Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 7025
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`WILLOW INNOVATIONS, INC.
`
` Plaintiff,
`v.
`
`
`CHIARO TECHNOLOGY LTD.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00229-JRG
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF WILLOW’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 7026
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS COMMON TO MULTIPLE PATENTS ....................... 1
`A.
`“pump mechanism” terms ...................................................................................... 1
`Elvie fails to rebut the § 112(f) presumption ............................................. 1
`1.
`Elvie disregards the dispositive intrinsic evidence .................................... 3
`2.
`The extrinsic evidence supports plain and ordinary meaning ................... 4
`3.
`the “upward flow” limitations ................................................................................ 5
`B.
`“contained within” ................................................................................................. 7
`C.
`CONSTRUCTION OF ’005 PATENT CLAIM TERMS ................................................... 8
`A.
`“pump mechanism comprises two drivers” (’005 Patent, claim 1) ....................... 8
`B.
`“the breast pump automatically senses letdown” (’005 Patent, claim 2) ............... 8
`C.
`“chassis” (’005 Patent, claim 1) ............................................................................. 8
`CONSTRUCTION OF ’229 PATENT CLAIM TERMS ................................................... 9
`A.
`“a latch suction is maintained throughout the pumping session” (’229
`Patent) .................................................................................................................... 9
`CONSTRUCTION OF WILLOW’S DESIGN PATENT CLAIMS .................................. 9
`
`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`
`i
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 7027
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
`2024 WL 137336 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2024) ................................................................................ 4
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 9
`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc.,
`796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................ 10
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 6
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc.,
`91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 2
`Mondis Tech, Ltd. v. LG Elec., Inc.,
`No. 2:08-CV-478-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2149925 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2011) ................................ 5
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................. 5, 6
`Personalized Media Communs., L.L.C. v. ITC,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 3
`Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 7028
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`Elvie’s response misinterprets the scope of Willow’s patent claims by inappropriately
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`focusing on extrinsic evidence, such as infringement contentions and selective excerpts from
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`lab notebooks and inventor emails, to suggest that the claims are limited to only one specific
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`type of “peristaltic” pump disclosed in the specification. For the most important dispute between
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`the parties—“pump mechanism”—Elvie’s proposal disregards the actual claim language (which
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`does not specify “peristaltic” pumps or “compressible tubes with actuators”), overlooks the
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`broader teachings of the patent specifications (which expressly teach a POSA that the claims are
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`directed to various types of pumps), and wholly ignores the prosecution history (which shows
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`that the examiner understood and applied a claim scope that was not so limited).
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`Furthermore, Elvie’s criticism of Willow for not presenting an expert to define the plain
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`and ordinary meaning of the claims is unfounded. Intrinsic evidence is the most authoritative
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`source in claim construction, and in this case, it alone suffices to clarify the claim scope. Elvie’s
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`reliance on extrinsic evidence is further undermined by the deposition of its own expert, Dr.
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`Stone, who admitted to disregarding parts of the specification that clearly show the claims are
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`not limited to peristaltic pumps. Ex. K at 118:3-16 (disregarding these teachings because they
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`are “not relevant to what a peristaltic pump is”). At bottom, as addressed in Willow’s Opening
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`Brief and below, Elvie’s assertion that Willow’s patents do not encompass diaphragm pump
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`architecture is contradicted not only by the intrinsic evidence but also Dr. Stone’s testimony.
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`I.
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`CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS COMMON TO MULTIPLE PATENTS
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`A.
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`“pump mechanism” terms
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`1.
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`Elvie fails to rebut the § 112(f) presumption
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`Means-plus-function under § 112(f)—a framework suggested by Dr. Stone because he saw
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`it once before (id. at 97:4-98:2)—does not apply to these terms which do not recite “means for”
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`language. Notably, Elvie fails to cite any authority finding that the claim language here invokes §
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`1
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 7029
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`112(f). Dkt. 82 at 6-8. Elvie also fails to distinguish Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc.,
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`where the Federal Circuit held that the term “detent mechanism” was not a means-plus-function
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`term because “detent … as the name for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in
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`the art.” 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Here, “pump” falls in the same category—and Dr.
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`Stone acknowledged that a POSA would understand that a “pump mechanism” refers to a “pump.”
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`Ex. K at 107:2-10; see Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (the
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`essential inquiry under § 112(f) is whether “the words of the claim are understood by persons of
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`ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”). And
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`while a “pump” is well understood to a POSA (Ex. K at 107:2-10, 107:12-108:15), Elvie resorts
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`to more extrinsic evidence to argue that their dictionary definition of “pump” is insufficient
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`because it uses “another nonce word, ‘device.’” Dkt. 82 at 6. But the same was true in Greenberg,
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`where the definition of “detent” was “a part of a mechanism (as a catch, pawl, dog, or click) that
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`locks or unlocks a movement.” 91 F.3d at 1583. Like the “pump” at issue here, Greenberg noted
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`that “[m]any devices take their names from the functions they perform,” including “filter,”
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`“brake,” “clamp,” “screwdriver,” and “lock,” but that is nevertheless “[in]sufficient to convert a
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`claim element containing that term into a ‘means for performing a specified function.’” Id.
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`Elvie’s contention that Willow’s construction is “extraordinarily broad[]” (Dkt. 82 at 7) is
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`belied by Dr. Stone, who admitted that (1) only a limited number of pumps were known in the art
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`(diaphragm, piston, centrifugal, and peristaltic pumps), (2) the universe of pumps appropriate for
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`use in a breast pump was even more limited, and (3) their “applications” (i.e., how to make and
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`use them) were also well understood by a POSA. Ex. I ¶ 23; Ex. K at 107:12-108:15. Elvie’s
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`brief, as it must, concedes this point. Dkt. 82 at 6 (“[A] POSA reviewing the claims and
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`specification of the asserted patents would not have understood ‘pumping mechanism’ to
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`2
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 7030
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`contemplate incorporating any and every ‘pump’ known at the time into Willow’s in-bra, wearable
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`breast pump.”). Thus, based on Elvie’s and Dr. Stone’s own admissions, the class of available
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`structures for the claimed pumping mechanism was as limited as it was well understood. At
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`bottom, the claims do not invoke § 112(f). See Personalized Media Communs., L.L.C. v. ITC, 161
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`F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding “detector” sufficiently structural because “[e]ven though
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`the term ‘detector’ does not specifically evoke a particular structure, it does convey to one
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`knowledgeable in the art a variety of structures known as ‘detectors’”).
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`Elvie also fails to meaningfully address the fatal inconsistency in its 112(f) positions based
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`on the prosecution of its own claim term, “mechanical or magnetic mechanism.” Dkt. 82 at 8.
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`There is no question that “mechanical mechanism” (which common sense dictates is redundant)
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`provides less structure (and maybe no structure at all) to a POSA as compared to a “pump” or
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`“pumping” or “vacuum pumping” mechanism, which conjures one of only a few different pump
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`types. Ex. K at 103:15-105:1. Accordingly, how can Elvie credibly argue here that Willow’s
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`“pump mechanism” invokes means-plus-function when it told the Patent Office that its own
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`“mechanical mechanism”—two “nonce” words to borrow from Elvie’s argument—does not?
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`2.
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`Elvie disregards the dispositive intrinsic evidence
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`Elvie argues that Willow’s “sole evidence of intrinsic support comes from the one-time use
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`of ‘equivalent.’” Dkt. 82 at 8-9. Not so. While Elvie is fixated on its foregone, but erroneous,
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`conclusion that Willow’s pump mechanism is limited to only a cylindrical, compressible tube,
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`Willow’s patents unambiguously teach in numerous instances that the claimed pump mechanism
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`is not so limited:
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`• “pumping regions 40, 42 [of tube 32] do not need to be in the shape of a cylindrical tube,
`or even a tube at all, but can be any volume shape that be changed/compressed. For
`example, the cross-section could be oval, square, trapezoid, etc. as needed to fit the device
`space.” (Ex. D at 12:2-5)
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`3
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 7031
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`• “[A]lthough both portions 32S and 32L [of flex-tube 32] are shown as tubular portions
`being circular in cross-section, the present disclosure is not limited to such, as one or both
`portions could be shaped otherwise.” (Ex. A at 17:31-34)
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`• “[T]he conduit region 32L in the embodiment of FIG. 3 is not cylindrical, but is formed
`as a pump chamber having a substantially oval face 32F and walls that extend substantially
`perpendicular thereto.” (id. at 17:35-38)
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`• “Like regions 32S and 32L, region 32S2 may be cylindrical and circular in cross section,
`but need not be.” (id. at 17:46-47)
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`• “[T]he present disclosure is not limited to [a tubular shape].” (Ex. C at 9:49-52).
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`In sum, these express disclosures inform a POSA that the claims cover the limited world of pumps.
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`Moreover, Elvie’s contention that Willow’s patents disclose “variations of peristaltic pump
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`systems, and no other pump type,” (Dkt. 82 at 9) is belied by Dr. Stone’s admission that a
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`diaphragm pump “includes a volume that can be changed or compressed,” which is an express
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`teaching in the specification. Ex. K at 26:8-11; see Ex. D at 12:2-5.
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`Elvie’s reliance on Apple Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 2024 WL 137336, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12,
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`2024), is misguided. There, the court limited the scope of the claimed “processing characteristics”
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`to “one or more signals from one or more detectors configured to detect [light]” because the claim
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`language did not permit a broader scope. Id. As the court noted, “[the recited] signals represent
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`the only signals received and processed in the claimed patient-monitoring invention.” Id. (citing
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`claim 1 of Masimo’s ’703 patent). Here, by contrast, Willow’s claims are agnostic to the specific
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`type of pump mechanism and do not support Elvie’s narrow reading.
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`3.
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`The extrinsic evidence supports plain and ordinary meaning
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`Because it has no support in terms of intrinsic evidence, Elvie doubles down on highly
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`selected portions of attorney-collated extrinsic evidence and Dr. Stone’s reliance on it. But the
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`sliver of cited extrinsic evidence tells only Elvie’s side of the story, not what happened during
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`Willow’s pioneering research and development of the first-ever discrete, wearable, under-the-bra
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`4
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 7032
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`
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`breast pump, and the broad patenting around it. Dr. Stone admitted at his deposition that he was
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`given only discrete excerpts from only one inventor notebook. Ex. K at 40:15-42:19.
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`Even a quick glance at other communications between the inventors show they had
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`possession of other pump designs, including a diaphragm pump. For example, one email discusses
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`a “piston design[]” that is not limited to a peristaltic architecture, see Ex. 7 at WLLW-ELV-
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`00314715, and diaphragm pumps are also disclosed in a different inventor’s lab notebook—one
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`that Dr. Stone was not asked to review. Dkt. 82 at 10-11; Ex. K at 40:15-42:15. Exemplary images
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`from Exhibit N showing a diaphragm (also called a membrane) are obvious. Ex. N at 6049, 6062.
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`The Willow inventors’ goal was to claim the pump mechanism broadly—as evidenced by
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`the claim language itself. Nowhere is “peristaltic” or “diaphragm” or “piston” used in the claims.
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`Elvie fails to rehabilitate Dr. Stone on these shortcomings (Ex. K at 118:3-16, 130:2-131:1), and
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`Elvie’s argument that Willow’s patents “do not disclose an entirely re-designed invention
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`comprising a new pump system,” Dkt. 82 at 12, fails in view of the proper standard by which to
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`analyze intrinsic evidence in its entirety as understood by a POSA. In any event, as discussed
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`above, Dr. Stone admitted that Willow’s patents disclose a diaphragm pump to a POSA. Ex. K at
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`26:8-11.
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`B.
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`the “upward flow” limitations
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`On upward flow, Elvie resorts to irrelevant arguments based on Willow’s infringement
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`contentions. But “claim construction is intended to be decided based on the intrinsic evidence and
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`to a lesser extent the extrinsic evidence—neither of which depend on the infringement positions
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`or infringing products.” Mondis Tech, Ltd. v. LG Elec., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-478-TJW-CE, 2011
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`WL 2149925, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2011). In any event, Elvie cannot justify a departure from
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`the plain and ordinary meaning by relying on O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
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`521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). O2 Micro merely holds that plain and ordinary meaning
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`5
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 7033
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`“may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a
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`term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” Id. Whereas here, with upward,
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`there is only one “ordinary” meaning consistent with the claim language, the Court can resolve the
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`parties’ dispute by rejecting Elvie’s unsupported construction. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing
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`Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (distinguishing O2 Micro after noting the district
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`court properly rejected defendant’s “unjustifiably narrow” construction).
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`Once again, Dr. Stone’s deposition testimony supports Willow’s position, and Elvie
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`conspicuously fails to address the fatality of the testimony to its position. Dr. Stone rightfully
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`distinguished between upward relative to the bottom of the flange (per the claims), as compared
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`to upward relative to gravity (his opinion outside the claims and specification). According to Dr.
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`Stone, “up and down are relative terms related to gravity, but the drawings relate instead to
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`direction with regard to the bottom of the flange.” Ex. K at 55:9-19. The claim language
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`consistent with the specification controls and the terms are clear—upward movement is
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`determined relative to the bottom portion of the flange. Ex. A at 50:45-51:2; Ex. F at 51:17-27.
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`In response, Elvie argues that rotation of the device “would read out the claim language ‘bottom
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`portion’ and ‘bottom’ because the bottom in one orientation would no longer be the bottom in the
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`rotated orientation.” Dkt. 82 at 14-15. But that is simply wrong and contrary to Dr. Stone’s
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`testimony, which correctly recognizes that the top and bottom of the device are always fixed—
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`thus, the key reference point (i.e., bottom portion of the flange) remains fixed even if the device is
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`rotated, e.g., when the user is pumping while lying on her back. Ex. K at 76:2-20.
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`Elvie further fails to explain why “when upright” is necessary (it is not) or how it is
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`consistent with the specifications’ teachings (again, it is not). Indeed, insertion of “when upright”
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`directly contradicts the specifications’ teachings that pumping may occur in non-upright positions,
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`6
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 7034
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`including “when the user is lying down, bending over, or in environments such as a bumpy ride,
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`as in an automobile or airplane trip.” Ex. B at 32:27-37. Further demonstrating the flaws in Elvie’s
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`proposed construction, its own experts interject ambiguity into their proposed construction by
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`disagreeing on what “when upright” means. While Elvie wrongly blames “Willow’s extensive
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`efforts to confuse this [simple] concept with [so-called] muddled hypotheticals,” Dkt. 82 at 16,
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`Elvie cannot credibly claim its experts’ opinions are “unrebutted” given their plain disagreement.
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`Finally, Elvie’s response fails to address the numerous other issues:
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`• Elvie improperly seeks to import the “the suction force and the milk flow path” into
`claim 11 of the ’228 Patent, despite that claim 11 recites neither a “suction force” nor
`a “milk flow path.” (Dkt. 75. at 11);
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`• Elvie arbitrarily substitutes the words “lower end” for the claimed “bottom portion,”
`even though the substitution is unnecessary and reduces clarity (id.); and
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`• Elvie substitutes the words “away from” for “relative to,” even though “relative to” is
`easily understood and “away from” introduces unnecessary confusion (id. at 12).
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`C.
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`“contained within”
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`Elvie’s response does not explain (1) why plain and ordinary meaning is insufficient, or
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`(2) why “contained within” and “contained completely within” should be construed together
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`despite their different language. Elvie’s proposal should be rejected as a threshold matter because
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`it would render “completely” superfluous.
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`The prosecution history does not dictate a different result. There, Willow distinguished
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`prior art reference Khalil on the basis that it failed to disclose a “pump mechanism and milk
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`collection container … contained within the main body,” as claimed in claim 1 of the ’229 Patent.
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`Dkt. 82 at 16-17. Willow distinguished the examiner’s proposal—formulated under the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation regime—that “contained within” should mean “resting on a surface of
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`the main body 34 or contoured to fit with the main body 34.” Ex. 11 at 4133. Instead, Willow
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 7035
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`argued, the pump mechanism and milk collection container must be “within the main body,” which
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`“simply means inside the main body.” Id. On that basis, Willow further distinguished
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`arrangements where the “milk collection container [is] configured on an outside of a main body.”
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`Id. Willow thus distinguished Khalil because its container was “sized and shaped to reside on the
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`exterior surface … of the breast pump system.” Id. This description is consistent with Willow’s
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`cited dictionary definition of “contain” that means “to have within,” as opposed to Elvie’s proposal
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`of “enclosed” which means “closed in or fenced off.” Dkt. 75 at 13.
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`II.
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`CONSTRUCTION OF ’005 PATENT CLAIM TERMS
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`A.
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`“pump mechanism comprises two drivers” (’005 Patent, claim 1)
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`Elvie does not confront the multiple disclosures in Willow’s specifications that the claimed
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`“flexible member” is not limited to a compressible tube. See Ex. A at 9:49-52, 17:35-37, 17:46-
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`47; Ex. C at 9:49-52; Ex. D at 12:2-5.
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`B.
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`“the breast pump automatically senses letdown” (’005 Patent, claim 2)
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`Elvie similarly glosses over this term, and merely cites its extrinsic declaration and
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`Willow’s extrinsic development documents. Dkt. 82 at 20.
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`C.
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`“chassis” (’005 Patent, claim 1)
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`Elvie fails to justify its departure from the plain and ordinary meaning which seeks to
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`exclude “the case or exterior of the device.” Where Elvie makes no disavowal or disclaimer
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`arguments, the proper analysis must start with the presumption that Willow’s claims are not limited
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`to exemplary. Also, Elvie asserts that the two dictionary definitions cited in Dr. Stone’s report are
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`not conflicting, but Elvie fails to explain how they are not. Dkt. 82 at 21.
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`8
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 7036
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`III. CONSTRUCTION OF ’229 PATENT CLAIM TERMS
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`A.
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`“a latch suction is maintained throughout the pumping session” (’229 Patent)
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`Elvie devotes its brief to arguing a point that is uncontested. Willow’s opening brief agreed
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`that “latch suction” means “a minimum vacuum level established when the pump is attached to
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`the breast—i.e., a pressure which is below atmospheric pressure.” Dkt. 75 at 20. Thus, the parties’
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`dispute is limited to whether “throughout the pumping session” should be narrowed to “during the
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`entire pumping session.” It should not.
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`Elvie’s brief is silent as to its justification for rewriting “throughout the pumping session”
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`to read “during the entire pumping session.” Elvie fails to acknowledge that its design expert, Mr.
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`Fletcher (1) used “throughout the pumping session” in his declaration, and (2) understands the
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`term “during the entire pumping session” to mean “constantly from start to finish.” Id. at 20-21;
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`Dkt. 82 at 22-24. Based on Elvie’s failure to address this issue, the Court should maintain the
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`claim language of “throughout the pumping session.”
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`Elvie similarly fails to confront the claim language, which merely requires that “a latch
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`suction” (meaning one or more) is “maintained throughout a pumping session.” Ex. B at 53:22-
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`23. It is telling that Elvie’s brief consistently refers to “the latch suction” but that is not what the
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`claim says. Indeed, Willow has not argued that “a latch suction” changes the underlying meaning
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`of “latch suction.” The parties maintain agreement on this point. Rather, Elvie excludes “a” from
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`the term to be construed, and then by argument, would have this Court interpret a different claim
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`term: “the latch suction.” These claim terms, however, have different meanings. “The” means
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`“one,” whereas “a” means one or more. See Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d
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`1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLOW’S DESIGN PATENT CLAIMS
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`Elvie’s response resorts to alleging that Willow’s citations to Mr. Fletcher’s deposition
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 7037
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`testimony is misleading, but an examination of his testimony reveals that the depictions of the
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`outer edges of Figures 6 and 7 are consistent with the depictions of the outer edges in Figures 1-5
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`of the D’995 Patent. Mr. Fletcher testified that he understood (1) the dashed line annotated in red
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`to mean that the front portion of the breast pump must extend at least to that dashed line; (2) the
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`front portion of the breast pump may extend beyond the dashed line annotated in red; and (3)
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`consistent with Figure 6, the “intersection” (annotated in Exhibit S in blue ink) between the
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`extended portion and the outer edge of the breast pump would be seen as a solid line. Ex. L at
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`52:20-54:5, 54:18-56:13.
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`Elvie wrongly accuses Willow of misleading Mr. Fletcher. But Elvie cannot defend his
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`admission that he failed to consider any alternative designs. Ex. L at 99:6-13. That fact alone is
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`sufficient to support a finding that Willow’s design is ornamental, not functional. See Ethicon
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`Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Elvie’s argument that
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`Willow fails to counter with expert testimony falls flat—these are publicly available products and
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`are cited in Willow’s claim construction tutorial.
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`Elvie further fails to explain the basis for including “oval” in its construction, when Mr.
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`Fletcher does not know what it means. Ex. L at 103:2-6. Willow’s point is not that oval means
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`egg-shaped, but rather that Mr. Fletcher’s verbal description introduces more confusion than it
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`purports to resolve. Mr. Fletcher acknowledged that a capsule and an egg shape—which are ovals
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`under common definitions—are not oval under his definition. Id. at 102:2-14.
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`On the D’625 Patent, Elvie’s description suffers the same deficiencies described above.
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`Moreover, the D’625 Patent does not claim the back portion of the breast pump, and thus the
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`claimed design does not even have the alleged “rounded bottom surface that curves until it meets
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`the flat rear surface” that Mr. Fletcher wants to encourage factfinders to notice.
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`10
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 7038
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`Date: August 29, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Timothy S. Durst
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`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`Timothy S. Durst (TX #00786924)
`tdurst@omm.com
`Cason Garrett Cole (TX #24109741)
`ccole@omm.com
`2801 North Harwood Street, Suite 1600
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone: (972) 360-1900
`Facsimile: (972) 360-1901
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`Robert F. Shaffer (admitted pro hac vice)
`rshaffer@omm.com
`Jason Fountain (admitted pro hac vice)
`jfountain@omm.com
`Miao Liu (admitted pro hac vice)
`mliu@omm.com
`1625 Eye St., NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 383-5300
`Facsimile: (202) 383-5414
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`Carolyn S. Wall (admitted pro hac vice)
`cwall@omm.com
`1301 Avenue of the Americas
`Suite 1700
`New York, NY 10019-6022
`Telephone: (212) 326-2000
`Facsimile: (212) 326-2061
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`Laura Burson (TX # 24091995)
`lburson@omm.com
`400 South Hope St
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (213) 430-6000
`Facsimile: (213) 430-6407
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff Willow
`Innovations, Inc.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00229-JRG Document 89 Filed 08/29/24 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 7039
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel of record who are deemed to have consented
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`to electronic services are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF
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`system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on August 29, 2024.
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`/s/ Timothy S. Durst____
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