Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 1 of 29
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`Exhibit 35
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 2 of 29
`Case 4:11-cv-06357-YGR Document 94 Filed 05/09/12 Page 1 of 28
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`
`
`William E. Thomson, Jr. (SBN 47195)
`wthomson@brookskushman.com
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`601 S. Figueroa St., Suite 2080
`Los Angeles, CA 90017-5726
`Tel: (213) 622-3003
`Fax: (213) 622-3053
`
`Mark A. Cantor (Pro Hac Vice)
`mcantor@brookskushman.com
`John S. Le Roy (Pro Hac Vice)
`jleroy@brookskushman.com
`Marc Lorelli (Pro Hac Vice)
`mlorelli@brookskushman.com
`John P. Rondini (Pro Hac Vice)
`jrondini@brookskushman.com
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`1000 Town Center, Twenty-Second Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`Tel.: (248) 358-4400
`Fax: (248) 358-3351
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Ancora Technologies, Inc.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 4:11-cv-06357-YGR
`
`
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S
`OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
`
`
`
`Hearing Date:
`
`June 15, 2012
`
`10:00 AM
`
`Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`
`
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`APPLE, INC.
`
`
`
`Counterclaimant,
`
`v.
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`Counterdefendant.
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`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LAW ...................................................................................... 3
`
`III.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES ............................................................................ 5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`A. “Non-Volatile Memory” ............................................................................................. 6
`
`B. “BIOS” ........................................................................................................................ 8
`
`C. “Program”.................................................................................................................. 11
`
`D. “Volatile Memory” ................................................................................................... 13
`
`E. “License Record”....................................................................................................... 16
`
`F. “verifying the program using at least the verification structure
` from the erasable non-volatile memory of the BIOS” ............................................. 18
`
`G. Apple’s “Ordering” Argument ................................................................................. 19
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 22
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007)........................................................................................... 12
`
`Baldwin Graphic System v. Siebert, Inc.,
`
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)......................................................................................... 19
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed.Cir.2002)............................................................................................. 3
`
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................... 6, 13
`
`Exxon Research and Eng’g Co., v. United States,
`
`265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................... 7, 15
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2011)............................................................... 3, 5, 11, 16, 18, 19
`
`Fuijitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs Operations, Inc.,
`
`821 F.Supp.2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................... 14
`
`Gart v. Logitech, Inc.,
`
`254 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................... 2
`
`Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc.,
`
`381 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................... 3
`
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc,
`
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)......................................................................................... 21
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed.Cir.2004)............................................................................................. 18
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir. 1995)...................................................................................... 3, 4, 14
`
`McCarty v. Lehigh Val R.R.,
`
`160 U.S. 110, 16 S.Ct. 240 (1895) .................................................................................... 17
`
`Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
`
`244 F.3d 1365 (Fed.Cir.2001)............................................................................................. 5
`
`O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., Ltd.,
`
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)........................................................................................... 5
`
`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................ 3, 4, 7, 14, 17, 18,19
`
`Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc.,
`
`451 F.3d 841 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................... 11, 21
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni,
`
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed.Cir. 1998).......................................................................................... 17
`
`Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC,
`
`588 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................. 6, 8, 13, 14
`
`Southwall Technologies, Inc v. Cardinal IG Company,
`
`54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)................................................................................... 4
`
`Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Tech, Inc.,
`
`607 F.3d 784, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................... 5
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Enter. Am. LLC,
`
`669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................. 3, 9, 12, 19
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`
`103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................. 3
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`
`90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........................................................................... 3, 4, 9
`
`
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`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 6 of 29
`Case 4:11-cv-06357-YGR Document 94 Filed 05/09/12 Page 5 of 28
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`In December 2010, Ancora Technologies, Inc. (“Ancora”) filed suit against Apple, Inc.
`
`(“Apple”) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941 (‘941) titled “Method of Restricting
`
`Software Operation Within A License Limitation.” (Declaration of John P. Rondini, ¶2, Ex. 1.)
`
`The invention, as the title suggests, covers techniques for limiting unauthorized software use on
`
`computers.
`
`
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`The ‘941 invention uses the memory of a computer’s Basic Input Output System
`
`(“BIOS”) to store a “license record” for a licensed program, i.e., a program that is permitted to
`
`run on the computer. When the program is executed on the computer, the license record stored
`
`in the BIOS is used to “verify” that the program is permitted to run on that computer. Other
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`facets of the invention are recorded in the claims. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference:
`
`A method of restricting software operation within a license for use
`1.
`with a computer including an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of the
`computer, and a volatile memory area the method comprising the steps of:
`
`selecting a program residing in the volatile memory;
`
`using an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable, non-volatile
`memory of the BIOS, the verification structure accommodating data that includes
`at least one license record,
`
`verifying the program using at least the verification structure from the erasable
`non-volatile memory of the BIOS, and
`
`acting on the program according to the verification.
`
`A distinguishing aspect of Ancora’s invention is the establishment of a “verification
`
`
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`structure” in the BIOS memory area of the computer. As recognized in the Background of the
`
`‘941 Patent, the invention prevents “hacking” and installation of unauthorized software. When
`
`the Patent Office allowed the ‘941 patent, the Examiner extolled some of the virtues of the
`
`invention:
`
`
`[T]he key distinction between the present invention and the closest prior art, is
`that [the prior art systems] run at the operating system level and BIOS level,
`respectively. More specifically,
`the closest prior art systems, singly or
`collectively, do not teach licensed programs running at the OS level interacting
`with a program verification structure stored in the BIOS to verify the program
`using the verification structure and having a user act on the program according to
`
`1
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`the verification. Further, it is well known to those of ordinary skill of the art that a
`computer BIOS is not setup to manage a software license verification structure.
`The present invention overcomes this difficulty by using an agent to set up a
`verification structure in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS.
`(Rondini Decl. ¶3, Ex. 2, File History, 2/20/02 Notice of Allowability, ANCA 722.)
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`
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`The ‘941 Patent was also subject to a Reexamination Proceeding in the Patent Office.
`
`Microsoft requested the re-examination during an earlier dispute with Ancora. Microsoft
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`submitted an exhaustive list of reasons why it believed the ‘941 Patent should be invalidated.
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`(Rondini Decl. ¶4, Ex. 3, Reexamination File History, Request, ANCA 2409-2447.) Upon
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`undertaking the Reexamination, the Patent Office concluded: “The patentability of claims 1-19 is
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`confirmed.” (Rondini Decl. ¶5, Ex. 4, Re-Examination Certificate, ANCA 2662.)
`
`
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`Because the validity of the ‘941 Patent is now beyond dispute, Apple seeks to change the
`
`scope of the patent under the guise of claim construction. But, as the Federal Circuit has
`
`repeatedly explained, claim construction “is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
`language in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.” Gart v.
`
`Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
`
`
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`Apple improperly attempts to narrow the claims in a thinly veiled attempt to avoid
`
`infringement of the claims as they are actually written. While the Court may interpret technical
`
`claim terms to assist the jury in understanding their meaning, it should not change the scope of
`
`the claims to something different than what the Patent Office allowed.
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`II.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LAW
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`“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of the patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Claim terms should
`
`generally be “given their ordinary and customary meaning” to those skilled in the art as informed
`
`by the specification. ld. at 1312-14. However, it is not necessary to construe every claim. E.g.
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the
`
`district court did not err by rejecting defendants’ construction and instructing the jury to give the
`
`claim term its “ordinary meaning”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy”).
`
`
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`There are only two exceptions to the general rule that words are generally given their
`
`ordinary and customary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the
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`specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Enter. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
`
`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1996)). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of
`
`the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quoting CCS Fitness,
`
`Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standard for disavowal of
`
`claim scope is similarly exacting.” Id. at 1366. “Absent a clear disavowal or contrary definition
`
`in the specification or the prosecution history, the patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim
`
`language.” Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`
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`Although a patentee may use the specification to assign unique definitions to claim terms,
`
`when it does so expressly and clearly as set forth above, limitations from the written description
`
`should not be imported into the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315-16, 1320, 1323 ([A]lthough
`
`the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
`
`warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”); Markman v. Westview
`
`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The
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`written description part of the specification does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the
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`function and purpose of the claims.”) Nevertheless, a claim is read “in the context of the entire
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`patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. In particular, the description of an embodiment
`
`in the specification does not, without more, limit the claims to that single embodiment. Id. at
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`1323 (“we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single
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`embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment”).
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`A patent’s prosecution history can also be considered. Id. at 1317 (“Like the specification, the
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`prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.”).
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`
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`While the Court may consider other evidence extrinsic to the patent, the use of extrinsic
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`evidence (such as expert testimony and dictionaries) must be secondary and subservient to the
`
`intrinsic evidence. As explained in Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, the Federal Circuit “view[s]
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`extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in
`
`determining how to read claim terms, for several reasons.” For example, extrinsic evidence is
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`not tied to the teachings of the patent and “undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk
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`that it will be used to change the meaning of the claims.” Id. at 1319. Indeed, it is improper to
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`rely on extrinsic evidence where “the claims, specification and file history” adequately define a
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`claim term. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. The intrinsic evidence defines the public record from
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`which the public is entitled to rely. Id. (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79.) “Allowing the
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`public record to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert
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`testimony, would make this right meaningless.” Id. (citing Southwall Technologies, Inc. v.
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`Cardinal IG Company, 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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`Case 4:11-cv-06357-YGR Document 94 Filed 05/09/12 Page 9 of 28
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`
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
`
`Apple contends that almost every claim term of the asserted independent claim 1 requires
`
`construction in this case. Claim 1 is reproduced below with the bolded language Apple has
`
`identified for construction.
`
`1. A method of restricting software operation within a license for use with a
`computer including an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of the
`computer, and a volatile memory area; the method comprising the steps of:
`selecting a program residing in the volatile memory,
`
`using an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable, non-
`
`volatile memory of the BIOS, the verification structure accommodating data
`that includes at least one license record,
`
`verifying the program using at least the verification structure from the
`erasable non-volatile memory of the BIOS, and
`
`acting on the program according to the verification.
`
`Claim construction is not a right. Claims are only construed when there is an “actual
`
`
`
`dispute” concerning the meaning a particular claim term. O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond
`
`Innovation Technology Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). And, if concluding that
`
`the ordinary meaning applies, that is all claim construction requires. Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1207
`
`(holding district court did not err by rejecting defendant’s construction and instructing jury that
`
`ordinary meaning applies); Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Tech., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 798 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010) (affirming district court’s choice to state term’s ordinary meaning applies rather than
`
`providing construction.); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`
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`No bonafide dispute over the meaning of the claim terms exist in this case. Apple – not
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`Ancora – has requested all of the constructions at issue. Ancora does not believe that claim
`
`construction is necessary for any claims. The patent claims are easily understood by one skilled
`
`in the art. What is revealed by Apple’s excessive terms and detail-laden constructions is that
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`Apple seeks to avoid infringement of the claims as actually written.
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`
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`Until Ancora receives Apple’s claim construction brief, it is unable to understand the full
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`nature of Apple’s alleged dispute over the identified claim terms. Accordingly, Ancora will
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`appropriately and fully respond in its reply brief. This is especially true on the terms that Apple
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`contends are indefinite, a contention for which Apple bears the burden of proof by clear and
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`convincing evidence. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005).
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`
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`The parties have agreed on the construction for one phrase as set forth below.
`
`Claim Term/Phrase
`“verification structure accommodating data
`that includes at least one license record”
`
`
`Agreed Construction
`data structure for verifying whether a program
`is licensed that includes at least one license
`record
`
`
`
`A.
`
`
`“Non-Volatile Memory”
`
`Claim Term/Phrase
`“non-volatile memory”
`
`
`Ancora Construction
`memory
`that
`is maintained
`when the power is removed
`
`Apple Construction
`Indefinite
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`
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`This term is recited throughout claim 1 and, as Apple’s expert admits, is well-known to
`
`those of skill in the art: “the ordinary meaning of ‘non-volatile memory’ is memory that does not
`lose its data when power is removed.” (Rondini Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 6, Kelly Decl., ¶23.)1 Indeed,
`Apple has 600 U.S. patents that describe “non-volatile memory.” (Rondini Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 16.)
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`Despite this reality, Apple contends that the term is “indefinite,” i.e., it cannot possibly be
`
`construed.
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`Indefiniteness is an invalidity defense that Apple must establish by clear and convincing
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`evidence. Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1348. A claim may be held invalid as indefinite only if it is
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`impossible to understand. Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1076
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be
`
`formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have
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`
`
` 1
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` Ancora’s expert similarly contends that “information stored in non-volatile memory is
`preserved for use after the power is removed.” (Rondini Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 5, Jestice Decl., ¶5.)
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 12 of 29
`Case 4:11-cv-06357-YGR Document 94 Filed 05/09/12 Page 11 of 28
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`held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds. Only claims not
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`amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.”) (citations and internal
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`quotation marks omitted). Indeed, only where “a claim is insolubly ambiguous, and no
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`narrowing construction can properly be adopted” can a claim be indefinite. Exxon Research and
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`Eng’g Co., v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`Apple’s expert acknowledges that the ‘941 Patent does not provide a special meaning or
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`definition for the term “non-volatile memory.” (Rondini Decl. ¶9, Ex. 8, Kelly Dep. Tr. at p. 77,
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`line 20 - p. 78, line 2.) Despite this acknowledgement that the term “non-volatile memory” is
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`well known to those of skill in the art (Rondini Decl. ¶7, Ex. 6, Kelly Decl., ¶23), Apple’s expert
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`inexplicably contends that the term is “hopelessly ambiguous” (Id., Ex. 6, Kelly Decl., ¶21).
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`Neither Kelly, nor Apple, has provided any analysis whatsoever to support this bald contention.
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`To the extent the Court is inclined to construe the term “non-volatile memory,” it should
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`adopt the “standard definition” that the Patent Examiner expressly provided during the original
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`examination of the ‘941 Patent:
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`the standard definition of “non-volatile” memory [is] memory that is maintained
`even when the power is removed from the storage system
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`(Rondini Decl. ¶3, Ex. 2, 6/21/01 Office Action, ANCA 669-670.)
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`This is the definition provided in the intrinsic record and should be adopted. “Like the
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`specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor
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`understood the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The ‘941 patent similarly references ROM
`and E2PROM when discussing non-volatile memory. (Rondini Decl. ¶2, Ex. 1, Col. 1, line 65 –
`col. 2, line 1; col. 4, lines 51-52.)
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`
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`Consistent with the specification and prosecution history, third party publications also
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`confirm this well-understood meaning. (Rondini Decl. ¶8, Ex. 7, ANCA 2870, The Microsoft
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`Computer Dictionary (1998), p. 246: “nonvolatile memory n. A storage system that does not
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`lose data when power is removed from it. Intended to refer to core memory, ROM, EPROM,
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`flash memory.”)
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 13 of 29
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`Because the term “non-volatile memory” is well-known to those of skill in the art
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`(including Apple and its expert), the term is amenable to construction and is, therefore, not
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`indefinite. Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d at 1076 (“If the meaning
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`of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be
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`one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to
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`avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds. Only claims not amenable to construction or
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`insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.”). Apple has not proposed a construction for “non-volatile
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`memory.” Ancora’s construction should be adopted.
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`
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`B.
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`
`“BIOS”
`
`Claim Term/Phrase
`“BIOS”
`
`
`Ancora Construction
`software routines that handle
`startup operations
`
`Apple Construction
`software routines on IBM PC
`compatible
`computers
`that
`handle startup operations and
`support the transfer of data
`among peripheral devices
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`
`
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`This term also first appears in preamble of claim 1: “a computer including an erasable,
`non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of a computer.” (emphasis added). Again, the Examiner
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`provided an express definition during prosecution of the ’941 patent. The Examiner stated:
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`The Microsoft Computer Dictionary, 5th Edition, 2002 defines BIOS as “the set of
`essential software routines that test hardware at startup, starts the operating
`system, and supports the transfer of data among hardware devices.” This
`definition is consistent with the specification of the ‘941 patent. Since a BIOS is
`therefore defined by the functional descriptive material contained within it, one
`skilled in the art would consider any non-functional descriptive material, such as
`tables, to be part of the BIOS only if it is made and used by the functions of the
`BIOS itself. This does not preclude such material being also used or modified by
`programs located outside of the BIOS, such as applications running in an
`operating system. The fact that a program or table resides in non-volatile memory
`does not necessarily mean that it is part of the BIOS. It is therefore the case that a
`reasonable examiner would only consider a table to be in a BIOS if it were, at a
`minimum, created by a function residing in the BIOS.
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 14 of 29
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`(Rondini Decl. ¶4, Ex. 3, Order Granting Request for Reexamination, pp. 8-9, ANCA 2568-
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`2569.)
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`
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`Apple seeks to deviate from the Examiner’s construction in two significant ways. First,
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`Apple injects “IBM PC” in a blatant attempt to exclude computers bearing Apple’s brand. No
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`law supports Apple’s request to limit a claim to a particular brand of product. Claim 1 broadly
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`recites a “BIOS of a computer,” not “BIOS of an IBM computer” as argued by Apple. Vitronics,
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`90 F.3d at 1582 (“we look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the
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`patented invention.”).
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`
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`The ‘941 Patent does not mention an “IBM PC” or any computer brand for that matter.
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`On the contrary, the ‘941 Patent expressly defines the claim term “computer” broadly: “[i]n the
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`context of the present invention, a ‘computer’ relates to a digital data processor.” (Rondini Decl.
`
`¶2, Ex. 1, ‘941 Patent, 3:18-19.) Why would the inventors have wanted to limit the scope of
`their invention to a particular brand of computer? On the contrary, during examination, the
`inventors made clear that: “all computers must have a BIOS.” (Rondini Decl. ¶3, Ex. 2,
`
`2/5/2002 Amendment, p. 7, ANCA 715, emphasis added.) Nowhere in the intrinsic evidence are
`
`there any indications of limiting the claims to an IBM computer, let alone a clear and
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`unmistakable disavowal of claim scope as is required for such a draconian construction.
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`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366.
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`
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`Apple presents an expert declaration that contradicts the intrinsic evidence and, therefore,
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`it should not be considered. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. John Kelly states: “The term ‘BIOS’
`
`was specific to IBM PCs or compatibles and was not associated with computers that were not
`
`IBM PCs.” (Rondini Decl. ¶7, Ex. 6 at ¶ 32.) Not only is this statement legally irrelevant, it is
`
`incorrect.
`
`
`
`Non-IBM computers (both before and after the ‘941 Patent was filed) included “BIOS.”
`
`Long before IBM computers, for example, the Commodore 64 computer had “BIOS.” (Rondini
`
`Decl. ¶10, Ex. 9, 1983 Commodore 64 User’s Guide: Section 6.3: “The BIOS Programs,” ANCA
`
`1610-1613.) Apple documents from the mid-1990’s confirm that Apple’s “Macintosh” brand of
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 52-5 Filed 04/27/20 Page 15 of 29
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`computers also included “BIOS.” (Rondini Decl. ¶11, Ex. 10, 1995 Apple Macintosh User
`
`Guide, p. 43 (ANCA 2716): “area in the BIOS”, “ROM BIOS,” p. 66 (ANCA 2739): “system
`
`BIOS,” p. 119: (ANCA2792) “BIOS calls.”) Apple further attempted to license its “Mac ROM
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`BIOS” to third parties during the 1990’s. (Rondini Decl. ¶12, Ex. 11, Info World, ANCA 2214-
`
`2215.)
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`
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`Apple’s patent applications illustrate that the iPhone (Rondini Decl. ¶13, Ex. 12, Fig. 5,
`
`ANCA 2879), Apple laptops (Id., Ex. 12, Fig. 3, ANCA 2877) and desktops (Id., Ex. 12, Fig. 4,
`ANCA 2878) all include BIOS. (See, e.g., Id., Ex. 12, U.S. Patent Publication No.
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`2011/0090380, ¶70 and ¶80, ANCA 2925-2926.) As explained in the application: “the
`memory 18 may store firmware for the electronic device 10, such as a basic input/output system
`(BIOS).” (Id. at ¶80 ANCA 2926; emphasis added.) Despite Apple’s contention that “BIOS” is
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`only used on an “IBM PC,” Apple’s own real world evidence proves otherwise. This objective
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`evidence confirms the fact that persons of ordinary skill in the art do not interpret the term
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`“BIOS” as being limited to “IBM PC compatible computers.”
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`
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`As explained by Ancora’s expert, Mr. Jestice:
`
` I
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` understand that Apple contends that BIOS is only present in “IBM” computers,
`presumably to exclude “Apple” computers. That is not correct because virtually
`all computers have BIOS. Any computer that does not include BIOS would
`require the user to manually input the system initialization parameters described
`above at start-up. I am not aware of