(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SECOND CIRCUIT
` No. 11–770. Argued November 1, 2012—Decided February 19, 2013
`
`While police were preparing to execute a warrant to search a basement
`apartment for a handgun, detectives conducting surveillance in an
`unmarked car outside the apartment saw two men―later identified
`as petitioner Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton―leave the gated
`area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away. The detec-
`tives waited for the men to leave and then followed the car approxi-
`mately a mile before stopping it. They found keys during a patdown
`search of Bailey, who initially said that he resided in the apartment
`but later denied it when informed of the search. Both men were
`handcuffed and driven in a patrol car to the apartment, where the
`search team had already found a gun and illicit drugs. After arrest-
`ing the men, police discovered that one of Bailey’s keys unlocked the
`apartment’s door.
`
`
`At trial, the District Court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the
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`apartment key and the statements he made to the detectives when
`stopped, holding that Bailey’s detention was justified under Michigan
`
`v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, as a detention incident to the execution of
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`a search warrant, and, in the alternative, that the detention was
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`supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1.
`Bailey was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed denial of the sup-
`pression motion. Finding that Summers authorized Bailey’s deten-
`tion, it did not address the alternative Terry holding.
`
`Held: The rule in Summers is limited to the immediate vicinity of the
`premises to be searched and does not apply here, where Bailey was
`detained at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of the im-
`mediate vicinity of the premises in question. Pp. 4−15.
`
`(a) The Summers rule permits officers executing a search warrant
`“to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is con-
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`BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
`ducted,” 452 U. S., at 705, even when there is no particular suspicion
`that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific
`
`danger to the officers, Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93. Detention is
`permitted “because the character of the additional intrusion caused
`by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are
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`substantial.” Id., at 98. In Summers and later cases the detained oc-
`cupants were found within or immediately outside the residence be-
`ing searched. Here, however, petitioner left the apartment before the
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`search began and was detained nearly a mile away. Pp. 4−6.
`(b) In Summers, the Court recognized three important law en-
`forcement interests that, taken together, justify detaining an occu-
`pant who is on the premises during the search warrant’s execution,
`452 U. S., at 702−703. The first, officer safety, requires officers to se-
`cure the premises, which may include detaining current occupants so
`the officers can search without fear that the occupants will become
`disruptive, dangerous, or otherwise frustrate the search. If an occu-
`pant returns home during the search, officers can mitigate the risk by
`
`taking routine precautions. Here, however, Bailey posed little risk to
`the officers at the scene after he left the premises, apparently with-
`out knowledge of the search. Had he returned, he could have been
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`apprehended and detained under Summers. Were police to have the
`authority to detain persons away from the premises, the authority to
`detain incident to the execution of a search warrant would reach be-
`yond the rationale of ensuring the integrity of the search by detain-
`ing those who are on the scene. As for the Second Circuit’s additional
`concerns, if officers believe that it would be dangerous to detain a de-
`parting individual in front of a residence, they are not required to
`stop him; and if officers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activi-
`
`ty, they can instead rely on Terry. The risk that a departing occu-
`pant might alert those still inside the residence is also an insufficient
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`safety rationale for expanding the detention authority beyond the
`immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.
`
`The second law enforcement interest is the facilitation of the com-
`pletion of the search. Unrestrained occupants can hide or destroy ev-
`idence, seek to distract the officers, or simply get in the way. But a
`general interest in avoiding obstruction of a search cannot justify de-
`tention beyond the vicinity of the premises. Occupants who are kept
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`from leaving may assist the officers by opening locked doors or con-
`tainers in order to avoid the use of force that can damage property or
`delay completion of the search. But this justification must be con-
`fined to persons on site as the search warrant is executed and so in a
`position to observe the progression of the search.
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`The third interest is the interest in preventing flight, which also
`serves to preserve the integrity of the search. If officers are con-
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`cerned about flight in the event incriminating evidence is found, they
`might rush the search, causing unnecessary damage or compromising
`its careful execution. The need to prevent flight, however, if un-
`
`bounded, might be used to argue for detention of any regular occu-
`pant regardless of his or her location at the time of the search, e.g.,
`detaining a suspect 10 miles away, ready to board a plane. Even if
`the detention of a former occupant away from the premises could fa-
`cilitate a later arrest if incriminating evidence is discovered, “the
`mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
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`by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Ari-
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`zona, 437 U. S. 385, 393.
`
`In sum, none of the three law enforcement interests identified in
`Summers applies with the same or similar force to the detention of
`recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
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`searched. And each is also insufficient, on its own, to justify an ex-
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`pansion of the rule in Summers to permit the detention of a former
`occupant, wherever he may be found away from the scene of the
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`search. Pp. 6–12.
`
`(c) As recognized in Summers, the detention of a current occupant
`“represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when
`the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant,” 452
`U. S., at 703, but an arrest of an individual away from his home in-
`volves an additional level of intrusiveness. A public detention, even
`if merely incident to a search, will resemble a full-fledged arrest and
`can involve the indignity of a compelled transfer back to the premis-
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`es. P. 12.
`
`(d) Limiting the rule in Summers to the area within which an occu-
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`pant poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search
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`warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search
`is confined to its underlying justification. Because petitioner was de-
`tained at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of immediate
`vicinity, there is no need to further define that term here. Since de-
`tention is justified by the interests in executing a safe and efficient
`search, the decision to detain must be acted upon at the scene of the
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`
`search and not at a later time in a more remote place. Pp. 13−15.
`
`
`(e) The question whether stopping petitioner was lawful under Ter-
`ry remains open on remand. P. 15.
`652 F. 3d 197, reversed and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`C. J., and SCALIA, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCA-
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`LIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ.,
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` joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and
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` ALITO, JJ., joined.
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
`
` No. 11–770
`_________________
` CHUNON L. BAILEY, AKA POLO, PETITIONER v.
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` UNITED STATES
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` ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`
`
` APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`
`[February 19, 2013]
`
` JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free
`from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search may
`be of a person, a thing, or a place. So too a seizure may be
`of a person, a thing, or even a place. A search or a seizure
`may occur singly or in combination, and in differing se-
`quence. In some cases the validity of one determines the
`validity of the other. The instant case involves the search
`of a place (an apartment dwelling) and the seizure of a
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`person. But here, though it is acknowledged that the
`search was lawful, it does not follow that the seizure was
`lawful as well. The seizure of the person is quite in ques-
`tion. The issue to be resolved is whether the seizure of the
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`person was reasonable when he was stopped and detained
`at some distance away from the premises to be searched
`when the only justification for the detention was to ensure
`the safety and efficacy of the search.
`I
`A
`
`At 8:45 p.m. on July 28, 2005, local police obtained a
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`warrant to search a residence for a .380-caliber handgun.
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`

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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The residence was a basement apartment at 103 Lake
`
`
` Drive, in Wyandanch, New York. A confidential informant
`had told police he observed the gun when he was at the
`apartment to purchase drugs from “a heavy set black male
`with short hair” known as “Polo.” App. 16–26. As the
`search unit began preparations for executing the warrant,
`two officers, Detectives Richard Sneider and Richard
`Gorbecki, were conducting surveillance in an unmarked
`car outside the residence. About 9:56 p.m., Sneider and
`Gorbecki observed two men—later identified as petitioner
`Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton—leave the gated
`area above the basement apartment and enter a car
`parked in the driveway. Both matched the general physi-
`cal description of “Polo” provided by the informant. There
`was no indication that the men were aware of the officers’
`presence or had any knowledge of the impending search.
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`The detectives watched the car leave the driveway. They
`waited for it to go a few hundred yards down the street
`and followed. The detectives informed the search team of
`their intent to follow and detain the departing occupants.
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`The search team then executed the search warrant at the
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`apartment.
`Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki tailed Bailey’s car for
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`about a mile—and for about five minutes—before pulling
`the vehicle over in a parking lot by a fire station. They
`ordered Bailey and Middleton out of the car and did a
`patdown search of both men. The officers found no weap-
`ons but discovered a ring of keys in Bailey’s pocket. Bailey
`identified himself and said he was coming from his home
`at 103 Lake Drive. His driver’s license, however, showed
`his address as Bayshore, New York, the town where the
`confidential informant told the police the suspect, “Polo,”
`used to live. Id., at 89. Bailey’s passenger, Middleton,
`said Bailey was giving him a ride home and confirmed
`they were coming from Bailey’s residence at 103 Lake
`Drive. The officers put both men in handcuffs. When
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Bailey asked why, Gorbecki stated that they were being
`detained incident to the execution of a search warrant
`at 103 Lake Drive. Bailey responded: “I don’t live there.
`Anything you find there ain’t mine, and I’m not cooperat-
`ing with your investigation.” Id., at 57, 77.
`
`The detectives called for a patrol car to take Bailey and
`Middleton back to the Lake Drive apartment. Detective
`Sneider drove the unmarked car back, while Detective
`Gorbecki used Bailey’s set of keys to drive Bailey’s car
`back to the search scene. By the time the group returned
`to 103 Lake Drive, the search team had discovered a gun
`and drugs in plain view inside the apartment. Bailey and
`Middleton were placed under arrest, and Bailey’s keys
`were seized incident to the arrest. Officers later discov-
`ered that one of Bailey’s keys opened the door of the
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`basement apartment.
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`
`B
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`Bailey was charged with three federal offenses: posses-
`sion of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
`U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii); possession of a fire-
`arm by a felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1); and
`possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
`offense, in violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). At trial Bailey
`moved to suppress the apartment key and the statements
`he made when stopped by Detectives Sneider and Gor-
`becki. That evidence, Bailey argued, derived from an
`unreasonable seizure. After an evidentiary hearing the
`United States District Court for the Eastern District of
`New York denied the motion to suppress. The District
`Court held that Bailey’s detention was permissible under
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`Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), as a detention
`incident to the execution of a search warrant. In the
`alternative, it held that Bailey’s detention was lawful as
`an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspi-
`
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`cion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). After a trial
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the jury found Bailey guilty on all three counts.
`
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that
`Bailey’s detention was proper and affirmed denial of the
`suppression motion. It interpreted this Court’s decision
`in Summers to “authoriz[e] law enforcement to detain the
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`occupant of premises subject to a valid search warrant
`when that person is seen leaving those premises and the
`detention is effected as soon as reasonably practicable.”
`652 F. 3d 197, 208 (2011). Having found Bailey’s deten-
`
`tion justified under Summers, the Court of Appeals did not
`
`address the District Court’s alternative holding that the
`stop was permitted under Terry.
`
`The Federal Courts of Appeals have reached differing
`conclusions as to whether Michigan v. Summers justifies
`the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity
`of the premises covered by a search warrant. This Court
`granted certiorari to address the question. 566 U. S. ___
`(2012).
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`The Fourth Amendment, applicable through the Four-
`
`teenth Amendment to the States, provides: “The right of
`the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unrea-
`sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
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`no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .
`particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
`persons or things to be seized.” This Court has stated “the
`general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘rea-
`sonable’ only if based on probable cause” to believe that
`the individual has committed a crime. Dunaway v. New
`York, 442 U. S. 200, 213 (1979). The standard of probable
`cause, with “roots that are deep in our history,” Henry v.
`United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959), “represent[s] the
`accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to
`the minimum justification necessary to make the kind
`of intrusion involved in an arrest ‘reasonable’ under the
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`Opinion of the Court
`Fourth Amendment.” Dunaway, supra, at 208.
`
`Within the framework of these fundamental rules there
`is some latitude for police to detain where “the intrusion
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`on the citizen’s privacy ‘was so much less severe’ than that
`involved in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing interests
`in crime prevention and detection and in the police of-
`ficer’s safety’ could support the seizure as reasonable.”
`
`Summers, supra, at 697–698 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at
`209); see also Terry, supra, at 27 (holding that a police
`officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
`may conduct a brief investigative stop).
`In Summers, the Court defined an important category of
`cases in which detention is allowed without probable cause
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`to arrest for a crime. It permitted officers executing a
`search warrant “to detain the occupants of the premises
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`while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U. S., at 705.
`
`The rule in Summers extends farther than some earlier
`exceptions because it does not require law enforcement to
`have particular suspicion that an individual is involved in
`criminal activity or poses a specific danger to the officers.
`Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93 (2005). In Muehler, apply-
`ing the rule in Summers, the Court stated: “An officer’s
`authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it
`does not depend on the ‘quantum of proof justifying deten-
`tion or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the
`seizure.’” 544 U. S., at 98 (quoting Summers, supra, at
`705, n. 19). The rule announced in Summers allows deten-
`tion incident to the execution of a search warrant “because
`the character of the additional intrusion caused by deten-
`tion is slight and because the justifications for detention
`are substantial.” Muehler, supra, at 98.
`In Summers and later cases the occupants detained
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`were found within or immediately outside a residence at
`the moment the police officers executed the search war-
`rant. In Summers, the defendant was detained on a walk
`leading down from the front steps of the house. See Tr. of
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`Oral Arg. in O. T. 1980, No. 79–1794, pp. 41–42; see also
`Muehler, supra, at 96 (detention of occupant in adjoining
`garage); Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U. S. 609, 611
`(2007) (per curiam) (detention of occupants in bedroom).
`
`
`Here, however, petitioner left the apartment before the
`search began; and the police officers waited to detain him
`until he was almost a mile away. The issue is whether the
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`reasoning in Summers can justify detentions beyond the
`immediate vicinity of the premises being searched. An
`exception to the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting
`detention absent probable cause must not diverge from its
`purpose and rationale. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S.
`491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the de-
`tention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justifi-
`cation”). It is necessary, then, to discuss the reasons for
`the rule explained in Summers to determine if its ra-
`
`tionale extends to a detention like the one here.
`A
`In Summers, the Court recognized three important law
`enforcement interests that, taken together, justify the
`detention of an occupant who is on the premises during
`the execution of a search warrant: officer safety, facilitat-
`ing the completion of the search, and preventing flight.
`452 U. S., at 702–703.
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`1
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`The first interest identified in Summers was “the inter-
`est in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers.” Id., at
`702. There the Court held that “the execution of a war-
`rant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that
`may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to con-
`ceal or destroy evidence,” and “[t]he risk of harm to both
`the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers
`routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situa-
`tion.” Id., at 702–703.
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`When law enforcement officers execute a search war-
`
`rant, safety considerations require that they secure the
`premises, which may include detaining current occupants.
`By taking “unquestioned command of the situation,” id., at
`703, the officers can search without fear that occupants,
`who are on the premises and able to observe the course of
`the search, will become disruptive, dangerous, or other-
`wise frustrate the search.
`After Summers, this Court decided Muehler v. Mena.
`The reasoning and conclusions in Muehler in applying the
`Summers rule go quite far in allowing seizure and deten-
`tion of persons to accommodate the necessities of a search.
`There, the person detained and held in handcuffs was not
`suspected of the criminal activity being investigated; but,
`
`the Court held, she could be detained nonetheless, to
`secure the premises while the search was underway. The
`“safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for
`weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs,
`[and] the need to detain multiple occupants made the use
`of handcuffs all the more reasonable.” 544 U. S., at 100.
`While the Court in Muehler did remand for consideration
`of whether the detention there—alleged to have been two
`or three hours—was necessary in light of all the circum-
`stances, the fact that so prolonged a detention indeed
`might have been permitted illustrates the far-reaching
`authority the police have when the detention is made at
`
`the scene of the search. This in turn counsels caution
`before extending the power to detain persons stopped or
`apprehended away from the premises where the search is
`
`being conducted.
`
`It is likely, indeed almost inevitable in the case of a
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`resident, that an occupant will return to the premises at
`some point; and this might occur when the officers are still
`conducting the search. Officers can and do mitigate that
`risk, however, by taking routine precautions, for instance
`by erecting barricades or posting someone on the perime-
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`8
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ter or at the door. In the instant case Bailey had left the
`premises, apparently without knowledge of the search. He
`posed little risk to the officers at the scene. If Bailey had
`rushed back to his apartment, the police could have ap-
`prehended and detained him under Summers. There is no
`established principle, however, that allows the arrest of
`anyone away from the premises who is likely to return.
`
`The risk, furthermore, that someone could return home
`during the execution of a search warrant is not limited to
`occupants who depart shortly before the start of a search.
`The risk that a resident might return home, either for
`reasons unrelated to the search or after being alerted by
`
`
`someone at the scene, exists whether he left five minutes
`
`or five hours earlier. Unexpected arrivals by occupants or
`other persons accustomed to visiting the premises might
`occur in many instances. Were police to have the authority
`to detain those persons away from the premises, the
`authority to detain incident to the execution of a search
`warrant would reach beyond the rationale of ensuring the
`integrity of the search by detaining those who are in fact
`on the scene.
`
`The Court of Appeals relied on an additional safety
`consideration. It concluded that limiting the application of
`the authority to detain to the immediate vicinity would
`put law enforcement officers in a dilemma. They would
`have to choose between detaining an individual immedi-
`ately (and risk alerting occupants still inside) or allowing
`the individual to leave (and risk not being able to arrest
`him later if incriminating evidence were discovered). 652
`F. 3d, at 205–206. Although the danger of alerting occu-
`pants who remain inside may be of real concern in some
`instances, as in the case when a no-knock warrant has
`been issued, this safety rationale rests on the false prem-
`ise that a detention must take place. If the officers find
`that it would be dangerous to detain a departing individ-
`ual in front of a residence, they are not required to stop
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`him. And, where there are grounds to believe the depart-
`ing occupant is dangerous, or involved in criminal activity,
`
`police will generally not need Summers to detain him at
`least for brief questioning, as they can rely instead on
`Terry.
`
`The risk that a departing occupant might notice the
`police surveillance and alert others still inside the resi-
`dence is also an insufficient safety rationale to justify ex-
`panding the existing categorical authority to detain so
`that it extends beyond the immediate vicinity of the prem-
`ises to be searched. If extended in this way the rationale
`would justify detaining anyone in the neighborhood who
`could alert occupants that the police are outside, all with-
`out individualized suspicion of criminal activity or connec-
`tion to the residence to be searched. This possibility
`demonstrates why it is necessary to confine the Summers
`rule to those who are present when and where the search
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`is being conducted.
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`2
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`The second law enforcement interest relied on in Sum-
`
`
`mers was that “the orderly completion of the search may
`be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present.”
`452 U. S., at 703. This interest in efficiency derives from
`distinct, but related, concerns.
`
`If occupants are permitted to wander around the prem-
`ises, there is the potential for interference with the execu-
`tion of the search warrant. They can hide or destroy
`evidence, seek to distract the officers, or simply get in the
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`way. Those risks are not presented by an occupant who
`departs beforehand. So, in this case, after Bailey drove
`away from the Lake Drive apartment, he was not a threat
`to the proper execution of the search. Had he returned,
`officers would have been free to detain him at that point.
`A general interest in avoiding obstruction of a search,
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`however, cannot justify detention beyond the vicinity of
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`the premises to be searched.
`
`Summers also noted that occupants can assist the offi-
`cers. Under the reasoning in Summers, the occupants’
`“self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or
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`locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only
`damaging to property but may also delay the completion of
`the task at hand.” Ibid. This justification must be con-
`fined to those persons who are on site and so in a position,
`when detained, to at once observe the progression of the
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`search; and it would have no limiting principle were it to
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`be applied to persons beyond the premises of the search.
`Here, it appears the police officers decided to wait until
`Bailey had left the vicinity of the search before detaining
`him. In any event it later became clear to the officers that
`Bailey did not wish to cooperate. See App. 57, 77 (“I don’t
`live there. Anything you find there ain’t mine, and I’m not
`cooperating with your investigation”). And, by the time
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`the officers brought Bailey back to the apartment, the
`search team had discovered contraband. Bailey’s deten-
`tion thus served no purpose in ensuring the efficient com-
`pletion of the search.
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`3
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`The third law enforcement interest addressed in Sum-
`mers was the “the legitimate law enforcement interest in
`preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence
`is found.” 452 U. S., at 702. The proper interpretation of
`this language, in the context of Summers and in the
`broader context of the reasonableness standard that must
`govern and inform the detention incident to a search, is
`that the police can prohibit an occupant from leaving the
`scene of the search. As with the other interests identified
`in Summers, this justification serves to preserve the integ-
`rity of the search by controlling those persons who are on
`the scene. If police officers are concerned about flight, and
`have to keep close supervision of occupants who are not
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`restrained, they might rush the search, causing unneces-
`sary damage to property or compromising its careful exe-
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`cution. Allowing officers to secure the scene by detaining
`those present also prevents the search from being impeded
`by occupants leaving with the evidence being sought or the
`means to find it.
`
`The concern over flight is not because of the danger of
`flight itself but because of the damage that potential flight
`can cause to the integrity of the search. This interest does
`not independently justify detention of an occupant be-
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`yond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.
`The need to prevent flight, if unbounded, might be used to
`argue for detention, while a search is underway, of any
`regular occupant regardless of his or her location at the
`time of the search. If not circumscribed, the rationale of
`preventing flight would justify, for instance, detaining a
`suspect who is 10 miles away, ready to board a plane. The
`interest in preventing escape from police cannot extend
`this far without undermining the usual rules for arrest
`based on probable cause or a brief stop for questioning
`under standards derived from Terry. Even if the detention
`of a former occupant away from the premises could facili-
`tate a later arrest should incriminating evidence be dis-
`covered, “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
`more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
`
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`Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385,
`393 (1978).
`
`In sum, of the three law enforcement interests identified
`to justify the detention in Summers, none applies with the
`same or similar force to the detention of recent occupants
`beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
`searched. Any of the individual interests is also insuffi-
`cient, on its own, to justify an expansion of the rule in
`Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant,
`wherever he may be found away from the scene of the
`search. This would give officers too much discretion. The
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` BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of
`a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicini-
`ty of the premises to be searched.
`B
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`In Summers, the Court recognized the authority to
`detain occupants incident to the execution of a search
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`warrant not only in light of the law enforcement interests
`at stake but also because the intrusion on personal liberty
`was limited. The Court held detention of a current occu-
`pant “represents only an incremental intrusion on personal
`liberty when the search of a home has been authorized
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`by a valid warrant.” 452 U. S., at 703. Because the deten-
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`tion occurs in the individual’s own home, “it could add only
`minimally to the public stigma associated with the search
`itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the
`indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police
`station.” Id., at 702.
`
`Where officers arrest an individual away from his home,
`however, there is an additional level of intrusiveness. A
`public detention, even if merely incident to a search, will
`resemble a full-fledged arrest. As demonstrated here,
`detention beyond the immediate vicinity can involve an
`initial detention away from the scene and a second deten-
`tion at the residence.
`In between, the individual will
`suffer the additional indignity of a compelled transfer back
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`to the premises, giving all the appearances of an arrest.
`The detention here was more intrusive than a usual de-
`tention at the search scene. Bailey’s car was stopped; he
`was ordered to step out and was detained in full public
`view; he was handcuffed, transported in a marked patrol
`car, and detained further outside the apartment. These
`facts illustrate that detention away from a premises where
`police are already present often will be more intrusive
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`than detent