(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 11–820. Argued November 1, 2012—Decided February 20, 2013
`
`Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against petitioner
`Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail
`fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that convic-
`tion by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her
`former attorney’s failure to advise her of the guilty plea’s immigra-
`tion consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under
`the Sixth Amendment. While her petition was pending, this Court
`
`held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, that the Sixth Amendment
`
`requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the depor-
`
`tation risks of guilty pleas. The District Court vacated Chaidez’s
`conviction, determining that Padilla did not announce a “new rule”
`
`under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, and thus applied to Chaidez’s
`
`
`case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had de-
`clared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final con-
`
`viction.
`Held: Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on di-
`rect review. Pp. 3−15.
`(a) Under Teague, a person whose conviction is already final may
`
`not benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure on collateral re-
`view. A “case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
`precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became fi-
`nal.” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. And a holding is not so dictated un-
`
`less it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix
`
`
`v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 527−528. At the same time, a case does
`not “announce a new rule, [when] it [is] merely an application of the
`
`principle that governed” a prior decision to a different set of facts.
`
`Teague, 489 U. S., at 307. Thus, garden-variety applications of the
`
`test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, for assessing ineffec-
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
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`

`
`2
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`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`Syllabus
` tive assistance claims do not produce new rules, id., at 687−688.
`
`
`But Padilla did more than just apply Strickland’s general standard
`
`to yet another factual situation. Before deciding if failing to inform a
`client about the risk of deportation “fell below [Strickland’s] objective
`
` standard of reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 688, Padilla first consid-
`ered the threshold question whether advice about deportation was
`
`“categorically removed” from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right
`to counsel because it involved only a “collateral consequence” of a
`conviction, rather than a component of a criminal sentence, 559 U. S.,
`at ___. That is, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied, Pa-
`
`dilla asked whether that test applied at all.
`
`That preliminary question came to the Court unsettled. Hill v.
`
`Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, had explicitly left open whether the Sixth
`Amendment right extends to collateral consequences. That left the
`issue to the state and lower federal courts, and they almost unani-
`mously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attor-
`neys to inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences,
`
`including deportation. Padilla’s contrary ruling thus answered an
`open question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach, in a way that al-
`
`tered the law of most jurisdictions. In so doing, Padilla broke new
`
`ground and imposed a new obligation. Pp. 3−11.
`
`
`(b) Chaidez argues that Padilla did no more than apply Strickland
`
`
`to a new set of facts. But she ignores that Padilla had to develop new
`law to determine that Strickland applied at all. The few lower court
`
`decisions she cites held only that a lawyer may not affirmatively mis-
`represent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client as to
`any important matter. Those rulings do not apply to her case, and
`they do not show that all reasonable judges thought that lawyers had
`to advise their clients about deportation risks. Neither does INS v.
`
`
`
`St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, have any relevance here. In saying that a rea-
`
`sonably competent lawyer would tell a non-citizen client about a
`guilty plea’s deportation consequences, St. Cyr did not determine that
`the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information.
`It took Padilla to decide that question. Pp. 11–15.
`655 F. 3d 684, affirmed.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
`
`
`
`
`
`filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a
`
`dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
`
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–820
`_________________
` ROSELVA CHAIDEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[February 20, 2013]
`
` JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___ (2010), this Court
`
`held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for
`a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of
`deportation arising from a guilty plea. We consider here
`whether that ruling applies retroactively, so that a person
`whose conviction became final before we decided Padilla
`
`can benefit from it. We conclude that, under the prin­
`
`ciples set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989),
`
`Padilla does not have retroactive effect.
`I
`
`Petitioner Roselva Chaidez hails from Mexico, but be­
`came a lawful permanent resident of the United States
`
`in 1977. About 20 years later, she helped to defraud an
`automobile insurance company out of $26,000. After
`federal agents uncovered the scheme, Chaidez pleaded
`guilty to two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18
`U. S. C. §1341. The District Court sentenced her to four
`
`years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution.
`Chaidez’s conviction became final in 2004.
`
`Under federal immigration law, the offenses to which
`Chaidez pleaded guilty are “aggravated felonies,” subject­
`
`

`
`2
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`
`
`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ing her to mandatory removal from this country. See 8
`U. S. C. §§1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). But accord­
`ing to Chaidez, her attorney never advised her of that fact,
`and at the time of her plea she remained ignorant of it.
`
`Immigration officials
`initiated removal proceedings
`against Chaidez in 2009, after an application she made for
`citizenship alerted them to her prior conviction. To avoid
`removal, Chaidez sought to overturn that conviction by
`filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis in Federal Dis­
`trict Court.1 She argued that her former attorney’s failure
`to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading
`guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under
`the Sixth Amendment.
`While Chaidez’s petition was pending, this Court decided
`
`
`
`Padilla. Our ruling vindicated Chaidez’s view of the
`Sixth Amendment: We held that criminal defense attor­
`neys must inform non-citizen clients of the risks of depor­
`tation arising from guilty pleas. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip
`op., at 9). But the Government argued that Chaidez could
`not benefit from Padilla because it announced a “new
`rule” and, under Teague, such rules do not apply in collat­
`eral challenges to already-final convictions.
`The District Court determined that Padilla “did not
`
`
`announce a new rule for Teague purposes,” and therefore
`
`should apply to Chaidez’s case. 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904
`(ND Ill. 2010). It then found that Chaidez’s counsel had
`performed deficiently under Padilla and that Chaidez
`suffered prejudice as a result. Accordingly, the court
`vacated Chaidez’s conviction. See No. 03 CR 636–6, 2010
`——————
`1A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to collaterally
`
`attack a criminal conviction for a person, like Chaidez, who is no longer
`“in custody” and therefore cannot seek habeas relief under 28 U. S. C.
`
`§2255 or §2241. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 507, 510–
`511 (1954). Chaidez and the Government agree that nothing in this
`case turns on the difference between a coram nobis petition and a
`habeas petition, and we assume without deciding that they are correct.
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`3
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`
`
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`WL 3979664 (ND Ill., Oct. 6, 2010).
`
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
`Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new
`rule and so should not apply in a challenge to a final con­
`viction. “Before Padilla,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned,
`“the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth
`Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to pro­
`vide advice about matters not directly related to [a]
`client’s criminal prosecution,” including the risks of deporta­
`tion. 655 F. 3d 684, 693 (2011). And state and lower
`federal courts had uniformly concluded that an attorney
`need not give “advice concerning [such a] collateral (as
`opposed to direct) consequenc[e] of a guilty plea.” Id., at
`690. According to the Seventh Circuit, Padilla’s holding
`was new because it ran counter to that widely accepted
`“distinction between direct and collateral consequences.”
`655 F. 3d, at 691. Judge Williams dissented. Agreeing
`with the Third Circuit’s view, she argued that Padilla
`“broke no new ground” because it merely applied estab­
`
`lished law about a lawyer’s “duty to consult” with a client.
`
`655 F. 3d, at 695 (quoting United States v. Orocio, 645
`F. 3d 630, 638–639 (CA3 2011) (internal quotation marks
`omitted)).
`
`We granted certiorari, 566 U. S. ___ (2012), to resolve a
`split among federal and state courts on whether Padilla
`applies retroactively.2 Holding that it does not, we affirm
`the Seventh Circuit.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`Teague makes the retroactivity of our criminal proce­
`
`——————
`2Compare 655 F. 3d 684 (CA7 2011) (case below) (not retroactive);
`
` United States v. Amer, 681 F. 3d 211 (CA5 2012) (same); United States
` v. Chang Hong, 671 F. 3d 1147 (CA10 2011) (same); State v. Gaitan,
`
`
` 209 N. J. 339, 37 A. 3d 1089 (2012) (same), with United States
`
`v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630 (CA3 2011) (retroactive); Commonwealth v.
`Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N. E. 2d 892 (2011) (same).
`
`
`
`

`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`dure decisions turn on whether they are novel. When we
`announce a “new rule,” a person whose conviction is al­
`
`ready final may not benefit from the decision in a habeas
`or similar proceeding.3 Only when we apply a settled rule
`may a person avail herself of the decision on collateral
`review. Here, Chaidez filed her coram nobis petition five
`years after her guilty plea became final. Her challenge
`therefore fails if Padilla declared a new rule.
`
`“[A] case announces a new rule,” Teague explained,
`“when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation”
`on the government. 489 U. S., at 301. “To put it differ­
`ently,” we continued, “a case announces a new rule if the
`result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
`
`the defendant’s conviction became final.” Ibid. And a
`holding is not so dictated, we later stated, unless it would
`have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix v.
`Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 527–528 (1997).
`
`But that account has a flipside. Teague also made clear
`that a case does not “announce a new rule, [when] it ‘[is]
`merely an application of the principle that governed’” a
`prior decision to a different set of facts. 489 U. S., at 307
`
`(quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 217 (1988)). As
`JUSTICE KENNEDY has explained, “[w]here the beginning
`
`point” of our analysis is a rule of “general application, a
`rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
`myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case
`that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one
`not dictated by precedent.” Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277,
`309 (1992) (concurring in judgment); see also Williams v.
`
`Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 391 (2000). Otherwise said, when
`all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual
`——————
`
` 3 Teague stated two exceptions: “[W]atershed rules of criminal proce­
`dure” and rules placing “conduct beyond the power of the [government]
`
` to proscribe” apply on collateral review, even if novel. 489 U. S., at 311
` (internal quotation marks omitted). Chaidez does not argue that either
`
`of those exceptions is relevant here.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
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`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely
`state a new rule for Teague purposes.
`Because that is so, garden-variety applications of the
`
`test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), for
`assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do
`not produce new rules. In Strickland, we held that legal
`representation violates the Sixth Amendment if it falls
`“below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as indi­
`cated by “prevailing professional norms,” and the defend­
`ant suffers prejudice as a result. Id., at 687–688. That
`
`standard, we later concluded, “provides sufficient guidance
`for resolving virtually all” claims of ineffective assistance,
`even though their particular circumstances will differ.
`
`Williams, 529 U. S., at 391. And so we have granted relief
`under Strickland in diverse contexts without ever suggest­
`ing that doing so required a new rule. See, e.g., ibid.;
`Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U. S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith,
`
`539 U. S. 510 (2003).4 In like manner, Padilla would not
`
`have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland’s
`general standard to yet another factual situation—that is,
`had Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who neglects
`to inform a client about the risk of deportation is profes­
`sionally incompetent.
`But Padilla did something more. Before deciding if
`failing to provide such advice “fell below an objective stan­
`dard of reasonableness,” Padilla considered a threshold
`question: Was advice about deportation “categorically
`removed” from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
`counsel because it involved only a “collateral consequence”
`of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`
`
` 4We did not consider Teague in Williams, Rompilla, and Wiggins, but
`
`
` we granted habeas relief pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) because
`
`
`state courts had unreasonably applied “clearly established” law. And,
`as we have explained, “clearly established” law is not “new” within the
`
`meaning of Teague. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 412.
`
`

`
`6
`
`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
` sentence? 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7–9).5 In other
`
`
` words, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied
`(“Did this attorney act unreasonably?”), Padilla asked
`whether the Strickland test applied (“Should we even
`evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?”). And as we
`will describe, that preliminary question about Strickland’s
`ambit came to the Padilla Court unsettled—so that the
`
`Court’s answer (“Yes, Strickland governs here”) required a
`new rule.
`The relevant background begins with our decision in
`
`
`Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), which explicitly left
`open whether advice concerning a collateral consequence
`must satisfy Sixth Amendment requirements. Hill pleaded
`guilty to first-degree murder after his attorney misin­
`formed him about his parole eligibility. In addressing his
`claim of ineffective assistance, we first held that the
`
`Strickland standard extends generally to the plea process.
`See Hill, 474 U. S., at 57. We then determined, however,
`that Hill had failed to allege prejudice from the lawyer’s
`error and so could not prevail under that standard. See
`id., at 60. That conclusion allowed us to avoid another,
`more categorical question: whether advice about parole
`(however inadequate and prejudicial) could possibly vio­
`late the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals, we
`noted, had held “that parole eligibility is a collateral ra­
`ther than a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a
`
`defendant need not be informed.” Id., at 55. But our
`ruling on prejudice made “it unnecessary to determine
`whether there may be circumstances under which” ad-
`——————
`5We have never attempted to delineate the world of “collateral conse­
`
`quences,” see Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 7, n. 8), nor do
`we do so here. But other effects of a conviction commonly viewed as
`collateral include civil commitment, civil forfeiture, sex offender regis­
`
`tration, disqualification from public benefits, and disfranchisement.
`See id., at ___ (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2–3)
`(listing other examples).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`7
`
`
`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`vice about a matter deemed collateral violates the Sixth
`
`Amendment. Id., at 60.6
`
`
`That non-decision left the state and lower federal courts
`to deal with the issue; and they almost unanimously con­
`cluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attor­
`neys to inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral
`consequences, including deportation. All 10 federal appel­
`late courts to consider the question decided, in the words
`of one, that “counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of the
`collateral consequences of a guilty plea is never” a viola­
`tion of the Sixth Amendment. Santos-Sanchez v. United
`States, 548 F. 3d 327, 334 (CA5 2008).7 That constitutional
`guarantee, another typical decision expounded, “assures
`an accused of effective assistance of counsel in ‘criminal
`prosecutions’”; accordingly, advice about matters like de-
`
`portation, which are “not a part of or enmeshed in the
`criminal proceeding,” does not fall within the Amend­
`
`ment’s scope. United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337
`
`(CA7 1989). Appellate courts in almost 30 States agreed.8
`——————
`6In saying that much, we declined to rule not only on whether advice
`
` about a conviction’s collateral consequences falls outside the Sixth
`Amendment’s scope, but also on whether parole eligibility should be
`considered such a consequence, as the court of appeals held.
`7See Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256 (CA10 2004); United
`States v. Fry, 322 F. 3d 1198, 1200–1201 (CA9 2003); United States v.
`Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 25 (CA1 2000); Russo v. United States, 1999 WL
`164951, *2 (CA2, Mar. 22, 1999); Ogunbase v. United States, 1991 WL
`11619, *1 (CA6, Feb. 5, 1991); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F. 2d
`
`55, 58–59 (CADC 1990); United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337
`(CA7 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F. 2d 6, 7–8 (CA4 1988);
`United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764, 768–769 (CA11 1985).
`8 Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 402–405 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002);
`Tafoya v. State, 500 P. 2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 183
`Ariz. 421, 423, 904 P. 2d 1245, 1247 (App. 1995); Niver v. Commissioner
`of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 1, 3–5, 919 A. 2d 1073, 1075–1076 (2007)
`(per curiam); State v. Christie, 655 A. 2d 836, 841 (Del. Super. 1994);
`
`Matos v. United States, 631 A. 2d 28, 31–32 (D. C. 1993); Major v. State,
`
`814 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002); People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 68–71,
`
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`

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`8
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`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`By contrast, only two state courts held that an attorney
`could violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to inform a
`client about deportation risks or other collateral conse­
`quences of a guilty plea.9 That imbalance led the authors
`of the principal scholarly article on the subject to call the
`exclusion of advice about collateral consequences from the
`Sixth Amendment’s scope one of “the most widely recog­
`
`nized rules of American law.” Chin & Holmes, Effective
`Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty
`
`Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 706 (2002).10
`——————
`571 N. E. 2d 736, 740–741 (1991); State v. Ramirez, 636 N. W. 2d 740,
`743–746 (Iowa 2001); State v. Muriithi, 273 Kan. 952, 961, 46 P. 3d
`1145, 1152 (2002); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S. W. 3d 384, 385–
`386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 2000–2739, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 810
`So. 2d 1106, 1110; Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. App. 916, 917,
`774 N. E. 2d 677, 678–679 (2002); People v. Davidovich, 463 Mich. 446,
`452, 618 N. W. 2d 579, 582 (2000) (per curiam); State ex rel. Nixon v.
`
`
`Clark, 926 S. W. 2d 22, 25 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Zarate, 264 Neb.
`690, 693–696, 651 N. W. 2d 215, 221–223 (2002); Barajas v. State, 115
`Nev. 440, 441–442, 991 P. 2d 474, 475–476 (1999) (per curiam); State v.
`
`Chung, 210 N. J. Super. 427, 434, 510 A. 2d 72, 76 (App. Div. 1986);
`People v. Ford, 86 N. Y. 2d 397, 403–404, 657 N. E. 2d 265, 268–269
`(1995); State v. Dalman, 520 N. W. 2d 860, 863–864 (N. D. 1994);
`Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555–557, 555 A. 2d 92, 93–94
`(1989); State v. Alejo, 655 A. 2d 692, 692–693 (R. I. 1995); Nikolaev v.
`
`Weber, 2005 S. D. 100, ¶¶11–12, 705 N. W. 2d 72, 75–77 (per curiam);
`Bautista v. State, 160 S. W. 3d 917, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Perez
`
`v. State, 31 S. W. 3d 365, 367–368 (Tex. App. 2000); State v. Rojas-
`Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ¶¶15–20, 125 P. 3d 930, 934–935; State v.
`Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wash. App. 869, 876–878, 999 P. 2d 1275, 1279–
`1280 (2000); State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 531, 401 N. W. 2d 856,
`858 (App. 1987).
`
`
` 9 People v. Pozo, 746 P. 2d 523, 527–529 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez,
` 2004–NMSC–036, ¶¶17–19, 136 N. M. 533, 539, 101 P. 3d 799, 805.
`
`
`10The dissent is therefore wrong to claim that we emphasize “the
`
`
` absence of lower court authority” holding that an attorney’s failure to
`advise about deportation violated the Sixth Amendment. Post, at 10
`
` (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). We instead point to the presence of lower
`court authority—in case after case and jurisdiction after jurisdiction—
`holding that such a failure, because relating to a collateral matter,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
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`
`9
`
`
`
` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`So when we decided Padilla, we answered a question
`
`about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that we had left open,
`in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions—and
`our reasoning reflected that we were doing as much. In
`the normal Strickland case, a court begins by evaluating
`the reasonableness of an attorney’s conduct in light of
`professional norms, and then assesses prejudice. But as
`earlier indicated, see supra, at 5–6, Padilla had a different
`starting point. Before asking whether the performance
`of Padilla’s attorney was deficient under Strickland, we
`considered (in a separately numbered part of the opinion)
`whether Strickland applied at all. See 559 U. S., at ___
`(slip op., at 7–9). Many courts, we acknowledged, had
`excluded advice about collateral matters from the Sixth
`Amendment’s ambit; and deportation, because the conse­
`quence of a distinct civil proceeding, could well be viewed
`as such a matter. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But, we
`
`continued, no decision of our own committed us to “appl[y]
`a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
`define the scope” of the right to counsel. Id., at ___ (slip
`
`op., at 8). And however apt that distinction might be in
`
`other contexts, it should not exempt from Sixth Amend­
`ment scrutiny a lawyer’s advice (or non-advice) about
`a plea’s deportation risk. Deportation, we stated, is
`“unique.” Ibid. It is a “particularly severe” penalty, and
`one “intimately related to the criminal process”; indeed,
`immigration statutes make it “nearly an automatic result”
`of some convictions. Ibid. We thus resolved the threshold
`question before us by breaching the previously chink-free
`wall between direct and collateral consequences: Notwith­
`standing the then-dominant view, “Strickland applies to
`Padilla’s claim.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
`If that does not count as “break[ing] new ground” or
`
`“impos[ing] a new obligation,” we are hard pressed to
`
`——————
`
`could not do so.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`know what would. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. Before
`Padilla, we had declined to decide whether the Sixth
`Amendment had any relevance to a lawyer’s advice about
`matters not part of a criminal proceeding. Perhaps some
`
`advice of that kind would have to meet Strickland’s rea­
`
`sonableness standard—but then again, perhaps not: No
`
`precedent of our own “dictated” the answer. Teague, 489
`U. S., at 301. And as the lower courts filled the vacuum,
`
`they almost uniformly insisted on what Padilla called the
`“categorica[l] remov[al]” of advice about a conviction’s non­
`criminal consequences—including deportation—from the
`Sixth Amendment’s scope. 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
`It was Padilla that first rejected that categorical ap­
`proach—and so made the Strickland test operative—when
`a criminal lawyer gives (or fails to give) advice about
`
`immigration consequences.11 In acknowledging that fact,
`we do not cast doubt on, or at all denigrate, Padilla.
`Courts often need to, and do, break new ground; it is the
`very premise of Teague that a decision can be right and
`
`also be novel. All we say here is that Padilla’s holding
`that the failure to advise about a non-criminal conse­
`——————
`11The separate opinions in Padilla objected to just this aspect of the
`Court’s ruling. Dissents have been known to exaggerate the novelty
`of majority opinions; and “the mere existence of a dissent,” like the
`existence of conflicting authority in state or lower federal courts, does
`
`
` not establish that a rule is new. Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 416,
` n. 5 (2004); see Williams, 529 U. S., at 410. But the concurring and
`
`
` dissenting opinions in Padilla were on to something when they de­
` scribed the line the Court was crossing. “Until today,” JUSTICE ALITO
`
`wrote, “the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts
`
`was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client
`about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.” See 559 U. S.,
`at ___ (concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2). Or again, this time from
`JUSTICE SCALIA: “[U]ntil today,” the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only
`“legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution” of a
`
`
`criminal charge. Id., at ___ (dissenting) (slip op., at 2). One need not
`agree with any of the separate opinions’ criticisms of Padilla to concur
`
`with their view that it modified governing law.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`quence could violate the Sixth Amendment would not have
`been—in fact, was not—“apparent to all reasonable ju­
`rists” prior to our decision. Lambrix, 520 U. S., at 527–
`528. Padilla thus announced a “new rule.”
`III
`
`Chaidez offers, and the dissent largely adopts, a differ­
`
`ent account of Padilla, in which we did no more than
`
`apply Strickland to a new set of facts. On Chaidez’s view,
`
`Strickland insisted “[f]rom its inception” that all aspects of
`a criminal lawyer’s performance pass a test of “‘reasona­
`bleness under prevailing professional norms’”: The deci­
`sion thus foreclosed any “categorical distinction between
`direct and collateral consequences.” Brief for Petitioner
`21–22 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S.,
`at 688). Indeed, Chaidez contends, courts prior to Padilla
`recognized Strickland’s all-encompassing scope and so
`applied its reasonableness standard to advice concerning
`deportation. See Brief for Petitioner 25–26; Reply Brief
`10–12. She here points to caselaw in three federal appeals
`courts allowing ineffective assistance claims when attor­
`neys affirmatively misled their clients about the deporta­
`tion consequences of guilty pleas.12 The only question left
`for Padilla to resolve, Chaidez claims, was whether pro­
`fessional norms also require criminal lawyers to volunteer
`advice about the risk of deportation. In addressing that
`issue, she continues, Padilla did a run-of-the-mill Strick-
`land analysis. And more: It did an especially easy Strick-
`land analysis. We had earlier noted in INS v. St. Cyr, 533
`U. S. 289 (2001)—a case raising an issue of immigration
`law unrelated to the Sixth Amendment—that a “compe­
`tent defense counsel” would inform his client about a
`
`guilty plea’s deportation consequences. Id., at 323, n. 50.
`——————
` 12See United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015–1017 (CA9 2005);
`
`
` United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan
`
` v. United States, 765 F. 2d 1534, 1540–1541 (CA11 1985).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
` All Padilla had to do, Chaidez concludes, was recite that
`prior finding.
`But Chaidez’s (and the dissent’s) story line is wrong, for
`
`reasons we have mostly already noted: Padilla had to
`develop new law, establishing that the Sixth Amendment
`applied at all, before it could assess the performance of
`Padilla’s lawyer under Strickland. See supra, at 5–6, 9.
`
`Our first order of business was thus to consider whether
`the widely accepted distinction between direct and collat­
`eral consequences categorically foreclosed Padilla’s claim,
`whatever the level of his attorney’s performance. We did
`
`not think, as Chaidez argues, that Strickland barred
`resort to that distinction. Far from it: Even in Padilla we
`did not eschew the direct-collateral divide across the
`board. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (“Whether that
`distinction is [generally] appropriate is a question we need
`not consider in this case”). Rather, we relied on the spe­
`cial “nature of deportation”—the severity of the penalty
`and the “automatic” way it follows from conviction—to
`show that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction [was]
`ill-suited” to dispose of Padilla’s claim. Id., at ___ (slip op.,
`at 8–9). All that reasoning came before we conducted a
`
` Strickland analysis (by examining professional norms and
`so forth), and none of it followed ineluctably from prior
`
`law.13
`——————
`13The dissent’s entire analysis founders on this most basic point. In
`its lengthy description of Padilla, the dissent picks up in the middle—
`after the Court concluded that the direct-collateral distinction did not
`
`preclude finding that Padilla’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance
`
`
`under the Sixth Amendment. See post, at 3–5. The dissent justifies
`ignoring that threshold conclusion on the ground that “Padilla declined
`to embrace the . . . distinction between collateral and direct conse­
`
`quences” and “stated very clearly that it found the distinction irrele­
`vant” to the case. Post, at 6. But it is exactly in refusing to apply the
`
`direct-collateral distinction that the Padilla Court did something novel.
`Before then, as the Court forthrightly acknowledged, that distinction
`
`would have doomed Padilla’s claim in well-nigh every court in the
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Predictably, then, the caselaw Chaidez and the dissent
`
`cite fails to support their claim that lower courts “accepted
`that Strickland applied to deportation advice.” Brief for
`Petitioner 25; see post, at 8–11. True enough, three fed-
`eral circuits (and a handful of state courts) held before Pa-
`dilla that misstatements about deportation could support
`an ineffective assistance claim