FOR PUBLICATION
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
` No. 17-70614
`
`D.C. No.
`3:16-cv-00733-
`BAS-MDD
`
`
`OPINION
`
`IN RE REGINA BOZIC,
`
`
`REGINA BOZIC, on behalf of herself
`and all others similarly situated,
`Petitioner,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
`CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO,
`Respondent,
`
`
`HENNY DEN UIJL, an individual;
`SANDRA DEN UIJL, an individual;
`BRYAN CORLETT, an individual;
`OBESITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a
`California Limited Liability
`Company; CONTINUITY PRODUCTS, a
`Delaware Limited Liability
`Company; NATIONAL WEIGHT LOSS
`INSTITUTE, a California Limited
`Liability Company; ZODIAC
`FOUNDATION, a California Limited
`Liability Company; INNOTRAC
`CORPORATION, a Georgia
`Corporation,
`
`Real Parties in Interest.
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`Petition for Writ of Mandamus
`to the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of California
`
`Argued and Submitted January 8, 2018
`Pasadena, California
`
`Filed April 25, 2018
`
`Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr. and Michelle T. Friedland,
`Circuit Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff,* Senior District Judge.
`
`Opinion by Judge Friedland
`
`
`
`
`
`* The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge
`for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
`
`

`

`
`
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`3
`
`SUMMARY**
`
`Mandamus
`
`
`
`
`The panel denied a petition for a writ of mandamus that
`
`sought to reverse an order transferring petitioner Regina
`Bozic’s putative class action from the United States District
`Court for the Southern District of California to the United
`States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
`
`The panel agreed with Bozic that it was clear error when
`
`the district court transferred her action to the Eastern District
`because venue was not proper there under the general venue
`statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The panel rejected defendants’
`contentions concerning venue. First, because nothing in
`Bozic’s complaint suggested that any event giving rise to her
`individual claims occurred in the Eastern District, the panel
`held that venue was not proper under § 1391(b)(2). The
`panel also held that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) nor (b)(3)
`provided a basis for venue in the Eastern District where none
`of the seven defendants resided in the Eastern District and
`venue was proper in the Southern District. Second,
`concerning defendants’ contention that the first-to-file rule
`negated 28 U.S.C § 1404(a)’s requirement that an action
`could be transferred only to a district where it “might have
`been brought,” the panel held that the argument was
`foreclosed by the plain language of § 1404(a) which allowed
`transfer only to a district where it might have been brought,
`a requirement that excludes the Eastern District.
`
`
`
`** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
`has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`4
`
`The panel held that despite the presence of a clear legal
`
`error, Bozic was not entitled to mandamus relief where
`issuance of the writ would have no practical impact on this
`case in its current procedural posture, and any injury Bozic
`might face was purely speculative. The panel concluded that
`the extraordinary remedy of mandamus was unwarranted at
`this time.
`
`
`
`COUNSEL
`
`
`Michael T. Houchin (argued) and Ronald A. Marron, Law
`Office of Ronald A. Marron, San Diego, California, for
`Petitioner.
`
`Richard P. Sybert (argued), Hazel Mae B. Pangan, and
`Patrick J. Mulkern, Gordon & Rees LLP, San Diego,
`California, for Real Parties in Interest.
`
`
`
`OPINION
`
`FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:
`
`Plaintiff-Petitioner Regina Bozic requests mandamus
`relief to reverse an order transferring her putative consumer
`class action from the United States District Court for the
`Southern District of California (“Southern District”) to the
`United States District Court for the Eastern District of
`California (“Eastern District”), where her action was
`consolidated with a similar one previously filed in the
`Eastern District. These two federal actions are stayed
`pending the outcome of a third class action that is proceeding
`in California state court.
`
`

`

`
`
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`5
`
`Although we agree with Bozic that it was clear error to
`transfer her action to the Eastern District, issuance of the writ
`would have no practical impact on this case in its current
`procedural posture, and any injury Bozic might face is purely
`speculative. We therefore hold that the extraordinary
`remedy of mandamus is unwarranted at this time.
`
`I.
`
`In 2015, Plaintiff-Petitioner Regina Bozic purchased the
`weight-loss supplement Lipozene in her home state of
`Pennsylvania. Disappointed by the product, Bozic filed a
`putative class action in the Southern District against the
`corporate
`entities
`and
`individuals
`(collectively,
`“Defendants”) responsible for the production, distribution,
`and marketing of Lipozene. In addition to asserting a series
`of state law claims, Bozic sought a declaratory judgment
`defining Lipozene purchasers’ rights under a 2005 Federal
`Trade Commission (“FTC”) consent decree that restricts
`Defendants’ ability to sell weight-loss products. The
`Southern District, where the decree was entered and where
`Defendants
`reside,
`retains
`jurisdiction over matters
`involving “construction, modification, and enforcement” of
`that decree.
`
`Bozic’s case is the third of its kind. At the time she filed
`suit, two related putative class actions were already pending
`in California: Duran v. Obesity Research Institute, LLC,
`filed in the San Diego Superior Court, and Fernandez v.
`Obesity Research Institute, LLC, filed in the Eastern
`District.1 All three suits assert similar state law claims
`
`
`1 We GRANT Bozic’s request for judicial notice of three minute
`orders from Duran and Fernandez. See United States v. Howard,
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`6
`
`against a largely overlapping group of defendants, although
`Bozic’s request for declaratory relief under the FTC consent
`decree is unique to the current action. Fernandez has been
`stayed since August 2013 pending the resolution of Duran.2
`
`After Bozic filed this action in March 2016 in the
`Southern District, Defendants moved in that court to transfer
`the case to the Eastern District for consolidation with
`Fernandez or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings. The
`court held that Bozic’s action was governed by the first-to-
`file rule, a judicially created “doctrine of federal comity,”
`Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94–95
`(9th Cir. 1982), which applies when two cases involving
`“substantially similar issues and parties” have been filed in
`different districts, Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg.
`Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2015). Under that
`rule, “the second district court has discretion to transfer, stay,
`or dismiss the second case in the interest of efficiency and
`judicial economy.” Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala,
`125 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1997).
`
`Reasoning that “the Fernandez Court [had] already
`determined that venue [was] proper” in the Eastern District,
`
`381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that we may take
`judicial notice of records in other court proceedings).
`
`2 In Duran, the San Diego Superior Court approved a final
`settlement in March 2015, but that judgment was successfully appealed.
`Duran v. Obesity Research Inst., LLC, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896, 900 (Ct.
`App. 2016). A set of objectors—themselves the named plaintiffs in
`Fernandez—argued that the settlement was defective due to lack of
`notice, among other alleged flaws. Id. The California Court of Appeal
`agreed and reversed. Id. (“The erroneous notice injected a fatal flaw into
`the entire settlement process and undermines the court’s analysis of the
`settlement’s fairness.”). The case is currently pending again before the
`Superior Court.
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`
`
`the district court chose to transfer. Bozic then filed a petition
`for a writ of mandamus asking our court to vacate the
`transfer order.
`
`7
`
`II.
`
`“The writ of mandamus is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’
`remedy.” In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir.
`2011) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60
`(1947)). A mandamus petitioner bears the burden of
`establishing that “right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and
`indisputable.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
`381 (2004) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,
`403 (1976)). Even when a petitioner has carried this burden,
`we may not grant relief unless we are “satisfied that the writ
`is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.
`
`We consider five factors, first outlined in Bauman v.
`United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977),
`when assessing whether mandamus relief is appropriate:
`
`(1) whether the petitioner has other adequate
`means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the
`relief he or she desires; (2) whether the
`petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a
`way not correctable on appeal; (3) whether
`the district court’s order is clearly erroneous
`as a matter of law; (4) whether the district
`court’s order makes an “oft-repeated error,”
`or “manifests a persistent disregard of the
`federal rules”; and (5) whether the district
`court’s order raises new and important
`problems, or legal issues of first impression.
`
`In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d at 841 (quoting Bauman, 557 F.2d
`at 654–55). Clear legal error is necessary, but not sufficient,
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`8
`
`for issuance of the writ. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380
`(holding that the writ is appropriate only when the petitioner
`has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires”
`(quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403)); In re Henson, 869 F.3d
`1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[S]atisfying the third Bauman
`factor—clear error—is necessary for granting the writ.”).
`
`III.
`
`Applying these standards, we conclude that although the
`district court committed clear legal error by transferring this
`action to the Eastern District, mandamus relief is not
`appropriate. Issuance of the writ would have no practical
`impact on this case in its current procedural posture. The
`district court made clear that it would either transfer or stay
`this case under the first-to-file rule, which the parties do not
`dispute applies. If transfer were not an available option,
`Bozic’s action therefore would be stayed pending a final
`judgment in Duran—which is the same state it is in now in
`the Eastern District. As a result, any injury Bozic might face
`from the transfer is purely speculative at this point. If the
`stay were eventually lifted in circumstances in which she
`could proceed with her case, thus making her asserted injury
`less speculative, Bozic could then file a motion in the
`Eastern District to transfer her case back to the Southern
`District and, if necessary, file a new petition for a writ of
`mandamus in our court.
`
`A.
`
`The district court clearly erred by transferring this case
`to the Eastern District because, under the general venue
`
`

`

`9
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`
`
`statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is not proper there.3 The
`district court had discretion to transfer Bozic’s action, but
`only “to any other district or division where it might have
`been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The phrase “where it
`might have been brought” refers solely to districts where
`Bozic could have originally filed suit. See Hoffman v.
`Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960). This category cannot be
`expanded by Defendants, even if they favor transfer to a
`district where the action could not have been brought. Id.
`
`Relying on the class character of Bozic’s claims,
`Defendants argue that venue is proper in the Eastern District
`because some putative class members presumably purchased
`Lipozene in that district. And even if venue is improper
`under § 1404(a), they insist that the requirements of
`§ 1404(a) do not control where, as here, an action is
`transferred pursuant to the first-to-file rule. We reject both
`contentions.
`
`1.
`
`Defendants assert that purchases by putative class
`members in the Eastern District comprise “a substantial part
`of the events or omissions giving rise to” Bozic’s claims, and
`that venue in the Eastern District is therefore proper under
`
`3 We previously held in In re United States, 791 F.3d 945 (9th Cir.
`2015), that “we should only offer guidance to the district court if the writ
`would have been an appropriate remedy at the time the petition was
`filed.” Id. at 954. There, however, the petitioner did not identify any
`“specific act the [petitioner] would have us compel the district court to
`do . . . nor [was] there any order we m[ight] vacate.” Id. at 953. By
`comparison, Bozic has requested that we return her action to the Eastern
`District, and this would be an appropriate remedy if we believed the
`requirements for mandamus relief were satisfied. We thus see no
`problem in evaluating the basis for the transfer order when assessing
`whether the “clear legal error” Bauman factor is satisfied.
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`10
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Even putting aside whether the
`purchase of Lipozene by some fraction of putative class
`members might qualify as “a substantial part of the
`events”—and further that no members of Bozic’s putative
`class have so far been identified—Defendants’ argument
`fails. Whether before or after class certification, the claims
`of unnamed class members can never make permissible an
`otherwise impermissible venue. Rather, in a class action, the
`“events” in question are only those involving the named
`plaintiffs. See Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 343 F.3d 482,
`490 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “all named plaintiffs to
`a class action must satisfy the venue requirements”); see also
`2 Newberg on Class Actions § 6:36 (5th ed.) (“The analysis
`of where a substantial part of the events took place, in a class
`action, looks to the events concerning the named plaintiffs’
`claims, not all of the class members’ claims.”). Otherwise,
`a nationwide class action could be transferred to any district
`in the country, thus abrogating the venue statute altogether.
`
`Nothing in Bozic’s Complaint suggests that a substantial
`part of the events giving rise to her individual claims—or,
`indeed, any event giving rise to her individual claims—
`occurred in the Eastern District. Nor have Defendants
`offered any evidence or legal theory connecting Bozic’s
`individual claims to the Eastern District. Bozic purchased
`Lipozene in Pennsylvania, and Defendants’ Lipozene
`business operations are based entirely in the Southern
`District. By contrast, venue is proper in the Eastern District
`in Fernandez, the related federal class action, because
`several of the named plaintiffs in Fernandez purchased
`Lipozene in the Eastern District. Fernandez v. Obesity
`Research Inst., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00975-MCE-KJN, 2013
`WL 4587005, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013). Contrary to
`Defendants’ argument, it is irrelevant that Bozic is herself a
`member of the putative class in Fernandez; whether venue
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`
`
`is proper under § 1391(b)(2) in this action depends only on
`the events surrounding Bozic’s claims.
`
`11
`
`Nor does § 1391(b)(1) or (b)(3) provide a basis for venue
`in the Eastern District. None of the seven defendants in this
`action reside in the Eastern District, as would be required for
`venue under § 1391(b)(1). And § 1391(b)(3) applies only if
`there is no district where venue lies under § 1391(b)(1) or
`(b)(2). Because venue is proper in the Southern District, this
`residual provision does not apply. Thus, the Eastern District
`is not an available venue for this action.
`
`2.
`
`Defendants also contend that the first-to-file rule negates
`§ 1404(a)’s requirement that an action may be transferred
`only to a district where it “might have been brought.” We
`disagree.
`
`Defendants’ argument on this score presents what
`appears to be an issue of first impression in the courts of
`appeals. But Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by the
`plain language of § 1404(a), which provides in relevant part
`that “a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
`district or division where it might have been brought.” See
`Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (explaining
`that the “transfer power is . . . expressly limited by the final
`clause of § 1404(a) restricting transfer to those federal
`districts in which the action ‘might have been brought’”). A
`contrary understanding of the interaction between the first-
`to-file rule and § 1404(a) would allow a judge-made doctrine
`to contravene a congressionally enacted statute—a result
`that the Supreme Court has made clear we cannot
`countenance. See Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474, 477
`(1960) (“Where the language of a statute is plain,
`unambiguous, and well understood according to its natural
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`12
`
`and ordinary sense and meaning, the statute itself furnishes
`a rule of construction beyond which the court cannot go.”).
`Although the first-to-file rule guides the district court’s
`exercise of discretion in handling related cases, the
`requirements of § 1404(a) cabin the exercise of that
`discretion.4
`
`Because the district court could only transfer this action
`to a district “where it might have been brought” under
`§ 1404(a)—a
`requirement
`that excludes
`the Eastern
`District—we conclude that the district court committed clear
`legal error by granting Defendants’ motion to transfer.
`
`B.
`
`Despite the presence of a clear legal error, we hold that
`Bozic is not entitled to mandamus relief. Mandamus may
`sometimes be appropriate to correct a clearly erroneous
`transfer order. See Commercial Lighting Prods., Inc. v. U.S.
`Dist. Court, 537 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); Pac. Car
`& Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951–52 (9th Cir.
`1968). But if clear legal error were sufficient for mandamus
`relief, every erroneous interlocutory order would warrant
`issuance of the writ. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,
`346 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1953) (rejecting the notion that
`“every interlocutory order which is wrong might be
`reviewed under the All Writs Act” and declining to issue a
`writ of mandamus where the court’s order, “even if
`erroneous,” “involved no abuse of judicial power”). That is
`why, when deciding whether to issue the writ, we also look
`
`4 Defendants’ reliance on Pacesetter Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic,
`Inc., 678 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1982), is unavailing. There the district court
`dismissed, rather than transferred, the second-filed action. Id. at 94. We
`therefore had no cause to consider the interaction between § 1404(a) and
`the first-to-file rule.
`
`

`

`13
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`
`
`to “whether the petitioner has other adequate means . . . to
`attain the relief he or she desires,” “whether the petitioner
`will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on
`appeal,” “whether the district court’s order makes an ‘oft-
`repeated error,’ or ‘manifests a persistent disregard of the
`federal rules,’” and “whether the district court’s order raises
`new and important problems, or legal issues of first
`impression.” In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir.
`2011) (quoting Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650,
`654–55 (9th Cir. 1977)). And here, these remaining Bauman
`factors collectively weigh against issuing the writ. See
`Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654–55.
`
`1.
`
`In evaluating the remaining Bauman factors, we first
`consider whether the “party seeking the writ has no other
`adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief
`he or she desires,” and, relatedly, whether the “petitioner will
`be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on
`appeal.” Id. at 654; see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court,
`542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). These factors are not satisfied
`here. Indeed, Bozic cannot even attain the relief she
`desires—the opportunity
`to
`litigate her own case
`immediately in a proper forum—through issuance of the
`writ. Because it would be inappropriate to wield “one of ‘the
`most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,’” Cheney,
`542 U.S. at 380 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,
`107 (1967)), when a petitioner faces no imminent injury—
`and will have other options available if that ever changes—
`these circumstances weigh heavily against granting
`mandamus relief.
`
`Bozic does not dispute that the first-to-file rule applies
`here. That rule allows a court to transfer, stay, or dismiss a
`later-filed suit in deference to an earlier-filed suit, see
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`14
`
`Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 623 (9th
`Cir. 1991), and the district court made clear that it would do
`one of those things here. If we were to grant mandamus
`relief and return Bozic’s action to the Southern District
`having held that transfer is not an option, the court would
`therefore almost certainly stay the case pending the outcome
`in Duran.5 Bozic’s case would thus remain in the same
`posture regardless of the transfer—namely, stayed pending
`the outcome in Duran. Bozic’s petition might have been
`more responsive to her articulated concern had she also
`requested that we reverse the district court’s conclusion that
`the first-to-file rule applied,
`thereby precluding any
`subsequent stay in the Southern District. Bozic has
`expressly acknowledged, though, that a stay pursuant to the
`first-to-file rule is appropriate in this case.
`
`If Duran were eventually resolved in a manner that
`would have preclusive effect on the federal actions, Bozic’s
`options for challenging the Duran judgment would remain
`the same regardless of whether we had granted this petition.
`Bozic argues that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the
`writ because any resolution of Duran will not provide
`sufficient relief.6 But Bozic’s ability to contest the Duran
`
`5 Because Defendants did not move to dismiss, the Southern District
`would presumably stay the case if it had occasion to choose between the
`remaining options provided by the first-to-file rule. Of course, if the
`Southern District chose to dismiss instead, our having granted Bozic’s
`mandamus petition would only have moved her farther from her
`requested relief.
`
`6 Duran in fact shows the opposite, by demonstrating that nothing
`irreparable would follow from an initial resolution in that case. There
`the Court of Appeal reversed the settlement after the named plaintiffs
`from the Fernandez action filed objections that identified significant
`flaws in the initial settlement agreement. See Duran v. Obesity Research
`Inst., LLC, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896, 900 (Ct. App. 2016).
`
`

`

`15
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`
`
`judgment in no way depends on where her case is stayed.
`Duran is still a putative class action. If the class in Duran
`were ever certified—whether as a settlement class or a
`litigation class—then Bozic would be able to choose to opt
`out or intervene regardless of whether her own separate case
`was pending in the Southern or Eastern District. See Cal.
`Civ. Code § 1781(e); Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware,
`Inc., 409 P.3d 281, 288–89 (Cal. 2018) (“Potential class
`members in [California] can opt out of the class action
`litigation and pursue their own litigation against the same
`class defendant, timely intervene in the action or proceeding,
`or move to set aside the judgment.”). This petition thus has
`no effect on Bozic’s options.
`
`Moreover, in the event Duran were resolved in a manner
`that did not preclude Bozic’s claims and the stay of her
`action were lifted—for example, if she opted out of any
`certified class in Duran—then Bozic could, in reliance on
`our opinion, file a motion in the Eastern District to transfer
`her case back to the Southern District. If that motion were
`unsuccessful, she could then refile for mandamus. At that
`point, any potential injury from her case remaining in the
`Eastern District would be far less speculative,7 and we could
`
`7 Bozic’s primary argument for why she is prejudiced by having her
`case in the Eastern District is that the Southern District has exclusive
`jurisdiction to adjudicate her claim regarding the FTC consent decree.
`But Bozic lacks standing to enforce that decree, meaning an inability to
`pursue enforcement in the Eastern District cannot injure her in any
`relevant way. See United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 821 (9th
`Cir. 2008) (holding that a third party lacks standing to enforce a
`governmental consent decree where, as here, the decree does not include
`“a clear expression of a different intent”). We have not definitively
`resolved whether third-party beneficiaries always lack standing to
`enforce a consent decree or, rather, whether third-party beneficiaries are
`presumed to lack standing absent a clear statement to the contrary. See
`id. But because the FTC consent decree contains no indication that third-
`
`

`

`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`16
`
`evaluate whether she would be prejudiced in a way that
`warranted mandamus relief.8
`
`2.
`
`The rest of the Bauman factors similarly do not support
`granting the writ. Bozic has no colorable argument that
`“[t]he district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or
`manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules.”
`Bauman, 557 F.2d at 655. And although it appears that the
`interaction of the first-to-file rule and § 1404(a) is a question
`of first impression, see id., we have now decided that
`question in the process of evaluating the “clear legal error”
`Bauman factor. Thus, the “first impression” Bauman factor
`has little relevance here. See Christensen v. U.S. Dist. Court,
`844 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (“All factors are not
`relevant in every case and the factors may point in different
`directions in any one case.”).
`
`
`party beneficiaries have enforcement rights, Bozic’s petition does not
`require exploring this ambiguity.
`
`Moreover, there is no dispute that the Eastern District has both
`subject matter jurisdiction over the remainder of this dispute and
`personal jurisdiction over Defendants. There is thus no risk that the
`Eastern District might adjudicate an action when it lacks the power to do
`so. See Libby, McNeill, & Libby v. City Nat’l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 510
`(9th Cir. 1978) (“Venue is not jurisdictional.”).
`
`8 Even then, it is not clear that mandamus relief would be
`appropriate. Cf. Wash. Pub. Utils. Grp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 843 F.2d
`319, 325 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus to order
`a change in venue even though the petitioners might have been “required
`to endure the expense and inconvenience of a second massive trial”).
`
`

`

`
`
`
`BOZIC V. USDC-CASD
`
`17
`
`IV.
`
`For all these reasons, we conclude that Bozic has not
`shown the necessary clear and indisputable right to issuance
`of the writ. The petition is therefore DENIED.
`
`