Case 4:20-cv-00665-SDJ-BD Document 232 Filed 01/06/25 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
`2745
`
`SEAN OWENS
`
`v.
`
`TRANSUNION, LLC, et al.
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`ORDER
`
`
`
` NO. 4:20-CV-00665-SDJ-BD
`
`
`
`
`Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”) filed a motion for sanctions against
`
`pro se plaintiff Sean Owens. Dkt. 172. ECMC seeks monetary sanctions and an order that Owens
`
`post security pursuant to Local Rules CV-11(f) and CV-65.1. Owens responded by moving to strike
`
`ECMC’s motion. Dkt. 178. The motion for sanctions will be denied, and the motion to strike will
`
`be dismissed as moot.
`
`Local Rule CV-65.1 provides that,
`
`[o]n its own motion or on motion of a party and after an opportunity to be heard, the court
`may at any time order a pro se litigant to give security in such amount as the court
`determines to be appropriate to secure the payment of any costs, sanctions, or other
`amounts which may be awarded against a vexatious pro se litigant.
`
`Federal courts have the authority to impose pre-filing injunctions to deter vexatious, abusive,
`
`and harassing litigation. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008). Those
`
`sanctions apply equally to pro se parties, who have “no license to harass others, clog the judicial
`
`machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v.
`
`MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.1986). This court imposes sanctions under Local
`
`Rule CV-65.1, including pre-filing injunctions and payment of security, only after a finding that the
`
`party to be sanctioned is vexatious. Cunningham v. Matrix Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 419-CV-
`
`00896ALMCAN, 2021 WL 2796645, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2021). To determine whether a pre-
`
`filing injunction or a security requirement is warranted, the court considers four factors: (1) the
`
`party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative
`
`lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good-faith basis for pursuing the litigation or just intended to
`
`

`

`Case 4:20-cv-00665-SDJ-BD Document 232 Filed 01/06/25 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:
`2746
`
`harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party’s
`
`filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. The court may impose
`
`CV-65.1 sanctions even where a party’s vexatiousness extends only to excessive filings in a single
`
`case rather than the duplicative filing of separate lawsuits. ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers,
`
`Inc., No. 6:06-CV-197, 2012 WL 12914643, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2012).
`
`Although ECMC does not move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the
`
`court may impose sanctions sua sponte under that rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). Rule 11 imposes
`
`a safe-harbor requirement when a party moves for sanctions, but that provision does not apply
`
`when the court acts sua sponte. See id. 11(c)(2). Filing otherwise legitimate documents that use
`
`abusive language toward opposing parties or the court violates Rule 11. Whitehead v. Food Max of
`
`Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 2003). Rule 11 applies equally to attorneys and to pro se
`
`litigants. See Hicks v. Bexar County, 973 F. Supp. 653, 687 (W.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d, 137 F.3d 1352
`
`(5th Cir. 1998).
`
`ECMC’s motion argues that sanctions are warranted because Owens has repeatedly used
`
`hostile and abusive language to address opposing counsel and the court, even after the court
`
`admonished him. See Dkt. 172-1 at 30–31 (hearing transcript). ECMC points to emails attached to
`
`Owens’s own motion for sanctions, one of which includes Owens’s statement that “the magistrate
`
`[judge]’s report . . . was horribly bungled and she misquoted and misinterpreted all the related facts
`
`to which [Navient] has desperately clung to in its ever-present ploy to avoid liability.” Dkt. 168-1
`
`at 5. In that email, Owens goes on to describe the conduct of Navient’s counsel as “a
`
`demonstration of willful incompetence and spite of the law and order” and calls counsel “arrogant
`
`and disrespectful.” Id. Owens’s correspondence with ECMC’s counsel includes the following
`
`question and statement: “Is this what your community of peers considers ʻgood lawyering?’ Your
`
`actions are unconscionable and disgraceful to the profession.” Dkt. 168-2 at 4.
`
`Owens’s response to the motion for sanctions, styled a motion to strike, contains more abusive
`
`language, stating that ECMC’s motion was filed “out of scorn and contempt” in a “testament of
`
`counsel’s improper motives.” Dkt. 178 at 2. It goes on to accuse ECMC’s counsel of “calculated,
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 4:20-cv-00665-SDJ-BD Document 232 Filed 01/06/25 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:
`2747
`
`malicious, and spiteful” conduct, id. at 6, and calls the motion for sanctions “the epitome of a
`
`frivolous paper presented for the sole purpose of harassing the plaintiff.” Id. at 10.
`
`ECMC’s motion fails to address the factors to be considered when determining whether a party
`
`is a vexatious litigant. Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. The court therefore cannot grant ECMC’s motion
`
`for sanctions under Rule CV-65.1. Owens should not, however, construe the denial of ECMC’s
`
`motion as approval of his conduct.
`
`Owens is admonished that abusive language toward the court, the parties, or their attorneys
`
`will not be tolerated. Parties’ disagreements about the law, the facts, and the application of the law
`
`to the facts are expected. Indeed, they are necessary to the proper functioning of our adversary
`
`system. But even when the parties or their attorneys disagree, they must treat each other with
`
`respect and courtesy. See E.D. Tex. Loc. R. AT-3. The court possesses inherent authority to
`
`impose sanctions and to hold parties in contempt for violating its orders. Chambers v. NASCO,
`
`Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–51 (1991). Owens is warned that any further infractions may result in
`
`sanctions, contempt, or other orders as appropriate.
`
`Owens is also advised that a motion to strike is not the appropriate vehicle to voice his
`
`disagreement with the defendants’ motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (providing that “[t]he court
`
`may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
`
`scandalous matter”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
`
`1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that motions to strike are generally disfavored); Augustus v. Bd.
`
`of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (explaining that “a motion
`
`to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the
`
`controversy”; that “[a] disputed question of fact cannot be decided on motion to strike”; and that,
`
`“when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the courts generally are not
`
`willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike”). A
`
`response to a motion, see E.D. Tex. Loc. R. CV-7, is the proper means of opposing it.
`
`It is ORDERED that the motion for sanctions, Dkt. 172, is DENIED, and the motion to strike,
`
`Dkt. 178, is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 4:20-cv-00665-SDJ-BD Document 232 Filed 01/06/25 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:
`2748
`
`It is further ORDERED that Owens refrain from using hostile or abusive language in his filings
`
`with this court and his correspondence with opposing counsel.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`