(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
`LAFLER v. COOPER
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
` No. 10–209. Argued October 31, 2011—Decided March 21, 2012
`
`
` Respondent was charged under Michigan law with assault with intent
`to murder and three other offenses. The prosecution offered to dis­
`miss two of the charges and to recommend a 51-to-85-month sentence
`on the other two, in exchange for a guilty plea. In a communication
`with the court, respondent admitted his guilt and expressed a will­
`
` ingness to accept the offer. But he rejected the offer, allegedly after
`his attorney convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to
`establish intent to murder because the victim had been shot below
`the waist. At trial, respondent was convicted on all counts and re­
`ceived a mandatory minimum 185-to-360-month sentence. In a sub­
`sequent hearing, the state trial court rejected respondent’s claim that
`his attorney’s advice to reject the plea constituted ineffective assis­
`tance. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the ineffec­
`tive-assistance claim on the ground that respondent knowingly and
`intelligently turned down the plea offer and chose to go to trial. Re­
`spondent renewed his claim in federal habeas. Finding that the state
`appellate court had unreasonably applied the constitutional effective­
`
`assistance standards laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
`668, and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, the District Court granted a
`conditional writ and ordered specific performance of the original plea
`offer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying Strickland, it found that
`counsel had provided deficient performance by advising respondent of
`an incorrect legal rule, and that respondent suffered prejudice be­
`cause he lost the opportunity to take the more favorable sentence of­
`fered in the plea.
`Held:
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`1. Where counsel’s ineffective advice led to an offer’s rejection, and
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`where the prejudice alleged is having to stand trial, a defendant must
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`LAFLER v. COOPER
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`
`Syllabus
`show that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable proba­
`bility that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that
`the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or
`sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe
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`than under the actual judgment and sentence imposed. Pp. 3–11.
`
`
`(a) Because the parties agree that counsel’s performance was de­
`ficient, the only question is how to apply Strickland’s prejudice test
`
`where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and
`the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial. Pp. 3–4.
`
`
`(b) In that context, the Strickland prejudice test requires a de­
`
`fendant to show a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the plea
`process would have been different with competent advice. The Sixth
`Circuit and other federal appellate courts have agreed with the
`
`Strickland prejudice test for rejected pleas adopted here by this
`Court. Petitioner and the Solicitor General propose a narrow view—
`that Strickland prejudice cannot arise from plea bargaining if the de­
`fendant is later convicted at a fair trial—but their reasoning is un­
`persuasive. First, they claim that the Sixth Amendment’s sole pur­
`
`pose is to protect the right to a fair trial, but the Amendment actually
`requires effective assistance at critical stages of a criminal proceed­
`ing, including pretrial stages. This is consistent with the right to ef­
`
`
`fective assistance on appeal, see, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U. S.
`
`605, and the right to counsel during sentencing, see, e.g., Glover v.
`
`United States, 531 U. S. 198, 203–204. This Court has not followed a
`rigid rule that an otherwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at
`trial, but has instead inquired whether the trial cured the particular
`error at issue. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 263. Se­
`cond, this Court has previously rejected petitioner’s argument that
`
`Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, modified Strickland and does so
`
`again here. Fretwell and Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, demon­
`strate that “it would be unjust to characterize the likelihood of a dif­
`
`ferent outcome as legitimate ‘prejudice,’ ” Williams v. Taylor, 529
`U. S. 362, 391–392, where defendants would receive a windfall as a
`result of the application of an incorrect legal principle or a defense
`strategy outside the law. Here, however, respondent seeks relief
`from counsel’s failure to meet a valid legal standard. Third, petition­
`er seeks to preserve the conviction by arguing that the Sixth
`Amendment’s purpose is to ensure a conviction’s reliability, but this
`argument fails to comprehend the full scope of the Sixth Amendment
`and is refuted by precedent. Here, the question is the fairness or re­
`liability not of the trial but of the processes that preceded it, which
`
`
`caused respondent to lose benefits he would have received but for
`counsel’s ineffective assistance. Furthermore, a reliable trial may not
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`foreclose relief when counsel has failed to assert rights that may have
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`2
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`

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`Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Syllabus
`altered the outcome. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365,
`379. Petitioner’s position that a fair trial wipes clean ineffective as­
`sistance during plea bargaining also ignores the reality that criminal
`justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
`
`
`trials. See Missouri v. Frye, ante, at ___. Pp. 4–11.
`
`
`
`
`2. Where a defendant shows ineffective assistance has caused the
`rejection of a plea leading to a more severe sentence at trial, the rem­
`
`edy must “neutralize the taint” of a constitutional violation, United
`States v. Morrison, 449 U. S. 361, 365, but must not grant a windfall
`to the defendant or needlessly squander the resources the State
`properly invested in the criminal prosecution, see United States v.
`Mechanik, 475 U. S. 66, 72. If the sole advantage is that the defend­
`ant would have received a lesser sentence under the plea, the court
`should have an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the de­
`fendant would have accepted the plea. If so, the court may exercise
`discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the
`term offered in the plea, the sentence received at trial, or something
`in between. However, resentencing based on the conviction at trial
`may not suffice, e.g., where the offered guilty plea was for less serious
`counts than the ones for which a defendant was convicted after trial,
`or where a mandatory sentence confines a judge’s sentencing discre­
`
`tion. In these circumstances, the proper remedy may be to require
`the prosecution to reoffer the plea. The judge can then exercise dis­
`cretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and
`accept the plea, or leave the conviction undisturbed. In either situa­
`
`tion, a court must weigh various factors. Here, it suffices to give two
`relevant considerations. First, a court may take account of a defend­
`ant’s earlier expressed willingness, or unwillingness, to accept re­
`sponsibility for his or her actions. Second, it is not necessary here to
`decide as a constitutional rule that a judge is required to disregard
`any information concerning the crime discovered after the plea offer
`was made. Petitioner argues that implementing a remedy will open
`the floodgates to litigation by defendants seeking to unsettle their
`convictions, but in the 30 years that courts have recognized such
`claims, there has been no indication that the system is overwhelmed
`or that defendants are receiving windfalls as a result of strategically
`timed Strickland claims. In addition, the prosecution and trial courts
`may adopt measures to help ensure against meritless claims. See
`Frye, ante, at ___. Pp. 11–14.
`
`
`
`
`3. This case arises under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
`
`Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), but because the Michigan Court of Ap­
`peals’ analysis of respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
`was contrary to clearly established federal law, AEDPA presents no
`
`bar to relief. Respondent has satisfied Strickland’s two-part test.
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`3
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`4
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`LAFLER v. COOPER
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`
`Syllabus
`The parties concede the fact of deficient performance. And respond­
`ent has shown that but for that performance there is a reasonable
`probability he and the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea.
`In addition, as a result of not accepting the plea and being convicted
`at trial, he received a minimum sentence 3½ times greater than he
`
`would have received under the plea. As a remedy, the District Court
`
`
`ordered specific performance of the plea agreement, but the correct
`
`remedy is to order the State to reoffer the plea. If respondent accepts
`the offer, the state trial court can exercise its discretion in determin­
`ing whether to vacate respondent’s convictions and resentence pur­
`suant to the plea agreement, to vacate only some of the convictions
`
`and resentence accordingly, or to leave the conviction and sentence
`resulting from the trial undisturbed. Pp. 14–16.
`376 Fed. Appx. 563, vacated and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
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`
`BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissent­
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`
`
`ing opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
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`joined as to all but Part IV. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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`

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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 10–209
`_________________
` BLAINE LAFLER, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY COOPER
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[March 21, 2012]
`
` JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In this case, as in Missouri v. Frye, ante, p. ___, also
`
`
`decided today, a criminal defendant seeks a remedy when
`inadequate assistance of counsel caused nonacceptance of
`
`a plea offer and further proceedings led to a less favorable
`outcome.
`In Frye, defense counsel did not inform the
`defendant of the plea offer; and after the offer lapsed the
`defendant still pleaded guilty, but on more severe terms.
`Here, the favorable plea offer was reported to the client
`
`but, on advice of counsel, was rejected. In Frye there was
`a later guilty plea. Here, after the plea offer had been
`rejected, there was a full and fair trial before a jury. After
`a guilty verdict, the defendant received a sentence harsher
`than that offered in the rejected plea bargain. The instant
`case comes to the Court with the concession that counsel’s
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`advice with respect to the plea offer fell below the stand­
`ard of adequate assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
`Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States through the
`Fourteenth Amendment.
`
`
`
`I
`On the evening of March 25, 2003, respondent pointed a
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`gun toward Kali Mundy’s head and fired. From the rec­
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`

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`2
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`LAFLER v. COOPER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ord, it is unclear why respondent did this, and at trial it
`was suggested that he might have acted either in self­
`defense or in defense of another person. In any event the
`shot missed and Mundy fled. Respondent followed in pur-
`suit, firing repeatedly. Mundy was shot in her buttock,
`
`hip, and abdomen but survived the assault.
`
`Respondent was charged under Michigan law with as-
`sault with intent to murder, possession of a firearm by a
`felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a fel-
`ony, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and for being a
`habitual offender. On two occasions, the prosecution
`offered to dismiss two of the charges and to recommend a
`sentence of 51 to 85 months for the other two, in exchange
`for a guilty plea. In a communication with the court re­
`spondent admitted guilt and expressed a willingness to
`accept the offer. Respondent, however, later rejected the
`offer on both occasions, allegedly after his attorney con­
`vinced him that the prosecution would be unable to estab­
`lish his intent to murder Mundy because she had been
`shot below the waist. On the first day of trial the prosecu­
`tion offered a significantly less favorable plea deal, which
`respondent again rejected. After trial, respondent was
`convicted on all counts and received a mandatory mini­
`mum sentence of 185 to 360 months’ imprisonment.
`
`In a so-called Ginther hearing before the state trial
`court, see People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 212 N. W. 2d
`922 (1973), respondent argued his attorney’s advice to
`reject the plea constituted ineffective assistance. The trial
`judge rejected the claim, and the Michigan Court of Ap­
`peals affirmed. People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL
`
`
`599740 (Mar. 15, 2005) (per curiam), App. to Pet. for Cert.
`44a. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim
`of ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that re-
`spondent knowingly and intelligently rejected two plea
`offers and chose to go to trial. The Michigan Supreme
`
`Court denied respondent’s application for leave to file an
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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` appeal. People v. Cooper, 474 Mich. 905, 705 N. W. 2d 118
`
`(2005) (table).
`Respondent then filed a petition for federal habeas relief
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`under 28 U. S. C. §2254, renewing his
`ineffective­
`assistance-of-counsel claim. After finding, as required by
`the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
`(AEDPA), that the Michigan Court of Appeals had un-
`reasonably applied the constitutional standards for effective
`assistance of counsel laid out in Strickland v. Washington,
`466 U. S. 668 (1984), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52
`
`
`(1985), the District Court granted a conditional writ.
`Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06–11068, 2009 WL 817712, *10 (ED
`Mich., Mar. 26, 2009), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a–42a. To
`
`remedy the violation, the District Court ordered “specific
`
`
`performance of [respondent’s] original plea agreement, for
`a minimum sentence in the range of fifty-one to eighty-five
`months.” Id., at *9, App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a.
`
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
`
`affirmed, 376 Fed. Appx. 563 (2010), finding “[e]ven full
`deference under AEDPA cannot salvage the state court’s
`decision,” id., at 569. Applying Strickland, the Court of
`Appeals found that respondent’s attorney had provided
`deficient performance by informing respondent of “an
`incorrect legal rule,” 376 Fed. Appx., at 570–571, and that
`respondent suffered prejudice because he “lost out on an
`
`opportunity to plead guilty and receive the lower sentence
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`that was offered to him.” Id., at 573. This Court granted
`certiorari. 562 U. S. ___ (2011).
`
`II
`
`
`A
`
`Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
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`a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process. Frye,
`ante, at 8; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, ___
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`(2010) (slip op., at 16); Hill, supra, at 57. During plea
`
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`negotiations defendants are “entitled to the effective assis­
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`3
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`4
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`LAFLER v. COOPER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tance of competent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397
`U. S. 759, 771 (1970). In Hill, the Court held “the two­
`part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to
`
`guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”
`
`474 U. S., at 58. The performance prong of Strickland
`requires a defendant to show “‘that counsel’s representa­
`tion fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”
`474 U. S., at 57 (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688). In
`this case all parties agree the performance of respondent’s
`counsel was deficient when he advised respondent to reject
`the plea offer on the grounds he could not be convicted at
`trial. In light of this concession, it is unnecessary for this
`
`Court to explore the issue.
`
`
`The question for this Court is how to apply Strickland’s
`prejudice test where ineffective assistance results in a re-
`
`jection of the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at
`the ensuing trial.
`
`
`
`B
` To establish Strickland prejudice a defendant must
`“show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
`counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed­
`ing would have been different.” Id., at 694. In the context
`of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea
`process would have been different with competent advice.
`See Frye, ante, at 12 (noting that Strickland’s inquiry, as
`applied to advice with respect to plea bargains, turns on
`“whether ‘the result of the proceeding would have been
`different’” (quoting Strickland, supra, at 694)); see also
`
`Hill, 474 U. S., at 59 (“The . . . ‘prejudice,’ requirement . . .
`focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
`performance affected the outcome of the plea process”). In
`Hill, when evaluating the petitioner’s claim that ineffec­
`tive assistance led to the improvident acceptance of a
`guilty plea, the Court required the petitioner to show “that
`there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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`

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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and
`would have insisted on going to trial.” Ibid.
`
`In contrast to Hill, here the ineffective advice led not to
`an offer’s acceptance but to its rejection. Having to stand
`trial, not choosing to waive it, is the prejudice alleged. In
`these circumstances a defendant must show that but for
`the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable prob-
`ability that the plea offer would have been presented
`to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted
`the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it
`in light of intervening circumstances), that the court
`would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or
`sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been
`less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in
`fact were imposed. Here, the Court of Appeals for the
`Sixth Circuit agreed with that test for Strickland preju­
`dice in the context of a rejected plea bargain. This is
`consistent with the test adopted and applied by other
`appellate courts without demonstrated difficulties or
`systemic disruptions. See 376 Fed. Appx., at 571–573; see
`
`also, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez Rodriguez, 929 F. 2d
`
`747, 753, n. 1 (CA1 1991) (per curiam); United States v.
`
`Gordon, 156 F. 3d 376, 380–381 (CA2 1998) (per curiam);
`United States v. Day, 969 F. 2d 39, 43–45 (CA3 1992);
`
`Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F. 2d 262, 267 (CA5 1981);
`
`Julian v. Bartley, 495 F. 3d 487, 498–500 (CA7 2007);
`
`Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F. 3d 700, 703–704 (CA8 2001);
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`Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F. 3d 1045, 1052–1053 (CA9 2003);
`Williams v. Jones, 571 F. 3d 1086, 1094–1095 (CA10 2009)
`
`
`(per curiam); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F. 3d 1498,
`1512–1514 (CADC 1997) (per curiam).
`
`Petitioner and the Solicitor General propose a different,
`far more narrow, view of the Sixth Amendment. They
`contend there can be no finding of Strickland prejudice
`arising from plea bargaining if the defendant is later
`
`convicted at a fair trial. The three reasons petitioner and
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`5
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`

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`6
`
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`
`
`LAFLER v. COOPER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Solicitor General offer for their approach are unper­
`
`suasive.
`
`First, petitioner and the Solicitor General claim that
`the sole purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to protect the
`right to a fair trial. Errors before trial, they argue, are not
`cognizable under the Sixth Amendment unless they affect
`the fairness of the trial itself. See Brief for Petitioner 12–
`21; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10–12. The
`
`Sixth Amendment, however, is not so narrow in its reach.
`Cf. Frye, ante, at 11 (holding that a defendant can show
`prejudice under Strickland even absent a showing that the
`
`deficient performance precluded him from going to trial).
`The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of
`counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Its
`protections are not designed simply to protect the trial,
`even though “counsel’s absence [in these stages] may
`derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.” United
`States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226 (1967). The constitu­
`tional guarantee applies to pretrial critical stages that are
`part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding, a pro­
`ceeding in which defendants cannot be presumed to make
`critical decisions without counsel’s advice. This is con­
`sistent, too, with the rule that defendants have a right to
`effective assistance of counsel on appeal, even though that
`
`cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.
`See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U. S. 605 (2005); Evitts
`v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985). The precedents also estab­
`lish that there exists a right to counsel during sentencing
`in both noncapital, see Glover v. United States, 531 U. S.
`
`198, 203–204 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128
`(1967), and capital cases, see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S.
`510, 538 (2003). Even though sentencing does not concern
`the defendant’s guilt or innocence, ineffective assistance of
`counsel during a sentencing hearing can result in Strick-
`land prejudice because “any amount of [additional] jail
`time has Sixth Amendment significance.” Glover, supra,
`
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`

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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`7
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`
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`
`
`at 203.
`
`The Court, moreover, has not followed a rigid rule that
`an otherwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at the
`trial itself. It has inquired instead whether the trial cured
`
`the particular error at issue. Thus, in Vasquez v. Hillery,
`474 U. S. 254 (1986), the deliberate exclusion of all
`African-Americans from a grand jury was prejudicial be-
`
`cause a defendant may have been tried on charges that
`would not have been brought at all by a properly constituted
`
`
`grand jury. Id., at 263; see Ballard v. United States, 329
`U. S. 187, 195 (1946) (dismissing an indictment returned
`by a grand jury from which women were excluded); see
`
`also Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212, 218–219
`(1960) (reversing a defendant’s conviction because the jury
`may have based its verdict on acts not charged in the
`indictment). By contrast, in United States v. Mechanik,
`475 U. S. 66 (1986), the complained-of error was a viola­
`tion of a grand jury rule meant to ensure probable cause
`existed to believe a defendant was guilty. A subsequent
`
`trial, resulting in a verdict of guilt, cured this error. See
`id., at 72–73.
`
`In the instant case respondent went to trial rather than
`accept a plea deal, and it is conceded this was the result of
`ineffective assistance during the plea negotiation process.
`Respondent received a more severe sentence at trial, one
`3½ times more severe than he likely would have received
`by pleading guilty. Far from curing the error, the trial
`caused the injury from the error. Even if the trial itself is
`free from constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to
`trial instead of taking a more favorable plea may be preju­
`diced from either a conviction on more serious counts or
`the imposition of a more severe sentence.
`
`Second, petitioner claims this Court refined Strickland’s
`prejudice analysis in Fretwell to add an additional re­
`quirement that the defendant show that ineffective assis­
`tance of counsel led to his being denied a substantive or
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`
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`

`
`8
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`
`LAFLER v. COOPER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`procedural right. Brief for Petitioner 12–13. The Court
`has rejected the argument that Fretwell modified Strick-
`land before and does so again now. See Williams v. Tay-
`
`lor, 529 U. S. 362, 391 (2000) (“The Virginia Supreme
`Court erred in holding that our decision in Lockhart v.
`Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993), modified or in some way
`
`supplanted the rule set down in Strickland”); see also
`
`Glover, supra, at 203 (“The Court explained last Term [in
`
`Williams] that our holding in Lockhart does not supplant
`the Strickland analysis”).
`
`Fretwell could not show Strickland prejudice resulting
`from his attorney’s failure to object to the use of a sentenc­
`ing factor the Eighth Circuit had erroneously (and tempo­
`
`rarily) found to be impermissible. Fretwell, 506 U. S., at
`373. Because the objection upon which his ineffective­
`assistance-of-counsel claim was premised was meritless,
`
`Fretwell could not demonstrate an error entitling him to
`relief. The case presented the “unusual circumstance
`where the defendant attempts to demonstrate prejudice
`
`based on considerations that, as a matter of law, ought not
`inform the inquiry.” Ibid. (O’Connor, J., concurring). See
`also ibid. (recognizing “[t]he determinative question—
`whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for
`counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed­
`ing would have been different—remains unchanged” (in­
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`ternal quotation marks and citation omitted)). It is for
`this same reason a defendant cannot show prejudice based
`on counsel’s refusal to present perjured testimony, even if
`such testimony might have affected the outcome of the
`case. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 175 (1986)
`(holding first that counsel’s refusal to present perjured
`testimony breached no professional duty and second that
`it cannot establish prejudice under Strickland).
`Both Fretwell and Nix are instructive in that they
`demonstrate “there are also situations in which it would
`be unjust to characterize the likelihood of a different
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`Opinion of the Court
`outcome as legitimate ‘prejudice,’” Williams, supra, at
`391–392, because defendants would receive a windfall as a
`result of the application of an incorrect legal principle or
`a defense strategy outside the law. Here, however, the
`injured client seeks relief from counsel’s failure to meet a
`valid legal standard, not from counsel’s refusal to violate
`it. He maintains that, absent ineffective counsel, he would
`have accepted a plea offer for a sentence the prosecution
`evidently deemed consistent with the sound administra­
`tion of criminal justice. The favorable sentence that elud­
`ed the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be
`the sentence he or others in his position would have re­
`ceived in the ordinary course, absent the failings of coun­
`sel. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:
`From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal. L.
`Rev. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“The expected post-trial sentence
`
`is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the
`sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised con­
`sumer would view full price as the norm and anything less
`a bargain”); see also Frye, ante, at 7–8. If a plea bargain
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`has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective
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`assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.
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`If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the
`plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on
`more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe
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`sentence.
`
`It is, of course, true that defendants have “no right to be
`offered a plea . . . nor a federal right that the judge accept
`it.” Frye, ante, at 12. In the circumstances here, that is
`
`beside the point. If no plea offer is made, or a plea deal
`is accepted by the defendant but rejected by the judge, the
`issue raised here simply does not arise. Much the same
`reasoning guides cases that find criminal defendants have
`a right to effective assistance of counsel in direct appeals
`even though the Constitution does not require States to
`provide a system of appellate review at all. See Evitts, 469
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`10
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`LAFLER v. COOPER
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`Opinion of the Court
`
` U. S. 387; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
`(1963). As in those cases, “[w]hen a State opts to act in a
`field where its action has significant discretionary ele­
`ments, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates
`of the Constitution.” Evitts, supra, at 401.
`Third, petitioner seeks to preserve the conviction ob­
`
`tained by the State by arguing that the purpose of the
`Sixth Amendment is to ensure “the reliability of [a] convic­
`tion following trial.” Brief for Petitioner 13. This argu­
`ment, too, fails to comprehend the full scope of the Sixth
`Amendment’s protections; and it is refuted by precedent.
`
`Strickland recognized “[t]he benchmark for judging any
`
`claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct
`so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
`process that the trial cannot be relied on as having pro­
`duced a just result.” 466 U. S., at 686. The goal of a just
`result is not divorced from the reliability of a conviction,
`see United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 658 (1984); but
`here the question is not the fairness or reliability of the
`trial but the fairness and regularity of the processes that
`preceded it, which caused the defendant to lose benefits he
`would have received in the ordinary course but for coun­
`sel’s ineffective assistance.
`There are instances, furthermore, where a reliable trial
`
`does not foreclose relief when counsel has failed to assert
`rights that may have altered the outcome. In Kimmelman
`v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365 (1986), the Court held that an
`attorney’s failure to timely move to suppress evidence
`during trial could be grounds for federal habeas relief.
`The Court rejected the suggestion that the “failure to
`
`make a timely request for the exclusion of illegally seized
`evidence” could not be the basis for a Sixth Amendment
`violation because the evidence “is ‘typically reliable and
`often the most probative information bearing on the guilt
`
`or innocence of the defendant.’” Id., at 379 (quoting Stone
`v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 490 (1976)). “The constitutional
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`Opinion of the Court
`rights of criminal defendants,” the Court observed, “are
`granted to the innocent and the guilty alike. Consequent­
`ly, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective
`assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that
`it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of
`actual guilt.” 477 U. S., at 380. The same logic applies
`here. The fact that respondent is guilty does not mean
`he was not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to effective
`assistance or that he suffered no prejudice from his attor­
`ney’s deficient performance during plea bargaining.
`In the end, petitioner’s three arguments amount to one
`
`
`general contention: A fair trial wipes clean any deficient
`performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining.
`That position ignores the reality that criminal justice
`today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system
`
`of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
`ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of
`guilty pleas. See Frye, ante, at 7. As explained in Frye,
`
`the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be
`defined or enforced without taking account of the central
`role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and
`
`determining sentences. Ibid. (“[I]t is insufficient simply
`
`to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that
`inoculates any errors in the pretrial process”).
`C
`Even if a defendant shows ineffective assistance of
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`counsel has caused the rejection of a plea leading to a trial
`and a more severe sentence, there is the question of what
`constitutes an appro