(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. MCBRIDE
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
`No. 10–235. Argued March 28, 2011—Decided June 23, 2011
`Respondent McBride, a locomotive engineer with petitioner CSX
`Transportation, Inc., an interstate railroad, sustained a debilitating
`hand injury while switching railroad cars. He filed suit under the
`Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), which holds railroads liable
`for employees’ injuries “resulting in whole or in part from [carrier]
`negligence.” 45 U. S. C. §51. McBride alleged that CSX negligently
`(1) required him to use unsafe switching equipment and (2) failed to
`train him to operate that equipment. A verdict for McBride would be
`in order, the District Court instructed, if the jury found that CSX’s
`negligence “caused or contributed to” his injury. The court declined
`CSX’s request for additional charges requiring McBride to “show that
`. . . [CSX’s] negligence was a proximate cause of the injury” and de-
`fining “proximate cause” as “any cause which, in natural or probable
`sequence, produced the injury complained of.” Instead, relying on
`Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, the court gave the
`Seventh Circuit’s pattern FELA instruction: “Defendant ‘caused or
`contributed to’ Plaintiff’s injury if Defendant’s negligence played a
`part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury.” The jury
`returned a verdict for McBride.
`On appeal, CSX renewed its objection to the failure to instruct on
`proximate cause, now defining the phrase to require a “direct relation
`between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” The
`appeals court, however, approved the District Court’s instruction and
`affirmed its judgment for McBride. Because Rogers had relaxed the
`proximate cause requirement in FELA cases, the court said, an in-
`struction that simply paraphrased Rogers’ language could not be de-
`clared erroneous.
`Held: The judgment is affirmed.
`
`

`
`2
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Syllabus
`
`598 F. 3d 388, affirmed.
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court with
`respect to all but Part III–A, concluding, in accord with FELA’s text
`and purpose, Rogers, and the uniform view of the federal appellate
`courts, that FELA does not incorporate stock “proximate cause” stan-
`dards developed in nonstatutory common-law tort actions. The
`charge proper in FELA cases simply tracks the language Congress
`employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad “caused or con-
`tributed to” a railroad worker’s injury “if [the railroad’s] negligence
`played a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury.”
`That, indeed, is the test Congress prescribed for proximate causation
`in FELA cases. Pp. 4–14, 16–19.
`(a) CSX’s interpretation of Rogers is not persuasive. Pp. 4–12.
`(1) Given FELA’s “broad” causation language, Urie v. Thompson,
`337 U. S. 163, 181, and Congress’ “humanitarian” and “remedial
`goal[s]” in enacting the statute, FELA’s causation standard is “re-
`laxed” compared to that applicable in common-law tort litigation,
`Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U. S. 532, 542–543.
`Rogers described that relaxed standard as “whether the proofs justify
`with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part,
`even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which dam-
`ages are sought.” 352 U. S., at 506. Because the District Court’s in-
`struction tracked Rogers’ language, the instruction was plainly
`proper so long as Rogers actually prescribes the causation definition
`applicable under FELA. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
`U. S. 164, 172. CSX, however, contends that Rogers was a narrowly
`focused decision that did not displace common-law formulations of
`“proximate cause.” Drawing largely on Justice Souter’s concurrence
`in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U. S. 158, 173, CSX urges
`that Rogers’ “any part . . . in producing the injury” test displaced only
`common-law restrictions on recovery for injuries involving contribu-
`tory negligence or other multiple causes, but did not address the req-
`uisite directness of a cause. Pp. 4–6.
`(2) In Rogers, the employee was burning vegetation that lined his
`employer’s railroad tracks. A passing train fanned the flames, which
`spread to the top of the culvert where he was standing. Attempting
`to escape, he slipped and fell on the sloping gravel covering the cul-
`vert, sustaining serious injuries. 352 U. S., at 501–503. The state-
`court jury returned a verdict for him, but the Missouri Supreme
`Court reversed. Even if the railroad had been negligent in failing to
`maintain a flat surface, the court reasoned, the employee was at fault
`because of his lack of attention to the spreading fire. As the fire “was
`something extraordinary, unrelated to, and disconnected from the in-
`cline of the gravel,” the court found that “plaintiff’s injury was not the
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Syllabus
`natural and probable consequence of any negligence of defendant.”
`Ibid. This Court reversed. FELA, this Court affirmed, did not incor-
`porate any traditional common-law formulation of “proximate causa-
`tion[,] which [requires] the jury [to] find that the defendant’s negli-
`gence was the sole, efficient, producing cause of injury.” Id., at 506.
`Whether the railroad’s negligent act was the “immediate reason” for
`the fall, the Court added, was “irrelevant.” Id., at 503. The Court
`then announced its “any part . . . in producing the injury” test, id., at
`506.
`Rogers is most sensibly read as a comprehensive statement of
`FELA’s causation standard. The State Supreme Court there ac-
`knowledged that a FELA injury might have multiple causes, but con-
`sidered the respondent railroad’s part too indirect to establish the
`requisite causation. That is the very reasoning this Court rejected in
`Rogers. It is also the reasoning CSX asks this Court to resurrect.
`The interpretation adopted today is informed by the statutory his-
`tory, see Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1,
`3, the precedents on which Rogers drew, see, e.g., Coray v. Southern
`Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520, 523–524, this Court’s subsequent deci-
`sions, see, e.g., Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U. S.
`521, 523–524, the decisions of every Court of Appeals that reviews
`FELA cases, and the overwhelming majority of state courts and
`scholars. This understanding of Rogers “has been accepted as settled
`law for several decades.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 32. To
`discard or restrict the instruction now would ill serve stare decisis.
`Pp. 6–12.
`(b) CSX nonetheless worries that the Rogers “any part” instruction
`opens the door to unlimited liability, inviting juries to impose liability
`on the basis of “but for” causation. A half century’s experience with
`Rogers gives little cause for concern: CSX has not identified even one
`trial in which the instruction generated an absurd or untoward
`award.
`FELA’s “in whole or in part” language is straightforward.
`“[R]easonable foreseeability of harm is an essential ingredient of
`[FELA] negligence,” Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U. S.
`108, 117 (emphasis added). If negligence is proved, however, and is
`shown to have “played any part, even the slightest, in producing the
`injury,” Rogers, 352 U. S., at 506, then the carrier is answerable in
`damages even if “ ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in which it
`occurred’ ” was not “[p]robable” or “foreseeable.” Gallick, 372 U. S.,
`at 120–121, and n. 8. Properly instructed on negligence and causa-
`tion, and told, as is standard practice in FELA cases, to use their
`“common sense” in reviewing the evidence, juries would have no war-
`rant to award damages in far out “but for” scenarios, and judges
`
`

`
`4
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Syllabus
`would have no warrant to submit such cases to the jury. Pp. 12–14,
`16–19.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part
`III–A. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined that opinion in full,
`and THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part III–A. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a
`dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 10–235
`_________________
`CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER v.
`
`ROBERT MCBRIDE
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 23, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court,
`except as to Part III–A.*
`This case concerns the standard of causation applicable
`in cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability
`Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. FELA renders rail­
`roads liable for employees’ injuries or deaths “resulting in
`whole or in part from [carrier] negligence.” §51. In accord
`with the text and purpose of the Act, this Court’s decision
`in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500 (1957),
`and the uniform view of federal appellate courts, we con­
`clude that the Act does not incorporate “proximate cause”
`standards developed in nonstatutory common-law tort
`actions. The charge proper in FELA cases, we hold, sim­
`ply tracks the language Congress employed, informing
`juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a
`plaintiff employee’s injury if the railroad’s negligence
`played any part in bringing about the injury.
`I
`Respondent Robert McBride worked as a locomotive
`——————
`* JUSTICE THOMAS joins all but Part III–A of this opinion.
`
`

`
`2
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`engineer for petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc., which
`operates an interstate system of railroads. On April 12,
`2004, CSX assigned McBride to assist on a local run be­
`tween Evansville, Indiana, and Mount Vernon, Illinois.
`The run involved frequent starts and stops to add and
`remove individual rail cars, a process known as “switch­
`ing.” The train McBride was to operate had an unusual
`engine configuration: two “wide-body” engines followed
`by three smaller conventional cabs. McBride protested
`that the configuration was unsafe, because switching with
`heavy, wide-body engines required constant use of a hand­
`operated independent brake. But he was told to take the
`train as is. About ten hours into the run, McBride injured
`his hand while using the independent brake. Despite two
`surgeries and extensive physical therapy, he never re­
`gained full use of the hand.
`Seeking compensation for his injury, McBride com­
`menced a FELA action against CSX in the U. S. District
`Court for the Southern District of Illinois. He alleged that
`CSX was twice negligent: First, the railroad required him
`to use equipment unsafe for switching; second, CSX failed
`to train him to operate that equipment. App. 24a–26a. A
`verdict for McBride would be in order, the District Court
`instructed, if the jury found that CSX “was negligent” and
`that the “negligence caused or contributed to” McBride’s
`injury. Id., at 23a.
`CSX sought additional charges that the court declined to
`give. One of the rejected instructions would have required
`“the plaintiff [to] show that . . . the defendant’s negligence
`was a proximate cause of the injury.” Id., at 34a. Another
`would have defined “proximate cause” to mean “any cause
`which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the
`injury complained of,” with the qualification that a proxi­
`mate cause “need not be the only cause, nor the last or
`nearest cause.” Id., at 32a.
`Instead, the District Court employed, as McBride re­
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Opinion of the Court
`quested, the Seventh Circuit’s pattern instruction for
`FELA cases, which reads:
`“Defendant ‘caused or contributed to’ Plaintiff’s injury
`if Defendant’s negligence played a part—no matter
`how small—in bringing about the injury. The mere
`fact that an injury occurred does not necessarily mean
`that the injury was caused by negligence.” Id., at 31a.
`For this instruction, the Seventh Circuit relied upon this
`Court’s decision in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352
`U. S. 500 (1957). The jury returned a verdict for McBride,
`setting total damages at $275,000, but reducing that
`amount by one-third, the percentage the jury attributed to
`plaintiff’s negligence. App. 29a.
`CSX appealed to the Seventh Circuit, renewing its ob­
`jection to the failure to instruct on “proximate cause.”
`Before the appellate court, CSX “maintain[ed] that the
`correct definition of proximate causation is a ‘direct rela­
`tion between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
`alleged.’” 598 F. 3d 388, 393, n. 3 (2010) (quoting Holmes
`v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S.
`258, 268 (1992)). A properly instructed jury, CSX con­
`tended, might have found that the chain of causation was
`too indirect, or that the engine configuration was unsafe
`because of its propensity to cause crashes during switch­
`ing, not because of any risk to an engineer’s hands. Brief
`for Defendant-Appellant in No. 08–3557 (CA7), pp. 49–52.
`The Court of Appeals approved the District Court’s
`instruction and affirmed the judgment entered on the
`jury’s verdict. Rogers had “relaxed the proximate cause
`requirement” in FELA cases, the Seventh Circuit con­
`cluded, a view of Rogers “echoed by every other court of
`appeals.” 598 F. 3d, at 399. While acknowledging that a
`handful of state courts “still appl[ied] traditional formula­
`tions of proximate cause in FELA cases,” id., at 404, n. 7,
`the Seventh Circuit said it could hardly declare erroneous
`
`

`
`4
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`an instruction that “simply paraphrase[d] the Supreme
`Court’s own words in Rogers,” id., at 406.
`We granted certiorari to decide whether the causation
`instruction endorsed by the Seventh Circuit is proper in
`FELA cases. 562 U. S. ___ (2010). That instruction does
`not include the term “proximate cause,” but does tell the
`jury defendant’s negligence must “pla[y] a part—no matter
`how small—in bringing about the [plaintiff’s] injury.” App.
`31a.
`
`II
`
`A
`
`The railroad business was exceptionally hazardous at
`the dawn of the twentieth century. As we have recounted,
`“the physical dangers of railroading . . . resulted in the
`death or maiming of thousands of workers every year,”
`Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U. S. 532,
`542 (1994), including 281,645 casualties in the year 1908
`alone, S. Rep. No. 61–432, p. 2 (1910). Enacted that same
`year in an effort to “shif[t] part of the human overhead of
`doing business from employees to their employers,” Gott-
`shall, 512 U. S., at 542 (internal quotation marks omit­
`ted), FELA prescribes:
`“Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be li­
`able in damages to any person suffering injury while
`he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury or
`death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
`of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such car­
`rier . . . .” 45 U. S. C. §51 (emphasis added).
`Liability under FELA is limited in these key respects:
`Railroads are liable only to their employees, and only for
`injuries sustained in the course of employment. FELA’s
`language on causation, however, “is as broad as could be
`framed.” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 181 (1949).
`Given the breadth of the phrase “resulting in whole or in
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`5
`
`Opinion of the Court
`part from the [railroad’s] negligence,” and Congress’ “hu­
`manitarian” and “remedial goal[s],” we have recognized
`that, in comparison to tort litigation at common law, “a
`relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA.”
`Gottshall, 512 U. S., at 542–543. In our 1957 decision in
`Rogers, we described that relaxed standard as follows:
`“Under [FELA] the test of a jury case is simply
`whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion
`that employer negligence played any part, even the
`slightest, in producing the injury or death for which
`damages are sought.” 352 U. S., at 506.
`As the Seventh Circuit emphasized, the instruction the
`District Court gave in this case, permitting a verdict for
`McBride if “[railroad] negligence played a part—no matter
`how small—in bringing about the injury,” tracked the
`language of Rogers. If Rogers prescribes the definition of
`causation applicable under FELA, that instruction was
`plainly proper. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
`491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis
`have special force in the area of statutory interpretation
`. . . .”). While CSX does not ask us to disturb Rogers, the
`railroad contends that lower courts have overread that
`opinion. In CSX’s view, shared by the dissent, post, at 9–
`10, Rogers was a narrowly focused decision that did not
`touch, concern, much less displace common-law formula­
`tions of “proximate cause.”
`Understanding this argument requires some back­
`ground. The term “proximate cause” is shorthand for a
`concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should
`give rise to legal liability. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
`R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
`Torts §42, p. 273 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and
`Keeton). “What we . . . mean by the word ‘proximate,’” one
`noted jurist has explained, is simply this: “[B]ecause of
`convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice,
`
`

`
`6
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
`beyond a certain point.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
`248 N. Y. 339, 352, 162 N. E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
`dissenting). Common-law “proximate cause” formulations
`varied, and were often both constricted and difficult to
`comprehend. See T. Cooley, Law of Torts 73–77, 812–813
`(2d ed. 1888) (describing, for example, prescriptions pre­
`cluding recovery in the event of any “intervening” cause or
`any contributory negligence). Some courts cut off liability
`if a “proximate cause” was not the sole proximate cause.
`Prosser and Keeton §65, p. 452 (noting “tendency . . . to
`look for some single, principal, dominant, ‘proximate’
`cause of every injury”). Many used definitions resembling
`those CSX proposed to the District Court or urged in the
`Court of Appeals. See supra, at 2–3 (CSX proposed key
`words “natural or probable” or “direct” to describe required
`relationship between injury and alleged negligent con­
`duct); Prosser and Keeton §43, pp. 282–283.
`Drawing largely on Justice Souter’s concurring opinion
`in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U. S. 158, 173
`(2007), CSX contends that the Rogers “any part” test
`displaced only common-law restrictions on recovery for
`injuries involving contributory negligence or other “multi­
`ple causes.” Brief for Petitioner 35 (internal quotation
`marks omitted).1 Rogers “did not address the requisite
`directness of a cause,” CSX argues, hence that question
`continues to be governed by restrictive common-law for­
`mulations. Ibid.
`
`B
`To evaluate CSX’s argument, we turn first to the facts of
`Rogers. The employee in that case was injured while
`burning off weeds and vegetation that lined the defen­
`——————
`1In Sorrell, the Court held that the causation standard was the same
`for railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence, but said
`nothing about what that standard should be. 549 U. S., at 164–165.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`7
`
`Opinion of the Court
`dant’s railroad tracks. A passing train had fanned the
`flames, which spread from the vegetation to the top of a
`culvert where the employee was standing. Attempting to
`escape, the employee slipped and fell on the sloping gravel
`covering the culvert, sustaining serious injuries. 352
`U. S., at 501–503. A Missouri state-court jury returned a
`verdict for the employee, but the Missouri Supreme Court
`reversed. Even if the railroad had been negligent in fail­
`ing to maintain a flat surface, the court reasoned, the
`employee was at fault because of his lack of attention to
`the spreading fire. Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S. W. 2d
`467, 472 (Mo. 1955). As the fire “was something extraordi­
`nary, unrelated to, and disconnected from the incline of
`the gravel,” the court felt “obliged to say [that] plaintiff’s
`injury was not the natural and probable consequence of
`any negligence of defendant.” Ibid.
`We held that the jury’s verdict should not have been
`upset. Describing two potential readings of the Missouri
`Supreme Court’s opinion, we condemned both. First, the
`court erred in concluding that the employee’s negligence
`was the “sole” cause of the injury, for the jury reasonably
`found that railroad negligence played a part. Rogers, 352
`U. S., at 504–505. Second, the court erred insofar as it
`held that the railroad’s negligence was not a sufficient
`cause unless it was the more “probable” cause of the in­
`jury. Id., at 505. FELA, we affirmed, did not incorporate
`any traditional common-law formulation of “proximate
`causation[,] which [requires] the jury [to] find that the
`defendant’s negligence was the sole, efficient, producing
`cause of injury.” Id., at 506. Whether the railroad’s negli­
`gent act was the “immediate reason” for the fall, we added,
`was “an irrelevant consideration.” Id., at 503. We then
`announced the “any part” test, id., at 506, and reiterated it
`several times. See, e.g., id., at 507 (“narro[w]” and “single
`inquiry” is whether “negligence of the employer played
`any part at all” in bringing about the injury); id., at 508
`
`

`
`8
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(FELA case “rarely presents more than the single question
`whether negligence of the employer played any part, how­
`ever small, in the injury”).2
`Rogers is most sensibly read as a comprehensive state­
`ment of the FELA causation standard. Notably, the Mis­
`souri Supreme Court in Rogers did not doubt that a FELA
`injury might have multiple causes, including railroad
`negligence and employee negligence. See 284 S. W. 2d, at
`472 (reciting FELA’s “in whole or in part” language). But
`the railroad’s part, according to the state court, was too
`indirect, not sufficiently “natural and probable,” to estab­
`lish the requisite causation. Ibid. That is the very reason­
`ing the Court rejected in Rogers. It is also the reasoning
`CSX asks us to resurrect.
`Our understanding is informed by the statutory history
`and precedent on which Rogers drew. Before FELA was
`enacted, the “harsh and technical” rules of state common
`law had “made recovery difficult or even impossible” for in­
`jured railroad workers. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Vir-
`ginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1, 3 (1964). “[D]issatisfied with
`the [railroad’s] common-law duty,” Congress sought to “sup­
`plan[t] that duty with [FELA’s] far more drastic duty of
`paying damages for injury or death at work due in
`whole or in part to the employer’s negligence.” Rogers, 352
`U. S., at 507. Yet, Rogers observed, the Missouri court
`and other lower courts continued to ignore FELA’s “sig­
`nifican[t]” departures from the “ordinary common-law
`
`——————
`2In face of Rogers’ repeated admonition that the “any part . . . in pro­
`ducing the injury” test was the single test for causation under FELA,
`the dissent speculates that Rogers was simply making a veiled ref­
`erence to a particular form of modified comparative negligence, i.e.,
`allowing plaintiff to prevail on showing that her negligence was “slight”
`while the railroad’s was “gross.” Post, at 9–10. That is not what Rogers
`conveyed. To repeat, Rogers instructed that “the test of a jury case
`[under FELA] is simply whether . . . employer negligence played any
`part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.” 352 U. S., at 506.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`9
`
`Opinion of the Court
`negligence” scheme, to reinsert common-law formulations
`of causation involving “probabilities,” and consequently to
`“deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination.”
`Id., at 507, 509–510. Aiming to end lower court disre-
`gard of congressional purpose, the Rogers Court repeatedly
`called the “any part” test the “single” inquiry determining
`causation in FELA cases.
`Id., at 507, 508 (emphasis
`added). In short, CSX’s argument that the Rogers stan­
`dard concerns only division of responsibility among multi­
`ple actors, and not causation more generally, misses the
`thrust of our decision in that case.
`Tellingly, in announcing the “any part . . . in producing
`the injury” test, Rogers cited Coray v. Southern Pacific
`Co., 335 U. S. 520 (1949), a decision emphasizing that
`FELA had parted from traditional common-law formula­
`tions of causation. What qualified as a “proximate” or
`legally sufficient cause in FELA cases, Coray had ex­
`plained, was determined by the statutory phrase “result­
`ing in whole or in part,” which Congress “selected . . . to fix
`liability” in language that was “simple and direct.” Id., at
`524. That straightforward phrase, Coray observed, was
`incompatible with “dialectical subtleties” that common-law
`courts employed to determine whether a particular cause
`was sufficiently “substantial” to constitute a proximate
`cause. Id., at 523–524.3
`Our subsequent decisions have confirmed that Rogers
`——————
`3The dissent, while recognizing “the variety of formulations” courts
`have employed to define “proximate cause,” post, at 2, does not say
`which of the many formulations it would declare applicable in FELA
`cases. We regard the phrase “negligence played a part—no matter how
`small,” see Rogers, 352 U. S., at 508, as synonymous with “negligence
`played any part, even the slightest,” see id., at 506, and the phrase “in
`producing the injury” as synonymous with the phrase “in bringing
`about the injury.” We therefore approve both the Seventh Circuit’s
`instruction and the “any part, even the slightest, in producing the
`injury” formulation. The host of definitions of proximate cause, in
`contrast, are hardly synonymous.
`
`

`
`10
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`announced a general standard for causation in FELA
`cases, not one addressed exclusively to injuries involv-
`ing multiple potentially cognizable causes. The very day
`Rogers was announced, we applied its “any part” instruc­
`tion in a case in which the sole causation issue was the
`directness or foreseeability of the connection between the
`carrier’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury. See Fergu-
`son v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 523–
`524 (1957) (plurality opinion).
`A few years later, in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
`372 U. S. 108 (1963), we held jury findings for the plaintiff
`proper in a case presenting the following facts: For years,
`the railroad had allowed a fetid pool, containing “dead and
`decayed rats and pigeons,” to accumulate near its right-of­
`way; while standing near the pool, the plaintiff-employee
`suffered an insect bite that became infected and required
`amputation of his legs. Id., at 109. The appellate court
`had concluded there was insufficient evidence of causation
`to warrant submission of the case to the jury. Id., at
`112. We reversed, reciting the causation standard Rogers
`announced. Id., at 116–117, 120–121. See also Crane v.
`Cedar Rapids & Iowa City R. Co., 395 U. S. 164, 166–167
`(1969) (contrasting suit by railroad employee, who “is not
`required to prove common-law proximate causation but
`only that his injury resulted ‘in whole or in part’from the
`railroad’s violation,” with suit by nonemployee, where
`“definition of causation . . . [is] left to state law”); Gott-
`shall, 512 U. S., at 543 (“relaxed standard of causation
`applies under FELA”).4
`——————
`4CSX and the dissent observe, correctly, that some of our pre-Rogers
`decisions invoked common-law formulations of proximate cause. See,
`e.g., Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 483 (1943) (injury must
`be “the natural and probable consequence of the negligence” (internal
`quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the “natural or probable” charge
`that CSX requested was drawn from Brady, which in turn relied on a
`pre-FELA case, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`11
`
`Opinion of the Court
`In reliance on Rogers, every Court of Appeals that re­
`views judgments in FELA cases has approved jury in­
`structions on causation identical or substantively equiva­
`lent to the Seventh Circuit’s instruction.5 Each appellate
`court has rejected common-law formulations of proximate
`cause of the kind CSX requested in this case. See supra,
`at 2–3. The current model federal instruction, recognizing
`that the “FELA causation standard is distinct from the
`usual proximate cause standard,” reads:
`“The fourth element [of a FELA action] is whether an
`injury to the plaintiff resulted in whole or part from
`the negligence of the railroad or its employees or
`agents. In other words, did such negligence play any
`——————
`475 (1877). But other pre-Rogers FELA decisions invoked no common­
`law formulations. See, e.g., Union Pacific R. Co. v. Huxoll, 245 U. S.
`535, 537 (1918) (approving instruction asking whether negligence “con­
`tribute[d] ‘in whole or in part’ to cause the death”); Coray v. South-
`ern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520, 524 (1949) (rejecting use of common-law
`“dialectical subtleties” concerning the term “proximate cause,” and ap­
`proving use of “simple and direct” statutory language). We rely on
`Rogers not because “time begins in 1957,” post, at 7, but because Rogers
`stated a clear instruction, comprehensible by juries: Did the railroad’s
`“negligence pla[y] any part, even the slightest, in producing [the plain­
`tiff’s] injury”? 352 U. S., at 506. In so instructing, Rogers replaced the
`array of formulations then prevalent. We have repeated the Rogers
`instruction in subsequent opinions, and lower courts have employed it
`for over 50 years. To unsettle the law as the dissent urges would show
`scant respect for the principle of stare decisis.
`5See Moody v. Maine Central R. Co., 823 F. 2d 693, 695–696 (CA1
`1987); Ulfik v. Metro-North Commuter R., 77 F. 3d 54, 58 (CA2 1996);
`Hines v. Consolidated R. Corp., 926 F. 2d 262, 267 (CA3 1991); Her-
`nandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F. 3d 432, 436 (CA4 1999);
`Nivens v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 425 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA5 1970);
`Tyree v. New York Central R. Co., 382 F. 2d 524, 527 (CA6 1967);
`Nordgren v. Burlington No. R. Co., 101 F. 3d 1246, 1249 (CA8 1996);
`Claar v. Burlington No. R. Co., 29 F. 3d 499, 503 (CA9 1994); Summers
`v. Missouri Pacific R. System, 132 F. 3d 599, 606–607 (CA10 1997); Sea-
`Land Serv., Inc., v. Sellan, 231 F. 3d 848, 851 (CA11 2000); Little v.
`National R. Passenger Corp., 865 F. 2d 1329 (CADC 1988) (table).
`
`

`
`12
`
`CSX TRANSP., INC. v. MCBRIDE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`part, even the slightest, in bringing about an injury to
`the plaintiff?” 5 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury
`Instructions–Civil ¶89.02, pp. 89–38, 89–40, and com­
`ment (2010) (hereinafter Sand).
`Since shortly after Rogers was decided, charges of this
`order have been accepted as the federal model. See W.
`Mathes & E. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instruc­
`tions §84.12, p. 517 (1965) (under FELA, injury “is proxi­
`mately caused by” the defendant’s negligence if the negli­
`gence “played any part, no matter how small, in bringing
`about or actually causing the injury”).6 The overwhelming
`majority of state courts7 and scholars8 similarly compre­
`hend FELA’s causation standard.
`In sum, the understanding of Rogers we here affirm “has
`been accepted as settled law for several decades.” IBP,
`Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 32 (2005). “Congress has had
`[more than 50] years in which it could have corrected our
`decision in [Rogers] if it disagreed with it, and has not
`chosen to do so