`
`In The
`
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`ANNE BLOCK,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioner,
`
`WSBA, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
`To The United States District Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
`
`REPLY TO RESPONDENT KENYON DISEND AND CITY OF GOLD BAR’S
`OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`ANNE'JBLOCK
`115 West Main St #204
`Monroe, WA 98272
`(206) 326-9933
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`444
`
`4 55 5 7
`
`INTRODUCTION
`THE RESPONDENTS INTRODUCTION
`I. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE PETITION
`(A) Procedural Facts:............................................
`(B) Substantive facts:............................................
`II. REPLY ARGUMENTS
`A. All three judges associated in this case have
`pre-existing conflicts of interest which require their
`disqualification.
`B. The plaintiff has properly pled first
`amendment retaliation claims.
`C. The Bar’s actions of retaliating for asserting
`her right to disassociate from the Bar violated her
`constitutional right to disassociate from
`organizations she disagrees with.
`CONCLUSION............................
`
`10
`11
`
`1
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Acosta Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.
`1992)............................................................................
`Allapattah Services Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739
`(11th Cir. 2004)..........................................................
`Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents,
`824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016)...........................
`Arrington v. Dickerson, 915 F. Supp. 1516.............
`Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).....
`Bd. ofCty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674
`10
`(1996)...........................................................................
`10
`Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)...................
`Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). 7
`11
`Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618
`Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
`Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, 585
`10, 11
`U.S.___(2018)
`Keller v. State Bar of California 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)
`11
`
`8,9
`10
`
`7 9 9
`
`Knox v. Service Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000
`11
`CSEIU”), 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).....................
`11
`Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
`Meehan v. County of L.A., 856 F.2d 102, 105 n.l (9th
`7
`Cir. 1988).
`New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
`10
`
`Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 569 F.2d 1250,
`1262 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1977)...........................................
`6,7
`Republic of Kazakhstan v. Does 1-100, 192 Wn. App.
`773
`
`9
`
`2
`
`
`
`10
`
`7 7 68
`
`Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)....
`State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171
`(1978).....................................................................
`Other Authorities
`6 Goodrichamram 2d, Standard Pennsylvania
`Practice § 2158.1 (1977).......................................
`Rules
`Pa. R. Civ. P. 2158...................................................
`Supreme Court rule 10............................................
`
`3
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Respondents’ assert to this Court that there is
`nothing unique or unusual about a news reporter
`being disbarred for reporting and publishing on
`public officials’ corruption. They see nothing wrong
`with the bar association issuing a subpoena
`demanding Ms. Block to divulge confidential sources,
`turner over reporter files not related to a client,
`when RCW 5.68.010 (Media Shield), the First
`Amendment, and the Washington Constitution
`prohibits such infringement of citizen’s rights. They
`offer no explanation as to how their thinly disguised
`attempt at censor and punish a member of the press
`and free speech of lawyers has anything to do with
`the practice of law.
`This case is unique because it involves for the
`first time in United States history when a news
`reporter, who happened to be a licensed attorney, is
`disbarred because of she writes about public officials
`corrupt acts in a publication. If allow to stand, years
`of case law are virtually overturned simply because
`Ms. Block was a lawyer who chose to investigate and
`report on corruption inside Washington State
`agencies. Every American’s precious constitutional
`right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press
`suffers when government officials punish lawful
`First Amendment activity.
`The court should take notice that some of the
`
`4
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`
`
`more active participants in the denial of first
`amendment rights of Anne Block, i.e. the Snohomish
`County, King County, WSBA, and Sky Valley
`defendants, have not even attempted to justify their
`actions against Ms. Block by submitting responses.
`Others who have, namely the Kenyon Disend, Gold
`Bar, and Port of Seattle defendants (collectively
`addressed here as “the respondents”), only provide
`inapplicable technical defenses, and provide no
`countervailing authority on substantive issues,
`essentially conceding that they have undermined
`important first amendment right established by
`previous Supreme Court precedents, as well as
`violated Block’s constitutional right to associate and
`disassociate with organizations of her own choosing.
`The Court should take notice that Ms. Block
`has never been sued by anyone for defamation.
`
`THE RESPONDENTS INTRODUCTION
`In their introduction, the respondents
`repeatedly refer to the plaintiff as “vexatious” while
`also mentioning the fact that a “vexatious litigant”
`order was entered. They conveniently leave out the
`fact that the vexatious litigant order was reversed
`and remanded to the trial court for further action.
`I. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE PETITION
`(A) PROCEDURAL FACTS:
`There are no significant disputes as to the
`procedural posture of this case.
`
`5
`
`
`
`(B) SUBSTANTIVE FACTS:
`There are no significant disputes as to the
`substantive facts of this case. The respondents have
`not challenged any of the substantive allegations
`given in the petition, and their version simply lists
`the allegations made in the complaint.
`
`II. REPLY ARGUMENTS
`A. All three judges associated in this case have pre
`existing conflicts of interest which require their
`disqualification.
`The gravamen of the respondents’ argument is
`that the plaintiff has not pointed out to any
`significant disputes among the circuits as to warrant
`Supreme Court review. They ignore completely the
`apparent dispute of the ninth circuit with the third
`circuit in the case of Plechner v. Widener College,
`Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 1262 n. 7 (3d Cir.1977), which
`supports Block.
`That case ruled that the amenability of an
`unincorporated association to suit is governed by the
`law of the state in which the court sits. Underwood v.
`Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1957), cert, denied,
`358 U.S. 864, 3 L. Ed. 2d 97, 79 S. Ct. 93 (1958); See
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). In Plechner, the forum state
`was Pennsylvania, which, allows suit to be brought
`against an unincorporated association either in its
`own name or that of an officer as trustee ad litem.
`Pa. R. Civ. P. 2153. A judgment entered against an
`association alone in Pennsylvania, will support
`
`6
`
`
`
`execution upon its property but not that of an
`individual member. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2158. 6
`Goodrichamram 2d, Standard Pennsyvania Practice
`§ 2158.1 <1977).
`That is not the case in Washington, where the
`common law prevails, which make all Washington
`federal judges liable if Block prevails. The
`respondents did not make any argument as to why
`Block’s analysis of Washington State case law was
`erroneous.
`In Washington, courts may assume that where
`no authority is cited, counsel has found none after
`search. State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d
`1171 (1978).
`Similarly, the respondents ignored the
`apparent dispute with the third circuit in Plechner,
`id.
`
`The ninth circuit has made similar rulings to
`Washington’s State v. Young id- See Acosta Huerta v.
`Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
`Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994);
`Meehan v. County of L.A., 856 F.2d 102, 105 n.l (9th
`Cir. 1988).
`B. The plaintiff has properly pled first amendment
`retaliation claims.
`For a private citizen, the tests for establishing
`a prima facie case for first amendment retaliation
`are covered under the following three-part test, (l)
`that his or her speech is protected by the First
`Amendment; (2) that the defendants took an adverse
`
`7
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`
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`action against the plaintiff and (3) that the adverse
`action was prompted or caused by the plaintiffs
`exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.
`Arrington v. Dickerson, 915 F. Supp. 1516.
`This is essentially the same three-part test
`that was articulated in Arizona Students’Ass’n v.
`Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir.
`2016) (discussing requirements for retaliation claim),
`which the panel cited as the basis for its dismissal.
`Significantly, this was the only test mentioned in
`Arizona Students id, as that case was primarily a
`case involving damage immunity for those who
`possessed 11th amendment immunity.
`The joint briefing does not address this
`analysis that resulted in the dismissal of her claim.
`Instead, they claim that there is no basis for appeal
`to the United States Supreme Court, contending this
`appeal is primarily “fact bound”. In support of this
`they cite to Supreme Court rule 10, which talks
`about erroneous factual findings. The petitioner is
`not claiming any factual errors, because this was a
`motion on the pleadings in which there is no factual
`findings as all allegations are construed in favor of
`the non-moving party. The petitioner is claiming
`there was an error of law, in the way the law was
`applied to a series of allegations that were
`unchallenged for the purpose of a motion of the
`pleadings.
`At no point did the plaintiff contend that this
`set of facts were so unique as to not be capable of
`
`8
`
`
`
`repetition as in Allapattah Services Inc. v. Exxon
`Corp., 362 F.3d 739 (llth Cir. 2004). In fact, just the
`opposite could be argued. If the kind of analysis used
`by the district court and the court of appeals were
`used on all first amendment cases, then it is difficult
`to imagine any kind of first amendment case
`surviving, because the respondents have basically
`admitted that all three prongs of Arrington v.
`Dickerson, 915 F. Supp. 1516, and Arizona Students’
`Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867
`(9th Cir. 2016) were met because they refused to
`apply any analysis as to why they were not met.
`In fact, none of the cases cited by the
`respondents apply because those cases involved
`disputed issues of fact. Here, since the case was won
`on a motion on the pleadings, and the respondents
`did not dispute the plausibility of any of the
`allegation in their response, the facts are essentially
`conceded and the appeal cannot be considered as
`“fact bound.”
`The Kenyon respondents claim there is no
`basis for concluding that any of the district court
`findings contradicted established U.S. Supreme court
`precedents. However, by failing to even address
`arguments based upon first amendment, such as the
`three part test in Arrington v. Dickerson, supra, and
`Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents
`
`9
`
`
`
`supra, or media shield in RCW 5.68.0101, the
`respondents have undermined the protections given
`in all the Supreme Court cases cited in the petition
`including Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14
`(l976)(broadest first amendment protections given
`for political speech), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
`476, 484 (1957), Bd. ofCty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518
`U.S. 668, 674 (1996);( threatening or causing
`pecuniary harm), Baird v. State Bar ofAriz., 401
`U.S. 1, 7 (1971); (withholding a license, right, or
`benefit), In Re Rufallo, 390 US 544 (denying due
`process for convicting of bar violations without
`charging them), as well as undermining principles in
`New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
`(which put restrictions on the power of public
`officials to sue for defamation.)
`C. The Bar’s actions of retaliating for asserting
`her right to disassociate from the Bar violated her
`constitutional right to disassociate from
`organizations she disagrees with.
`In her petition, the appellant brought forth
`detailed arguments on how compulsory subsidies
`such as mandatory bar association dues cannot be
`sustained under existing case law. She also supplied
`detailed briefing demonstrating how her appeal was
`an issue of first impression as to how mandatory bars
`
`1 First Amend, extended to online publications such as the
`Gold Bar Reporter in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Does 1-
`100, 192 Wn. App. 773. It protects against subpoenas which
`disclosure would identity of a source of any news source.
`10
`
`
`
`can be legal following this court’s decision in Janus v.
`American Federation of State, County, and
`Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, 585
`U.S.__ (2018).
`Contrary to the respondents assertion, Block
`has pointed out this case has raised an unsettled
`area of the law, namely, whether the finding in
`Janus should now be applied to bar associations,
`who, like public unions coerce members of a
`profession to join an organization. The respondents
`confusingly assert that Block has not argued how
`this case violates principles established in other
`supreme court cases, but provide no authority which
`contradicts her arguments as to how the ninth circuit
`violated principles established in Knox v. Service
`Emps. Inti Union, Local 1000 CSEIU”), 132 S. Ct.
`2277 (2012), Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843
`(1961), Keller v. State Bar of California 496 U.S. 1, 4
`(1990), Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618 and other
`cases cited to by her in her petition.
`For the most part, the respondents have
`ignored substantive arguments raised by the
`petition, instead asking this court to summarily
`reject the petition on their unproven assertion that
`this appeal is “fact bound.” As argued earlier,
`respondents cannot ignore these substantive
`arguments by not providing countervailing authority.
`It is not up to the United States Supreme Court to
`provide arguments for them.
`
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`
`
`CONCLUSION
`For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner
`respectfully requests the US Supreme Court to reject
`the reply arguments raised by the limited number of
`respondents and grant review in this case.
`
`Dated this 12 day of November, 2019.
`
`Anne Block, Pro Se
`115 West Main St #204
`Monroe, WA 98272
`(206) 326-9933
`
`12
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