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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
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`No. 09-10721
`Non-Argument Calendar
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` FILED
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`DECEMBER 4, 2009
`THOMAS K. KAHN
`CLERK
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`D. C. Docket No. 99-00755-CR-JAL
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`RICHARD MENENDEZ,
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`versus
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`Plaintiff-Appellee,
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`Defendant-Appellant.
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`________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`_________________________
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`(December 4, 2009)
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`Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Richard Menendez appeals the district court’s denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P.
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`60(b)(1) motion for relief from a judgment denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(g) motion
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`for return of property. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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`I.
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`A grand jury issued an indictment charging Menendez with conspiracy to
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`possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
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`846, (“Count 1”); and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of
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`21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, (“Count 2”). The indictment also
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`contained a forfeiture count stating that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, Menendez
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`should forfeit all property constituting and derived from proceeds obtained as a
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`result of Counts 1 and 2, including $174,545 in United States currency.
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`Menendez entered a conditional guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 and the
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`forfeiture count, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of a motion
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`to suppress. Under the plea agreement, Menendez agreed to forfeit his interest in
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`the $174,545. At the change of plea hearing, the court noted that Menendez’s
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`guilty plea would require him to forfeit the seized currency. Menendez stated that
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`he wished to plead guilty to Counts 1, 2, and the forfeiture count.
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`Prior to sentencing, the government filed a motion for entry of an order of
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`forfeiture of the $174,545. On May 25, 2000, the district court entered an order of
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`forfeiture, but noted that, “[b]efore the agreed upon forfeiture can be accomplished,
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`the United States . . . must publish notice of the forfeiture to address any claims.”
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`The order stated that a final order of forfeiture would be entered upon adjudication
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`of all third party interests, or, if no claims were filed within 30 days of the final
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`publication of notice, the present order would be deemed a final order of forfeiture.
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`On June 29, 2000, the United States published the order of forfeiture in the
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`Miami Daily Business Review. No claims were filed within 30 days. On August
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`1, 2000, the court sentenced Menendez to 135 months’ imprisonment on each
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`count, to run concurrently, followed by 3 years’ supervised release.
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`Six years later, on July 31, 2006, Menendez filed a pro se motion for return
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`of property, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(g). He asserted that the court had no
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`jurisdiction to enter a forfeiture order, because it had failed to enter such an order
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`during his sentencing hearing.
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`The government filed a motion to dismiss Menendez’s Rule 41(g) motion.
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`On March 30, 2007, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
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`(“R&R”), recommending denial of Menendez’s motion for return of property. The
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`magistrate determined that Menendez failed to demonstrate that he had a
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`possessory interest in the seized currency, because, in the plea agreement, he
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`expressly agreed to forfeit the currency. It also noted that Menendez failed to
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`challenge the court’s finding, set forth in the order of forfeiture, that he had
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`relinquished all rights to the money. The magistrate also determined that “a return
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`of the currency that constitutes proceeds of illegal narcotics violations, and which
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`[Menendez] has already conceded is subject to forfeiture, would thwart the purpose
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`of the forfeiture statute.” It noted that Menendez pled guilty to the forfeiture count
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`contained in the indictment, which alleged that the currency constituted proceeds
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`of narcotics violations. The R&R noted that the parties had 10 business days in
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`which to file written objections.
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`On April 18, 2007, the district court entered an order adopting the R&R,
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`denying Menendez’s motion for return of property, and granting the government’s
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`motion to dismiss. It noted that neither party had filed objections to the R&R.
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`Two months later, on June 16, 2007, Menendez mailed objections to the
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`R&R. First, Menendez asserted that the amount of money seized by the
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`government was $200,000. Second, Menendez objected “to the magistrate’s report
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`and recommendation in its entirety.” He stated that the district court’s failure to
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`enter a final order of forfeiture at sentencing rendered his preliminary order null
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`and void, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to amend the final judgment. On
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`June 27, 2007, the district court struck Menendez’s objections as untimely.
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`On April 18, 2008, Menendez filed a motion for relief from final judgment,
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`under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), requesting that the court vacate the April 18, 2007
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`order denying his motion for return of property. Menendez explained that, on
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`February 7, 2007, he was
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`placed on an administrative transfer from FPC Pensacola
`and did not arrive to FCI La Tuna until April 13, 2007.
`On April 17, 2007 during mail call defendant received
`the magistrate’s R&R and filed an informative motion
`requesting an extension of time to file objections because
`of the above mentioned reasons on April 19, 2007.
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`He asserted that, because he was in transit between prisons until April 13, 2007, it
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`was impossible to file objections to the R&R. He also asserted that he first learned
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`that an R&R had been issued on April 17, 2007, one day prior to the district court
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`adopting the R&R. Menendez stated that he was unable to appeal the district
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`court’s final order, because he did not learn the district court had issued a final
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`order until June 2007, when his objections to the R&R were stricken as untimely.
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`Menendez asked the court to vacate its final order and allow him to file his
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`objections to the R&R.
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`Menendez attached to his motion a document titled “informative and request
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`for exten[s]ion of time motion to file objections to magistrate’s report and
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`recommendation.” In the document, Menendez explained that he was transferred
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`between prisons and asked for an extension of time in which to file objections to
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`the R&R. The certificate of service states that Menendez mailed the document on
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`April 19, 2007, but there is no indication that the document was stamped as having
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`been filed with the court.
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`The court denied Menendez’s motion for relief from final judgment, stating
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`that Menendez never filed a motion for extension of time in which to file
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`objections to the R&R. It also noted that Menendez failed to demonstrate that he
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`was entitled to relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
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`II.
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`We review the district court’s denial of relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for
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`an abuse of discretion. Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d
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`839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008). To show abuse of discretion, the appellant “must
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`demonstrate a justification [for relief] so compelling that the court was required to
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`vacate its order.” Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir.
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`1993).
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`Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a district court may relieve a party from a final
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`judgment or order for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
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`Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). We have held that “whether a party’s neglect of a deadline
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`may be excused is an equitable decision turning on all relevant circumstances
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`surrounding the party’s omission.” Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71
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`F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). We consider “the
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`danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential
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`impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was
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`within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good
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`faith.” Id.
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`The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Menendez’s Rule
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`60(b)(1) motion, because Menendez failed to show a “justification so compelling
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`that the court was required to vacate its order.” See Cavaliere, 996 F.2d at 1115.
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`Although Menendez alleged, in his Rule 60(b) motion, facts that would have made
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`it impossible for him to file objections to the R&R within 10 days of the R&R’s
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`filing, the length of Menendez’s delay in filing his objections his Rule 60(b)
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`motion weigh against granting the motion. See Cheney, 71 F.3d at 850. First,
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`although Menendez asserted that he moved for an extension of time in which to file
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`his objections, the district court noted and the record reflects that such a motion
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`was not filed. Menendez attached to his Rule 60(b) motion a copy of a motion
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`requesting such an extension, but this document was not marked as having been
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`received or filed by the court. Second, Menendez did not mail his objections to the
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`R&R until June 16, 2007, two months after he learned that the magistrate had
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`issued the R&R. Menendez fails to explain why he waited so long to file the
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`objections. Finally, Menendez’s Rule 60(b) motion was not filed until April 22,
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`2008, about ten months after he had learned that the magistrate had issued the
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`R&R. Again, he does not explain the reasons behind the delay. Granting
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`Menendez’s Rule 60(b) motion after such a long delay would cause prejudice to
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`the government, especially considering the fact that the preliminary order of
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`forfeiture became final on July 29, 2000, more than seven and a half years prior to
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`the filing of the Rule 60(b) motion. See id. (noting that the courts should consider
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`“the danger of prejudice to the opposing party” and “the length of the delay and its
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`potential impact on judicial proceedings” in determining whether to grant a Rule
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`60(b) motion). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Menendez’s
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`Rule 60(b) motion.
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`AFFIRMED.
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