`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION
`
`VIRNETX INC. AND
`LEIDOS, INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`Civil Action No. 6:12-cv-00855
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`APPLE’S SUR-REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO VIRNETX’S MOTION
`FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND ITS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF A NEW TRIAL ON
`DAMAGES
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 57577
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`VirnetX Cannot Avoid a New Trial by Mischaracterizing the Normal Rule ..................... 1
`
`Speculation Does Not Warrant Departing from the Federal Circuit’s Normal Rule .......... 3
`
`A New Trial Is Necessary to Prevent Injustice ................................................................... 5
`
`Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 57578
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada,
`591 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
`369 U.S. 469 (1962) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
`477 U.S. 299 (1986) ...................................................................................................................2
`
`Oiness v. Walgreen Co.,
`88 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1996)................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp.,
`920 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................3
`
`Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp.,
`773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 137 S.
`Ct. 734 (2017) ............................................................................................................................2
`
`Ross v. Bernhard,
`396 U.S. 531 (1970) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
`07-190, Dkt. 266 (D. Del. Aug. 19, 2011) .................................................................................3
`
`TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
`943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................3, 4, 5
`
`Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign. Co.,
`69 F.3d 512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)..................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................1
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`792 F. App’x 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ....................................................................................1, 2, 3
`
`WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`913 F.3d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................1, 3, 4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: 57579
`
`
`VirnetX’s reply rehashes the arguments in its opening brief without acknowledging, let
`
`alone addressing, the critical question: whether any basis exists to depart from the Federal Circuit’s
`
`normal rule. That rule provides that when the basis of liability underlying the jury’s verdict is
`
`narrowed, and “the jury rendered a single verdict on damages, without breaking down the damages
`
`attributable to each patent,” a new damages trial is required. VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 792 F.
`
`App’x 796, 812 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503
`
`F.3d 1295, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). That is what should happen here. All that remains are the two
`
`patents asserted against VOD, and while the parties presented conflicting evidence concerning
`
`damages or value associated with that, “the jury did not have to decide whether the $1.20 per-
`
`unit figure would be correct if only VPN on Demand infringed.” Id. at 813; Dkt. 825 at 10–15.
`
`The amount of damages the jury might have awarded from VOD alone is unknowable from the
`
`verdict and the normal rule requires a new trial. See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`
`913 F.3d 1067, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2019). VirnetX asks the Court to ignore this binding precedent and
`
`guess what the jury might have done had it decided damages for VOD. VirnetX also argues that
`
`Apple should be denied its Seventh Amendment right to a damages trial based on an award of
`
`equitable relief in the form of an ongoing royalty, which itself was based on an infringement
`
`verdict that no longer stands. “What might have been” is not enough to disregard Apple’s Seventh
`
`Amendment right to have a jury decide damages for VOD alone.
`
`I.
`
`VirnetX Cannot Avoid a New Trial by Mischaracterizing the Normal Rule
`
`The Federal Circuit’s “normal rule” requires a new trial in this case. Dkt. 825 at 6–8, 10–
`
`15; Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1310; WesternGeco, 913 F.3d at 1074. In its reply, VirnetX attempts to
`
`avoid this “normal rule” by arguing it only applies when “the verdict does not reveal the means by
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 57580
`
`
`which the jury calculated damages.”1 Dkt. 828 at 4 (quoting from Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
`
`Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)). But that is exactly this case. The verdict does not reveal how the
`
`jury calculated damages for VOD alone because the jury was never asked to decide that question.
`
`VirnetX, 792 F. App’x at 812. Regardless, Memphis supports granting a new trial here. There, the
`
`jury’s verdict “did not specify how much” of its award was compensatory damages or damages
`
`based on the value of constitutional rights; the latter category could not be awarded as damages.
`
`Memphis, 477 U.S. at 310, 312. Because it was “likely, although not certain, that a major part of
`
`these damages was intended to ‘compensate’ … for” the defendant’s constitutional rights, the case
`
`had to “be remanded for a new trial[.]” Id. at 312–13. So too here. Even though it may “not [be]
`
`certain” whether a “major part” of the jury’s damages award was intended to compensate for
`
`FaceTime, that possibility requires a new trial. See id.; Dkt. 825 at 6–8, 10–15.
`
`Although VirnetX purports to distinguish four Federal Circuit cases applying the “normal
`
`rule,” those distinctions are mischaracterizations. VirnetX says that in Promega, “the Federal
`
`Circuit did not discuss the necessity of a retrial,” Dkt. 828 at 5, but it did: “[s]ince the challenged
`
`claims of four of the five asserted patents on which the jury based its damages verdict are invalid,
`
`we vacate the jury’s damages award.” Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1358
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017). Likewise, Omega
`
`does not stand for the proposition that the “normal rule” is inapplicable if an identified “subset” of
`
`accused devices survives on appeal, as VirnetX suggests. Dkt. 825 at 5. In Omega, like here, it
`
`
`1 Although “Federal Circuit law controls ‘the distinctive characteristics of patent damages law.’”
`Dkt. 825 at 8 (citation omitted), VirnetX claims Unisplay holds that “the Federal Circuit routinely
`looks to regional circuit law in this context.” Dkt. 828 at 4 n.2. Unisplay, however, recites the
`Federal Circuit’s own rule for remittitur. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1030 (Fed. Cir.
`1996) (“This court has adopted the ‘maximum recovery rule’ which requires this court to remit
`the damage award to the highest amount the jury could “properly have awarded[.]”) (citing
`Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign. Co., 69 F.3d 512, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 57581
`
`
`was not possible to determine the damages attributable to the accused product from the jury’s
`
`damages award. Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., 920 F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`Similarly, VirnetX points out that in Siemens, the district court was permitted to determine
`
`a royalty on remand for 18 products excluded from the lost profits award. Dkt. 825 at 4. The court
`
`only did so because “[t]he parties … agreed that the royalty determination should be made by the
`
`Court based on the trial record.” Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
`
`Plastics, Inc., 07-190, Dkt. 266 at 2 (D. Del. Aug. 19, 2011). There is no such agreement here.
`
`VirnetX also argues that in WesternGeco, damages could be affirmed if the “marine surveys
`
`causing lost profits[] practiced a remaining claim.” Dkt. 828 at 5. But infringement alone was
`
`insufficient to sustain the verdict; the adjudicated infringing technology had to be “undisputed[ly]
`
`… necessary to perform the surveys upon which the lost profits award is based.” WesternGeco,
`
`913 F.3d at 1075. Here, the value of VOD was disputed, requiring a new trial. Dkt. 825 at 8, 15.
`
`VirnetX also points to Unisplay and Oiness for support, but neither warrant departure from
`
`the normal rule. In both, the Federal Circuit only awarded remittitur after it affirmed liability for
`
`all accused products and patents. Oiness, 88 F.3d at 1030; Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 519. In this case,
`
`by contrast, the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that FaceTime did not infringe and the jury’s general
`
`verdict “raise[d] the question of whether a new trial must or should be held because of the reduced
`
`basis of liability.” VirnetX, 792 F. App’x at 812. Nonetheless, both cases make clear that “[a] court
`
`is not at liberty to supplant its own judgment on the damages amount for the jury’s findings.”
`
`Oiness, 88 F.3d at 1030 (citing Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 519). Denying a new trial here would do just
`
`that and deny Apple its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on damages. See TCL Commc’n
`
`Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`II.
`
`Speculation Does Not Warrant Departing from the Federal Circuit’s Normal Rule
`
`Although the jury’s valuation of VOD cannot be discerned from its verdict, VirnetX again
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 57582
`
`
`contends that “[a] damages retrial is unnecessary … where a sustained theory of liability supports
`
`an existing damages award.” Dkt. 828 at 4. But even VirnetX admits that infringement by VOD
`
`alone cannot sustain the “existing damages award” and VirnetX’s speculation that the jury may
`
`have found VOD was also worth $1.20/unit does not mean the jury necessarily would have arrived
`
`at that same conclusion on its own.2 See WesternGeco, 913 F.3d at 1075. Indeed, VirnetX does not
`
`dispute that FaceTime is more popular and more commonly used than VOD or that the jury had
`
`evidence from which it could arrive at a different royalty for VOD alone of less than $0.06.3 Dkt.
`
`825 at 8, 15. This is why Apple’s position has always been that if infringement of one of the
`
`accused features was disturbed, “a new trial on damages should be granted.” Dkt. 775 at 38.
`
`VirnetX now acknowledges Apple’s position, but it still maintains Apple “conceded” the jury
`
`adopted Mr. Weinstein’s damages theory. Dkt. 828 at 2–3 & n.1. VirnetX’s rehashed arguments
`
`fail for the same reasons Apple explained in its opposition: Apple never argued, and the Court
`
`never found, that the jury adopted Mr. Weinstein’s royalty rate for VOD alone. Dkt. 825 at 11. As
`
`a result, a new damages trial should be granted.
`
`Finally, VirnetX repeats its argument that the Court’s earlier award of an ongoing royalty
`
`(equitable relief) can now be used to deny Apple’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on
`
`damages (legal relief). Dkt. 828 at 3; Dkt. 798 at 49–50; TCL, 943 F.3d at 1371. The Federal
`
`Circuit, however, has made clear that the “right to a jury trial of legal issues” cannot be “lost
`
`
`2 This case is therefore unlike Alaniz, where the theories of liability affirmed on appeal supported
`the entirety of the jury’s award. Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 773 (5th Cir. 2009).
`3 VirnetX tries to dismiss that evidence by claiming it indicates VOD “is worth six times as much
`as FaceTime.” Dkt. 828 at 3 n.1. Mr. Bakewell, Apple’s damages expert, testified to the following
`royalty rates: $0.01 per unit for FaceTime alone; $0.06 for FaceTime and VOD combined; and
`“less than $0.06 per unit” if only VOD infringed (4/9 (PM) Tr. 263:3–25). Thus, the jury had
`sufficient evidence to award less than $0.06/unit for VOD alone.
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 57583
`
`
`through prior determination of equitable claims.” TCL, 943 F.3d at 1372.4 Ongoing royalties are
`
`awarded as a matter of the district court’s discretion and are not limited to precisely what the jury
`
`necessarily determined. And in this case, the ongoing royalty was premised on a verdict where
`
`both FaceTime and VOD were found to infringe. Dkt. 798 at 49–50. When the Court was deciding
`
`for itself the equitable remedy of an ongoing royalty, the Court was not required to decide, did not
`
`decide, and was not even asked to consider, whether the jury had determined damages for VOD-
`
`only units. As explained in Apple’s opposition and in this sur-reply, that conclusion cannot be
`
`drawn from the jury’s verdict and a new trial should be granted. Dkt. 825 at 15.
`
`III. A New Trial Is Necessary to Prevent Injustice
`
`The jury’s failure to award a VOD-only royalty means there are “sufficient uncertainties
`
`relating to the jury’s verdict to justify the grant of a new trial.” Dkt. 825 at 16 (citation omitted).
`
`VirnetX claims a trial now would “consume scarce judicial and party resources,” Dkt. 828 at 5,
`
`yet VirnetX previously argued the opposite in this case. Specifically, VirnetX asserted that “[t]he
`
`burden on the parties and the Court for the upcoming trial is minimal at worst” and “the amount
`
`of work left to do pales in comparison to the amount of work already done.” Dkt. 522 at 4, 6. That
`
`retrial involved infringement of two features, damages, and willfulness. VirnetX cannot now claim
`
`that an even more limited trial would be burdensome, and a new trial should be granted.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`Apple respectfully requests that VirnetX’s motion be denied and that a new trial be granted.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4 See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (the “right to jury trial on the legal claims
`… must not be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones”);
`Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962) (“the legal claims involved in the action
`must be determined prior to any final court determination of respondents' equitable claims.”).
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 57584
`
`
`Dated: March 11, 2020
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Jeanne M. Heffernan
`Gregory S. Arovas
`greg.arovas@kirkland.com
`Robert A. Appleby
`robert.appleby@kirkland.com
`Jeanne M. Heffernan
`jeanne.heffernan@kirkland.com
`Joseph A. Loy
`joseph.loy@kirkland.com
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`601 Lexington Avenue
`New York, New York 10022
`Telephone: (212) 446-4800
`Facsimile: (212) 446-4900
`
`John C. O’Quinn
`john.oquinn@kirkland.com
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`Telephone: (202) 879-5000
`Facsimile: (202) 879-5200
`Michael E. Jones
`Texas Bar No. 10969400
`mikejones@potterminton.com
`POTTER MINTON
`A Professional Corporation
`110 N. College Avenue, Suite 500
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Facsimile: (903) 593-0846
`
`Attorneys for Apple Inc.
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00855-RWS Document 830 Filed 03/11/20 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 57585
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that, on March 11, 2020, the foregoing document was filed
`electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5(a). As such, this motion was served on all
`counsel who have consented to electronic service. Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A).
`
`/s/ Jeanne M. Heffernan
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`