(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., ET AL. v. SEB S. A.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`No. 10–6. Argued February 23, 2011—Decided May 31, 2011
`After respondent SEB invented an innovative deep fryer, obtained a
`U. S. patent for its design, and began selling its fryer in this country,
`Sunbeam Products, Inc., asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises,
`Ltd., a Hong Kong home appliance maker and wholly owned subsidi-
`ary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., to supply Sunbeam
`with deep fryers meeting certain specifications. Pentalpha purchased
`an SEB fryer that was made for sale in a foreign market and thus
`lacked U. S. patent markings, copied all but the fryer’s cosmetic fea-
`tures, and retained an attorney to conduct a right-to-use study with-
`out telling him it had copied directly from SEB’s design. Failing to
`locate SEB’s patent, the attorney issued an opinion letter stating that
`Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he had
`found. Pentalpha then started selling its fryers to Sunbeam, which
`resold them in this country under its own trademarks at a price that
`undercut SEB’s.
`SEB then sued Sunbeam for patent infringement. Though Sun-
`beam notified Pentalpha of the lawsuit, Pentalpha went on to sell its
`fryers to other companies, which resold them in the U. S. market un-
`der their respective trademarks. After settling the Sunbeam lawsuit,
`SEB sued Pentalpha, asserting, as relevant here, that it had contra-
`vened 35 U. S. C. §271(b) by actively inducing Sunbeam and the
`other purchasers of Pentalpha fryers to sell or offer to sell them in
`violation of SEB’s patent rights. The jury found for SEB on the in-
`duced infringement theory, and the District Court entered judgment
`for SEB. Affirming, the Federal Circuit stated that induced in-
`fringement under §271(b) requires a showing that the alleged in-
`fringer knew or should have known that his actions would induce ac-
`tual infringements; declared that this showing includes proof that the
`
`

`
`2
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`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Syllabus
`alleged infringer knew of the patent; held that, although there was
`no direct evidence that Pentalpha knew of SEB’s patent before it re-
`ceived notice of the Sunbeam suit, there was adequate proof that it
`deliberately disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective pat-
`ent; and said that such disregard is not different from, but a form of,
`actual knowledge.
`Held:
`1. Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the
`induced acts constitute patent infringement. Pp. 3–10.
`(a) Section 271(b)’s text—“[w]hoever actively induces infringe-
`ment of a patent shall be liable as an infringer”—is ambiguous as to
`the intent needed to impose liability. In referring to a party that “in-
`duces infringement,” the provision may require merely that the in-
`ducer must lead another to engage in conduct that happens to
`amount to infringement. On the other hand, the reference to a party
`that “induces infringement” may also be read to mean that the in-
`ducer must persuade another to engage in conduct that the inducer
`knows is infringement. Pp. 4–5.
`(b) Like §271(b)’s language, the pre-1952 case law is susceptible
`to conflicting interpretations. However, Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
`Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476 (Aro II), resolves the question at
`issue. Pp. 5–8.
`(c) Induced infringement was not considered a separate theory of
`indirect liability in the pre-1952 case law, but was treated as evi-
`dence of “contributory infringement,” i.e., the aiding and abetting of
`direct infringement by another party. When Congress enacted §271,
`it separated the contributory infringement concept into two catego-
`ries: induced infringement, covered by §271(b), and sale of a compo-
`nent of a patented invention, covered by §271(c). In the badly frac-
`tured Aro II decision, a majority concluded that a violator of §271(c)
`must know “that the combination for which his component was espe-
`cially designed was both patented and infringing.” 377 U. S., at 488.
`That conclusion, now a fixture in the law, compels this same knowl-
`edge for liability under §271(b), given that the two provisions have a
`common origin and create the same difficult interpretive choice. Pp.
`8–10.
`2. Deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists does
`not satisfy the knowledge required by §271(b). Nevertheless, the
`Federal Circuit’s judgment must be affirmed because the evidence in
`this case was plainly sufficient to support a finding of Pentalpha’s
`knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness. Pp. 10–16.
`(a) The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in crimi-
`nal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted
`knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine have held
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`3
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`Syllabus
`that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliber-
`ately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that
`are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The traditional ration-
`ale for the doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are
`just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge. This Court en-
`dorsed a concept similar to willful blindness over a century ago in
`Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S. 728, 735, and every Federal Court
`of Appeals but one has fully embraced willful blindness. Given the
`doctrine's long history and wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary,
`there is no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits
`for induced patent infringement under §271(b). Pp. 10–13.
`(b) Although the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of will-
`ful blindness in slightly different ways, all agree on two basic re-
`quirements. First, the defendant must subjectively believe that there
`is a high probability that a fact exists. Second, the defendant must
`take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. These require-
`ments give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that sur-
`passes recklessness and negligence. Pp. 13–14.
`(c) Although the Federal Circuit’s test departs from the proper
`willful blindness standard in important respects, the evidence when
`viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict for SEB was suffi-
`cient under the correct standard. Pentalpha believed that SEB’s
`fryer embodied advanced technology that would be valuable in the
`U. S. market as evidenced by its decision to copy all but the fryer’s
`cosmetic features. Also revealing is Pentalpha’s decision to copy an
`overseas model of SEB’s fryer, aware that it would not bear U. S.
`patent markings. Even more telling is Pentalpha’s decision not to in-
`form its attorney that the product to be evaluated was simply a
`knockoff of SEB’s fryer. Taken together, the evidence was more than
`sufficient for a jury to find that Pentalpha subjectively believed there
`was a high probability that SEB’s fryer was patented and took delib-
`erate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and that it therefore willfully
`blinded itself to the infringing nature of Sunbeam’s sales. Pp. 14–16.
`594 F. 3d 1360, affirmed.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`and SCALIA, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
`joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 10–6
`_________________
`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., ET AL.,
`
`PETITIONERS v. SEB S. A.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[May 31, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
`We consider whether a party who “actively induces in­
`fringement of a patent” under 35 U. S. C. §271(b) must know
`that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.
`I
`This case concerns a patent for an innovative deep fryer
`designed by respondent SEB S. A., a French maker of
`home appliances. In the late 1980’s, SEB invented a “cool­
`touch” deep fryer, that is, a deep fryer for home use with
`external surfaces that remain cool during the frying proc­
`ess. The cool-touch deep fryer consisted of a metal frying
`pot surrounded by a plastic outer housing. Attached to the
`housing was a ring that suspended the metal pot and
`insulated the housing from heat by separating it from the
`pot, creating air space between the two components. SEB
`obtained a U. S. patent for its design in 1991, and some­
`time later, SEB started manufacturing the cool-touch fryer
`and selling it in this country under its well-known “T-Fal”
`brand. Superior to other products in the American market
`at the time, SEB’s fryer was a commercial success.
`
`

`
`2
`
`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc., a U. S. competitor of
`SEB, asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to
`supply it with deep fryers meeting certain specifications.
`Pentalpha is a Hong Kong maker of home appliances and
`a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Ap­
`pliances, Inc.1
`In order to develop a deep fryer for Sunbeam, Pentalpha
`purchased an SEB fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but
`its cosmetic features. Because the SEB fryer bought in
`Hong Kong was made for sale in a foreign market, it bore
`no U. S. patent markings. After copying SEB’s design,
`Pentalpha retained an attorney to conduct a right-to-use
`study, but Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney
`that its design was copied directly from SEB’s.
`The attorney failed to locate SEB’s patent, and in Au­
`gust 1997 he issued an opinion letter stating that Pental­
`pha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he
`had found. That same month, Pentalpha started selling
`its deep fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them in the
`United States under its trademarks. By obtaining its
`product from a manufacturer with lower production costs,
`Sunbeam was able to undercut SEB in the U. S. market.
`After SEB’s customers started defecting to Sunbeam,
`SEB sued Sunbeam in March 1998, alleging that Sun­
`beam’s sales infringed SEB’s patent. Sunbeam notified
`Pentalpha of the lawsuit the following month. Unde­
`terred, Pentalpha went on to sell deep fryers to Fingerhut
`Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co., both of which resold
`them in the United States under their respective trade­
`marks.
`SEB settled the lawsuit with Sunbeam, and then sued
`Pentalpha, asserting two theories of recovery: First, SEB
`claimed that Pentalpha had directly infringed SEB’s
`patent in violation of 35 U. S. C. §271(a), by selling or
`——————
`1We refer to both petitioners as “Pentalpha.”
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`3
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`Opinion of the Court
`offering to sell its deep fryers; and second, SEB claimed
`that Pentalpha had contravened §271(b) by actively induc­
`ing Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward to sell or
`to offer to sell Pentalpha’s deep fryers in violation of SEB’s
`patent rights.
`Following a 5-day trial, the jury found for SEB on both
`theories and also found that Pentalpha’s infringement had
`been willful. Pentalpha filed post-trial motions seeking
`a new trial or judgment as a matter of law on several
`grounds. As relevant here, Pentalpha argued that there
`was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of
`induced infringement under §271(b) because Pentalpha
`did not actually know of SEB’s patent until it received the
`notice of the Sunbeam lawsuit in April 1998.
`The District Court rejected Pentalpha’s argument, as
`did the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
`affirmed the judgment, SEB S. A. v. Montgomery Ward &
`Co., 594 F. 3d 1360 (2010). Summarizing a recent en banc
`decision, the Federal Circuit stated that induced in­
`fringement under §271(b) requires a “plaintiff [to] show
`that the alleged infringer knew or should have known
`that his actions would induce actual infringements” and
`that this showing includes proof that the alleged infringer
`knew of the patent. Id., at 1376. Although the record
`contained no direct evidence that Pentalpha knew of
`SEB’s patent before April 1998, the court found adequate
`evidence to support a finding that “Pentalpha deliberately
`disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective pat­
`ent.” Id., at 1377. Such disregard, the court said, “is not
`different from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual
`knowledge.” Ibid.
`We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___ (2010).
`II
`Pentalpha argues that active inducement liability under
`§271(b) requires more than deliberate indifference to a
`
`

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`4
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`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`known risk that the induced acts may violate an existing
`patent. Instead, Pentalpha maintains, actual knowledge
`of the patent is needed.
`
`A
`In assessing Pentalpha’s argument, we begin with the
`text of §271(b)—which is short, simple, and, with respect
`to the question presented in this case, inconclusive. Sec­
`tion 271(b) states: “Whoever actively induces infringement
`of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”
`Although the text of §271(b) makes no mention of intent,
`we infer that at least some intent is required. The term
`“induce” means “[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to
`move by persuasion or influence.” Webster’s New Interna­
`tional Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945). The addition of the
`adverb “actively” suggests that the inducement must
`involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring about the
`desired result, see id., at 27.
`When a person actively induces another to take some
`action, the inducer obviously knows the action that he or
`she wishes to bring about. If a used car salesman induces
`a customer to buy a car, the salesman knows that the
`desired result is the purchase of the car. But what if it
`is said that the salesman induced the customer to buy a
`damaged car? Does this mean merely that the salesman
`induced the customer to purchase a car that happened to
`be damaged, a fact of which the salesman may have been
`unaware? Or does this mean that the salesman knew that
`the car was damaged? The statement that the salesman
`induced the customer to buy a damaged car is ambiguous.
`So is §271(b). In referring to a party that “induces
`infringement,” this provision may require merely that the
`inducer lead another to engage in conduct that happens to
`amount to infringement, i.e., the making, using, offering to
`sell, selling, or importing of a patented invention. See
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`5
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`Opinion of the Court
`§271(a).2 On the other hand, the reference to a party
`that “induces infringement” may also be read to mean that
`the inducer must persuade another to engage in conduct
`that the inducer knows is infringement. Both readings are
`possible.
`
`B
`Finding no definitive answer in the statutory text, we
`turn to the case law that predates the enactment of §271
`as part the Patent Act of 1952. As we recognized in Aro
`Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476
`(1964) (Aro II), “[t]he section was designed to ‘codify in
`statutory form principles of contributory infringement’
`which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years.’” Id.,
`at 485–486, n. 6 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong.,
`2d Sess., 9 (1952)).
`Unfortunately, the relevant pre-1952 cases are less clear
`than one might hope with respect to the question pre­
`sented here. Before 1952, both the conduct now covered
`by §271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now
`addressed by §271(c) (sale of a component of a patented
`invention) were viewed as falling within the overarching
`concept of “contributory infringement.” Cases in the latter
`category—i.e., cases in which a party sold an item that
`was not itself covered by the claims of a patent but that
`enabled another party to make or use a patented machine,
`process, or combination—were more common.
`The pre-1952 case law provides conflicting signals re­
`garding the intent needed in such cases. In an oft-cited
`decision, then-Judge Taft suggested that it was sufficient
`if the seller of the component part intended that the part
`——————
`2Direct infringement has long been understood to require no more
`than the unauthorized use of a patented invention. See Aro Mfg. Co. v.
`Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U. S. 476, 484 (1964); 3 A. Deller,
`Walker on Patents §453, p. 1684 (1937) (hereinafter Deller). Thus, a
`direct infringer’s knowledge or intent is irrelevant.
`
`

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`6
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`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`be used in an invention that happened to infringe a pat­
`ent. He wrote that it was “well settled that where one
`makes and sells one element of a combination covered by a
`patent with the intention and for the purpose of bringing
`about its use in such a combination he is guilty of con­
`tributory infringement.” Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v.
`Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (CA6 1897).3
`On the other hand, this Court, in Henry v. A. B. Dick
`Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion
`Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S.
`502 (1917), stated that “if the defendants [who were ac­
`cused of contributory infringement] knew of the patent and
`that [the direct infringer] had unlawfully made the pat­
`——————
`3For an article that is particularly clear on this point, see H. Howson,
`Paper before American Association of Inventors and Manufacturers,
`Washington, D. C., Contributory Infringement of Patents 9 (Jan. 1895)
`(reading late 19th-century case law to require only that a party “inten­
`tionally contribut[e] to the act, which the Court holds to be an in­
`fringement” (emphasis in original)). Other authorities from this era
`likewise suggest that it was sufficient if the seller intended a compo­
`nent part to be used in a manner that happened to infringe a patent.
`See, e.g., Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper
`Co., 152 U. S. 425, 433 (1894) (“There are doubtless many cases to the
`effect that the manufacture and sale of a single element of a combina­
`tion, with intent that it shall be united to the other elements, and so
`complete the combination, is an infringement”); Individual Drinking
`Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739–740 (CA2 1924) (“[B]efore one may be
`held for contributory infringement, it must be shown that he had
`knowingly done some act without which the infringement would not
`have occurred”); New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459
`(CA8 1915) (“Contributory infringement is the intentional aiding of one
`person by another in the unlawful making, or selling, or using of a third
`person’s patented invention”); 3 Deller §507, at 1764–1765 (“[W]here a
`person furnishes one part of a patented combination, intending that it
`shall be assembled with the other parts thereof, and that the complete
`combination shall be used or sold; that person is liable to an action, as
`infringer of the patent on the complete combination”); 3 W. Robinson,
`Patents §924, p. 101 (1890) (“To make or sell a single element with the
`intent that it shall be united to the other elements, and so complete
`the combination, is infringement”).
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`7
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ented article . . . with the intent and purpose that [the
`direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they
`would assist in her infringing use.” 224 U. S., at 33 (em­
`phasis added and deleted).4
` Our decision in Metro-
`Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S.
`913 (2005), which looked to the law of contributory patent
`infringement for guidance in determining the standard to
`be applied in a case claiming contributory copyright in­
`fringement, contains dicta that may be read as interpret­
`ing the pre-1952 cases this way. In Grokster, we said that
`“[t]he inducement rule . . . premises liability on purpose­
`ful, culpable expression and conduct.” Id., at 937.
`While both the language of §271(b) and the pre-1952
`case law that this provision was meant to codify are sus­
`ceptible to conflicting interpretations, our decision in Aro
`II resolves the question in this case. In Aro II, a majority
`held that a violator of §271(c) must know “that the combi­
`——————
`4The earlier case of Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207
`U. S. 196 (1907), contains language that may be read as adopting a
`similar position. In that case, the Neostyle Company had a patent for
`a “stencil duplicating machine” called the “rotary Neostyle,” and it
`licensed the use of its machine pursuant to a license requiring the
`licensee to use only Neostyle’s ink. Id., at 198. Another company,
`Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., sold its ink to a Neostyle licensee, and
`Neostyle sued the Johnson company, claiming that it was “inducing a
`breach of the license contracts” and was thus indirectly infringing
`Neostyle’s patent rights. Id., at 199. The Court held that the defen­
`dant did not have “sufficient evidence of notice” to support liability.
`The Court wrote:
`“True, the defendant filled a few orders for ink to be used on a rotary
`Neostyle, but it does not appear that it ever solicited an order for ink to
`be so used, that it was ever notified by the plaintiffs of the rights which
`they claimed, or that anything which it did was considered by them an
`infringement upon those rights.” Id., at 200 (emphasis added).
`The italicized language above may suggest that it was necessary to
`show that the defendants had notice of Neostyle’s patent rights. See
`also Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (CC Mass.
`1898) (“a necessary condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge
`of the complainant’s patent”).
`
`

`
`8
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`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`nation for which his component was especially designed
`was both patented and infringing,” 377 U. S., at 488, and
`as we explain below, that conclusion compels this same
`knowledge for liability under §271(b).
`C
`As noted above, induced infringement was not consid­
`ered a separate theory of indirect liability in the pre-1952
`case law. Rather, it was treated as evidence of “contribu­
`tory infringement,” that is, the aiding and abetting of
`direct infringement by another party. See Lemley, In­
`ducing Patent Infringement, 39 U. C. D. L. Rev. 225, 227
`(2005). When Congress enacted §271, it separated what
`had previously been regarded as contributory infringe­
`ment into two categories, one covered by §271(b) and the
`other covered by §271(c).
` Aro II concerned §271(c), which states in relevant part:
`“Whoever offers to sell or sells . . . a component of a
`patented [invention] . . . , constituting a material part
`of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
`made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
`of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity
`of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
`use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.” (Em­
`phasis added.)
`This language contains exactly the same ambiguity as
`§271(b). The phrase “knowing [a component] to be espe­
`cially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe­
`ment” may be read to mean that a violator must know
`that the component is “especially adapted for use” in a
`product that happens to infringe a patent. Or the phrase
`may be read to require, in addition, knowledge of the
`patent’s existence.
`This question closely divided the Aro II Court. In a
`badly fractured decision, a majority concluded that knowl­
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`9
`
`Opinion of the Court
`edge of the patent was needed. 377 U. S., at 488, and n. 8;
`id., at 514 (White, J., concurring); id., at 524–527 (Black,
`J., dissenting).5 Justice Black’s opinion, which explained
`the basis for the majority’s view, concluded that the lan­
`guage of §271(c) supported this interpretation. See id., at
`525. His opinion also relied on an amendment to this
`language that was adopted when the bill was in commit­
`tee. Id., at 525–527.
`Four Justices disagreed with this interpretation and
`would have held that a violator of §271(c) need know only
`that the component is specially adapted for use in a prod­
`uct that happens to infringe a patent. See id., at 488–490,
`n. 8. These Justices thought that this reading was sup­
`ported by the language of §271(c) and the pre-1952 case
`law, and they disagreed with the inference drawn by the
`majority from the amendment of §271(c)’s language. Ibid.
`While there is much to be said in favor of both views
`expressed in Aro II, the “holding in Aro II has become
`a fixture in the law of contributory infringement under
`[section] 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents §15:20,
`p. 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)—so much so that SEB has not
`asked us to overrule it, see Brief for Respondent 19, n. 3.
`Nor has Congress seen fit to alter §271(c)’s intent re­
`quirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was
`decided. In light of the “‘special force’” of the doctrine of
`stare decisis with regard to questions of statutory inter­
`pretation, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
`552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008), we proceed on the premise that
`§271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent
`that is infringed.
`——————
`5Although Justice Black disagreed with the judgment and was thus
`in dissent, he was in the majority with respect to the interpretation of
`§271(c), and his opinion sets out the reasoning of the majority on this
`point. Three other Justices joined his opinion, and a fourth, Justice
`White, endorsed his reasoning with respect to the interpretation of
`§271(c). See 377 U. S., at 514 (White, J., concurring).
`
`

`
`10
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`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowl­
`edge is needed for induced infringement under §271(b). As
`noted, the two provisions have a common origin in the pre­
`1952 understanding of contributory infringement, and the
`language of the two provisions creates the same difficult
`interpretive choice. It would thus be strange to hold that
`knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under §271(c)
`but not under §271(b).
`Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement
`under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts
`constitute patent infringement.
`III
`Returning to Pentalpha’s principal challenge, we agree
`that deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent
`exists is not the appropriate standard under §271(b). We
`nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
`because the evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to
`support a finding of Pentalpha’s knowledge under the
`doctrine of willful blindness.
`A
`The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in
`criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a
`defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts apply­
`ing the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants
`cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately
`shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts
`that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The
`traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants
`who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those
`who have actual knowledge. Edwards, The Criminal
`Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 302 (1954)
`(hereinafter Edwards) (observing on the basis of English
`authorities that “up to the present day, no real doubt has
`been cast on the proposition that [willful blindness] is as
`
`

`
`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`11
`
`Opinion of the Court
`culpable as actual knowledge”). It is also said that per­
`sons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof
`of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those
`facts. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 2d 697, 700 (CA9
`1976) (en banc).
`This Court’s opinion more than a century ago in Spurr
`v. United States, 174 U. S. 728 (1899),6 while not using the
`term “willful blindness,” endorsed a similar concept. The
`case involved a criminal statute that prohibited a bank
`officer from “willfully” certifying a check drawn against
`insufficient funds. We said that a willful violation would
`occur “if the [bank] officer purposely keeps himself in
`ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank.”
`Id., at 735. Following our decision in Spurr, several fed­
`eral prosecutions in the first half of the 20th century
`invoked the doctrine of willful blindness.7 Later, a 1962
`proposed draft of the Model Penal Code, which has since
`become official, attempted to incorporate the doctrine by
`——————
`6The doctrine emerged in English law almost four decades earlier
`and became firmly established by the end of the 19th century. Edwards
`298–301. In American law, one of the earliest references to the doctrine
`appears in an 1882 jury charge in a federal prosecution. In the charge,
`the trial judge rejected the “great misapprehension” that a person may
`“close his eyes, when he pleases, upon all sources of information, and
`then excuse his ignorance by saying that he does not see anything.”
`See United States v. Houghton, 14 F. 544, 547 (DC NJ).
`7 United States v. Yasser, 114 F. 2d 558, 560 (CA3 1940) (interpreting
`the crime of knowingly and fraudulently concealing property belonging
`to the estate of a bankrupt debtor to include someone who “closed his
`eyes to facts which made the existence of” the receiver or trustee
`“obvious”); Rachmil v. United States, 43 F. 2d 878, 881 (CA9 1930) (per
`curiam) (same); United States v. Erie R. Co., 222 F. 444, 448–451 (DC
`NJ 1915) (approving a “willful ignorance” jury instruction to a charge
`that a rail carrier knowingly granted a concession to a shipper); Grant
`Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 13 Ariz. 388, 400, 114 P. 955, 959
`(1911) (interpreting the crime of knowingly encouraging the importa­
`tion of contract laborers to include those who “willfully and intention­
`ally ignored facts and circumstances known to them, which would have
`led to [actual] knowledge”).
`
`

`
`12
`
`GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S. A.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`defining “knowledge of the existence of a particular fact”
`to include a situation in which “a person is aware of a
`high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he actually
`believes that it does not exist.” ALI, Model Penal Code
`§2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Our Court has
`used the Code’s definition as a guide in analyzing whether
`certain statutory presumptions of knowledge comported
`with due process. See Turner v. United States, 396 U. S.
`398, 416–417 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6,
`46–47, and n. 93 (1969). And every Court of Appeals—
`with the possible exception of the District of Columbia
`Circuit, see n. 9, infra—has fully embraced willful blind­
`ness, applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal
`statutes.
`Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide
`acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason
`why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for
`induced patent infringement under 35 U. S. C. §271(b).8
`Pentalpha urges us not to take this step, arguing that
`§271(b) demands more than willful blindness with respect
`to the induced acts that constitute infringement. See
`Reply Brief for Petitioners 13–14. This question, however,
`is not at issue here. There is no need to invoke the doc­
`trine of willful blindness to establish that Pentalpha knew
`that the retailers who purchased its fryer were selling that
`product in the American market; Pentalpha was indis­
`putably aware that its customers were selling its product
`in this country.
`——————
`8Unlike the dissent, we do not think that utilitarian concerns de­
`mand a stricter standard for knowledge under §271(b), see post, at 3
`(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). The dissent does not explain—nor can we
`see—why promoting “ ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ ” ibid.,
`requi