Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 1 of 18
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`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`CARBYNE BIOMETRICS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
` Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-00324
`
`Defendant.
`
` JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
`FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 2 of 18
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`APPLE’S MOTION ADDRESSED EACH ASSERTED CLAIM, AND DID NOT RELY
`I.
`ON CLAIM REPRESENTATIVENESS ........................................................................................ 1
`II.
`THE FRAUD REDUCTION PATENTS CLAIM INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER ... 2
`III.
`THE AUTHENTICATION PATENTS CLAIM INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER ..... 5
`IV.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
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`i
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 3 of 18
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`
`
`Cases
`
`Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc.,
`728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................4
`
`Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .....................................................................................................1, 5, 8, 11
`
`Amdocs. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. C15-311 MJP, 2015 WL 4210890 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2015), aff'd, 676
`F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................11
`
`Blue Spike v. Google Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-01650, 2015 WL 5260506 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) ...............................................7
`
`Coho Licensing LLC v. Glam Media, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-01576 JSW, 2017 WL 6210882 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017), aff'd sub
`nom. Coho Licensing LLC v. Oath Inc., 710 F. App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................8
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................2
`
`CosmoKey Sols. GmbH & Co. v. Duo Sec. LLC,
`15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................5
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................3, 6
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................9
`
`FairWarning IP, LLC v Iatric Sys., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................7
`
`ii
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 4 of 18
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`
`
`IBM v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,
`50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................9
`
`Mytee Prod., Inc. v. Harris Rsch., Inc.,
`439 F. App’x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................5
`
`Pres. Wellness Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1559-WCB, 2016 WL 2742379 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2016), aff'd
`684 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................6
`
`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..............................................................................................7, 8
`
`Sanderling Mgmt. v. Snap Inc.,
`65 F.4th 698 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................11
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................9
`
`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................2
`
`Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................7
`
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................4, 5, 7
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc.,
`978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................9
`
`USR LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`10 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................7
`
`WhitServe LLC v. Dropbox, Inc.,
`854 F. App’x 367 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................7, 8, 10
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................................................................9
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`iii
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 5 of 18
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`Exhibit
`Ex. J
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`Ex. K
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`Ex. L
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`Ex. M
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`Ex. N
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`Ex. O
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`Ex. P
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`Ex. Q
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`Ex. R
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Document
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 10,713,656, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 11,526,886, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 9,972,010, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 11,475,105, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 10,929,512, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Excerpt from the File History of U.S. Patent No. 11,514,138, retrieved from
`the website of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Identity Theft Resource Center, Scammers Steal Deceased Man’s Identity via
`Mail, (Aug. 8, 2017), available at
`https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/scammers-steal-deceased-mans-identity-
`via-mail/
`Excerpt from Samsung’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, & Counterclaims,
`RightQuestion, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:21-cv-00238, Dkt. 56 (E.D.
`Tex. Mar. 4, 2022)
`Excerpt from RightQuestion LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:21-cv-00238-
`JRG, slip op (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2022)
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`iv
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 6 of 18
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`The asserted patents are patent ineligible. First, Apple’s motion addressed each asserted
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`claim, and did not rely on claim representativeness. Second, Carbyne’s reliance on determining
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`“aliveness” with biometrics is insufficient to save the Fraud Reduction Patents from ineligibility,
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`as the claims’ recitations are conclusory and lack the specificity of any actual technological
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`improvement or solution unique to computers or computer networks. Third, with respect to the
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`Authentication Patents, Carbyne admits that the patents merely claim means for “restricting access
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`to sensitive information” for safer and more convenient authentication (Opp. at 14), which is a
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`longstanding economic practice that can be performed mentally or manually and is therefore
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`abstract. None of the concepts identified by Carbyne is inventive, as each is routine and
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`conventional. The asserted patents are thus invalid under § 101, and this case should be dismissed.
`
`I.
`
`APPLE’S MOTION ADDRESSED EACH ASSERTED CLAIM, AND DID NOT
`RELY ON CLAIM REPRESENTATIVENESS
`
`Apple’s Motion addressed each asserted claim in both Alice steps 1 and 2. Carbyne’s
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`assertion that Apple treated one claim from each patent family as representative is incorrect and
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`appears to be based on Apple’s Motion having expressly recited the complete claim language of
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`only two of the asserted claims, rather than all 64. But Apple’s analysis did not end with those two
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`claims or fail to analyze the other claims. Instead, after reciting and addressing each limitation in
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`those two claims, Apple’s Motion further discussed the additional or different elements found in
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`the other independent and dependent claims of each patent, e.g., Mot. at 4-6, 13-15, as Carbyne
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`itself acknowledged, e.g., Opp. at 8; Mot. at 5. It so happens that the other claims within the same
`
`family have significantly overlapping language with claim 9 of the ’010 and claim 13 of the ’138.1
`
`
`1 Confirming the significant overlap in claim language and claimed concepts, applicant
`acknowledged that the claims within each family are not patentably distinct by filing terminal
`disclaimers to overcome double patenting rejections. Ex. J (’656 over ’010 and its parent, ’041);
`Ex. K at 13-14 (’886 over ’010 and ’656); Ex. L (disclaiming ’010 over its parent, ’041); Ex. M
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 7 of 18
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`
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`But overlapping claim language did not require Apple to treat claims as representative, nor did it.
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`As a result, Carbyne’s remaining arguments—e.g., that some claims’ purportedly “distinct
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`limitations” preclude any claim from being representative—miss the mark. Critically, Carbyne
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`has not identified any legally distinct elements that were not addressed in Apple’s Motion, or
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`explained any legal relevance for the purportedly “distinct” limitations it identifies. Opp. at 5-8.
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`For example, the “cloud storage” limitation neither alters the abstract idea nor adds an inventive
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`concept. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d
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`1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And Apple expressly addressed the remaining claim elements
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`argued by Carbyne. Mot. at 5 (“password,” display, storing data), 12 (“set of images”), 14,19 (data
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`storage, receipt, transmittal, “two generic processors”). Carbyne elides Apple’s descriptions of the
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`claim categories, which closely track the claims. E.g., compare Mot. at 5 (“origin of collected
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`information (virtual likeness provided by the recipient of a transaction)”), with ’656 cls. 4
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`(“wherein the virtual likeness of the face of the recipient was provided by the recipient”), 13
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`(same).2 In sum, Apple has “rebut[ted] the presumption of independent validity” by showing that
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`every asserted claim is independently invalid under § 101 because each claim within the same
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`family is directed to the same abstract idea and lacks any inventive concept.
`
`II.
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`THE FRAUD REDUCTION PATENTS CLAIM INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
`
`At Alice Step 1, Carbyne does not dispute that collecting, receiving, and analyzing
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`information (including location) about a user to enable a transaction is abstract. Opp. at 16. Nor
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`does Carbyne dispute that the USPTO repeatedly found the concept of analyzing biometric data to
`
`
`(’105 claims over ’512); Exs. N, O (both ’512 and ’138 over parent ’696). See SimpleAir, Inc. v.
`Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (disclaimers “strong clue” applicant thought
`claims not patentably distinct).
`2 Carbyne, in contrast, did not track the claim language. Compare Opp. at 8 (“providing for brand
`or vendor association”), with ’886 cl. 10 (not reciting that concept or language).
`
`2
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 8 of 18
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`determine “aliveness” ineligible under § 101. Mot. at 6; Ex. K at 7-11, 15, 18-23, 26. Despite this,
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`Carbyne wrongly contends that the same “aliveness” requirement renders these claims a
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`“technological improvement.” Opp. at 17. Carbyne is wrong.3 See Mot. at 7-9.
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`First, Carbyne does not (and indeed can not) contend the claims recite how “aliveness”
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`detection is performed or provide a technological solution for that function—omissions that are
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`fatal. Carbyne effectively concedes the claimed “aliveness” determination is a “black box” when
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`it argues that (i) “[o]ther rules [beyond the sole example provided in the specification] can be
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`applied for making this determination,” Opp. 15-16, and (ii) “how a [POSITA] would implement”
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`the claimed invention is an enablement issue (i.e., conceding the implementation is not claimed),
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`Opp. at 19. Tellingly, Carbyne focuses on the alleged problem solved by and benefits of the
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`“aliveness” determination, Opp. 15-16, rather than explaining what the solution is. Carbyne does
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`not attempt to distinguish Dropbox, which held that a feature is merely a “functional abstraction”
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`when the specification fails to describe an actual “technological solution” for its implementation.
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`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Mot. at 8-9. In short,
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`there is no disclosed “technological solution” for the claimed “aliveness” determination.
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`Second, Carbyne’s identified idea—using biometrics to determine whether a transaction
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`participant is alive—is neither a solution to a computer problem nor a technological improvement
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`and is itself abstract. See Opp. at 15. Even absent computer networks, fraudsters scheme without
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`“a physical link to the victim.” Id.4 As a result, fraud checks to prevent the use of a decedent’s
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`identity have long been routine, such as those performed by a bank before permitting in-person
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`bank withdrawals or by a notary as part of a real estate transaction. Mot. at 9. Carbyne contends
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`3 Carbyne’s allegation that Apple purportedly reads the “aliveness” determination out of the
`claims, Opp. at 17, is belied by Apple’s reference to “alive” twenty times in its opening brief.
`4 See, e.g., Ex. P (discussing scheming without a physical link as a well-known problem).
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 9 of 18
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`an “aliveness” determination is necessary only in remote transactions, Opp. at 18—but this only
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`proves Apple’s point that Carbyne’s alleged solution (“analyze a user’s biometric information to
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`determine that the user is alive,” Opp. 15) is the one traditionally used by commercial actors.
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`Historically, to prevent fraudsters from using another person’s identity, especially that of
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`decedents, market participants performed major transactions before notaries or in person.
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`Carbyne’s claims do no more than apply that concept to an electronic transaction, which is
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`insufficient. See Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (“[S]imply implementing an abstract concept on a computer” patent ineligible).
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`Moreover, Carbyne’s argument that the claims “improv[e devices’] technical functionality” by
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`claiming “a processor … with improved biometric authentication capabilities” has been rejected
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`repeatedly, as Apple previously explained. Mot. at 7-8 (citing USR LLC v. Apple Inc., 10 F.4th
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`1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2021) and Blue Spike v. Google Inc., No. 14-cv-01650, 2015 WL 5260506,
`
`at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015)).
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`The Fraud Reduction claims are unlike the claims to specific techniques at issue in Ancora
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`and SRI. In Ancora, the Federal Circuit found that “[i]mproving security … can be a non-abstract
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`computer-functionality improvement if done by a specific technique that departs from earlier
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`approaches to solve a specific computer problem.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d
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`1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). SRI likewise concerned a “specific technique” that
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`“prevent[s] the normal, expected operation of a conventional computer network.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v.
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In contrast, the Fraud Reduction claims
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`neither recite a specific technique nor prevent the normal operation of a network. Cf. Ancora, 908
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`F.3d at 1348. The claims recite a “black box” function, not a “new technique.” Opp. at 18.
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`Third, Carbyne offers no other rebuttal to Apple’s showing that the claims’ “essentially
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`4
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 10 of 18
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`result-focused, functional character” confirms their ineligibility. Opp. 18. Carbyne does not even
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`attempt to rebut Apple’s cited cases. Mot. at 7 (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
`
`F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Solutran,
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`Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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`As for Alice Step Two, Carbyne applies an improper legal framework, which fatally infects
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`Carbyne’s arguments. Courts must first set aside the abstract idea of the claims, and then consider
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`“[w]hat else is there in the claims.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014)
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`(citation omitted). But to show an inventive concept, Carbyne points exclusively to the very
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`abstract idea to which the claims are directed (compare Mot. 6 with Opp. 15, 19-20), and as such
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`its arguments should be disregarded. Regardless, Carbyne does not dispute that the claims lack the
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`necessary specificity to support an inventive concept (compare Mot. 11-12 (citing Yu and USR)
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`with Opp. 19-20 (addressing none of Apple’s cases)), and its own cases confirm the need for
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`specificity to survive Step 2. E.g., CosmoKey Sols. GmbH & Co. v. Duo Sec. LLC, 15 F.4th 1091,
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`1099 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[h]ere, the claim limitations are more specific”).5 Carbyne’s pleading only
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`confirms that the “aliveness” determination is a black box, and that the claims lack the specificity
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`necessary to support the finding of any inventive concept. Compl. ¶ 60 (reciting multiple methods
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`of determining “aliveness,” none of which is (or is even alleged to be) required by the claims).
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`III. THE AUTHENTICATION PATENTS CLAIM INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
`At Alice Step 1, the Authentication Claims are directed to an unpatentable abstract idea.6
`
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`5 Nor does Mytee have any applicability here. Mytee Prod., Inc. v. Harris Rsch., Inc., 439 F. App’x
`882, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (party supplied no rationale for motivation to combine).
`6 Carbyne’s first argument, that Samsung “did not raise § 101 as a defense in a litigation…with
`some of the same patents,” is both erroneous and irrelevant. Opp. at 9. Only one of the
`Authentication Patents was asserted in the Samsung litigation, and Samsung did raise § 101 as a
`defense and as a counterclaim in its answer. Ex. Q at ¶¶ 79, 114. Regardless, arguments that an
`unrelated entity did or did not make are not relevant to the present litigation.
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 11 of 18
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`Indeed, Carbyne does not dispute that nearly half of the asserted Authentication Claims are
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`directed to an abstract idea. Specifically, claims 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19, 22, and 25 of the ’138
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`and claims 1, 18, and 35 of the ’105 do not contain any of the three supposedly “technological
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`solutions” that Carbyne argues render the claims non-abstract—use of two processors to perform
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`bifurcated tasks, a restricted interface, and a secure storage. Opp. at 10-11. The purported solution
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`Carbyne primarily relies on—bifurcating tasks between two processors—is not recited in any of
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`the 20 asserted ’138 and ’105 claims, and the other two are recited in only seven claims. Opp. at
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`11;7 ’105 cls. 9, 11, 28; ’138 cls. 11-12, 23-24. Thus, because Carbyne has failed to defend their
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`eligibility, at least 13 of the 31 asserted claims indisputably are directed to an abstract idea.
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`The remaining 18 asserted claims are also abstract, and Carbyne’s arguments to the
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`contrary fail. Carbyne first describes the Authentication Patents as directed to “restrict[ing] access”
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`to a person’s “sensitive information” to “enable safer and more convenient authentication”—but
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`that itself is an abstract idea. Opp. at 9, 12. See Dropbox, 815 F. App’x 529, 530-32 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (finding “data security” system providing authentication associated with a user fell
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`“squarely within the [abstract] category of controlling access to data”); Pres. Wellness Techs. LLC
`
`v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols., No. 2:15-cv-1559-WCB, 2016 WL 2742379, at *7–8 (E.D. Tex.
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`May 10, 2016), aff'd 684 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding abstract claims restricting access
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`to medical records). Far from being “necessarily rooted in computer technology” to “overcome a
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`problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” SRI Int’l, Inc., 930 F.3d at 1303,
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`the problems Carbyne identifies—unprotected sensitive information and inconvenience—are not
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`unique to computers, as Apple’s unrebutted real-world analogies demonstrate. For example,
`
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`7 Carbyne erroneously contends that claim 1 of the ’105 recites a restricted interface—it does not.
`Opp. at 11. Carbyne also cites to the restricted interface in a claim that is not even asserted against
`Apple—claim 10 of the ’105. Id.
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`6
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 12 of 18
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`
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`security guards stationed at a building’s entrance enable safer and more convenient authentication
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`by keeping a copy of an individual’s photo ID, available only to security personnel, so the
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`individual need not provide their ID to security every time authentication is required. See Mot. at
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`16-17. Merely limiting the application of an abstract concept that can be performed in the mind to
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`the field of computer networking cannot save the claims. E.g., FairWarning IP, LLC v Iatric Sys.,
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`Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (invalidating claims that “merely implement an old
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`practice in a new environment”). And Carbyne did not even attempt to rebut Apple’s cited cases.
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`Mot. at 16-18 (discussing Electric Power, Yu, Solutran, DDR Holdings, FairWarning, Umbanet,
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`Intellectual Ventures, WhitServe LLC, Blue Spike, and RecogniCorp).
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`Carbyne’s three so-called “technical solutions” to restrict access to sensitive information
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`are not technical solutions at all and do not render the claims non-abstract. Far from “abstract[ing]
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`away” the details, Apple addressed each of Carbyne’s identified “technical details.” Mot. at 15-16
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`(restricted interface), 15-18 (secure storage), 14-16, 18 (processors). “The separation and
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`bifurcation of tasks” between two processors (’512 cls. 1-4, 10-14, 20-21)—the only limitation
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`Carbyne cites to distinguish the Authentication Claims from those found abstract in Prism and
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`USR—does not change the abstract nature of the claims. Opp. at 12. “Dividing and assigning tasks
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`among computers” for “distributed processing” is an abstract idea. Coho Licensing LLC v. Glam
`
`Media, Inc., No. 14-cv-01576 JSW, 2017 WL 6210882, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017), aff'd
`
`sub nom. Coho Licensing LLC v. Oath Inc., 710 F. App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The [patents]
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`recite the abstract idea of distributed processing—merely splitting up a job into smaller pieces to
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`be completed by multiple participating computers in the hierarchy.”); Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
`
`Inc., No. C15-311 MJP, 2015 WL 4210890, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2015), aff'd, 676 F. App’x
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`1007 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding abstract claims describing “using a network of multiple actors …
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 13 of 18
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`by breaking down the job into small pieces, each handled by a different actor”). Adding one
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`abstract idea to another does not render the claim nonabstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
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`855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Likewise, contrary to Carbyne’s representation (Opp. at 11-
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`12), the specification clarifies that restricting access to information can be performed with generic,
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`off-the-shelf processors. ’512 at 2:13-20. Reciting an arrangement of generic computer
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`components cannot change the claim’s abstract nature. Appistry, Inc., 2015 WL 4210890, at *2-3.
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`The same is true regarding the claimed restricted interface and secure storage, whether
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`alone or together. ’512, 3:60-4:26 (secure storage), cls. 1-4, 10-14, 20-21; ’105 18:45-61 (restricted
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`interface); ’138 cls. 11-12, 23-24. Using multiple conventional computer components in
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`conventional ways to restrict access to sensitive information to enable safer and more convenient
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`authentication does not change the abstract nature of the claims. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226; WhitServe
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`LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., 854 F. App’x 367, 371 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (use of particular form of storage
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`in a system safeguarding data did not alter abstract idea of maintaining data records). None of
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`Carbyne’s cited cases is to the contrary. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336,
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`1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to “a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in
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`the software arts”); TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (claims
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`“identif[ied] a ‘specific’ improvement in computer capabilities or network functionality”).
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`At Alice Step 2, none of Carbyne’s identified concepts is even arguably inventive, and its
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`conclusory assertions to the contrary should be disregarded. Carbyne concedes that the claims
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`disclose nothing more than an “authentication technique” to address the “tedium” and lack of
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`security in authentication systems, and Carbyne’s emphasis on the alleged benefits (and not the
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`inventive concept) is telling, Opp. at 13-14. The specifications admit that this technique is
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`implemented using generic components performing generic functions, none of which is inventive
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`8
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 14 of 18
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`alone or as an ordered combination. Conclusory statements to the contrary in the complaint should
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`be disregarded. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48 (alleging improvements (e.g. “secure backup, “wiping”) not
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`described as such in specification), ¶¶ 49-50 (legal conclusions); IBM v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th
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`1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e disregard conclusory statements.”).
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`Bifurcating tasks amongst multiple processors is not inventive because the claims and
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`specification make clear that this limitation requires only generic processors to perform that
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`function. ’512 at 2:13-20 (generic processor); Opp. at 13-14; Compl. ¶¶ 42-45. This is not enough.
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`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1169–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (generic parallel
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`processing components did not render claim non-abstract); Appistry, Inc., 2015 WL 4210890, at
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`*4 (“That computers are capable of dividing a task” is “basic,” and claiming tasks “hierarchically
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`implemented by various actors…is not inventive,” nor is “separating the actors’ geographic
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`locations.”). The “secure backup” (’512 cls. 1, 11, 21), “same brand backup” (’105 cls. 1, 18, 35),
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`and “using a cryptographic key as the credential” (’105 cls. 1, 18, 35; ’138 cls. 1, 13, 25) limitations
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`do not disclose inventive concepts because the specifications do not “explain the technological
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`processes underlying the purported technological improvement[s]” contrary to Carbyne’s
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`allegations. Opp. at 14; Complaint at ¶ 46 (secure backup in the ’512), ¶ 47 (same brand backup
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`in the ’105), ¶ 48 (cryptographic key in the ’138); WhitServe LLC, 854 F. App’x at 372. Indeed,
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`the specification explains that “technical material that is known in the technical field related to the
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`invention has not been described in detail.” ’512 at 2:33-36. Instead, the claims rely on ordinary
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`storage, backup, and cryptographic operations capabilities of computers and apply those ordinary
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`functionalities in the particular context of an authentication technique, which is insufficient.
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`WhitServe LLC, 854 F. App’x at 372. Likewise, the claimed combinations are not inventive
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`because the claims merely recite “restricting access to information” with the requirement to
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 15 of 18
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`perform it on a set of generic computer components, unlike the claims in BASCOM, and no
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`limitation “necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional
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`manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality,” unlike the claims in Amdocs.
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`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Finally, Carbyne argues that, before Apple’s Motion can be adjudicated, two claim terms
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`need to be construed, but tellingly Carbyne does not propose a construction for either, let alone
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`articulate how such a construction would change the analysis. Opp. at 14. Even assuming
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`constructions most favorable to Carbyne, these elements are still not inventive. For example, the
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`“restricted interface” 8 must encompass at least a “dedicated physical connection” or an
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`“application programming interface,” which are both routine and conventional. Opp. at 6, ’105 cls.
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`10-11. As for “secure backup,” after Carbyne’s predecessor argued that no construction was
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`necessary, a court construed “perform a secure backup of the record to a storage service” as “create
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`a backup of the record that is protected from unauthorized access and transmit it to a storage
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`service,” which is routine and conventional. Ex. R at 14-15. Backup of information protected from
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`unauthorized access is an age-old practice. Thus, no claim construction issues preclude dismissal.
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`Sanderling Mgmt. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 703-04 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal where
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`plaintiff identified terms for construction but failed to provide proposed constructions or explain
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`how its constructions would make any difference to the Alice analysis).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For these reasons, Apple respectfully asks the Court to dismiss with prejudice.
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`8 Carbyne argues that “restricted interface” may not be generic because Samsung’s IPR petition
`failed to identify it in one art combination—but Carbyne conflates § 102 with § 101. Berkheimer
`v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“In the § 101 inquiry, … novelty and obviousness
`… are ‘of no relevance.’”) (citation omitted).
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 16 of 18
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`Dated: June 28, 2023
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` Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
`Texas Bar No. 24001351
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`James Travis Underwood
`Texas Bar No. 24102587
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`102 North College, Suite 800
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`travis@gillamsmithlaw.com
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`James R. Batchelder (pro hac vice)
`Andrew Radsch
`James Mack (admission pending)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1900 University Avenue
`East Palo Alto, California 94303-2284
`Telephone: (650) 617-4000
`Facsimile: (650) 617-4090
`James.Batchelder@ropesgray.com
`Andrew.Radsch@ropesgray.com
`James.Mack@ropesgay.com
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`Cassandra Roth (pro hac vice)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1211 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10036-8704
`Telephone: (212) 596-9000
`Facsimile: (212) 596-9090
`Cassandra.Roth@ropesgray.com
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`Allen S. Cross (pro hac vice)
`Nicole Pobre (pro hac vice)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
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`11
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`Case 1:23-cv-00324-ADA Document 31 Filed 06/28/23 Page 17 of 18
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`Telephone: (202) 508-4600
`Facsimile: (202) 508-4650
`Allen.cross@ropesgray.com
`Nicole.Pobre@ropesgray.com
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`S. Lara Ameri (pro hac vice)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`Prudential Tower
`800 Boylston Street
`Boston, Massachusetts 02199-3600
`Telephone: (617) 951-7000
`Facsimile: