`Woodstock Ventures, LC v. Woodstock Roots LLC
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`SUMMARY ORDER
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`RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
`SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
`FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
`CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
`EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
`“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
`ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
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`At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
`the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
`on the 26th day of February, two thousand twenty-one.
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`PRESENT:
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`SUSAN L. CARNEY,
`WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
`Circuit Judges,
`LEWIS J. LIMAN,
`District Judge.*
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`Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees,
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`v.
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`No. 19-2720
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`_________________________________________
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`WOODSTOCK VENTURES, LC, THE WOODSTOCK CANNABIS COMPANY, LLC,
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`WOODSTOCK ROOTS LLC, WOODSTOCK CANNABIS COMPANY, LLC, CHET-5
`BROADCASTING, LP, GARY CHETKOF, AXCENTRIA PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, WOODSTOCK
`PRODUCTS COMPANY INTERNATIONAL, LLC, DBA WOODSTOCK AMERICAN PRODUCTS,
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`Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants.
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`_________________________________________
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`* Judge Lewis J. Liman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
`designation.
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`FOR APPELLANTS:
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`FOR APPELLEES:
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`ANDREW R. SPERL, (Seth A. Goldberg,
`Joseph J. Pangaro, on the brief), Duane
`Morris LLP, Philadelphia, PA; Evan
`Michailidis, (on the brief), Duane Morris
`LLP, New York, NY.
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`EDWARD T. COLBERT, (Erik C. Kane, on
`the brief), Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP,
`Washington, DC; Jonathan D. Reichman,
`Shawn P. Regan, Jennifer Bloom, (on the
`brief), Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP, New
`York, NY.
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`Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
`of New York (Gardephe, J.).
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`UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
`ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order entered on July 29, 2019, is AFFIRMED.
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`Defendants-Appellants Woodstock Roots, LLC, et al. (collectively, “Roots”), appeal
`the denial of a preliminary injunction that they sought against Plaintiffs-Appellees
`Woodstock Ventures, LC, et al. (collectively, “Ventures”). In the underlying action, Ventures
`sued Roots for trademark infringement, claiming Roots’s products infringed on Ventures’s
`use of the “Woodstock” mark in connection with the sale of recreational marijuana and
`related products. Roots counterclaimed for trademark infringement based on its federal
`registration of the “Woodstock” mark in connection with “smokers’ articles.” Roots then
`sought a preliminary injunction against Ventures based on its counterclaim for trademark
`infringement. The district court (Gardephe, J.) declined to enter a preliminary injunction,
`ruling that, even if Roots had priority in the “Woodstock” mark in connection with
`“smokers’ articles,” it did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because it had
`not shown a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287
`F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
`procedural history, and arguments on appeal, and refer to them only as necessary to explain
`our decision to affirm.
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`2
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`We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. SG
`Cowen Sec. Corp. v. Messih, 224 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2000). “Such an abuse of discretion
`ordinarily consists of either applying an incorrect legal standard or relying on a clearly
`erroneous finding of fact.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting King v.
`Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1992)). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the
`movant must show: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious
`questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation” and the balance of
`hardships tips “decidedly in the plaintiff’s favor; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury in the
`absence of an injunction; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4)
`that the public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of an injunction.” Benihana,
`Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
`alteration omitted) (citing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2010)). The standard
`is demanding: “[I]njunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded
`upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79
`(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). Such relief should not be
`granted “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.
`Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
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`“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
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`Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). Roots bore a heavy burden in
`seeking a preliminary injunction. It has failed on appeal to identify any clear error in the
`district court’s factual findings underlying its analysis of the likelihood of success on the
`merits. We conclude that the district court acted within the permissible bounds of its
`discretion in denying the requested preliminary injunction.
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`We express no opinion on the merits or strength of the parties’ underlying claims.
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`The District Court’s order is AFFIRMED.
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`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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