(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` MARTEL, WARDEN v. CLAIR
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 10–1265. Argued December 6, 2011—Decided March 5, 2012
`
`Respondent Clair was charged with capital murder for the 1984 slaying
`of Linda Rodgers. The main evidence at his trial in California state
`
`
` court came from statements Clair made to his former girlfriend in a
` conversation that she secretly recorded for the police. He was con-
`
`victed and sentenced to death, and his verdict was upheld on direct
`
` review.
`
` In 1994, Clair commenced federal habeas proceedings by filing a
`
`request for appointment of counsel, which the District Court granted
`under 18 U. S. C. §3599. That statute entitles indigent capital habe-
`
`
`
`as petitioners like Clair to appointed counsel. It also contemplates
`
`that appointed counsel may be “replaced . . . upon motion of the de-
`
`fendant,” §3599(e), but it does not specify a standard for district
`
`
`courts to use in evaluating those motions. Clair’s counsel filed his in-
`
`itial habeas petition in 1994, and in the late 1990’s, when two associ-
`ates from the firm representing Clair moved to the Office of the Fed-
`eral Public Defender (FPD), the FPD was substituted as counsel of
`record. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Clair’s ha-
`beas petition in August 2004, and the parties submitted their post-
`hearing briefs by February 2005. The court subsequently told the
`
`parties that it did not wish to receive further material about the peti-
`tion. In March, Clair moved to substitute counsel, claiming that his
`attorneys were seeking only to overturn his death sentence, not to
`prove his innocence. After the court asked the parties to address the
`
`motion, Clair’s counsel informed it that they had met with Clair and
`that he wanted the FPD to continue representing him. The court ac-
`cordingly decided that it would take no action. Six weeks later, how-
`ever, Clair filed another substitution motion, adding one more charge
`to his earlier claims: that his private investigator had discovered that
`
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`

`
`2
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`MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`
`Syllabus
`certain physical evidence from the crime scene had never been fully
`tested, but that Clair’s attorneys had done nothing to analyze this ev-
`idence or follow up on its discovery. The court denied the renewed
`
`
`motion without further inquiry. On the same day, it also denied
`
`Clair’s habeas petition.
`
`Clair sought review of his substitution motion pro se, and the FPD
`appealed the habeas ruling. The Ninth Circuit asked the FPD to ad-
`dress whether substitution was now warranted, and after the FPD
`informed the court that the attorney-client relationship had broken
`down, the court provided Clair with a new lawyer. Clair then asked
`the District Court to vacate the denial of his habeas petition under
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he should be al-
`lowed to explore the significance of the new physical evidence for his
`
`case. The District Court rejected his request, and Clair appealed.
`Consolidating his appeals, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District
`Court’s denial of both his substitution request and his habeas peti-
`tion. Holding that the “interests of justice” standard used in non-
`capital cases, see 18 U. S. C. §3006A, should govern substitution mo-
`
`tions like Clair’s, it ruled that the District Court abused its discretion
`by failing to inquire into the complaints in Clair’s second letter. Be-
`cause Clair had already received new counsel on appeal, the court de-
`cided the best remedy was to treat Clair’s new counsel as though he
`
`had been appointed in June 2005 and to allow him to make whatever
`
`submissions he would have made then, including a motion to amend
`Clair’s habeas petition in light of new evidence.
`Held:
`
`1. When evaluating motions to substitute counsel in capital cases
`under 18 U. S. C. §3599, courts should employ the same “interests of
`justice” standard that applies in non-capital cases under §3006A.
`
`Pp. 6–12.
`
`
`(a) Although §3599 guarantees that indigent capital defendants
`and petitioners seeking federal habeas relief in capital cases will re-
`ceive the assistance of counsel, see, e.g., §§3599(a)(1), (a)(2), (e), and
`contemplates that an appointed attorney may be “replaced by simi-
`larly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own motion or upon mo-
`tion of the defendant,” §3599(e), the statute fails to specify how a
`
`court should decide such a motion. Clair argues, and the Ninth Cir-
`
`cuit agreed, that district courts should use the “in the interests of
`justice” standard of §3006A, which governs the appointment and sub-
`stitution of counsel in federal non-capital litigation. By contrast, the
`State contends that an appointed lawyer can only be replaced when
`the defendant has suffered an “actual or constructive denial” of coun-
`sel—that is, when the lawyer lacks the requisite statutory qualifica-
`tions, has a conflict of interest, or has completely abandoned the
`
`
`
`
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`

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`Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`client.
`
`The Court adopts Clair’s approach, based on the history of §3599.
`Before 1988, §3006A governed both capital and non-capital cases, au-
`thorizing courts to appoint counsel for federal habeas petitioners and
`providing that in all cases in which a court had appointed counsel,
`
`substitution motions should be decided “in the interests of justice.”
`§3006A(c). Thus, a court in those days would have used that stand-
`ard to evaluate a request like Clair’s. In 1988, Congress enacted
`what is now §3599, thus displacing §3006A for persons facing execu-
`tion. The new statute grants federal capital defendants and capital
`habeas petitioners enhanced rights of representation. Habeas peti-
`tioners facing execution now receive counsel as a matter of right, see
`§3599(a)(2), and in multiple ways the statute aims to improve the
`quality of their representation: it provides them with more experi-
`
`enced counsel than §3006A demands, authorizes higher rates of com-
`pensation, and provides more money for investigative and expert
`
`services. These measures “reflec[t] a determination that quality legal
`representation is necessary” in all capital proceedings to foster “fun-
`damental fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.” McFar-
`land v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849, 855, 859. Given this context, the Court
`cannot conclude that Congress silently prescribed a substitution
`standard that would make it more difficult for those facing capital
`punishment to substitute counsel. Adopting a more stringent test
`than §3006A’s would deprive capital defendants of a tool they former-
`ly had, and non-capital defendants still have, to handle serious rep-
`resentational problems. By contrast, utilizing §3006A’s standard
`comports with the myriad ways that §3599 seeks to promote effective
`
`
`representation for persons facing capital punishment. Pp. 6–9.
`
`
`(b) The dearth of support for the State’s alternative standard re-
`inforces this conclusion. The State concedes that Congress has not
`
`considered its standard in any context; neither has a federal court
`used it in any case. The Court prefers to use a familiar standard, al-
`ready known to work, than to try out a new one. Moreover, the
`State’s proposed test would gut §3599’s substitution provision, be-
`
`cause even absent that provision courts would have an obligation to
`ensure that the defendant’s statutory right to counsel was satisfied
`throughout the litigation. The State counters that only its approach
`comports with the rule that habeas petitioners generally have no
`Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But Congress declined to track
`that Amendment in providing statutory rights to counsel in both
`§3006A and §3599. Thus, the scope of the Amendment cannot an-
`swer the statutory question presented here. The State also contends
`that the “interests of justice” standard will permit substitution mo-
`tions to become a mechanism to defer enforcement of a death sen-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`

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`
`MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`tence. But the “interests of justice” standard takes into account
`
`
`whether a substitution motion will cause undue delay. Pp. 9–12.
`
`
`2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clair’s
`second request for new counsel under §3599’s “interests of justice”
`standard. In reviewing substitution motions, the courts of appeals
`have pointed to several relevant considerations, including: the time-
`liness of the motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into
`the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint,
`including the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication
`between lawyer and client. Because a trial court’s decision on substi-
`tution is so fact-specific, it deserves deference and may be overturned
`only for an abuse of discretion.
`
`Here, the District Court received Clair’s second substitution motion
`on the eve of deciding his 10-year-old habeas petition. Just three
`months earlier, Clair had written the court to complain about his at-
`torneys. After making proper inquiry, the court learned that Clair
`and his counsel had settled their dispute and turned once more to
`ruling on Clair’s habeas petition, only to receive a second letter six
`weeks later. In it Clair maintained his general assertion that his
`
`
`lawyers were not trying to prove his innocence, but he also alleged a
`new and significant charge of attorney error: that counsel had re-
`fused to investigate particular, newly located physical evidence.
`Such a charge normally would require the court to make further in-
`quiry; a district court cannot usually rule on a substitution motion
`without exploring why a defendant wants new counsel. But here, the
`motion’s timing precludes a holding that the District Court abused its
`
`discretion. The court received the letter while putting the finishing
`touches on its denial of Clair’s habeas petition. After years of litiga-
`tion, an evidentiary hearing, and post-hearing briefing, the court had
`
`
`instructed the parties that it would accept no further submissions.
`All proceedings had therefore come to a close, and a new attorney
`could have done nothing further in the District Court. In those cir-
`cumstances, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying
`Clair’s substitution motion. Pp. 13–16.
`403 Fed. Appx. 276, reversed and remanded.
`
` KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`
`
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`
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`
`4
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`
`
`

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`
` Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 10–1265
`_________________
`MICHAEL MARTEL, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
`
`
`
` KENNETH CLAIR
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[March 5, 2012]
`
`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`A federal statute, §3599 of Title 18, entitles indigent
`
`defendants to the appointment of counsel in capital cases,
`including habeas corpus proceedings. The statute con-
`templates that appointed counsel may be “replaced . . .
`upon motion of the defendant,” §3599(e), but it does not
`specify the standard that district courts should use in
`evaluating those motions. We hold that courts should
`employ the same “interests of justice” standard that they
`apply in non-capital cases under a related statute, §3006A
`of Title 18. We also hold that the District Court here did
`not abuse its discretion in denying respondent Kenneth
`Clair’s motion to change counsel.
`
`I
`
`This case arises from the murder of Linda Rodgers in
`1984. Rodgers resided at the home of Kai Henriksen and
`Margaret Hessling in Santa Ana, California. Clair was a
`squatter in a vacant house next door. About a week prior
`to the murder, police officers arrested Clair for burglariz-
`ing the Henriksen-Hessling home, relying on information
`Henriksen had provided. On the night the police released
`
`
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`
`
`

`
`2
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`
`
`
`
` MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Clair from custody, Hessling returned from an evening out
`to find Rodgers’ dead body in the master bedroom, naked
`from the waist down and beaten, stabbed, and strangled.
`
`Some jewelry and household items were missing from the
`
`house. See People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 644–647, 828
`P. 2d 705, 713–714 (1992); App. to Pet. for Cert. 23–24.
`
`The district attorney charged Clair with Rodgers’ mur-
`der and sought the death penalty. No forensic evidence
`linked Clair to the crime; instead, the main evidence
`against Clair came from his former girlfriend, Pauline
`Flores. Although she later recanted her testimony, see
`App. 36–42, Flores stated at trial that she and Clair were
`walking in the neighborhood on the night of the murder
`and split up near the Henriksen-Hessling house. When
`they reunited about an hour later, Flores recounted, Clair
`
`was carrying jewelry and other items and had blood on his
`right hand. According to Flores, Clair explained to her
`that he had “just finished beating up a woman.” Clair, 2
`Cal. 4th, at 647, 828 P. 2d, at 714. The prosecution then
`
`introduced a tape recording of a talk between Flores and
`Clair several months after the murder, which Flores had
`made in cooperation with the police. On that tape, Clair
`at one point denied committing the murder, but also made
`
`several inculpatory statements. For example, when Flores
`told Clair that she had seen blood on him, he replied “Ain’t
`
`on me no more” and “They can’t prove nothing.” App. to
`Pet. for Cert. 53 (internal quotation marks omitted). And
`in response to her continued probing, Clair explained
`“[W]hat you fail to realize, how . . . they gonna prove I was
`
`there . . . ? There ain’t no . . . fingerprints, ain’t no . . .
`body seen me go in there and leave out there.” Id., at 53–
`54 (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury convicted
`Clair and sentenced him to death. The California Su-
`preme Court upheld the verdict, and this Court denied
`review, Clair v. California, 506 U. S. 1063 (1993).
`
`
`
`Clair commenced federal habeas proceedings by filing a
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` request for appointment of counsel, which the District
`
`Court granted under §3599. Clair and his counsel filed an
`initial petition for habeas relief in 1994 and, after exhaust-
`ing state remedies, an amended petition the following
`year. The petition alleged more than 40 claims, involving
`such matters as jury selection and composition, sufficiency
`of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, nondisclosure
`of exculpatory materials relating to state witnesses, and
`ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In the late 1990’s, two
`associates from the firm representing Clair took jobs at
`the Office of the Federal Public Defender (FPD), and the
`
`court substituted that office as counsel of record. The
`court held an evidentiary hearing on Clair’s habeas peti-
`
`tion in August 2004, and the parties submitted post-
`hearing briefs by February 2005. The court subsequently
`informed the parties that it viewed the briefing “to be
`
`complete and d[id] not wish to receive any additional
`material” about the petition. App. 3–4.
`
`On March 16, 2005, Clair sent a letter to the court
`stating that the FPD attorneys “no longer . . . ha[d] [his]
`best interest at hand” and that he did not want them to
`continue to represent him. Id., at 24; see id., at 18–25.
`Clair alleged that the lawyers had repeatedly dismissed
`his efforts to participate in his own defense. Prior to the
`evidentiary hearing, Clair wrote, he had become so frus-
`trated with the attorneys that he enlisted a private detec-
`tive to look into his case. But the lawyers, Clair charged,
`refused to cooperate with the investigator; they were
`seeking only to overturn his death sentence, rather than to
`prove his innocence. As a result, Clair felt that he and his
`counsel were not “on the same team.” Id., at 23.
`
`The District Court responded by asking both parties to
`address Clair’s motion to substitute counsel. See id., at
`18. The State noted that “[w]hat the trial court does with
`respect to appointing counsel is within its discretion,
`providing the interests of justice are served.” Id., at 29.
`
`
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`3
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`

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`4
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`
`
` MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The State further advised the court that “nothing in
`[Clair’s] letter require[d] a change” of counsel because the
`FPD lawyers had provided appropriate representation and
`substitution would delay the case. Ibid. Clair replied to
`the court’s request through his FPD attorneys on April 26,
`2005. Their letter stated: “After meeting with Mr. Clair,
`counsel understands that Mr. Clair wants the [FPD] to
`continue to serve as his counsel in this case at this time.”
`
`Id., at 27. On the basis of that representation, the court
`determined that it would “take no further action on the
`matter at this time.” Id., at 33.
`
`But the issue resurfaced just six weeks after the court’s
`decision. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a second letter to
`the court asking for substitution of counsel. That letter
`again asserted a “total break down of communication”
`between Clair and the FPD; according to Clair, he was “no
`
`longer able to trust anybody within that office.” Id., at 62–
`63. In explaining the source of the problem, Clair reiter-
`ated each of the points made in his prior complaint. And
`then he added one more. Clair recounted that his private
`investigator had recently learned that the police and dis-
`trict attorney’s office were in possession of fingerprints
`and other physical evidence from the crime scene that had
`never been fully tested. The FPD lawyers, Clair asserted,
`were doing nothing to analyze this evidence or otherwise
`follow up on its discovery. Clair attributed this failure,
`too, to the FPD’s decision to focus on his sentence, rather
`than on questions of guilt.
`
`Two weeks later, the District Court denied Clair’s re-
`
`
`newed request for substitution without further inquiry.
`
`The court stated: “It does not appear to the Court that a
`
`
`change of counsel is appropriate. It appears that [Clair’s]
`counsel is doing a proper job. No conflict of interest or
`inadequacy of counsel is shown.” Id., at 61. On the same
`day, the court denied Clair’s habeas petition in a detailed
`opinion. Clair v. Brown, Case No. CV 93–1133 GLT (CD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Cal., June 30, 2005), App. to Pet. for Cert. 20–91.
`
`Clair sought review of his substitution motion pro se,
`
`while the FPD filed a notice of appeal from the denial of
`his habeas petition. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Circuit instructed the FPD to address whether substitu-
`tion of counsel was now warranted, and in October 2005,
`the FPD informed the court that “the attorney-client
`relationship ha[d] broken down to such an extent that sub-
`stitution of counsel [would be] appropriate.” Attorney
`for Appellant’s Response to Court’s Sept. 15, 2005 Order,
`in No. 05–99005 (CA9), Record, Doc. 9, p. 1. The State did
`
`not comment or object, and the Court of Appeals provided
`
`Clair with a new lawyer going forward. Clair then asked
`the District Court to vacate the denial of his habeas peti-
`tion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing
`that he should be allowed to explore the significance of
`the new physical evidence for his case. The District Court
`(with a new judge assigned, because the judge previously
`handling the case had retired) rejected that request on the
`ground that the new evidence did not pertain to any of the
`claims presented in Clair’s habeas petition. See App. to
`
`Pet. for Cert. 9–10. Clair appealed that decision as well.1
`After consolidating Clair’s appeals, the Ninth Circuit
`
`vacated the trial court’s denial of both Clair’s request for
`new counsel and his habeas petition. See Clair v. Ayers,
`403 Fed. Appx. 276 (2010). The Court of Appeals’ opinion
`
`focused on Clair’s substitution motion. Holding that the
`
`“interests of justice” standard should apply to that motion,
`——————
`1While litigating his Rule 60(b) motion in the District Court, Clair
`also pursued discovery in the California state courts relating to the
`newly found physical evidence. On the basis of material he obtained,
`Clair filed another petition for state habeas relief, alleging (among
`other claims) actual innocence and improper suppression of exculpatory
`
`
`
` material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The California
` Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. See In re Clair, No.
`
`
`S169188 (Aug. 24, 2011).
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Ninth Circuit ruled that the District Court abused its
`discretion by failing to inquire into the complaints in
`Clair’s second letter. See id., at 278. The Court of Ap-
`peals then considered how to remedy that error, given that
`Clair had received new counsel while on appeal. It decid-
`ed that “the most reasonable solution” was to “treat Clair’s
`current counsel as if he were the counsel who might have
`been appointed” in June 2005, and to allow him to make
`whatever submissions he would have made then, includ-
`ing a motion to amend Clair’s habeas petition in light of
`new evidence. Id., at 279.
`We granted certiorari to review this judgment, 564 U. S.
`
`__ (2011), and now reverse.
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`We first consider the standard that district courts
`
`should use to adjudicate federal habeas petitioners’ mo-
`tions to substitute counsel in capital cases. The question
`arises because the relevant statute, 18 U. S. C. §3599,
`contains a notable gap. Section 3599 first guarantees that
`indigent defendants in federal capital cases will receive
`the assistance of counsel, from pretrial proceedings
`through stay applications. See §§3599(a)(1), (a)(2), (e). It
`next grants a corresponding right to people like Clair who
`seek federal habeas relief from a state death sentence, for
`all post-conviction proceedings and related activities. See
`
` §§3599(a)(2), (e); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849, 854–
`855 (1994); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U. S. 180, 183–185
`(2009). And the statute contemplates that both sets of
`litigants may sometimes substitute counsel; it notes that
`an attorney appointed under the section may be “replaced
`by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own
`motion or upon motion of the defendant.” §3599(e).2 But
`——————
` 2Section 3599(e) provides in full:
`
`“Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s
`
`own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appoint-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`here lies the rub: The statute fails to specify how a court
`
`should decide such a motion. Section 3599 says not a word
`about the standard a court should apply when addressing
`a request for a new lawyer.
`
`The parties offer us two alternative ways to fill this
`statutory hole. Clair argues, and the Ninth Circuit
`agreed, that district courts should decide substitution
`motions brought under §3599 “in the interests of justice.”
`That standard derives from 18 U. S. C. §3006A, which
`governs the appointment and substitution of counsel in
`federal non-capital litigation. By contrast, the State con-
`tends that district courts may replace an appointed lawyer
`under §3599 only when the defendant has suffered an
`“actual or constructive denial” of counsel. Brief for Peti-
`tioner 33. That denial occurs, the State asserts, in just
`three situations: when the lawyer lacks the qualifications
`necessary for appointment under the statute; when he has
`a “disabling conflict of interest”; or when he has “complete-
`
`ly abandoned” the client. Id., at 34. On this matter, we
`
`
`think Clair, not the State, gets it right.
`
`A trip back in time begins to show why. Prior to 1988,
`§3006A governed the appointment of counsel in all federal
`criminal cases and habeas litigation, regardless whether
`
`the matter involved a capital or a non-capital offense.
`That section provided counsel as a matter of right to most
`indigent criminal defendants, from pre-trial proceedings
`through appeal. See §§3006A(a)(1), (c) (1982 ed.). In
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`ed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of
`available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial,
`sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of
`certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available
`post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of exe-
`
`cution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also
`
`represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and pro-
`
`ceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the
`defendant.”
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
` MARTEL v. CLAIR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`addition, the statute authorized courts to appoint counsel
`for federal habeas petitioners when “the interests of
`justice so require[d],” §3006A(g); and under that provi-
`sion, courts almost always appointed counsel to represent
`petitioners convicted of capital offenses, see Ruthenbeck,
`Dueling with Death in Federal Courts, 4 ABA Criminal
`Justice, No. 3, pp. 2, 42 (Fall, 1989). In all cases in which
`a court had appointed counsel, §3006A further provided
`(as it continues to do) that substitution motions should be
`decided “in the interests of justice.” §3006A(c). So in
`those days, a court would have used that standard to
`evaluate a request like Clair’s.
`In 1988, Congress enacted the legislation now known as
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`§3599 to govern appointment of counsel in capital cases,
`thus displacing §3006A for persons facing execution (but
`retaining that section for all others). See Anti-Drug Abuse
`Act, 102 Stat. 4393–4394, 21 U. S. C. §§848(q)(4)–(10)
`(1988 ed.) (recodified at 18 U. S. C. §3599 (2006 ed. and
`Supp. IV)). The new statute grants federal capital defend-
`ants and capital habeas petitioners enhanced rights of
`representation, in light of what it calls “the seriousness
`of the possible penalty and . . . the unique and complex
`nature of the litigation.” §3599(d) (2006 ed.). Habeas
`petitioners facing execution now receive counsel as a
`matter of right, not an exercise of the court’s discretion.
`
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`See §3599(a)(2). And the statute aims in multiple ways to
`improve the quality of representation afforded to capital
`petitioners and defendants alike. Section 3599 requires
`lawyers in capital cases to have more legal experience
`than §3006A demands. Compare §§3599(b)–(d) with
`§3006A(b). Similarly, §3599 authorizes higher rates of
`compensation, in part to attract better counsel. Compare
`§3599(g)(1) with §3006A(d) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). And
`§3599 provides more money for investigative and expert
`services. Compare §§3599(f) (2006 ed.), (g)(2) (2006 ed.,
`
`Supp. IV), with §3006A(e) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). As we
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`have previously noted, those measures “reflec[t] a deter-
`mination that quality legal representation is necessary” in
`all capital proceedings to foster “fundamental fairness
`in the imposition of the death penalty.” McFarland, 512
`U. S., at 855, 859.
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`That understanding of §3599’s terms and origins goes
`far toward resolving the parties’ dispute over what stand-
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`ard should apply. We know that before §3599’s passage,
`courts used an “interests of justice” standard to decide
`substitution motions in all cases—and that today, they
`continue to do so in all non-capital proceedings. We know,
`
`too, that in spinning off §3599, Congress enacted a set of
`reforms to improve the quality of lawyering in capital
`litigation.
` With all those measures pointing in one direc-
`tion, we cannot conclude that Congress silently prescribed
`a substitution standard that would head the opposite way.
`Adopting a more stringent test than §3006A’s would de-
`prive capital defendants of a tool they formerly had, and
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`defendants facing lesser penalties still have, to handle
`serious representational problems. That result clashes
`with everything else §3599 does. By contrast, utilizing
`§3006A’s standard comports with the myriad ways that
`§3599 seeks to promote effective representation for per-
`sons threatened with capital punishment.
`
`The dearth of support for the State’s alternative stand-
`ard reinforces the case for borrowing from §3006A. Recall
`that the State thinks substitution proper “only when . . .
`counsel is completely denied”—which, the State says,
`occurs when counsel lacks the requisite experience; “ac-
`tively represents conflicting interests”; or has “total[ly]
`desert[ed]” the client. Brief for Petitioner 15, 35, 38. As
`the State acknowledges, this test comes from . . . well,
`from nowhere. The State conceded during argument that
`Congress has not considered (much less adopted) the
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`standard in any context; neither has a federal court used
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`it in any case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Indeed, the stand-
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`Opinion of the Court
`ard is new to the State’s own attorneys. As noted earlier,
`when Clair first requested a change of counsel, the State
`responded that substitution is a “matter . . . of trial court
`discretion,” based on “the interests of justice.” App. 29;
`see supra, at 3–4. Only later did the State devise its
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`present proposal.
`Inventiveness is often an admirable
`quality, but here we think the State overdoes it. To be
`sure, we must infer a substitution standard for §3599; in
`that sense, we are writing on a blank slate. But in under-
`taking that task, we prefer to copy something familiar
`than concoct something novel. That enables courts to rely
`on experience and precedent, with a standard already
`known to work effectively.
`Still worse, the State’s proposed test guts §3599’s pro-
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`vision for substitution motions. See §3599(e) (2006 ed.)
`(appointed counsel may be “replaced . . . upon motion of
`the defendant”). According to the State, a court may not
`change counsel under §3599 even if the attorney-client
`relationship has broken down, so long as the lawyer has
`the required qualifications and is “act[ing] as an advo-
`cate.” Brief for Petitioner 35. And that is so, continues
`the State, even when substitution will not cause delay or
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`other prejudice—because again, the defendant retains a
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`functioning lawyer. See id., at 34. That approach, as
`
`already noted, undermines Congress’s efforts in §3599 to
`enhance representation in capital cases. See supra, at 8–
`9. And beyond that, it renders §3599’s substitution provi-
`sion superfluous. Even in the absence of that provision, a
`court would have to ensure that the defendant’s statutory
`right to counsel was satisfied throughout the litigation; for
`example, the court would have to appoint new counsel if
`the first lawyer developed a conflict with or abandoned the
`client. So by confining substitution to cases in which the
`defendant has no counsel at all, the State’s proposal effec-
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`tively deletes §3599’s substitution clause.
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`The State counters that only its approach comports with
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`“this Court’s long-established jurisprudence that habeas
`prisoners, including capital prisoners,” have no right to
`counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner
`18; see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 10, 12 (1989)
`(plurality opinion); id., at 14–15 (KENNEDY, J., concurring
`
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`in judgment); cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501