United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eighth Circuit
`___________________________
`
`No. 12-2450
`___________________________
`
`United States of America
`
`lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
`
`v.
`
`Delmarcus Deante Johnson
`
`lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
`____________
`
` Appeal from United States District Court
`for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
`____________
`
` Submitted: February 15, 2013
` Filed: June 3, 2013
`____________
`
`Before SMITH, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
`____________
`
`SMITH, Circuit Judge.
`
`Delmarcus Deante Johnson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one
`count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
`and (b)(2). Following entry of his guilty plea, Johnson moved to withdraw his plea.
`
`

`
`The district court denied Johnson's motion to withdraw his plea. On appeal, he
`1
`argues that the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal
`Procedure 11(b)(3) because his guilty plea lacks a factual basis. Specifically, he
`asserts that nothing in the record supports a finding that the video at issue was
`"produced" using materials that moved in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C.
`§ 2252(a)(4)(B). Additionally, he contends that the district court abused its discretion
`in denying his motion to withdraw because he articulated a fair and just reason to
`withdraw his plea. We affirm.
`
`
`I. Background
`Johnson was charged in a one-count indictment with possession of child
`pornography, in violation of § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). The indictment provided that
`Johnson
`
`did knowingly possess one or more matters that contained a visual
`depiction which was produced using materials that had been mailed,
`shipped and transported in interstate commerce by any means, where the
`production of such visual depiction involved the use of [a] minor
`engaging in sexually explicit conduct and the visual depiction is of such
`conduct, including but not limited to the following digital image file:
`MOV01485.mpg, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
`Sections 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2).
`
`(Emphasis added.)
`
`Johnson, representing himself, and with stand-by counsel, entered into a plea
`agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) with the
`government in which Johnson agreed to plead guilty to the offense. Paragraph 2 of
`the plea agreement set forth the factual basis of the plea as follows:
`
`The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District
`1
`of Minnesota.
`
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`
`

`
`The defendant agrees that in or about May 2010, in the State and District
`of Minnesota, he possessed a video which depicts him engaging in
`sexual intercourse with Minor A at a motel in the Minneapolis,
`Minnesota area. The defendant agrees that the video of the sex act was
`stored on a device that was manufactured outside of the state of
`Minnesota. Therefore, the defendant agrees that the image he possessed
`was stored on materials that had been mailed, shipped or transported
`in interstate commerce.
`
`(Emphases added.)
`
`In ¶ 6 of the plea agreement, "the parties agree[d] pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
`11(c)(1)(C) that a sentence that does not exceed 36 months imprisonment[] is
`appropriate after consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
`§ 3553(a)." The government agreed to "seek a sentence of 36 months," while Johnson
`reserved the right to "seek a lower sentence."
`
`At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court expressed its intent to accept
`the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and sentence Johnson to 36 months'
`imprisonment or less. The government then reviewed the plea agreement with
`Johnson. Johnson agreed that he was pleading guilty to "possession of child
`pornography[,] in violation of 18 United States Code Sections 2252(a)(4)(B) and
`2252(b)(2)." The government then reviewed the factual basis for the plea with
`Johnson, and the following exchange occurred:
`
`MR. STEINKAMP [for the government]: Now, so here is what
`I'm going to ask you. On or about May of 2010, you possessed an
`electronic device that had on it a video, correct?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
`
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`
`

`
`MR. STEINKAMP: And it was a video of you and your then
`17-year-old girlfriend, who we've referred to in the plea agreement as
`"Minor A", correct?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: And you know who I mean when I say
`"Minor A"?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: I think we can say her initials are D.P.
`without identifying her in the courtroom.
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: But that's the person we're talking about?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: And that person was on the tape with you and
`you—that tape shows you and Minor A engaging in a sexual act,
`correct?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: And at the time you—that that was taken,
`Minor A was under the age of 18, correct?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: She was—she could consensually have sex
`under the laws of Minnesota, correct?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`-4-
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`

`
`MR. STEINKAMP: But you now know, and you didn't know then,
`that you could not videotape consensual sex between you and her under
`federal law, true?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: True.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: You agree that you now know that the law
`says that you cannot do that?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: Okay. So, therefore, do you agree that you're
`guilty of that offense under federal law?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: Okay. Let me just make one other thing clear,
`your Honor.
`
`THE COURT: Certainly.
`
`MR. STEINKAMP: You agree that the camera that was—that
`stored this video was manufactured outside of Minnesota. It was likely
`made in probably an eastern country like Korea, Japan. You're not
`saying that that camera didn't move in interstate commerce. You think
`it did, right?
`
`THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, sir.
`
`(Emphases added.)
`
`During the hearing, the court advised Johnson that it "must be satisfied that
`[Johnson's] decision to enter into this [plea] is a knowing, voluntary, conscious
`decision on [his] part." The court explained that it had to satisfy itself that no one
`threatened or promised Johnson anything in return for his guilty plea and that "[t]his
`
`-5-
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`

`
`is a voluntary decision on [Johnson's] part." Following the government's review of
`the factual basis for the plea, the court reviewed with Johnson his constitutional
`rights, including his right to proceed to trial on the charges against him. The court
`explained that Johnson was foregoing those rights by pleading guilty, and Johnson
`indicated that he understood. The court then asked Johnson's stand-by counsel
`whether he was "satisfied that the decision that [Johnson] is making here today is a
`voluntary, conscious decision on his part," and stand-by counsel replied, "Yes I do,
`your Honor. I've had a chance to discuss this plea agreement, other plea agreements
`with Mr. Johnson. I think he is intelligent, articulate. I think he understands the nature
`of the plea agreement, the proceedings here in court today, and all the potential
`ramifications." Stand-by counsel was not "aware of any reason [why the court] should
`not accept the plea agreement."
`
`Before accepting Johnson's plea, the court inquired whether the government
`was "satisfied that [it] ha[d] sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction to
`the charges in Count 1 of the Indictment if the matter did proceed to trial." The
`government confirmed that it did have sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
`After making sure that Johnson had no additional questions for the court or his stand-
`by counsel, the court asked Johnson whether he was "prepared to proceed . . . with a
`plea." Johnson responded that he was and then pleaded guilty to the charge. The court
`accepted Johnson's guilty plea.
`
`Approximately one month after the change-of-plea hearing, Johnson filed his
`first motion to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that his plea was coerced, he was
`denied adequate assistance from his stand-by counsel, he was scared, he lacked access
`to a law library, and he was mislead about the plea bargain. Thereafter, he filed a
`"Continuing Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" in which he stated, among other
`things:
`
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`

`
`3. The justice of the law should protect me although I pleaded
`guilty (involuntarily, threatened and coerced) but not had also realized
`[sic] that my alleged conduct of allegedly claiming that a backpack that
`was twenty feet away from me was mines [sic] does not fall within
`. . . the charge of possession. . . . I was tricked into thinking that I would
`be found guilty to "those" circumstances of "that" back[p]ack holding
`the camera with the alleged pornographic image of a minor sitting in a
`corner which I never claimed to be mines [sic]! I believe that in my heart
`that I should not be found guilty and there is no factual basis for the
`plea, and would request that the involuntary plea be set aside and this
`matter be set for trial to protect my innocence.
`
`(Emphasis added.) 2
`
`The court denied Johnson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, rejecting
`Johnson's argument "that the [g]overnment cannot prove that the offense with which
`he was charged and to which he entered a guilty plea affects interstate commerce."
`According to the court:
`
`[T]he government satisfied the interstate commerce element here. First,
`the plea agreement that the Defendant signed and agreed to specifically
`states that the materials used to produce the child pornography he is
`charged with possessing were produced and stored on "materials that
`had been mailed[,] shipped or transported in interstate commerce." Plea
`Agreement, ¶ 2. Second, the [g]overnment advised the [c]ourt that it had
`sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction to the charge in
`the Indictment. Plea Transcript, 36. Finally, the Defendant in his sworn
`plea admitted that the images he possessed were produced using
`materials transported in interstate commerce. Plea Transcript, 30. Such
`evidence satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
`
`Following this supplemental motion, Johnson filed two additional motions to
`2
`withdraw his plea.
`
`-7-
`
`

`
`(Emphases added.)3
`
`The court also rejected Johnson's claim that it should allow him to withdraw
`his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, explaining that Johnson
`chose to proceed pro se after the court "warned of the perils of proceeding in such a
`manner." The court concluded that Johnson's "stand-by counsel could not have been
`ineffective" given that Johnson "was his own counsel" and the court never
`"authorized hybrid representation." Finally, the court concluded that Johnson failed
`to show a fair and just reason under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B)
`to justify the withdrawal of the plea.
`
`to 36 months'
`The district court ultimately sentenced Johnson
`imprisonment—the maximum time permitted under the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
`agreement.
`
`II. Discussion
`Johnson challenges his conviction, contending that the district court violated
`Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) by failing to determine that a factual
`basis for his plea existed. Specifically, he asserts that nothing in the record supports
`a finding that the video at issue was "produced" using materials that moved in
`interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Additionally, he contends that
`the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
`plea because he asserted his innocence and articulated a fair and just reason to
`withdraw his plea.
`
`The district court's use of the terms "produce" and "produced" in describing
`3
`the plea agreement is inaccurate. As previously noted, ¶ 2 of the plea agreement uses
`the term "stored."
`
`-8-
`
`

`
`A. Factual Basis for Plea
`Johnson first argues that his plea lacks a factual basis under Rule 11(b)(3)
`because nothing in the record supports a finding that he "produced" the video using
`materials that moved in interstate commerce. According to Johnson, he only admitted
`that the video was "stored" on a device that moved in interstate commerce.
`
`Rule 11(b)(3) requires that, "[b]efore entering judgment on a
`guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
`plea." This provision is "satisfied by the existence of sufficient evidence
`at the time of the plea upon which a court may reasonably determine that
`the defendant likely committed the offense." United States v. Gamble,
`327 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
`
`United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2010). In determining whether a
`factual basis exists for the plea, the district "court may consider stipulated facts in a
`plea agreement along with any other evidence presented at a plea hearing." Id.
`"Although [a] district court [may] not [have] set forth its reasons for accepting [a
`defendant's] plea, the record [may] reflect[] that a factual basis did exist." Id.
`
`"The purpose of [Rule11(b)(3)] is to protect a defendant who is in the position
`of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without
`realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge." United States v.
`Heid, 651 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). "[A]
`district court's failure to comply with Rule 11 calls into question the knowing and
`voluntary nature of a plea, and thus its validity." Frook, 616 F.3d at 775. A
`defendant's entry of an unconditional guilty plea following "an imperfect Rule 11
`colloquy . . . do[es] not 'waive' all errors under Rule 11." Id.
`
`If a district court accepts a guilty plea based on a set of facts that plainly
`and obviously does not constitute a federal offense, but nonetheless
`determines pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) that the defendant's conduct did
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`

`
`violate federal law, then there has been a violation of the Rule 11
`scheme designed to ensure a knowing and voluntary plea.
`
`Id.
`
`Johnson and the government dispute which standard of review applies to our
`review of his alleged Rule 11 error. Johnson argues that we should apply harmless
`error, while the government argues that plain error applies. See United States v. Gray,
`581 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2009) ("When considering an alleged Rule 11 error, this
`Court must first determine if the defendant objected before the district court. If so, we
`review for harmless error, and the government has the burden of proving the
`defendant's knowledge and comprehension of the omitted information would not have
`been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty. If not, we review for plain error,
`and the burden is on the defendant to show he would have plead not guilty but for the
`Rule 11 violation." (internal citation omitted)). We need not definitively resolve
`which standard of review applies because we conclude that no Rule 11(b)(3) error
`occurred, as sufficient evidence exists from which the district court could reasonably
`conclude that Johnson committed the charged offense. See United States v.
`Christenson, 653 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2011).
`
`Our review of the factual basis for a guilty plea is limited. We ask
`only whether there was sufficient evidence before the district court
`"upon which a court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely
`committed the offense." See United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 769
`(8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). "We have held that facts
`gathered from the prosecutor's summarization of the plea agreement and
`the language of the plea agreement itself, a colloquy between the
`defendant and the district court, and the stipulated facts before the
`district court are sufficient to find a factual basis for a guilty plea."
`United States v. Orozco–Osbaldo, 615 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 2010)
`(internal quotation omitted). We may also consider facts set forth in the
`presentence report to determine whether there was a sufficient factual
`
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`

`
`basis for the plea. See Orozco–Osbaldo, 615 F.3d at 958; United States
`v. Brown, 331 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. Howard v. United
`States, 135 F.3d 506, 509–10 (7th Cir. 1998).
`
`Id.
`
`Here, Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation
`of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). A defendant violates § 2252(a)(4)(B) if he "knowingly
`possessed an item of child pornography which was transported or produced using
`materials transported in interstate commerce." United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470,
`478 (8th Cir. 2010). "[T]he government [is] required to establish that the child
`pornography [that the defendant] possessed had been transported in interstate
`commerce or produced using such materials." Id. at 479 (emphasis added). Here, the
`indictment charged Johnson with possessing a video "which was produced using
`materials that had been mailed, shipped and transported in interstate commerce by any
`means."
`
`"'Producing' is defined as 'producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing,
`publishing, or advertising.'" United States v. Fadl, 498 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2007).
`We have previously recognized that
`
`[t]he fact that "producing" is retained in the definition and placed
`alongside other terms indicates that Congress intended to retain a
`non-technical definition of the term "producing" (that is, in the sense of
`creating or making), but also sought to expand its scope to include
`activities that may not be generally considered to fall within the typical
`meaning of the term. We therefore conclude that list of terms in the
`definition reflects Congress's intention to enact a broad definition of
`"producing" that encompasses the varied means by which an individual
`might actively participate in the creation and distribution of child
`pornography.
`
`Id. at 866–67 (emphases added).
`
`-11-
`
`

`
`Johnson points out that the factual-basis paragraph in the plea agreement only
`states "that the image he possessed was stored on materials that had been mailed,
`shipped or transported in interstate commerce." (Emphasis added.) He also notes that
`he only agreed during the change-of-plea hearing "that the camera that stored the
`video was manufactured outside of the State Minnesota." According to Johnson,
`"'[s]toring' and 'producing' are not synonymous, and the statutory definition of
`'producing' in § 2256 does not include 'storing.' Therefore, mere storage of the video
`on materials that moved in interstate commerce does not come within the conduct
`prohibited by the statute." He also argues that the government's representation to the
`court that it had sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction is insufficient to
`establish the production element because the government failed to describe the record
`evidence. Thus, Johnson concludes that "[t]he district court violated Rule 11 by not
`enforcing the plain language of the statute, which requires showing that the video was
`produced—not stored—using materials that moved in interstate commerce."
`(Emphasis omitted.)
`
`But Johnson overlooks his admissions at the change-of-plea hearing, which
`support a finding that he "produced" the video found on the camera; that is, he
`"created" or "made" the child pornography or "actively participate[d] in the creation
`. . . of child pornography." See Fadl, 498 F.3d at 867. The government asked
`Johnson, "[Y]ou now know . . . that you could not videotape consensual sex between
`you and [your minor girlfriend] under federal law, true?" (Emphasis added.) Johnson
`responded, "True." By answering in the affirmative, Johnson admitted that it was
`unlawful for him to videotape the sexual encounter, i.e., "create" or "make" the child
`pornography. See Fadl, 498 F.3d at 867. In answering a follow-up question, Johnson
`acknowledged that federal "law says that [he] cannot do that," i.e., videotape a
`consensual sexual encounter with a minor. He also agreed that he "possessed an
`electronic device[, the camera,] that had on it a [child-pornography] video" and that
`this "camera . . . that stored this video was manufactured outside of Minnesota" and
`therefore "move[d] in interstate commerce." (Emphasis added.) Based on this
`
`-12-
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`

`
`evidence, the district court could reasonably infer that the camera that traveled in
`interstate commerce, which Johnson possessed and which stored the child-
`pornography video, was the same one that Johnson used to create the video. 4
`
`Therefore, we conclude that no Rule 11(b)(3) error occurred, as sufficient
`evidence exists from which the district court could reasonably conclude that Johnson
`committed the charged offense. See Christenson, 653 F.3d at 700.
`
`B. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
`Johnson also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
`motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he "timely articulated a fair and just
`reason for withdrawing the plea because he challenged [the] voluntariness of his
`plea." (Emphasis omitted.) Specifically, he asserts that he "challenged [the]
`voluntariness of the plea [that] he entered by asserting that (1) the plea lacks [a]
`factual basis and (2) he did not possess an understanding of the law in relation to the
`facts."
`
`"After a guilty plea is accepted but before sentencing, a defendant may
`withdraw the plea if he establishes 'a fair and just reason for requesting
`
`Johnson relies extensively on Sixth Circuit precedent in his reply brief. See,
`4
`e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988) ("In our judgment,
`to permit the district court to infer a factual basis in the absence of a record
`demonstrating the existence of a factual basis would tend to negate the
`well-established safeguards inherent in the Rule 11(f) mandate."). In Goldberg, the
`court had a very limited record on which to prove that the defendant affirmatively
`concealed mail fraud—a much more fact-intensive inquiry than here. The record here
`is more detailed and does not require an inference of the entire factual basis—rather,
`the circumstantial evidence (as well as Johnson's admission of breaking the law)
`allows the court to "reasonably determine that the defendant likely committed the
`offense." Frook, 616 F.3d at 776 (quotation and citation omitted); see also id.
`(circumstantial proof acceptable); United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 769 (8th
`Cir. 2009) (same).
`
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`

`
`the withdrawal.'" United States v. Goodson, 569 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.
`2009) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). "While the standard is
`liberal, the defendant has no automatic right to withdraw a plea." United
`States v. Ramirez–Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006). "Even
`if such a fair and just reason exists, before granting the motion a court
`must consider 'whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the
`charge, the length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to
`withdraw it, and whether the government will be prejudiced if the court
`grants the motion.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Nichols, 986 F.2d
`1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 1993)). However, "[i]f the defendant fails to
`establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing the guilty plea, the trial
`court need not address the remaining considerations." Nichols, 986 F.2d
`at 1201. We review the district court's decision not to allow the
`withdrawal of a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
`Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wicker, 80
`F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1996).
`
`United States v. Heid, 651 F.3d 850, 853–54 (8th Cir. 2011).
`
`We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
`Johnson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Johnson failed to establish a
`fair and just reason for the withdrawal of the plea. See id. First, we have already
`concluded that a factual basis does exist for the guilty plea.
`
`Second, the record reflects that Johnson did possess "an understanding of the
`law in relation to the facts." See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)
`("Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal
`criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
`understanding of the law in relation to the facts."). Johnson contends "that his stand-
`by counsel failed to provide him with legal research," which shows that his plea was
`involuntary because he did not understand the law. But Johnson chose to represent
`himself, and "a defendant who has elected to proceed pro se cannot later complain of
`
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`

`
`his own ineffectiveness as a ground for reversal." United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d
`389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988).
`
`Furthermore, a review of the change-of-plea transcript belies Johnson's claims
`that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea. We agree with the government that,
`"[d]uring his plea colloquy, [Johnson] indicated he was clear headed, was able to
`make decisions, understood the consequences of his plea, had sufficient time to
`review the charges, understood the . . . plea agreement that was offered, and wished
`to take advantage of the offer and enter a guilty plea." Following the government's
`review of the factual basis for the plea, the court reviewed with Johnson his
`constitutional rights and explained that Johnson was foregoing those rights by
`pleading guilty. Johnson indicated that he understood. When the court inquired of
`stand-by counsel whether counsel believed that Johnson was voluntarily and
`knowingly entering his guilty plea, stand-by counsel answered in the affirmative.
`Counsel explained that he had reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson and
`expressed his belief that Johnson "is intelligent [and] articulate" and "underst[oo]d
`the nature of the plea agreement, the proceedings . . . in court . . . , and all the
`potential ramifications."
`
`"In short, there is no indication in the record of any fair and just reason to allow
`[Johnson] to withdraw his guilty plea[], and the district court did not abuse its
`discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal." See United States v. Osei, 679 F.3d 742,
`747 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a fair and just reason
`existed for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas "because the pleas were predicated on
`his attorney's urgings and direction, he misunderstood the parties' agreement
`regarding relevant conduct for sentencing, and he demonstrated clear confusion
`. . . during the Rule 11 colloquy" where the defendant was "highly educated,"
`"testified clearly to the factual bases of his guilty pleas," "responded coherently when
`the court asked him whether he had adequately conferred with his attorneys," and
`
`-15-
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`

`
`"listened and indicated his understanding and acceptance when the court explained
`to him that his guilty pleas would be final").
`
`III. Conclusion
`Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
`______________________________
`
`-16-