.” Dkt. # 60 at 9.

However, Defendants contend, and Plaintiff has later conceded, that the City may otherwise seek relief for proprietary harm and that the continuing tort doctrine resolves any statute of limitations issues.

Pursuant to Local Rule 83.5, and the attached certification, counsel moves the

admission pro hac vice of Timothy P. Best, Ph.D., of McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200, Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206 to represent plaintiffs Taiho Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Taiho Oncology, Inc., in this matter.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that counsel’s motion for admission pro hac vice of Timothy P. Best, Ph.D., is granted.

United States District Court Judge Dated: _________________

Pursuant to Local Rule 83.5, I certify that I am eligible for admission to this Court, am admitted, practicing and in good standing as a member of the Bar of the State of California and pursuant to Local Rule 83.6 submit to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court for any alleged misconduct which occurs in the preparation or course of this action.

The Court, having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Michelle L. Peterson, United States Magistrate Judge, any objections thereto, and the remaining record, hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: (1) The Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted; (2) Defendants Monsanto Company, Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia Corporation’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. # 326) is DENIED as to the discreet issues of: (1) whether the State of Washington released Plaintiff City of Seattle’s (“City”) intentional public nuisance claim when it settled its PCB lawsuit against Defendants in

June 2020; and (2) whether res judicata otherwise bars the City’s public nuisance claim.

(3) The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to the parties.

DATED this 6th day of July, 2023.

The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the City seeks to exclude the testimony of Defendants Monsanto Company, Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia LLC’s (“Defendants” or “Monsanto”) waste and disposal expert Marc Rogoff, Ph.D.

The City’s sole remaining cause of action alleges Defendants intentionally manufactured, distributed, marketed, and promoted PCBs in a manner that created a public nuisance harmful to the health and free use of the LDW and the City’s stormwater and drainage systems.

Expert testimony is relevant where “the evidence logically advance[s] a material aspect of the party’s case.” Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

Defendants argue that Dr. Rogoff’s third opinion is relevant to counter the City’s allegations concerning the post-sale environmental effects of PCBs because, though life-cycle product management was not established until 1997, Old Monsanto incorporated aspects of its approach thirty years earlier.

Dr. Rogoff’s third opinion, similar to his first, opines that Monsanto’s notification to its customers of the environmental effects of PCBs, disposal recommendations and services, and incentivized return of PCB products were all implemented before such approaches were standardized and/or common in the manufacturing industry.