(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`No. 10–5400. Argued April 18, 2011—Decided June 16, 2011
`Petitioner Tapia was convicted of, inter alia, smuggling unauthorized
`aliens into the United States. The District Court imposed a 51-
`month prison term, reasoning that Tapia should serve that long in
`order to qualify for and complete the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential
`Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). On appeal, Tapia argued that length-
`ening her prison term to make her eligible for RDAP violated 18
`U. S. C. §3582(a), which instructs sentencing courts to “recogniz[e]
`that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correc-
`tion and rehabilitation.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Relying on
`Circuit precedent, it held that a sentencing court cannot impose a
`prison term to assist a defendant’s rehabilitation, but once impris-
`onment is chosen, the court may consider the defendant’s rehabilita-
`tion needs in setting the sentence’s length.
`Held: Section 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or
`lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation.
`Pp. 3–15.
`(a) For nearly a century, the Federal Government used an inde-
`terminate sentencing system premised on faith in rehabilitation.
`Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363. Because that system
`produced “serious disparities in [the] sentences” imposed on similarly
`situated defendants, id., at 365, and failed to “achieve rehabilitation,”
`id., at 366, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
`(SRA), replacing the system with one in which Sentencing Guidelines
`would provide courts with “a range of determinate sentences,” id., at
`368. Under the SRA, a sentencing judge must impose at least im-
`prisonment, probation, or a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the
`appropriate sentence, judges must consider retribution, deterrence,
`incapacitation, and rehabilitation, §3553(a)(2), but a particular pur-
`
`

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`2
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`pose may apply differently, or not at all, depending on the kind of
`sentence under consideration. As relevant here, a court ordering im-
`prisonment must “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropri-
`ate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” §3582(a). A
`similar provision instructs the Sentencing Commission, as the Sen-
`tencing Guidelines’ author, to “insure that the guidelines reflect the
`inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
`for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant.” 28 U. S. C. §994(k).
`Pp. 3–6.
`(b) Consideration of Tapia’s claim starts with §3582(a)’s clear text.
`Putting together the most natural definitions of “recognize”—“to ac-
`knowledge or treat as valid”—and not “appropriate”—not “suitable or
`fitting for a particular purpose”—§3582(a) tells courts to acknowledge
`that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting reha-
`bilitation. It also instructs courts to make that acknowledgment
`when “determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and
`. . . [when] determining the length of the term.” Amicus, appointed to
`defend the judgment below, argues that the “recognizing” clause is
`merely a caution for judges not to put too much faith in the capacity
`of prisons to rehabilitate. But his alternative interpretation is un-
`persuasive, as Congress expressed itself clearly in §3582(a). Amicus
`also errs in echoing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that §3582’s term
`“imprisonment” relates to the decision whether to incarcerate, not the
`determination of the sentence’s length. Because “imprisonment”
`most naturally means “the state of being confined” or “a period of con-
`finement,” it does not distinguish between the defendant’s initial
`placement behind bars and his continued stay there.
`Section 3582(a)’s context supports this textual conclusion. By re-
`stating §3582(a)’s message to the Sentencing Commission, Congress
`ensured that all sentencing officials would work in tandem to imple-
`ment the statutory determination to “reject imprisonment as a means
`of promoting rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367. Equally il-
`luminating is the absence of any provision authorizing courts to en-
`sure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation programs.
`When Congress wanted sentencing courts to take account of rehabili-
`tative needs, it gave them authority to do so. See, e.g., §3563(b)(9).
`In fact, although a sentencing court can recommend that an offender
`be placed in a particular facility or program, see §3582(a), the author-
`ity to make the placement rests with the Bureau of Prisons, see, e.g.,
`§3621(e). The point is well illustrated here, where the District
`Court’s strong recommendations that Tapia participate in RDAP and
`be placed in a particular facility went unfulfilled. Finally, for those
`who consider legislative history useful, the key Senate Report on the
`SRA provides corroborating evidence. Pp. 6–12.
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`3
`
`Syllabus
`(c) Amicus’ attempts to recast what the SRA says about rehabilita-
`tion are unavailing. Pp. 12–14.
`(d) Here, the sentencing transcript suggests that Tapia’s sentence
`may have been lengthened in light of her rehabilitative needs. A
`court does not err by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation
`within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training pro-
`grams. But the record indicates that the District Court may have in-
`creased the length of Tapia’s sentence to ensure her completion of
`RDAP, something a court may not do. The Ninth Circuit is left to
`consider on remand the effect of Tapia’s failure to object to the sen-
`tence when imposed. Pp. 14–15.
`376 Fed. Appx. 707, reversed and remanded.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR,
`J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 10–5400
`_________________
` ALEJANDRA TAPIA, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 16, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`We consider here whether the Sentencing Reform Act pre-
`cludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a
`prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s
`rehabilitation. We hold that it does.
`I
`Petitioner Alejandra Tapia was convicted of, inter alia,
`smuggling unauthorized aliens into the United States, in
`violation of 8 U. S. C. §§1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). At sen-
`tencing, the District Court determined that the United
`States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a prison term
`of between 41 and 51 months for Tapia’s offenses. The
`court decided to impose a 51-month term, followed by
`three years of supervised release. In explaining its rea-
`sons, the court referred several times to Tapia’s need for
`drug treatment, citing in particular the Bureau of Prison’s
`Residential Drug Abuse Program (known as RDAP or the
`500 Hour Drug Program). The court indicated that Tapia
`should serve a prison term long enough to qualify for and
`complete that program:
`“The sentence has to be sufficient to provide needed
`correctional treatment, and here I think the needed
`
`

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`2
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program.
`.
` .
` .
` .
` .
`
`“Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am
`going to impose a 51-month sentence, . . . and one of
`the factors that affects this is the need to provide
`treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough to
`get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.” App.
`27.
`(“Number two” was “to deter her from committing other
`criminal offenses.”
`Ibid.) The court “strongly recom-
`mend[ed]” to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that Tapia
`“participate in [RDAP] and that she serve her sentence at”
`the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California
`(FCI Dublin), where “they have the appropriate tools . . .
`to help her, to start to make a recovery.” Id., at 29. Tapia
`did not object to the sentence at that time. Id., at 31.
`On appeal, however, Tapia argued that the District
`Court had erred in lengthening her prison term to make
`her eligible for RDAP. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. In Tapia’s
`view, this action violated 18 U. S. C. §3582(a), which
`instructs sentencing courts to “recogniz[e] that imprison-
`ment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction
`and rehabilitation.” The United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 376 Fed. Appx. 707 (2010),
`relying on its prior decision in United States v. Duran, 37
`F. 3d 557 (1994). The Ninth Circuit had held there that
`§3582(a) distinguishes between deciding to impose a term
`of imprisonment and determining its length. See id., at
`561. According to Duran, a sentencing court cannot im-
`pose a prison term to assist a defendant’s rehabilitation.
`But “[o]nce imprisonment is chosen as a punishment,” the
`court may consider the defendant’s need for rehabilitation
`in setting the length of the sentence. Ibid.
`We granted certiorari to consider whether §3582(a)
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
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`Opinion of the Court
`permits a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison
`term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation. 562
`U. S. ___ (2010). That question has divided the Courts of
`Appeals.1 Because the United States agrees with Tapia’s
`interpretation of the statute, we appointed an amicus
`curiae to defend the judgment below.2 We now reverse.
`II
`We begin with statutory background—how the relevant
`sentencing provisions came about and what they say.
`Aficionados of our sentencing decisions will recognize
`much of the story line.
`“For almost a century, the Federal Government em-
`ployed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sen-
`tencing.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363
`(1989). Within “customarily wide” outer boundaries set by
`Congress, trial judges exercised “almost unfettered discre-
`tion” to select prison sentences for federal offenders. Id.,
`at 364. In the usual case, a judge also could reject prison
`time altogether, by imposing a “suspended” sentence. If
`the judge decided to impose a prison term, discretionary
`authority shifted to parole officials: Once the defendant
`had spent a third of his term behind bars, they could order
`his release. See K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging:
`Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 18–20 (1998).
`This system was premised on a faith in rehabilitation.
`——————
`1Three Circuits have held that §3582(a) allows a court to lengthen,
`although not to impose, a prison term based on the need for rehabilita-
`tion. See United States v. Duran, 37 F. 3d 557 (CA9 1994); United
`States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F. 3d 622 (CA8 2006); United States v.
`Jimenez, 605 F. 3d 415 (CA6 2010). Two Courts of Appeals have ruled
`that §3582(a) bars a court from either imposing or increasing a period
`of confinement for rehabilitative reasons. See United States v. Man-
`zella, 475 F. 3d 152 (CA3 2007); In re Sealed Case, 573 F. 3d 844
`(CADC 2009).
`2We appointed Stephanos Bibas to brief and argue the case, 562 U. S.
`___ (2011), and he has ably discharged his responsibilities.
`
`

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`4
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Discretion allowed “the judge and the parole officer to
`[base] their respective sentencing and release decisions
`upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability
`to rehabilitation.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 363. A convict,
`the theory went, should generally remain in prison only
`until he was able to reenter society safely. His release
`therefore often coincided with “the successful completion
`of certain vocational, educational, and counseling pro-
`grams within the prisons.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 40
`(1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.). At that point, parole officials
`could “determin[e] that [the] prisoner had become reha-
`bilitated and should be released from confinement.” Stith
`& Cabranes, supra, at 18.3
`But this model of indeterminate sentencing eventually
`fell into disfavor. One concern was that it produced “[s]eri-
`ous disparities in [the] sentences” imposed on simi-
`larly situated defendants. Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 365.
`Another was that the system’s attempt to “achieve reha-
`bilitation of offenders had failed.” Id., at 366. Lawmakers
`and others increasingly doubted that prison programs
`could “rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis”—or that
`parole officers could “determine accurately whether or
`when a particular prisoner ha[d] been rehabilitated.”
`S. Rep., at 40.
`——————
`3The statutes governing punishment of drug-addicted offenders (like
`Tapia) provide an example of this system at work. If a court concluded
`that such an offender was “likely to be rehabilitated through treat-
`ment,” it could order confinement “for treatment . . . for an indetermi-
`nate period of time” not to exceed the lesser of 10 years or the statutory
`maximum for the offender’s crime. 18 U. S. C. §4253(a) (1982 ed.); see
`also §4251(c) (“ ‘Treatment’ includes confinement and treatment in an
`institution . . . and includes, but is not limited to, medical, educational,
`social, psychological, and vocational services, corrective and preventive
`guidance and training, and other rehabilitative services”). Once the
`offender had undergone treatment for six months, the Attorney General
`could recommend that the Board of Parole release him from custody,
`and the Board could then order release “in its discretion.” §4254.
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`5
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`Opinion of the Court
` Congress accordingly enacted the Sentencing Reform
`Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987 (SRA or Act), to overhaul fed-
`eral sentencing practices. The Act abandoned indetermi-
`nate sentencing and parole in favor of a system in which
`Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by a new Sentencing
`Commission, would provide courts with “a range of deter-
`minate sentences for categories of offenses and defen-
`dants.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 368. And the Act further
`channeled judges’ discretion by establishing a framework
`to govern their consideration and imposition of sentences.
`Under the SRA, a judge sentencing a federal offender
`must impose at least one of the following sanctions: im-
`prisonment (often followed by supervised release), proba-
`tion, or a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the appro-
`priate sentence from among these options, §3553(a)(2)
`requires the judge to consider specified factors, including:
`“the need for the sentence imposed—
`“(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
`to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
`vide just punishment for the offense;
`“(B) to afford adequate deterrence to crimi-
`nal conduct;
`“(C) to protect the public from further
`crimes of the defendant; and
`“(D) to provide the defendant with needed
`educational or vocational training, medical
`care, or other correctional treatment in the
`most effective manner.”
`These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, inca-
`pacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of
`sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence
`“to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent that they are
`applicable” in a given case. §3551(a).
`The SRA then provides additional guidance about how
`the considerations listed in §3553(a)(2) pertain to each of
`
`

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`6
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Act’s main sentencing options—imprisonment, super-
`vised release, probation, and fines. See §3582(a); §3583;
`§3562(a); §3572(a). These provisions make clear that a
`particular purpose may apply differently, or even not at
`all, depending on the kind of sentence under considera-
`tion. For example, a court may not take account of retri-
`bution (the first purpose listed in §3553(a)(2)) when impos-
`ing a term of supervised release. See §3583(c).
`Section 3582(a), the provision at issue here, specifies the
`“factors to be considered” when a court orders imprison-
`ment. That section provides:
`“The court, in determining whether to impose a term
`of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is
`to be imposed, in determining the length of the term,
`shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
`to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing
`that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
`promoting correction and rehabilitation.”
`A similar provision addresses the Sentencing Commission
`in its capacity as author of the Sentencing Guidelines.
`The SRA instructs the Commission to:
`“insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriate-
`ness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
`for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or pro-
`viding the defendant with needed educational or voca-
`tional training, medical care, or other correctional
`treatment.” 28 U. S. C. §994(k).
`With this statutory background established, we turn to
`the matter of interpretation.
`III
`A
`Our consideration of Tapia’s claim starts with the text of
`18 U. S. C. §3582(a)—and given the clarity of that provi-
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`7
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`Opinion of the Court
`sion’s language, could end there as well. As just noted,
`that section instructs courts to “recogniz[e] that impris-
`onment is not an appropriate means of promoting correc-
`tion and rehabilitation.” A common—and in context the
`most natural—definition of the word “recognize” is “to ac-
`knowledge or treat as valid.” Random House Dictionary of
`the English Language 1611 (2d ed. 1987). And a thing
`that is not “appropriate” is not “suitable or fitting for a
`particular purpose.” Id., at 103. Putting these two defini-
`tions together, §3582(a) tells courts that they should ac-
`knowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the pur-
`pose of promoting rehabilitation. And when should courts
`acknowledge this? Section §3582(a) answers: when “de-
`termining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and,
`if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, [when] deter-
`mining the length of the term.” So a court making these
`decisions should consider the specified rationales of
`punishment except for rehabilitation, which it should ac-
`knowledge as an unsuitable justification for a prison term.
`As against this understanding, amicus argues that
`§3582(a)’s “recognizing” clause is not a flat prohibition
`but only a “reminder” or a “guide [for] sentencing judges’
`cognitive processes.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus
`Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 23–24 (hereinafter
`Amicus Brief) (emphasis deleted). Amicus supports this
`view by offering a string of other definitions of the
`word “recognize”: “‘recall to mind,’ ‘realize,’ or ‘perceive
`clearly.’” Id., at 24 (quoting dictionary definitions). Once
`these are plugged in, amicus suggests, §3582(a) reveals
`itself as a kind of loosey-goosey caution not to put too
`much faith in the capacity of prisons to rehabilitate.
`But we do not see how these alternative meanings of
`“recognize” help amicus’s cause. A judge who “perceives
`clearly” that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
`promoting rehabilitation would hardly incarcerate some-
`one for that purpose. Ditto for a judge who “realizes” or
`
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`8
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“recalls” that imprisonment is not a way to rehabilitate an
`offender. To be sure, the drafters of the “recognizing”
`clause could have used still more commanding language:
`Congress could have inserted a “thou shalt not” or equiva-
`lent phrase to convey that a sentencing judge may never,
`ever, under any circumstances consider rehabilitation in
`imposing a prison term. But when we interpret a statute,
`we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the merely
`excellent. Congress expressed itself clearly in §3582(a),
`even if armchair legislators might come up with some-
`thing even better. And what Congress said was that when
`sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall consider
`all the purposes of punishment except rehabilitation—
`because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
`pursuing that goal.
`Amicus also claims, echoing the Ninth Circuit’s reason-
`ing in Duran, that §3582(a)’s “recognizing” clause bars
`courts from considering rehabilitation only when imposing
`a prison term, and not when deciding on its length. The
`argument goes as follows. Section 3582(a) refers to two
`decisions: “The court, [1] in determining whether to im-
`pose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprison-
`ment is to be imposed, [2] in determining the length of the
`term” must consider the purposes of punishment listed
`in §3553(a)(2), subject to the caveat of the “recognizing”
`clause. But that clause says only that “imprisonment” is
`not an appropriate means of rehabilitation. Because the
`“primary meaning of ‘imprisonment’ is ‘the act of confining
`a person,’” amicus argues, the clause relates only to
`[1] the decision to incarcerate, and not to [2] the separate
`determination of the sentence’s length. Amicus Brief 52.
`We again disagree. Under standard rules of grammar,
`§3582(a) says: A sentencing judge shall recognize that
`imprisonment is not appropriate to promote rehabilita-
`tion when the court considers the applicable factors of
`§3553(a)(2); and a court considers these factors when
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`9
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`Opinion of the Court
`determining both whether to imprison an offender and
`what length of term to give him. The use of the
`word “imprisonment” in the “recognizing” clause does not
`destroy—but instead fits neatly into—this construction.
`“Imprisonment” as used in the clause most naturally
`means “[t]he state of being confined” or “a period of con-
`finement.” Black’s Law Dictionary 825 (9th ed. 2009); see
`also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1137
`(1993) (the “state of being imprisoned”). So the word does
`not distinguish between the defendant’s initial placement
`behind bars and his continued stay there. As the D. C.
`Circuit noted in rejecting an identical argument, “[a]
`sentencing court deciding to keep a defendant locked up
`for an additional month is, as to that month, in fact choos-
`ing imprisonment over release.” In re Sealed Case, 573
`F. 3d 844, 850 (2009).4 Accordingly, the word “imprison-
`ment” does not change the function of the “recognizing”
`clause—to constrain a sentencing court’s decision both to
`impose and to lengthen a prison term.5
`The context of §3582(a) puts an exclamation point on
`this textual conclusion. As noted earlier, supra, at 6,
`another provision of the SRA restates §3582(a)’s message,
`
`——————
`4Indeed, we can scarcely imagine a reason why Congress would have
`wanted to draw the distinction that amicus urges on us. That distinc-
`tion would prevent a court from considering rehabilitative needs in
`imposing a 1-month sentence rather than probation, but not in choosing
`a 60-month sentence over a 1-month term. The only policy argument
`amicus can offer in favor of this result is that “[t]he effects of impris-
`onment plateau a short while after the incarceration” and “ ‘[t]he dif-
`ference in harm between longer and shorter prison terms is smaller
`than typically assumed.’ ” Amicus Brief 56. But nothing in the SRA
`indicates that Congress is so indifferent to the length of prison terms.
`5The Government argues that “Congress did not intend to prohibit
`courts from imposing less imprisonment in order to promote a defen-
`dant’s rehabilitation.” Brief for United States 40 (emphasis added).
`This case does not require us to address that question, and nothing in
`our decision expresses any views on it.
`
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`10
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`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`but to a different audience. That provision, 28 U. S. C.
`§994(k), directs the Sentencing Commission to ensure that
`the Guidelines “reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a
`sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of
`rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant
`with needed educational or vocational training, medical
`care, or other correctional treatment.” In this way, Con-
`gress ensured that all sentencing officials would work
`in tandem to implement the statutory determination to
`“rejec[t] imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilita-
`tion.” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367 (citing 28 U. S. C.
`§994(k)). Section 994(k) bars the Commission from rec-
`ommending a “term of imprisonment”—a phrase that
`again refers both to the fact and to the length of incarcera-
`tion—based on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs. And
`§3582(a) prohibits a court from considering those needs to
`impose or lengthen a period of confinement when selecting
`a sentence from within, or choosing to depart from, the
`Guidelines range. Each actor at each stage in the sentenc-
`ing process receives the same message: Do not think about
`prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.
`Equally illuminating here is a statutory silence—the
`absence of any provision granting courts the power to
`ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation
`programs. For when Congress wanted sentencing courts
`to take account of rehabilitative needs, it gave courts
`the authority to direct appropriate treatment for offend-
`ers. Thus, the SRA instructs courts, in deciding whether
`to impose probation or supervised release, to consider
`whether an offender could benefit from training and treat-
`ment programs. See 18 U. S. C. §3562(a); §3583(c). And
`so the SRA also authorizes courts, when imposing those
`sentences, to order an offender’s participation in cer-
`tain programs and facilities. §3563(b)(9); §3563(b)(11);
`§3563(a)(4); §3583(d). As a condition of probation, for
`example, the court may require the offender to “undergo
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`11
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`Opinion of the Court
`available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment,
`including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, as
`specified by the court, and [to] remain in a specified insti-
`tution if required for that purpose.” §3563(b)(9).
`If Congress had similarly meant to allow courts to base
`prison terms on offenders’ rehabilitative needs, it would
`have given courts the capacity to ensure that offenders
`participate in prison correctional programs. But in fact,
`courts do not have this authority. When a court sentences
`a federal offender, the BOP has plenary control, subject to
`statutory constraints, over “the place of the prisoner’s
`imprisonment,” §3621(b), and the treatment programs (if
`any) in which he may participate, §§3621(e), (f); §3624(f).
`See also 28 CFR pt. 544 (2010) (BOP regulations for ad-
`ministering inmate educational, recreational, and voca-
`tional programs); 28 CFR pt. 550, subpart F (drug abuse
`treatment programs). A sentencing court can recommend
`that the BOP place an offender in a particular facility
`or program. See §3582(a). But decisionmaking authority
`rests with the BOP.
`This case well illustrates the point. As noted earlier,
`the District Court “strongly recommend[ed]” that Tapia
`participate in RDAP, App. 29, and serve her sentence at
`FCI Dublin, “where they have the facilities to really help
`her,” id., at 28. But the court’s recommendations were
`only recommendations—and in the end they had no effect.
`See Amicus Brief 42 (“[Tapia] was not admitted to RDAP,
`nor even placed in the prison recommended by the district
`court”); Reply Brief for United States 8, n. 1 (“According to
`BOP records, [Tapia] was encouraged to enroll [in RDAP]
`during her psychology intake screening at [the federal
`prison], but she stated that she was not interested, and
`she has not volunteered for the program”). The sentencing
`court may have had plans for Tapia’s rehabilitation, but it
`lacked the power to implement them. That incapacity
`speaks volumes. It indicates that Congress did not intend
`
`

`
`12
`
`TAPIA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative needs when
`imposing prison sentences.
`Finally, for those who consider legislative history useful,
`the key Senate Report concerning the SRA provides one
`last piece of corroborating evidence. According to that
`Report, decades of experience with indeterminate sentenc-
`ing, resulting in the release of many inmates after they
`completed correctional programs, had left Congress skep-
`tical that “rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a
`prison setting.” S. Rep., at 38. Although some critics
`argued that “rehabilitation should be eliminated com-
`pletely as a purpose of sentencing,” Congress declined to
`adopt that categorical position. Id., at 76. Instead, the
`Report explains, Congress barred courts from considering
`rehabilitation in imposing prison terms, ibid., and n. 165,
`but not in ordering other kinds of sentences, ibid., and
`n. 164.
`“[T]he purpose of rehabilitation,” the Report
`stated, “is still important in determining whether a sanc-
`tion other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a
`particular case.” See id., at 76–77 (emphasis added).
`And so this is a case in which text, context, and history
`point to the same bottom line: Section 3582(a) precludes
`sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison
`term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.
`B
`With all these sources of statutory meaning stacked
`against him, amicus understandably tries to put the SRA’s
`view of rehabilitation in a wholly different frame. Amicus
`begins by conceding that Congress, in enacting the SRA,
`rejected the old “[r]ehabilitation [m]odel.” Amicus Brief 1.
`But according to amicus, that model had a very limited
`focus: It was the belief that “isolation and prison routine”
`could alone produce “penitence and spiritual renewal.”
`Id., at 1, 11. What the rehabilitation model did not in-
`clude—and the SRA therefore did not reject—was prison
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`13
`
`Opinion of the Court
`treatment programs (including for drug addiction) tar-
`geted to offenders’ particular needs. See id., at 21, 25, 27–
`28. So even after the passage of §3582(a), amicus argues,
`a court may impose or lengthen a prison sentence to pro-
`mote an offender’s participation in a targeted treatment
`program. The only thing the court may not do is to impose
`a prison term on the ground that confinement itself—its
`inherent solitude and routine—will lead to rehabilitation.
`We think this reading of the SRA is too narrow. For one
`thing, the relevant history shows that at the time of
`the SRA’s enactment, prison rehabilitation efforts focused
`on treatment, counseling, and training programs, not on
`seclusion and regimentation. See Rotman, The Failure of
`Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in Oxford History of
`the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society
`169, 189–190 (N. Morris & D. Rothman eds. 1995) (de-
`scribing the pre-SRA “therapeutic model of rehabilitation”
`as characterized by “individualized treatment” and “voca-
`tional training and group counseling programs”); see also
`n. 3, supra (noting pre-SRA statutes linking the confine-
`ment of drug addicts to the completion of treatment pro-
`grams).
`Indeed, Congress had in mind precisely these
`programs when it prohibited consideration of rehabilita-
`tion in imposing a prison term. See 28 U. S. C. §994(k)
`(instructing the Sentencing Commission to prevent the
`use of imprisonment to “provid[e] the defendant with
`needed educational or vocational training . . . or other
`correctional treatment”); S. Rep., at 40 (rejecting the
`“model of ‘coercive’ rehabilitation—the theory of correction
`that ties prison release dates to the successful completion
`of certain vocational, educational, and counseling pro-
`grams within the prisons”). Far from falling outside the
`“rehabilitation model,” these programs practically defined
`it.
`It is hardly surprising, then, that amicus’s argument
`finds little support in the statutory text. Read mo