APPENDIX 1
`
`Decisions of the District Court
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
`ANNE K BLOCK,
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR
`ASSOCIATION, et al.,
`Defendants.
`
`CASE NO. 05-2018 RSM
`
`ORDER ON MOTION TO
`DISQUALIFY ALL WASHINGTON
`STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
`MEMBERS FROM HEARING THIS
`CASE
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s
`Motion to Disqualify All Washington State Bar Association
`Members from Hearing This Case Including But Not Limted
`[sic] to Judge Ricardo Martinez Citing 9th Circuit Precedent.
`Dkt. #9. Defendants Snohomish County, et al. have opposed
`the motion, joined by a number of other Defendants. Dkts.
`#12, #13 and #15. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
`now DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
`II. DISCUSSION
`Plaintiff has filed a Complaint alleging a widespread
`
`1
`
`
`
`Decisions of the District Court
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
`ANNE K BLOCK,
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR
`ASSOCIATION, et al.,
`Defendants.
`
`CASE NO. 05-2018 RSM
`
`ORDER ON MOTION TO
`DISQUALIFY ALL WASHINGTON
`STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
`MEMBERS FROM HEARING THIS
`CASE
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s
`Motion to Disqualify All Washington State Bar Association
`Members from Hearing This Case Including But Not Limted
`[sic] to Judge Ricardo Martinez Citing 9th Circuit Precedent.
`Dkt. #9. Defendants Snohomish County, et al. have opposed
`the motion, joined by a number of other Defendants. Dkts.
`#12, #13 and #15. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
`now DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
`II. DISCUSSION
`Plaintiff has filed a Complaint alleging a widespread
`
`1
`
`
`
`conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights,
`motivated by a desire to stop her from uncovering and
`reporting on malfeasance and corruption at many levels of
`government, including the Washington State Bar Association
`(“WSBA”). Dkts. #1 and #19. It is part of the legal theory of
`her case that all judges in the State of Washington, by virtue of
`their membership in the WSBA, “have an inherent conflict of
`interest that prevents them from hearing this case.” Dkt. #19 at
`24,113.1.
`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge of the United
`States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
`impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Federal judges
`also shall disqualify themselves in circumstances where they
`have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or
`personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
`the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
`Under both 28 U.S.C. §144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455,
`recusal of a federal judge is appropriate if “a reasonable
`person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the
`judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman
`v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.1993). This
`is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the
`appearance of bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v.
`United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.1992); United States
`v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir.1980). In Liteky v.
`United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the United States Supreme
`Court further explained the narrow basis for recusal: [Jjudicial
`rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
`partiality motion.... [O]pinions formed by the judge on the
`basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of
`the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not
`
`2
`
`
`
`constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they
`display a deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would
`make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during
`the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even
`hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not
`support a bias or partiality challenge. Id. at 555.
`In the instant motion, Plaintiff fails to even allege that
`any behavior by the Court during the (brief) course of this case
`has demonstrated bias towards her. She argues that this
`Court’s membership in the WSBA, coupled with other
`historical factual allegations (which will be addressed below),
`is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite conflict of interest.
`The Court disagrees. Simple joinder of a bar association in a
`party’s complaint “does not require recusal of judges who are
`members of that bar association.” Denardo v. Municipality of
`Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Pilla
`v. American Bar Assoc., 542 F.2d 56, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1976).
`There are a string of cases holding that just belonging to a bar
`association is not the kind of relationship which gives rise to a
`reasonable doubt about a judge’s ability to preside impartially
`over a case in which the bar association is a party.1 In fact, it is
`unreasonable to assume that a judge’s membership in a state
`bar association in any way foretells the kind of “deep-seated
`favoritism or antagonism” that requires recusal. See King v.
`
`See Hu v. American Bar Assoc., 334 F.Appx 17,19 (7th Cir.
`2009) (citing Hirsh v. Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d
`708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995)); In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925,
`930 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984); Plechner v. Widener College, Inc.,
`569 F.2d 1250,1262 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1977); also Parrish v. Bd.
`Of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar, 527 F.2d 98,104 (5th Cir.
`1975).
`
`3
`
`
`
`Kansas, No. 09-4117- JAR, 2009 WL 2912475, at *1 (D. Kan.
`Sept. 9, 2009). Importantly, none of Plaintiff’s factual
`allegations demonstrate “a personal bias against [her] or in
`favor of any adverse party.” Her allegation that the Court is “a
`personal friend to WSBA Defendant in this case, Doug Ende,”
`is not true. The fact that Mr. Ende and the Court served on a
`CLE workshop panel in September 2014 (the only fact she
`cites in support of this allegation; see Dkt. #9, Ex. A) is proof
`of nothing more than that the two men were in the same room
`at a point in time. Plaintiff produces no other evidence of any
`kind of personal relationship with Mr. Ende, or how that
`would demonstrate bias against her.
`Plaintiff further cites the undersigned Judge’s involvement on
`the Board of the Washington Leadership Institute, a joint
`effort of the University of Washington School of Law and the
`WSBA to solicit greater participation by underrepresented
`portions of the legal community. .See Dkt. #9, Ex. B. She
`characterizes this activity as “active member [ship] of a WSBA
`Board,” but presents no evidence of a relationship between the
`Leadership Institute and the WSBA that would lend itself to
`reasonable assumptions of bias, nor any legal authority that
`simply serving on the board of an organization co-founded by
`a state bar association is sufficient to constitute per se
`prejudice.
`Finally, Plaintiff cites the fact that the undersigned
`Judge formerly served as a King County Superior Court judge.
`What she fails to do is to present any evidence of how a prior
`term as a state judge constitutes proof of bias against her or in
`favor of the WSBA (or even gives rise to a reasonable
`question that bias might be present) or any legal authority
`previously holding this to be the case. Although Plaintiff
`
`4
`
`
`
`claims to provide “binding” Ninth Circuit precedent that
`“anytime the WSBA is a defendant, since all Washington
`State judges are mandated to hold WSBA licenses, all WSBA
`members must remove themselves from these cases,” Dkt. #9
`at 4, a closer examination of her legal authority reveals no
`such mandatory language. Indeed, in support of her assertion
`that “[t]he Ninth circuit (sic) held as members of the
`Washington State Bar Association, could become liable for its
`wrongdoing, and therefore are indirect defendants in the case”
`Plaintiff cites the case of Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612 (1997).
`The case is neither on point (involving the denial of a building
`application to a nonprofit unincorporated homeowners
`association) nor is it from the Ninth Circuit. It is inapplicable
`to this issue.
`Plaintiff also points to three prior instances in this
`District where judges from outside the district were brought in
`on local cases, but none of the cases involved appellate
`opinions by the Ninth Circuit related to issues of prejudice
`based on WSBA membership. The appointment orders
`concerning those cases2 do not discuss judicial membership in
`WSBA, do not discuss the existence of a conflict of interest
`and do not stand for the propositions asserted by Plaintiff.
`Other than the mere fact that an outside judge was
`brought in, Plaintiff points to no holding that mere judicial
`membership in the WSBA creates a potentially disqualifying
`conflict. This Court finds that there is none.
`III. CONCLUSION
`Plaintiff has presented neither factual nor legal
`evidence justifying her request that this Court recuse itself,
`and the Court declines to do so. In conformity with LCR 3(e),
`the Chief Judge refers any order in which he or she has
`declined to recuse to “the active judge with the highest
`5
`
`
`
`seniority;” in this District. Accordingly the Court hereby finds
`and ORDERS:
`1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify (Dkt. #9) is DENIED.
`2. In accordance with LCR 3(e), that this Order is referred to
`the Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, the senior active judge in
`this District, for review of this decision.
`3. The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to U.S.
`District Judge Ronald B. Leighton.
`Dated this 24 day of February, 2016.
`
`RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
`CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`6
`
`
`
`APPENDIX 2
`
`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`ANNE BLOCK, Esquire, an individual,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`v.
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION;
`et al.,
`Defendants-Appellees,
`WILLIAM SCHEIDLER,
`Intervenor-Appellee.
`No. 16-35461
`D.C. No. 2'15-cv-02018-RSM
`MEMORANDUM* and ORDER
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S.
`Martinez, Chief Judge, Presiding
`Submitted February 7, 2019** Seattle,
`Washington
`FILED
`FEB 11 2019
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF
`APPEALS
`* This disposition is not appropriate for
`publication and is not precedent except as provided by
`Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`* *
`The panel unanimously concludes this case
`is suitable for decision without oral argument. See
`
`7
`
`
`
`Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115,
`DktEntry: 197-1, Page 1 of 6
`Before: IKUTA and CHRISTEN, Circuit
`***
`Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,
`District Judge.
`Plaintiff-appellant Anne Block appeals the
`district court’s orders dismissing
`her amended complaint against
`defendants-appellees City of Gold Bar, Washington
`State Bar Association (WSBA), Snohomish
`County, Kenyon Disend, Sky Valley,
`City of Duvall, Port of Seattle, King County,
`and various individuals. She also
`appeals a vexatious litigant pre-filing order
`and orders awarding attorneys’ fees to
`Kenyon Disend, Snohomish County, and City
`of Gold Bar. We have jurisdiction
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in
`part and vacate and remand in part.
`1. Block’s motion for judicial notice is
`DENIED. WSBA’s motion to strike
`the brief of proposed intervenor William
`Scheidler is GRANTED. Block’s
`motions to strike are DENIED.
`2. The district court did not abuse its
`discretion by denying Block’s motions
`to disqualify because Block failed to identify
`any grounds for recusal. See 28
`U.S.C. §§ 144, 4551 DeNardo v. Municipality of
`Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201
`
`8
`
`
`
`(9th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that a plaintiff sues a
`bar association does not require
`recusal of judges who are members of that bar
`association.”). We therefore affirm
`the orders denying Block’s motions to
`disqualify.
`* * *
`The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal,
`United States District Judge for the District of
`Wyoming, sitting by designation.
`2
`
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115,
`DktEntry: 197-1, Page 2 of 6
`3. The district court had discretion to award
`attorneys’ fees to Kenyon
`Disend, Snohomish County, and City of Gold
`Bar pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
`Procedure 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if it
`determined that Block’s complaint was
`frivolous. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified
`Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir.
`1994) (per curiam) (observing that fee awards
`pursuant to Rule 11 and § 1988 are
`warranted in response to frivolous actions).
`The district court concluded that
`Block’s claims were frivolous, and Block fails to
`demonstrate on appeal that the
`district court erred in so concluding. We
`therefore affirm the fee awards.
`4. Block argues that the district court abused
`
`9
`
`
`
`its discretion when it imposed
`a vexatious litigant pre-filing order. Before
`imposing such an order, a district court
`must-
`(l) give litigants notice and “an opportunity to
`oppose the order before it [is] entered”; (2) compile an
`adequate record for appellate review, including “a
`listing of all the cases and motions that led the
`district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant
`order was needed”; (3) make substantive findings of
`frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor the order
`narrowly so as “to closely fit the specific vice
`encountered.”
`Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761
`F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014)
`(quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144,
`1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990)). We
`strictly enforce these four requirements
`because this type of order affects a
`litigant’s fundamental right to access the
`courts. See id. at 1061.
`3
`
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115,
`DktEntry: 197-1, Page 3 of 6
`The district court imposed its pre-filing order
`sua sponte in response to
`Kenyon Disend’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
`There is no indication that Block
`had notice of the pre-filing order or an
`
`10
`
`
`
`opportunity to oppose it. We therefore
`conclude that the district court abused its
`discretion by issuing the pre-filing order
`without appropriate notice and opportunity to
`oppose. We vacate the order and
`remand for further proceedings in accordance
`with the four requirements set forth
`in De Long.
`5. The district court did not abuse its
`discretion by denying Block’s requests
`for extensions of time because Block failed to
`demonstrate good cause. See Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Block did not seek extensions
`in advance of the time her
`oppositions were due (in violation of the local
`rules), and she filed multiple
`motions of her own during the period in which
`she claimed she was unable to file
`oppositions. We therefore affirm the district
`court’s orders denying extensions of
`time.
`6. Because Block fails to coherently argue that
`the district court erred by
`granting defendants’ motions to dismiss on res
`judicata grounds, we affirm the
`district court’s order. Greenwood v. FAA, 28
`F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We
`will not manufacture arguments for an
`appellant, and a bare assertion does not
`4
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115,
`DktEntry: 197-1, Page 4 of 6
`preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a
`host of other issues are presented for
`review.”). 1
`7. The district court did not err by dismissing
`Block’s remaining claims
`against the WSBA, City of Duvall, Sky Valley,
`Port of Seattle, and King County,
`and various individual defendants. The
`district court correctly dismissed Block’s
`suit against the WSBA and WSBA individual
`defendants on Eleventh Amendment
`and quasi-judicial immunity grounds. See
`Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of
`Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
`curiam) (discussing immunity of a state
`bar and state bar judges and prosecutors);
`Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681
`(9th Cir. 1966) (concluding the Washington
`State Bar Association is “an agency of
`the state” and not subject to liability under 42
`U.S.C. § 1983).
`With respect to City of Duvall, Sky Valley, Port
`of Seattle, King County,
`and the related individual defendants, we
`conclude that the district court did not err
`by dismissing Block’s defamation, civil RICO,
`and retaliation claims. Block does
`not argue that her defamation claim was
`
`12
`
`
`
`adequately pleaded for purposes of
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
`Moreover, Block fails to demonstrate
`1 We deem Block to have waived all other
`claims that were dismissed by the district court and
`not distinctly raised on appeal, such as Block’s claim
`that the defendants violated the Americans with
`Disabilities Act. See Greenwood, 28 F.3d at 977.
`
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115,
`DktEntry: 197-1, Page 5 of 6
`that she satisfied her burden for alleging
`retaliation and civil RICO claims. See,
`e.g., Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of
`Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir.
`2016) (discussing requirements for retaliation
`claim); Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d
`506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
`requirements for civil RICO claim).
`Accordingly, we affirm the orders dismissing
`Block’s claims.
`VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART,
`AFFIRMED IN PART.
`Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
`6
`
`13
`
`
`
`APPENDIX 3
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`ANNE BLOCK, Esquire, an individual,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`v.
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR
`ASSOCIATION; et al.,
`Defendants-Appellees,
`WILLIAM SCHEIDLER,
`Intervenor-Appellee.
`No. 16-35461
`D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02018-RSM
`Western District of Washington,
`Seattle
`ORDER
`Before: IKUTA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and
`FREUDENTHAL,* District
`Judge.
`The panel has unanimously voted to deny
`Plaintiff-Appellant’s petition for
`panel rehearing. Judges Ikuta and Christen have
`voted to deny the petition for
`
`14
`
`
`
`rehearing en banc, and Judge Freudenthal has so
`recommended.
`The full court has been advised of
`Plaintiff-Appellant’s petition for
`rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has
`requested a vote on the petition for
`rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
`
`FILED
`
`APR 2 2019
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`*The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States
`District Judge for
`the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
`Case: 16-35461, 04/02/2019, ID: 11249560, DktEntry:
`204, Page 1 of 2
`The petition for rehearing and the petition for
`rehearing en banc are
`DENIED.
`
`15
`
`
`
`APPENDIX 4
`
`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`ANNE BLOCK, Esquire, an individual,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`v.
`WASHINGTON STATE BAR
`ASSOCIATION; et al.,
`Defendants-Appellees,
`WILLIAM SCHEIDLER,
`Intervenor-Appellee.
`No. 16-35461
`D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02018-RSM
`MEMORANDUM* and ORDER
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Western District of Washington
`Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, Presiding
`Submitted February 7, 2019**
`Seattle, Washington
`
`FILED
`
`FEB 11 2019
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`* This disposition is not appropriate for publication
`and is not precedent
`
`16
`
`
`
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`**The panel unanimously concludes this case is
`suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115, DktEntry: 197-1,
`Page 1 of 6
`
`Before: IKUTA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and
`FREUDENTHAL,
`District Judge.
`Plaintiff-appellant Anne Block appeals the district
`court’s orders dismissing
`her amended complaint against defendants-appellees
`City of Gold Bar, Washington
`State Bar Association (WSBA), Snohomish County,
`Kenyon Disend, Sky Valley,
`City of Duvall, Port of Seattle, King County, and
`various individuals. She also
`appeals a vexatious litigant pre-filing order and
`orders awarding attorneys’ fees to
`Kenyon Disend, Snohomish County, and City of
`Gold Bar. We have jurisdiction
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and
`vacate and remand in part.
`1. Block’s motion for judicial notice is DENIED.
`WSBA’s motion to strike
`
`17
`
`
`
`the brief of proposed intervenor William Scheidler is
`GRANTED. Block’s
`motions to strike are DENIED.
`2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
`denying Block’s motions
`to disqualify because Block failed to identify any
`grounds for recusal. See 28
`U.S.C. §§ 144,455; DeNardo v. Municipality of
`Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200,1201
`(9th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that a plaintiff sues a bar
`association does not require
`recusal of judges who are members of that bar
`association.”). We therefore affirm
`the orders denying Block’s motions to disqualify.
`The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United
`* * *
`States District Judge for
`the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
`2
`
`‘ Case: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115, DktEntry: 197-1,
`Page 2 of 6
`3. The district court had discretion to award
`attorneys’ fees to Kenyon
`Disend, Snohomish County, and City of Gold Bar
`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
`Procedure 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if it determined
`that Block’s complaint was
`
`18
`
`
`
`frivolous. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch.
`Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir.
`1994) (per curiam) (observing that fee awards
`pursuant to Rule 11 and § 1988 are
`warranted in response to frivolous actions). The
`district court concluded that
`Block’s claims were frivolous, and Block fails to
`demonstrate on appeal that the
`district court erred in so concluding. We therefore
`affirm the fee awards.
`4. Block argues that the district court abused its
`discretion when it imposed
`a vexatious litigant pre-filing order. Before imposing
`such an order, a district court
`must:
`(1) give litigants notice and “an opportunity to
`oppose the order
`before it [is] entered”; (2) compile an adequate record
`for appellate
`review, including “a listing of all the cases and
`motions that led the
`district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant
`order was needed”;
`(3) make substantive findings of frivolousness or
`harassment; and (4)
`tailor the order narrowly so as “to closely fit the
`specific vice
`
`19
`
`
`
`encountered.”
`Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761
`F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014)
`(quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144,
`1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990)). We
`strictly enforce these four requirements because this
`type of order affects a
`litigant’s fundamental right to access the courts. See
`id. at 1061.
`
`3 C
`
`ase: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115, DktEntry: 197-1,
`Page 3 of 6
`The district court imposed its pre-filing order sua
`sponte in response to
`Kenyon Disend’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
`There is no indication that Block
`had notice of the pre-filing order or an opportunity to
`oppose it. We therefore
`conclude that the district court abused its discretion
`by issuing the pre-filing order
`without appropriate notice and opportunity to
`oppose. We vacate the order and
`remand for further proceedings in accordance with
`the four requirements set forth
`in De Long.
`5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
`denying Block’s requests
`
`20
`
`
`
`for extensions of time because Block failed to
`demonstrate good cause. See Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Block did not seek extensions in
`advance of the time her
`oppositions were due (in violation of the local rules),
`and she filed multiple
`motions of her own during the period in which she
`claimed she was unable to file
`oppositions. We therefore affirm the district court’s
`orders denying extensions of
`time.
`6. Because Block fails to coherently argue that the
`district court erred by
`granting defendants’ motions to dismiss on res
`judicata grounds, we affirm the
`district court’s order. Greenwood V. FAA, 28 F.3d
`971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We
`will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and
`a bare assertion does not
`
`4 C
`
`ase: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115, DktEntry: 197-1,
`Page 4 of 6
`preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of
`other issues are presented for
`review.”).i
`7. The district court did not err by dismissing Block’s
`remaining claims
`
`21
`
`
`
`against the WSBA, City of Duvall, Sky Valley, Port
`of Seattle, and King County,
`and various individual defendants. The district court
`correctly dismissed Block’s
`suit against the WSBA and WSBA individual
`defendants on Eleventh Amendment
`and quasi-judicial immunity grounds. See Hirsh V.
`Justices of Supreme Court of
`Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
`(discussing immunity of a state
`bar and state bar judges and prosecutors); Clark V.
`Washington, 366 F.2d 678,681
`(9th Cir. 1966) (concluding the Washington State Bar
`Association is “an agency of
`the state” and not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.
`§ 1983).
`With respect to City of Duvall, Sky Valley, Port of
`Seattle, King County,
`and the related individual defendants, we conclude
`that the district court did not err
`by dismissing Block’s defamation, civil RICO, and
`retaliation claims. Block does
`not argue that her defamation claim was adequately
`pleaded for purposes of
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Moreover,
`Block fails to demonstrate
`
`22
`
`
`
`i We deem Block to have waived all other claims that
`were dismissed
`by the district court and not distinctly raised on
`appeal, such as Block’s claim that
`the defendants violated the Americans with
`Disabilities Act. See Greenwood, 28
`F.3d at 977.
`
`5 C
`
`ase: 16-35461, 02/11/2019, ID: 11185115, DktEntry: 197-1,
`Page 5 of 6
`that she satisfied her burden for alleging retaliation
`and civil RICO claims. See,
`e.g., Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of
`Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir.
`2016) (discussing requirements for retaliation claim);
`Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d
`506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing requirements for
`civil RICO claim).
`Accordingly, we affirm the orders dismissing
`Block’s claims.
`VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART,
`AFFIRMED IN PART.
`Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
`6
`
`23
`
`
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