(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`No. 09–1498. Argued February 22, 2011—Decided May 26, 2011
`The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) provides, inter alia, that in “any case
`in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial . . . shall commence
`within seventy days” after the arraignment, 18 U. S. C. §3161(c)(1),
`but lists a number of exclusions from the 70-day period, including
`“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the mo-
`tion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt dispo-
`sition of, such motion,” §3161(h)(1)(D).
`Respondent Tinklenberg’s trial on federal drug and gun charges
`began 287 days after his arraignment. The District Court denied his
`motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the trial violated
`the Act’s 70-day requirement, finding that 218 of the days fell within
`various of the Act’s exclusions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thus
`making the trial timely. On Tinklenberg’s appeal from his convic-
`tion, the Sixth Circuit agreed that many of the 287 days were exclud-
`able, but concluded that 9 days during which three pretrial motions
`were pending were not, because the motions did not actually cause a
`delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial. Since these 9 days were
`sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days above 70, the
`court found a violation of the Act. And given that Tinklenberg had
`already served his prison sentence, it ordered the indictment dis-
`missed with prejudice.
`Held:
`1. The Act contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial mo-
`tion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial.
`Rather, §3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running
`automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of
`whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins. Pp. 3–
`12.
`
`

`
`2
`
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Syllabus
`(a) The Sixth Circuit reasoned that subparagraph (D)’s “delay re-
`
`
`sulting from” phrase, read most naturally, requires a court to apply
`the exclusion provision only to motions that actually cause a trial de-
`lay, or the expectation of such a delay. While such a reading is lin-
`guistically reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation.
`The subparagraph falls within a general set of provisions introduced
`by the phrase: “The following periods of delay shall be excluded.”
`§3161(h). That phrase is followed by a list that includes “[a]ny period
`of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,
`including. . . .” §3161(h)(1). This latter list is followed by a sublist,
`each member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase “delay
`resulting from . . . .” Ibid. Those words are followed by a more spe-
`cific description, such as “any pretrial motion” from its “filing”
`“through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition
`of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D). The whole paragraph can be read
`as requiring the automatic exclusion of the members of that specific
`sublist, while referring to those members in general as “periods of de-
`lay” and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended the
`judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to definitional
`way, the words embody Congress’ own view of the matter. Thus, lan-
`guage alone cannot resolve the basic question presented. Pp. 4–7.
`
`
`(b) Several considerations, taken together, compel the conclusion
`that Congress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically.
`First, subparagraph (D) and neighboring subparagraphs (F) and (H)
`contain language that instructs courts to measure the time actually
`consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence, but those subpara-
`graphs do not mention the date on which the trial begins or was ex-
`pected to begin. Second, during the 37 years since Congress enacted
`the statute, every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Sixth Cir-
`cuit’s interpretation. Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would
`make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to
`administer, thereby hindering the Act’s efforts to secure fair and effi-
`cient trials. Fourth, the Court’s conclusion is reinforced by the diffi-
`culty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with the “auto-
`matic application” rule expressed in, e.g., Henderson v. United States,
`476 U. S. 321, 327. Fifth, the legislative history also supports the
`Court’s conclusion. Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one un-
`der paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the
`Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially extend well beyond
`pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical
`competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of
`plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. Pp. 7–12.
` 2. The Sixth Circuit also misinterpreted §3161(h)(1)(F), which ex-
`cludes from the 70-day calculation “delay resulting from transporta-
`
`
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Syllabus
`tion of any defendant . . . to and from places of examination . . . , ex-
`cept that any time consumed in excess of ten days . . . shall be pre-
`sumed to be unreasonable.” The lower courts agreed that a total of
`20 transportation days had elapsed when Tinklenberg was evaluated
`for competency, and that because the Government provided no justi-
`fication, all days in excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were
`unreasonable. However, the Sixth Circuit exempted 8 weekend days
`and holidays from the count on the theory that subparagraph (F) in-
`corporated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a), which, at the
`time, excluded such days when computing any period specified in
`“rules” and “court order[s]” that was less than 11 days. Thus, the
`Circuit considered only two transportation days excessive, and the
`parties concede that the eight extra days were enough to make the
`difference between compliance with, and violation of, the Act.
`This Court exercises its discretion to consider the subsidiary sub-
`paragraph (F) question because doing so is fairer to Tinklenberg, who
`has already served his sentence. In the Court’s view, subparagraph
`(F) does not incorporate Rule 45. The Act does not say that it does so,
`the Government gives no good reason for such a reading, and the
`Rule itself, as it existed at the relevant time, stated it applied to rules
`and court orders, but said nothing about statutes. The fact that Rule
`45 is revised from time to time also argues against its direct applica-
`tion to subparagraph (F) because such changes, likely reflecting con-
`siderations other than those related to the Act, may well leave courts
`treating similar defendants differently. The better reading includes
`weekend days and holidays in subparagraph (F)’s 10-day period un-
`der the common-law rule that such days are included when counting
`a statutory time period of 10 days unless a statute specifically ex-
`cludes them. Many courts have treated statutory time periods this
`way, and Congress has tended specifically to exclude weekend days
`and holidays from statutory time periods of 10 days when it intended
`that result. Indeed, Rule 45 has been recently modified to require a
`similar result. Pp. 12–14.
`3. Although the Sixth Circuit’s interpretations of subparagraphs
`(D) and (F) are both mistaken, the conclusions the court drew from
`its interpretations in relevant part cancel each other out, such that
`the court’s ultimate conclusion that Tinklenberg’s trial failed to com-
`ply with the Act’s deadline is correct. Pp. 14–15.
`579 F. 3d 589, affirmed.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`GINSBURG, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. SCALIA,
`J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
`
`

`
`4
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Syllabus
`in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. KAGAN, J., took no part
`in the consideration or decision of the case.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 09–1498
`_________________
`UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JASON LOUIS
`
`TINKLENBERG
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`[May 26, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq.,
`provides that in “any case in which a plea of not guilty is
`entered, the trial . . . shall commence within seventy days”
`from the later of (1) the “filing date” of the information or
`indictment or (2) the defendant’s initial appearance before
`a judicial officer (i.e., the arraignment). §3161(c)(1). The
`Act goes on to list a set of exclusions from the 70-day
`period, including “delay resulting from any pretrial mo-
`tion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion
`of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such
`motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (emphasis
`added).
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
`held in this case that a pretrial motion falls within this
`exclusion only if it “actually cause[s] a delay, or the expec-
`tation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d 589, 598 (2009). In
`our view, however, the statutory exclusion does not con-
`tain this kind of causation requirement. Rather, the filing
`of a pretrial motion falls within this provision irrespective
`of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay
`
`

`
`2
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`in starting a trial.
`
`I
`Jason Louis Tinklenberg, the respondent, was convicted
`of violating federal drug and gun laws. 18 U. S. C.
`§922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm); 21 U. S. C.
`§843(a)(6) (possession of items used to manufacture a
`controlled substance). He made his initial appearance
`before a judicial officer on October 31, 2005, and the
`Speedy Trial clock then began to run. His trial began on
`August 14, 2006, 287 days later. Just before trial,
`Tinklenberg asked the District Court to dismiss the in-
`dictment on the ground that the trial came too late, vio-
`lating the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day requirement. The
`District Court denied the motion after finding that 218
`of the 287 days fell within various Speedy Trial Act exclu-
`sions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thereby making the
`trial timely.
`On appeal the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District
`Court that many of the 287 days were excludable. But it
`disagreed with the District Court about the excludability
`of time related to three pretrial motions. The Government
`filed the first motion, an unopposed motion to conduct a
`video deposition of a witness, on August 1, 2006; the Dis-
`trict Court disposed of the motion on August 3, 2006. The
`Government filed the second motion, an unopposed motion
`to bring seized firearms into the courtroom as evidence at
`trial, on August 8, 2006; the District Court disposed of the
`motion on August 10, 2006. Tinklenberg filed the third
`motion, a motion to dismiss the indictment under the
`Speedy Trial Act, on August 11, 2006; the District Court
`denied that motion on August 14, 2006.
`In the Sixth
`Circuit’s view, the nine days during which the three mo-
`tions were pending were not excludable because the mo-
`tions did not “actually cause a delay, or the expectation of
`delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. Because these 9 days
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Opinion of the Court
`were sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days
`above 70, the Court of Appeals found a violation of the Act.
`And given the fact that Tinklenberg had already served
`his prison sentence, it ordered the District Court to dis-
`miss the indictment with prejudice.
`We granted certiorari at the Government’s request in
`order to review the Sixth Circuit’s motion-by-motion cau-
`sation test. We now reverse its determination. But be-
`cause we agree with the defendant about a subsidiary
`matter, namely, the exclusion of certain holidays and
`weekend days during the period in which he was trans-
`ported for a competency examination, id., at 597, we af-
`firm the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion.
`II
`A
`In relevant part the Speedy Trial Act sets forth a basic
`rule:
`“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered,
`the trial of a defendant . . . shall commence within
`seventy days from [the later of (1)] the filing date . . .
`of the information or indictment, or . . . [(2)] the date
`the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of
`the court in which such charge is pending . . . .”
`§3161(c)(1) (2006 ed.).
`The Act then says that the “following periods of delay shall
`be excluded in computing . . . the time within which the
`trial . . . must commence.” §3161(h) (2006 ed., Supp. III).
`It lists seven such “periods of delay.”
`It describes the first of these seven excludable periods as
`“(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceed-
`ings concerning the defendant including but not lim-
`ited to—
`“(A) delay resulting from any proceeding . . . to de-
`termine the mental competency or physical capacity of
`
`

`
`4
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`the defendant;
`“(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other
`charges . . . ;
`“(C) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;
`“(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from
`the filing of the motion through the conclusion of
`the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such
`motion;
`“(E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to
`the transfer of a case [or defendant] . . . from another
`district . . . ;
`“(F) delay resulting from transportation of any de-
`fendant from another district, or to and from places of
`examination or hospitalization, except that any time
`consumed in excess of ten days . . . shall be presumed
`to be unreasonable;
`“(G) delay resulting from consideration by the court
`of a proposed plea agreement . . .;
`“(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not
`to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding
`concerning the defendant is actually under advise-
`ment by the court.” Ibid. (2006 ed. and Supp. III)
`(emphasis added).
`
`B
`The particular provision before us, subparagraph (D),
`excludes from the Speedy Trial period “delay resulting
`from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion
`through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
`disposition of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D). The question
`is whether this provision stops the Speedy Trial clock from
`running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion
`irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on
`when the trial begins. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we believe
`the answer to this question is yes.
`We begin with the Act’s language. The Sixth Circuit
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`5
`
`Opinion of the Court
`based its answer primarily upon that language. It argued
`that the phrase “delay resulting from,” read most natu-
`rally, requires a court to apply the exclusion provision only
`to those “motion[s]” that “actually cause a delay, or the
`expectation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. We
`agree that such a reading is linguistically reasonable, but
`the Court of Appeals wrote that there “is no conceivable
`way to read this language other than to require a delay to
`result from any pretrial motion before excludable time
`occurs.” Ibid. See also ibid. (“[T]he statute is clear”). And
`here we disagree.
`When the Court of Appeals says that its reading is the
`only way any reasonable person could read this language,
`it overstates its claim. For one thing, even though the
`word “delay” ordinarily indicates a postponement, it need
`not inevitably do so. Compare The American Heritage
`Dictionary 480 (4th ed. 2000) (“[t]o postpone until a later
`time” or “[t]o cause to be later or slower than expected or
`desired”) with ibid. (“[t]he interval of time between two
`events”). In any event, terms must be read in their statu-
`tory context in order to determine how the provision in
`question should be applied in an individual case.
`Statutory language that describes a particular circum-
`stance, for example, might require a judge to examine
`each individual case to see if that circumstance is present.
`But, alternatively, it might ask a judge instead to look at
`more general matters, such as when a statute requires a
`judge to increase the sentence of one convicted of a “crime
`of violence” without requiring the judge to determine
`whether the particular crime at issue in a particular case
`was committed in a violent manner. See Taylor v. United
`States, 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990) (“crime of violence” char-
`acterizes the generic crime, not the particular act commit-
`ted). Similarly a statute that forbids the importation of
`“wild birds” need not require a court to decide whether a
`particular parrot is, in fact, wild or domesticated. It may
`
`

`
`6
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`intend to place the entire species within that definition
`without investigation of the characteristics of an individ-
`ual specimen. See United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclec-
`tus Parrots, 685 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA9 1982).
`More than that, statutory language can sometimes
`specify that a set of circumstances exhibits a certain char-
`acteristic virtually as a matter of definition and irrespec-
`tive of how a court may view it in a particular case. A
`statute that describes “extortion” as a “crime of violence”
`makes that fact so by definition, without asking a court
`to second-guess Congress about the matter. 18 U. S. C.
`§924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006 ed.) (defining “violent felony” to
`include extortion for purposes of the Armed Career Crimi-
`nal Act).
`The statute before us, though more complex, can be read
`similarly. The pretrial motion subparagraph falls within a
`general set of provisions introduced by the phrase: “The
`following periods of delay shall be excluded.” §3161(h)
`(2006 ed., Supp. III). That phrase is then followed by a list
`that includes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other
`proceedings concerning the defendant, including . . . .”
`§3161(h)(1). This latter list is followed by a sublist, each
`member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase
`“delay resulting from . . . ,” ibid. (2006 ed. and Supp. III),
`which words are followed by a more specific description,
`such as “any pretrial motion” from its “filing” “through the
`conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition
`of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). The
`whole paragraph can be read as requiring the automatic
`exclusion of the members of that specific sublist, while
`referring to those members in general as “periods of delay”
`and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended
`the judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to
`definitional way, the words embody Congress’ own view of
`the matter.
`It is not farfetched to describe the members of the spe-
`
`

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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`7
`
`Opinion of the Court
`cific sublist in the statute before us in this definitional
`sense—as “periods of delay” or as bringing about delay.
`After all, the exclusion of any of the specific periods de-
`scribed always delays the expiration of the 70-day Speedy
`Trial deadline. Or Congress might have described the
`specific periods listed in paragraph (1) as “periods of de-
`lay” and “delay[s] resulting from” simply because periods
`of the type described often do cause a delay in the start of
`trial. Both explanations show that, linguistically speak-
`ing, one can read the statutory exclusion as automatically
`applying to the specific periods described without leaving
`to the district court the task of determining whether the
`period described would or did actually cause a postpone-
`ment of the trial in the particular case. Thus, language
`alone cannot resolve the basic question presented in this
`case. But when read in context and in light of the stat-
`ute’s structure and purpose, we think it clear that Con-
`gress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically.
`C
`We now turn to several considerations, which, taken
`together, convince us that the subparagraphs that specifi-
`cally list common pretrial occurrences apply automatically
`in the way we have just described. First, subparagraph
`(D) clarifies that the trial court should measure the period
`of excludable delay for a pretrial motion “from the filing of
`the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
`other prompt disposition of such motion,” but nowhere
`does it mention the date on which the trial begins or was
`expected to begin. §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III).
`Thus, it is best read to instruct measurement of the time
`actually consumed by consideration of the pretrial mo-
`tion. Two other related subparagraphs contain clarifying
`language that contemplates measurement of the time
`actually consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence
`without regard to the commencement of the trial. See
`
`

`
`8
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`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`§3161(h)(1)(F) (“Any time consumed in excess of ten days
`from the date an order of removal or an order directing
`such transportation, and the defendant’s arrival at the
`destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable”);
`§3161(h)(1)(H) (“delay reasonably attributable to any
`period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any pro-
`ceeding concerning the defendant is actually under ad-
`visement by the court”). If “delay” truly referred to the
`postponement of trial, then presumably those subpara-
`graphs would instruct that excludable periods should be
`measured from the date that trial was otherwise sched-
`uled to begin.
`Second, we are impressed that during the 37 years since
`Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act, every Court of
`Appeals has considered the question before us now, and
`every Court of Appeals, implicitly or explicitly, has re-
`jected the interpretation that the Sixth Circuit adopted in
`this case. See United States v. Wilson, 835 F. 2d 1440,
`1443 (CADC 1987) (explicit), abrogated on other grounds
`by Bloate v. United States, 559 U. S. ___ (2010); United
`States v. Hood, 469 F. 3d 7, 10 (CA1 2006) (explicit);
`United States v. Cobb, 697 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1982) (ex-
`plicit), abrogated on other grounds by Henderson v. United
`States, 476 U. S. 321 (1986); United States v. Novak, 715
`F. 2d 810, 813 (CA3 1983) (explicit) abrogated on other
`grounds by Henderson v. United States, 476 U. S. 321
`(1986); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F. 3d 248, 253–254
`(CA4 1997) (explicit); United States v. Green, 508 F. 3d
`195, 200 (CA5 2007) (explicit); United States v. Montoya,
`827 F. 2d 143, 151 (CA7 1987) (explicit); United States v.
`Titlbach, 339 F. 3d 692, 698 (CA8 2003) (implicit); United
`States v. Van Brandy, 726 F. 2d 548, 551 (CA9 1984)
`(explicit); United States v. Vogl, 374 F. 3d 976, 985–986
`(CA10 2004) (explicit); United States v. Stafford, 697 F. 2d
`1368, 1371–1372 (CA11 1983) (explicit). This unanimity
`among the lower courts about the meaning of a statute of
`
`

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`
`9
`
`Opinion of the Court
`great practical administrative importance in the daily
`working lives of busy trial judges is itself entitled to strong
`consideration, particularly when those courts have main-
`tained that interpretation consistently over a long a period
`of time. See General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
`Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 593–594 (2004).
`Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would make the
`subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to
`administer. And in doing so, it would significantly hinder
`the Speedy Trial Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient
`criminal trial proceedings. See Zedner v. United States,
`547 U. S. 489, 497 (2006) (noting that the Act’s exceptions
`provide “necessary flexibility”); H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, p.
`15 (1974) (the Act seeks to achieve “efficiency in the proc-
`essing of cases which is commensurate with due process”);
`S. Rep. No. 93–1021, p. 21 (1974). Trial judges may, for
`example, set trial dates beyond 70 days in light of other
`commitments. And in doing so, a trial judge may well be
`aware, based on his or her experience, that pretrial mo-
`tions will likely consume the extra time—even though the
`judge may know little about which specific motions will be
`filed, when, and how many. How is that judge to apply the
`Sixth Circuit’s approach, particularly when several, in-
`cluding unanticipated, pretrial proceedings did consume
`the time in question?
`Moreover, what is to happen if several excludable and
`several nonexcludable potential causes of delay (e.g., pre-
`trial motions to take depositions, potential scheduling
`conflicts, various health examinations, etc.) coincide,
`particularly in multidefendant cases? Can the judge,
`motion by motion, decide which motions were responsible
`and which were not responsible for postponing what oth-
`erwise might have been an earlier trial date? And how is
`a defendant or his attorney to predict whether or when a
`judge will later find a particular motion to have caused a
`postponement of trial? And if the matter is difficult to
`
`

`
`10
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`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`predict, how is the attorney to know when or whether he
`or she should seek further postponement of the 70-day
`deadline?
`With considerable time and judicial effort, perhaps
`through the use of various presumptions, courts could find
`methods for overcoming these and other administrative
`difficulties. In some instances, the judge may know at the
`time of filing that a given motion is easily resolved or that
`its complexity will almost certainly postpone the trial.
`Judges could note on the record their predictions about
`whether the motion will postpone trial at the time that the
`motion is filed. Parties could also stipulate as to whether
`a given motion would be excluded from the Speedy Trial
`clock. But those theoretical strategies would not prevent
`all or even most mistakes, needless dismissals of indict-
`ments, and potential retrials after appeal—all of which
`exact a toll in terms of the fairness of and confidence in
`the criminal justice system. And any such future strate-
`gies for administering the Sixth Circuit’s rule cannot
`provide a present justification for turning the federal
`judicial system away from the far less obstacle-strewn
`path that the system has long traveled.
`Fourth, we are reinforced in our conclusion by the diffi-
`culty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with
`this Court’s precedent. In Henderson v. United States, 476
`U. S. 321 (1986), the Court rejected the contention that
`the exclusion provision for pretrial motions governs only
`reasonable delays. The Court there concluded (as the
`Court of Appeals had held) that the exclusion “was in-
`tended to be automatic.” Id., at 327 (quoting United States
`v. Henderson, 746 F. 2d 619, 622 (CA9 1984); internal
`quotation marks omitted). See also Bloate v. United
`States, 559 U. S. ___ (2010) (holding based in part on
`the view that the exclusion applies “automatically” to the
`specified period of delay). Henderson did not consider
`whether a trial court must determine whether the pretrial
`
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`Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`11
`
`Opinion of the Court
`motion actually caused postponement of the trial in each
`individual case. But the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
`would nonetheless significantly limit the premise of “auto-
`matic application” upon which the case rests.
`Fifth, for those who find legislative history useful, it is
`worthwhile noting, (as this Court noted in Henderson)
`that the Senate Report concerning the reenactment of the
`provision in 1979 described it, along with the other provi-
`sions in §3161(h)(1), as referring to “specific and recurring
`periods of time often found in criminal cases,” and charac-
`terized them as “automatically excludable delay,” S. Rep.
`No. 96–212, p. 9 (1979). See H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, at 21
`(“The time limits would be tolled by hearings, proceedings
`and necessary delay which normally occur prior to the
`trial of criminal cases” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 93–
`1021, at 21 (“[The Act] has carefully constructed exclu-
`sions and exceptions which permit normal pre-trial prepa-
`ration in the ordinary noncomplex cases which represent
`the bulk of business in the Federal courts”). But cf. id., at
`35 (paragraph (h)(1) excludes “[d]elays caused by proceed-
`ings relating to the defendant” (emphasis added)).
`Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under
`paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting
`from,” the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially
`extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such
`matters as mental and physical competency examinations,
`interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements,
`and the absence of essential witnesses. See §3161(h)(1)
`(2006 ed., Supp. III); §3161(h)(3)(A) (2006 ed.). Given the
`administrative complexity the causation requirement
`would bring about in all these areas, those Circuits that
`have considered a causation requirement in respect to
`these other matters have rejected it. See, e.g., United
`States v. Pete, 525 F. 3d 844, 852 (CA9 2008) (interlocutory
`appeal); United States v. Miles, 290 F. 3d 1341, 1350
`(CA11 2002) (unavailability of essential witnesses); United
`
`

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`12
`
`UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`States v. Robinson, 887 F. 2d 651, 656–657 (CA6 1989)
`(trial on other charges). That further complexity, along
`with these lower court holdings, reinforce our conclusion.
`We consequently disagree with the Sixth Circuit that
`the Act’s exclusion requires a court to find that the event
`the exclusion specifically describes, here the filing of the
`pretrial motion, actually caused or was expected to cause
`delay of a trial. We hold that the Act contains no such
`requirement.
`
`III
`Tinklenberg also argues that the Sixth Circuit wrongly
`interpreted a different exclusion provision, this time the
`provision excluding
`“delay resulting from transportation of any defendant
`from another district, or to and from places of exami-
`nation or hospitalization, except that any time con-
`sumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of
`removal or an order directing such transportation,
`and the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be
`presumed to be unreasonable.” §3161(h)(1)(F) (2006
`ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added).
`The District Court granted Tinklenberg’s request for a
`competency evaluation and he was transported to a medi-
`cal facility for examination. The lower courts agreed that
`a total of 20 transportation days elapsed and that since
`the Government provided no justification, all days in
`excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were unrea-
`sonable. But in counting those excess days, the court
`exempted weekend days and holidays. Since Veterans
`Day, Thanksgiving Day, and three weekends all fell
`within the 20-day period, only 2 days, not 10 days, were
`considered excessive, during which the 70-day Speedy
`Trial Act clock continued to tick.
`Tinklenberg argues that subparagraph (F) does not
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`13
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`Opinion of the Court
`exempt weekend days and holidays; hence the court
`should have considered 10, not 2, days to be excessive.
`And the parties concede that those 8 extra ticking days are
`enough to make the difference between compliance with,
`and violation of, the Act.
`As the Solicitor General notes, we may consider, or
`“decline to entertain,” alternative grounds for affirmance.
`See United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 242, n. 16
`(1975). In this case, we believe it treats Tinklenberg, who
`has already served his sentence, more fairl