`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2019
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` TRUMP ET AL. v. MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`No. 19–715. Argued May 12, 2020—Decided July 9, 2020*
`In April 2019, three committees of the U. S. House of Representatives
`issued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of Pres-
`ident Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. The
`
`House Committee on Financial Services issued a subpoena to Deutsche
`
`Bank seeking any document related to account activity, due diligence,
`foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statements
`
`
`of net worth, tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by
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`Deutsche Bank. It issued a second subpoena to Capital One for similar
`
`information. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued
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`a subpoena to Deutsche Bank that mirrored the subpoena issued by
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`the Financial Services Committee. And the House Committee on
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`Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to the President’s personal
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`accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP, demanding information related to
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`the President and several affiliated businesses. Although each of the
`
`committees sought overlapping sets of financial documents, each sup-
`plied different justifications for the requests, explaining that the infor-
`mation would help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from
`
`money laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. elec-
`tions. Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along with
`
`his children and affiliated businesses—contested the subpoena issued
`
`by the Oversight Committee in the District Court for the District of
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`Columbia (Mazars, No. 19–715) and the subpoenas issued by the Fi-
`nancial Services and Intelligence Committees in the Southern District
`
`of New York (Deutsche Bank, No. 19–760). In both cases, petitioners
`
`contended that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose
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`——————
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`* Together with 19–760, Trump et al. v. Deutsche Bank AG et al., on
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`certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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`2
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
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`Syllabus
`and violated the separation of powers. The President did not, however,
`argue that any of the requested records were protected by executive
`
`privilege.
`
`In Mazars, the District Court granted judgment for the House and
`
`the D. C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the subpoena issued by the
`
`Oversight Committee served a valid legislative purpose because the
`requested information was relevant to reforming financial disclosure
`requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates. In Deutsche
`
`Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction and the Sec-
`ond Circuit affirmed in substantial part, holding that the Intelligence
`
`Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of
`an investigation into alleged foreign influence in the U. S. political pro-
`
`cess, which could inform legislation to strengthen national security
`
`and combat foreign meddling. The court also concluded that the sub-
`poenas issued by the Financial Services Committee to Deutsche Bank
`and Capital One were adequately related to potential legislation on
`money laundering, terrorist financing, and the global movement of il-
`
`licit funds through the real estate market.
`
`Held: The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant
`
`separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas
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`for the President’s information. Pp. 7–20.
`
`(a) Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presiden-
`
`
`tial documents have been resolved by the political branches through
`negotiation and compromise without involving this Court. The Court
`recognizes that this dispute is the first of its kind to reach the Court;
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`that such disputes can raise important issues concerning relations be-
`tween the branches; that similar disputes recur on a regular basis, in-
`cluding in the context of deeply partisan controversy; and that Con-
`gress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over two
`centuries to resolve these disputes among themselves without Su-
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`preme Court guidance. Such longstanding practice “‘is a consideration
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`of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between
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`[the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on the Court
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`a duty of care to ensure that it does not needlessly disturb “the com-
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`promises and working arrangements” reached by those branches.
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`NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 524–526 (quoting The Pocket
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`Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689). Pp. 7–11.
`
`(b) Each House of Congress has the power “to secure needed infor-
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`
`mation” in order to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135,
`161. This power is “indispensable” because, without information, Con-
`
`gress would be unable to legislate wisely or effectively. Watkins v.
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`United States, 354 U. S. 178, 215. Because this power is “justified
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`solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several
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`limitations. Id., at 197. Most importantly, a congressional subpoena
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`3
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`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Syllabus
`is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task
`of the Congress.” Id., at 187. The subpoena must serve a “valid legis-
`
`lative purpose.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161. Further-
`more, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law en-
`
`forcement,” because that power is assigned to the Executive and the
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`
`Judiciary. Ibid. Finally, recipients of congressional subpoenas retain
`their constitutional rights and various privileges throughout the
`course of an investigation. Pp. 11–12.
`
`(c) The President contends, as does the Solicitor General on behalf
`of the United States, that congressional subpoenas for the President’s
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`information should be evaluated under the standards set forth in
`United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and Senate Select Committee on
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`Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, which would
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`
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`require the House to show that the requested information satisfies a
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`“demonstrated, specific need,” 418 U. S., at 713, and is “demonstrably
`critical” to a legislative purpose, 498 F. 2d, at 731. Nixon and Senate
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`Select Committee, however, involved subpoenas for communications
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`
`between the President and his close advisers, over which the President
`asserted executive privilege. Because executive privilege safeguards
`the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Ex-
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`ecutive Branch, information subject to the privilege deserves “the
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`greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.”
`418 U. S., at 715. That protection should not be transplanted root and
`branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by
`
`definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.
`The standards proposed by the President and the Solicitor General—
`if applied outside the context of privileged information—would risk se-
`riously impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities, giving
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`short shrift to its important interests in conducting inquiries to obtain
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`information needed to legislate effectively. Pp. 12–14.
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`(d) The approach proposed by the House, which relies on precedents
`that did not involve the President’s papers, fails to take adequate ac-
`count of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congres-
`sional subpoenas for the President’s information. The House’s ap-
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`proach would leave essentially no limits on the congressional power to
`
` A limitless subpoena
`subpoena the President’s personal records.
`
`
`power could transform the established practice of the political
`branches and allow Congress to aggrandize itself at the President’s ex-
`pense. These separation of powers concerns are unmistakably impli-
`cated by the subpoenas here, which represent not a run-of-the-mill leg-
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`islative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government
`over records of intense political interest for all involved. The inter-
`branch conflict does not vanish simply because the subpoenas seek per-
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`sonal papers or because the President sued in his personal capacity.
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`4
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
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`Syllabus
`Nor are separation of powers concerns less palpable because the sub-
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`poenas were issued to third parties. Pp. 14–18.
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`(e) Neither side identifies an approach that adequately accounts for
`these weighty separation of powers concerns. A balanced approach is
`necessary, one that takes a “considerable impression” from “the prac-
`
`tice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401,
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`and “resist[s]” the “pressure inherent within each of the separate
`
`Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha, 462
`
`U. S. 919, 951. In assessing whether a subpoena directed at the Pres-
`ident’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a le-
`
`gitimate task of the Congress,” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187, courts must
`take adequate account of the separation of powers principles at stake,
`including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the
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`unique position of the President.
`
`
`Several special considerations inform this analysis. First, courts
`should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose war-
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`rants the significant step of involving the President and his papers.
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`“ ‘[O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two
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`branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United
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`States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 389–390 (quoting Nixon, 418
`
`
`U. S., at 692). Congress may not rely on the President’s information if
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`other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it
`needs in light of its particular legislative objective. Second, to narrow
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`the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist
`on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Con-
`
`gress’s legislative objective. The specificity of the subpoena’s request
`“serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into
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`the operation of the Office of the President.” Cheney, 542 U. S., at 387.
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`Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered
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`by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative
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`purpose. The more detailed and substantial, the better. That is par-
`ticularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sen-
`sitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presi-
`dency. Fourth, courts should assess the burdens imposed on the
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`President by a subpoena, particularly because they stem from a rival
`political branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President
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`and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage. Other
`considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries
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`does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list. Pp. 18–20.
`No. 19–715, 940 F. 3d 710; No. 19–760, 943 F. 3d 627, vacated and re-
`manded.
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` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
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` BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
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`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Syllabus
`THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
`_________________
` Nos. 19–715 and 19–760
`_________________
`DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`19–715
`
`v.
`MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`19–760
`
`v.
`DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`[July 9, 2020]
`
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
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`Court.
`
`Over the course of five days in April 2019, three commit-
`
`tees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued four sub-
`poenas seeking information about the finances of President
`
`Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses.
`We have held that the House has authority under the Con-
`
`stitution to issue subpoenas to assist it in carrying out its
`legislative responsibilities. The House asserts that the fi-
`
`nancial information sought here—encompassing a decade’s
`worth of transactions by the President and his family—will
`help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from money
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`laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S.
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`2
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
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`Opinion of the Court
`elections. The President contends that the House lacked a
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`valid legislative aim and instead sought these records to
`harass him, expose personal matters, and conduct law en-
`forcement activities beyond its authority. The question pre-
`sented is whether the subpoenas exceed the authority of the
`House under the Constitution.
`
`We have never addressed a congressional subpoena for
`
`the President’s information. Two hundred years ago, it was
`established that Presidents may be subpoenaed during a
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`federal criminal proceeding, United States v. Burr, 25 F.
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`Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. J.), and
`earlier today we extended that ruling to state criminal pro-
`ceedings, Trump v. Vance, ante, p. ___. Nearly fifty years
`ago, we held that a federal prosecutor could obtain infor-
`
`mation from a President despite assertions of executive
`privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), and
`more recently we ruled that a private litigant could subject
`a President to a damages suit and appropriate discovery ob-
`ligations in federal court, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681
`(1997).
`
`
`This case is different. Here the President’s information
`is sought not by prosecutors or private parties in connection
`
`with a particular judicial proceeding, but by committees of
`Congress that have set forth broad legislative objectives.
`Congress and the President—the two political branches es-
`tablished by the Constitution—have an ongoing relation-
`ship that the Framers intended to feature both rivalry and
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`reciprocity. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed.
`1961) (J. Madison); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
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`yer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
`That distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of
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`the question before us.
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`
`I
`A
`Each of the three committees sought overlapping sets of
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`3
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`Opinion of the Court
`financial documents, but each supplied different justifica-
`tions for the requests.
`
`
`The House Committee on Financial Services issued two
`subpoenas, both on April 11, 2019. App. 128, 154, 226. The
`first, issued to Deutsche Bank, seeks the financial infor-
`mation of the President, his children, their immediate fam-
`ily members, and several affiliated business entities. Spe-
`
`cifically, the subpoena seeks any document related to
`account activity, due diligence, foreign transactions, busi-
`
`ness statements, debt schedules, statements of net worth,
`
`tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by Deutsche
`Bank. The second, issued to Capital One, demands similar
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`financial information with respect to more than a dozen
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`business entities associated with the President. The
`Deutsche Bank subpoena requests materials from “2010
`through the present,” and the Capital One subpoena covers
`
`“2016 through the present,” but both subpoenas impose no
`time limitations for certain documents, such as those con-
`
`nected to account openings and due diligence. Id., at 128,
`155.
`
`According to the House, the Financial Services Commit-
`tee issued these subpoenas pursuant to House Resolution
`206, which called for “efforts to close loopholes that allow
`corruption, terrorism, and money laundering to infiltrate
`our country’s financial system.” H. Res. 206, 116th Cong.,
`
`1st Sess., 5 (Mar. 13, 2019). Such loopholes, the resolution
`explained, had allowed “illicit money, including from Rus-
`sian oligarchs,” to flow into the United States through
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`“anonymous shell companies” using investments such as
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`“luxury high-end real estate.” Id., at 3. The House also
`invokes the oversight plan of the Financial Services Com-
`
`mittee, which stated that the Committee intends to review
`banking regulation and “examine the implementation, ef-
`fectiveness, and enforcement” of laws designed to prevent
`
`financing of terrorism.
`money
`laundering and the
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`4
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
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`Opinion of the Court
`H. R. Rep. No. 116–40, p. 84 (2019). The plan further pro-
`vided that the Committee would “consider proposals to pre-
`vent the abuse of the financial system” and “address any
`vulnerabilities identified” in the real estate market. Id.,
`at 85.
`
`
`On the same day as the Financial Services Committee,
`
`the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued an
`
`identical subpoena to Deutsche Bank—albeit for different
`reasons. According to the House, the Intelligence Commit-
`
`tee subpoenaed Deutsche Bank as part of an investigation
`
`into foreign efforts to undermine the U. S. political process.
`Committee Chairman Adam Schiff had described that in-
`vestigation in a previous statement, explaining that the
`
`Committee was examining alleged attempts by Russia to
`influence the 2016 election; potential links between Russia
`and the President’s campaign; and whether the President
`and his associates had been compromised by foreign actors
`or interests. Press Release, House Permanent Select Com-
`mittee on Intelligence, Chairman Schiff Statement on
`House Intelligence Committee Investigation (Feb. 6, 2019).
`Chairman Schiff added that the Committee planned “to de-
`velop legislation and policy reforms to ensure the U. S. gov-
`ernment is better positioned to counter future efforts to un-
`
`dermine our political process and national security.” Ibid.
`
`Four days after the Financial Services and Intelligence
`Committees, the House Committee on Oversight and Re-
`
`form issued another subpoena, this time to the President’s
`
`personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena
`demanded information related to the President and several
`affiliated business entities from 2011 through 2018, includ-
`ing statements of financial condition, independent auditors’
`reports, financial reports, underlying source documents,
`
`and communications between Mazars and the President or
`his businesses. The subpoena also requested all engage-
`ment agreements and contracts “[w]ithout regard to time.”
`App. to Pet. for Cert. in 19–715, p. 230.
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`5
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` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Chairman Elijah Cummings explained the basis for the
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`
`
`subpoena in a memorandum to the Oversight Committee.
`According to the chairman, recent testimony by the Presi-
`dent’s former personal attorney Michael Cohen, along with
`several documents prepared by Mazars and supplied by Co-
`hen, raised questions about whether the President had ac-
`curately represented his financial affairs. Chairman Cum-
`mings asserted that the Committee had “full authority to
`
`investigate” whether the President: (1) “may have engaged
`in illegal conduct before and during his tenure in office,”
`(2) “has undisclosed conflicts of interest that may impair his
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`ability to make impartial policy decisions,” (3) “is complying
`with the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution,” and
`
`(4) “has accurately reported his finances to the Office of
`Government Ethics and other federal entities.” App. in No.
`19–5142 (CADC), p. 107. “The Committee’s interest in
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`these matters,” Chairman Cummings concluded, “informs
`its review of multiple laws and legislative proposals under
`our jurisdiction.” Ibid.
`
`
`B
`Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along
`
`
` with his children and affiliated businesses—filed two suits
`
`challenging the subpoenas. They contested the subpoena
`
`
`issued by the Oversight Committee in the District Court for
`the District of Columbia (Mazars, No. 19–715), and the sub-
`poenas issued by the Financial Services and Intelligence
`
`
` Committees in the Southern District of New York (Deutsche
`Bank, No. 19–760). In both cases, petitioners contended
`that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose
`and violated the separation of powers. The President did
`not, however, resist the subpoenas by arguing that any of
`the requested records were protected by executive privilege.
`For relief, petitioners asked for declaratory judgments and
`injunctions preventing Mazars and the banks from comply-
`ing with the subpoenas. Although named as defendants,
`
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`

`

`6
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
`
`Opinion of the Court
` Mazars and the banks took no positions on the legal issues
`
`in these cases, and the House committees intervened to de-
`fend the subpoenas.
`
`Petitioners’ challenges failed. In Mazars, the District
`
`
`
`Court granted judgment for the House, 380 F. Supp. 3d 76
`(DC 2019), and the D. C. Circuit affirmed, 940 F. 3d 710
`
`
`(2019). In upholding the subpoena issued by the Oversight
`Committee to Mazars, the Court of Appeals found that the
`subpoena served a “valid legislative purpose” because the
`requested information was relevant to reforming financial
`
`disclosure requirements for Presidents and presidential
`
`candidates. Id., at 726–742 (internal quotation marks omit-
`ted). Judge Rao dissented. As she saw it, the “gravamen”
`of the subpoena was investigating alleged illegal conduct by
`the President, and the House must pursue such wrongdoing
`through its impeachment powers, not its legislative powers.
`
`Id., at 773–774. Otherwise, the House could become a “rov-
`ing inquisition over a co-equal branch of government.” Id.,
`
`at 748. The D. C. Circuit denied rehearing en banc over
`several more dissents. 941 F. 3d 1180, 1180–1182 (2019).
`In Deutsche Bank, the District Court denied a prelimi-
`nary injunction, 2019 WL 2204898 (SDNY, May 22, 2019),
`and the Second Circuit affirmed “in substantial part,” 943
`F. 3d 627, 676 (2019). While acknowledging that the sub-
`
`poenas are “surely broad in scope,” the Court of Appeals
`held that the Intelligence Committee properly issued its
`subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of an investigation into
`alleged foreign influence over petitioners and Russian in-
`terference with the U. S. political process. Id., at 650, 658–
`
`659. That investigation, the court concluded, could inform
`legislation to combat foreign meddling and strengthen na-
`tional security. Id., at 658–659, and n. 59.
`
`
`As to the subpoenas issued by the Financial Services
`Committee to Deutsche Bank and Capital One, the Court of
`Appeals concluded that they were adequately related to po-
`
`tential legislation on money laundering, terrorist financing,
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`

`7
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`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
`and the global movement of illicit funds through the real
`
`estate market. Id., at 656–659. Rejecting the contention
`
`that the subpoenas improperly targeted the President, the
`court explained in part that the President’s financial deal-
`
`ings with Deutsche Bank made it “appropriate” for the
`
`House to use him as a “case study” to determine “whether
`
`new legislation is needed.” Id., at 662–663, n. 67.1
`
`
`Judge Livingston dissented, seeing no “clear reason why
`a congressional investigation aimed generally at closing
`regulatory loopholes in the banking system need focus on
`over a decade of financial information regarding this Presi-
`dent, his family, and his business affairs.” Id., at 687.
`
`We granted certiorari in both cases and stayed the judg-
`
`ments below pending our decision. 589 U. S. ___ (2019).
`
`II
`A
`
`The question presented is whether the subpoenas exceed
`the authority of the House under the Constitution. Histor-
`ically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential
`
`documents have not ended up in court. Instead, they have
`been hashed out in the “hurly-burly, the give-and-take of
`the political process between the legislative and the execu-
`tive.” Hearings on S. 2170 et al. before the Subcommittee
`on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee
`on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1975)
`
`(A. Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
`
`Counsel).
`
`
`That practice began with George Washington and the
`
`
`
`——————
`1The Court of Appeals directed a “limited” remand for the District
`
`
` Court to consider whether it was necessary to disclose certain “sensitive
`
` personal details” (such as documents reflecting medical services received
`
`by employees of the Trump business entities) and a “few” documents that
`
`might not relate to the committees’ legislative purposes. 943 F. 3d 627,
`667–668, 675 (2019). The Court of Appeals ordered that all other docu-
`
` ments be “promptly transmitted” to the committees. Id., at 669.
`
`
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`

`

`8
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`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
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`Opinion of the Court
`early Congress. In 1792, a House committee requested Ex-
`
`ecutive Branch documents pertaining to General St. Clair’s
`campaign against the Indians in the Northwest Territory,
`which had concluded in an utter rout of federal forces when
`
`they were caught by surprise near the present-day border
`
`between Ohio and Indiana. See T. Taylor, Grand Inquest:
`
`The Story of Congressional Investigations 19–23 (1955).
`Since this was the first such request from Congress, Presi-
`dent Washington called a Cabinet meeting, wishing to take
`
`care that his response “be rightly conducted” because it
`could “become a precedent.” 1 Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
`son 189 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
`
`The meeting, attended by the likes of Alexander Hamil-
`ton, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry
`Knox, ended with the Cabinet of “one mind”: The House
`had authority to “institute inquiries” and “call for papers”
`but the President could “exercise a discretion” over disclo-
`
`sures, “communicat[ing] such papers as the public good
`
`would permit” and “refus[ing]” the rest. Id., at 189–190.
`President Washington then dispatched Jefferson to speak
`
`to individual congressmen and “bring them by persuasion
`into the right channel.” Id., at 190. The discussions were
`
`apparently fruitful, as the House later narrowed its request
`and the documents were supplied without recourse to the
`courts. See 3 Annals of Cong. 536 (1792); Taylor, supra,
`at 24.
`
`Jefferson, once he became President, followed Washing-
`ton’s precedent. In early 1807, after Jefferson had disclosed
`
`that “sundry persons” were conspiring to invade Spanish
`
`territory in North America with a private army, 16 Annals
`of Cong. 686–687, the House requested that the President
`produce any information in his possession touching on the
`
`conspiracy (except for information that would harm the
`public interest), id., at 336, 345, 359. Jefferson chose not to
`divulge the entire “voluminous” correspondence on the sub-
`
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`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
`ject, explaining that much of it was “private” or mere “ru-
`mors” and “neither safety nor justice” permitted him to “ex-
`pos[e] names” apart from identifying the conspiracy’s “prin-
`
`cipal actor”: Aaron Burr. Id., at 39–40. Instead of the entire
`
`correspondence, Jefferson sent Congress particular docu-
`ments and a special message summarizing the conspiracy.
`Id., at 39–43; see generally Vance, ante, at 3–4. Neither
`Congress nor the President asked the Judiciary to
`
`intervene.2
`Ever since, congressional demands for the President’s in-
`
`formation have been resolved by the political branches
`
`without involving this Court. The Reagan and Clinton
`
`presidencies provide two modern examples:
`
`During the Reagan administration, a House subcommit-
`
`tee subpoenaed all documents related to the Department of
`the Interior’s decision whether to designate Canada a recip-
`rocal country for purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing
`Act. President Reagan directed that certain documents be
`
`withheld because they implicated his confidential relation-
`ship with subordinates. While withholding those docu-
`ments, the administration made “repeated efforts” at ac-
`commodation through limited disclosures and testimony
`over a period of several months. 6 Op. of Office of Legal
`Counsel 751, 780 (1982). Unsatisfied, the subcommittee
`
`and its parent committee eventually voted to hold the Sec-
`retary of the Interior in contempt, and an innovative com-
`promise soon followed: All documents were made available,
`but only for one day with no photocopying, minimal
`notetaking, and no participation by non-Members of Con-
`gress. Id., at 780–781; see H. R. Rep. No. 97–898, pp. 3–8
`(1982).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
` 2By contrast, later that summer, the Judiciary was called on to resolve
`
`
`
` whether President Jefferson could be issued a subpoena duces tecum
` arising from Burr’s criminal trial. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
`
`
`
` 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807); see also Trump v. Vance, ante, at 5–7.
`
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`

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`10
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`
`TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP
`
`Opinion of the Court
`In 1995, a Senate committee subpoenaed notes taken by
`
`a White House attorney at a meeting with President Clin-
`ton’s personal lawyers concerning the Whitewater contro-
`versy. The President resisted the subpoena on the ground
`
`that the notes were protected by attorney-client privilege,
`leading to “long and protracted” negotiations and a Senate
`threat to seek judicial enforcement of the subpoena. S. Rep.
`No. 104–204, pp. 16–17 (1996). Eventually the parties
`
`
`reached an agreement, whereby President Clinton avoided
`the threatened suit, agreed to turn over the notes, and ob-
`tained the Senate’s concession that he had not waived any
`privileges. Ibid.; see L. Fisher, Congressional Research
`Service, Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and Con-
`tempt Power 16–18 (2003).
`Congress and the President maintained this tradition of
`
`
`negotiation and compromise—without the involvement of
`
`this Court—until the present dispute. Indeed, from Presi-
`dent Washington until now, we have never considered a dis-
`pute over a congressional subpoena for the President’s rec-
`ords. And, according to the parties, the appellate courts
`
`have addressed such a subpoena only once, when a Senate
`committee subpoenaed President Nixon during the Wa-
`tergate scandal. See infra, at 13 (discussing Senate Select
`
` Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
`498 F. 2d 725 (CADC 1974) (en banc)). In that case, the
`court refused to enforce the subpoena, and the Senate did
`
`not seek review by this Court.
`This dispute therefore represents a significant departure
`
`
`from historical practice. Although the parties agree that
`this particular controversy is justiciable, we recognize that
`it is the first of its kind to reach this Court; that disputes of
`this sort can raise important issues concerning relations be-
`tween the branches; that related disputes involving con-
`gressional efforts to seek official Executive Branch infor-
`mation recur on a regular basis, including in the context of
`
`
`
`
`

`

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` 11
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`Opinion of the Court
`deeply partisan controversy; and that Congress and the Ex-
`ecutive have nonetheless managed for over two centuries to
`resolve such disputes among themselves without the bene-
`fit of guidance from us. Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a
`consideration of great weight’” in cases concerning “the al-
`location of power