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`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
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`No. 22-30388
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`Raymond Harold Kimble, III,
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`
`United States Court of Appeals
`Fifth Circuit
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`FILED
`June 12, 2023
`
`Lyle W. Cayce
`Clerk
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`Plaintiff—Appellant,
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`
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`versus
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`Correcthealth Jefferson, L.L.C.,
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`Defendant—Appellee.
`______________________________
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`
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Louisiana
`USDC No. 2:21-CV-409
`______________________________
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`Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
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`Per Curiam:*
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`Raymond Harold Kimble, III is a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson
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`Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”) in Gretna, Louisiana. Kimble claims
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`CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC (“CHJ”)—the medical care provider at
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`JPCC—denied him adequate care. The district court granted CHJ’s Rule
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`12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. We affirm.
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`_____________________
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`* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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`Case: 22-30388 Document: 00516783602 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`No. 22-30388
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`Kimble
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`alleges
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`that CHJ
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`responded
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`inadequately
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`and
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`unconstitutionally to injuries he suffered in 2020 at JPCC. According to
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`Kimble, he injured himself by lifting heavy boxes on March 11, by slipping
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`and falling in the bathroom on December 17, and by slipping and falling after
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`taking a shower on December 19. Although CHJ staff examined Kimble,
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`ordered x-rays, and prescribed and administered medication, Kimble
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`nevertheless claims they provided constitutionally deficient medical care—
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`namely, by ignoring his requests for specific types of care such as
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`appointments with certain medical professionals.
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`Kimble filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various
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`defendants, including CHJ. He alleges that CHJ has a policy or practice of
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`wantonly disregarding detainees’ serious medical needs, which he says was
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`the moving force behind the CHJ staff’s alleged indifference to his 2020
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`injuries. The magistrate judge disagreed. She determined that the facts
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`alleged in Kimble’s complaint did not rise to the level of deliberate
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`indifference and thus could not support a constitutional violation.
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`Accordingly, she recommended that CHJ’s motion to dismiss be granted and
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`that Kimble’s claims against CHJ be dismissed with prejudice. The district
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`court so ordered.
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`Kimble timely appealed. Our jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1291. We review the district court’s motion-to-dismiss ruling de novo and
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`apply the same standards. Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2020).
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`Both parties agree that CHJ should be treated as a municipal or local
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`governmental entity for purposes of § 1983. See Rosborough v. Mgmt. &
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`Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Kennemer v.
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`Parker Cnty., 2022 WL 2610239, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. July 8, 2022) (per curiam)
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`(“Even though LaSalle is a private corporation, it is subject to the same rules
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`as municipalities because private prisons engage in a fundamentally
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`2
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`Case: 22-30388 Document: 00516783602 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`No. 22-30388
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`governmental function.” (quotation omitted)). To state a claim against such
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`a local entity, Kimble must plead facts that plausibly establish “that (1) an
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`official policy (2) promulgated by [a relevant] policymaker (3) was the
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`moving force behind the violation of [his] constitutional right[s].” Peterson v.
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`City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
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`Even assuming Kimble’s complaint satisfies the first two prongs, it
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`fails the third. Kimble asserts a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-
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`indifference claim. See Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir.
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`2020) (pretrial detainees’ deliberate-indifference claims are rooted in the
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`Fourteenth Amendment, while those of convicted prisoners stem from the
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`Eighth); Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019) (subjecting
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`Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims to the
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`same analysis). To survive CHJ’s motion to dismiss, Kimble must plead facts
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`demonstrating that CHJ staff were “aware of facts from which the inference
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`could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” that they
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`“actually drew the inference” and “disregarded that risk,” and that
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`“substantial harm resulted.” Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir.
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`2020) (quotation omitted). Put differently, Kimble must plausibly allege that
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`CHJ staff believed he was at substantial risk of serious harm and that they
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`nonetheless “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
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`treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
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`evince a wanton disregard for [his] serious medical needs.” Davis v. Lumpkin,
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`35 F.4th 958, 963 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
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`Kimble does not meet this “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex.
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`Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). As Kimble himself
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`acknowledges in his complaint, CHJ staff were attentive to his maladies and
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`responsive to his mishaps. After Kimble injured himself carrying boxes on
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`March 11, he was quickly evaluated and given “remedies to help resolve the
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`pain and stiffness.” When the pain did not abate, he was later evaluated by a
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`3
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`Case: 22-30388 Document: 00516783602 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`No. 22-30388
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`nurse practitioner (twice), diagnosed with “swollen nerves,” and provided
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`“a pill twice a day to keep the nerve from swelling.” After Kimble slipped
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`and fell on December 17, CHJ staff “brought [him] to the clinic by
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`wheelchair,” where he was examined by the nurse practitioner, observed
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`overnight, and ultimately shuttled to University Medical Center (“UMC”)
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`for x-rays. Finally, after Kimble slipped and fell on December 19, a CHJ nurse
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`“immediately” examined him for a concussion and “concluded that ice
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`packs were needed [as well as] some form of pain relief.” This is a far cry
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`from the “wanton” or “reckless” disregard that the Fourteenth Amendment
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`protects against. Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307; see also Bejaran v. Cruz, 79 F.
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`App’x 73, 74 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Bejaran’s admission in his
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`complaint that the prison medical staff took x-rays of his back and that Mrs.
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`Osha gave him ‘generic,’ ‘mild medications’ refute his assertion of deliberate
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`indifference to his medical needs.”).
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`In response, Kimble claims that CHJ’s reliance on LPNs (licensed
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`practical nurses) and CNAs (certified nursing assistants) delayed his ability
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`to meet with more “educated” and “qualified” health care professionals. He
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`also highlights one instance where CHJ staff forgot to bring him ice packs and
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`anti-inflammatories, and another where CHJ allegedly pursued a different
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`treatment plan than the one suggested at UMC. But if “[u]nsuccessful
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`medical treatment,” “disagreement with medical judgments,” “acts of
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`negligence,” and “medical malpractice [are] not enough to meet [the
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`deliberate-indifference] standard,” then Kimble’s allegations likewise fail.
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`Davis, 35 F.4th at 963 (quotation omitted); see also Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d
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`459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The mere delay of medical care can also constitute
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`a[] [constitutional] violation but only if there has been deliberate indifference
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`that results in substantial harm.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted));
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`Blank v. Bell, 634 F. App’x 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that prison
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`physicians have “discretion whether to follow any medication prescriptions
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`4
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`Case: 22-30388 Document: 00516783602 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`No. 22-30388
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`in [an inmate’s/detainee’s] hospital-discharge instructions”); Stewart v.
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`Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1999) (similar).
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`Accordingly, Kimble
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`fails
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`to plausibly allege a Fourteenth
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`Amendment deliberate-indifference violation. His § 1983 claims against CHJ
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`cannot proceed without an underlying constitutional violation. Hicks-Fields
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`v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (“As is well established,
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`every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.”
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`(quotation omitted)).
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`AFFIRMED.
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`5
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