J-S55043-20
`
`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
`
`IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
`PENNSYLVANIA
`
`No. 695 WDA 2020
`
`:::::::::
`
`IN THE MATTER OF: ADOPTION OF:
`M.L.K..
`
`APPEAL OF: N.S.K., MOTHER
`
`Appeal from the Decree Dated June 12, 2020
`In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans' Court at
`No(s): 2020-209 IVT
`
`BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
`
`MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:
`
`FILED DECEMBER 29, 2020
`
`N.S.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered June 12,
`
`2020, granting the petition, filed by Cambria County Children and Youth
`
`Service (“CYS” or the “Agency”), seeking to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
`
`parental rights to M.L.K. (“Child”) (born in June of 2017), her minor, female
`
`child with J.S. (“Father”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §
`
`2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
`
`____________________________________________
`
`* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
`
`1 The trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and
`Father (collectively, the “Parents”), on the same date. Father has not
`appealed the termination of his parental rights, nor has he filed a brief in this
`appeal.
`
`

`

`J-S55043-20
`
`On February 26, 2020, CYS filed the petition to involuntarily terminate
`
`Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
`
`2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On March 17, 2020, the trial court
`
`appointed Attorney Suzann Lehmier as Child’s guardian ad litem and legal
`
`interests counsel (“GAL/Counsel”).2 On May 14, the trial court appointed
`
`attorney Sydney Maurer to represent Mother. Father proceeded pro se.
`
`____________________________________________
`
`2 In In re Adoption of L.B.M., 639 Pa. 428, 161 A.3d 172 (2017) (plurality),
`our Supreme Court held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires the appointment
`of counsel to represent the legal interests of any child involved in a contested
`involuntary termination proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interests
`as synonymous with his or her preferred outcome. In In re T.S., 648 Pa.
`236, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) (filed August 22, 2018), the Supreme Court held
`that the trial court did not err in allowing the children’s GAL to act as their sole
`representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three
`years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome. The
`Court explained, “if the preferred outcome of the child is incapable of
`ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be
`no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as
`such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act that counsel be
`appointed ‘to represent the child,’ 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), is satisfied where the
`court has appointed an attorney-[GAL] who represents the child’s best
`interests during such proceedings.” Id. at 257, 192 A.3d at 1092-1093.
`
`Here, Child was almost three years old at the time of the hearing. The
`trial court determined there was no conflict between Child’s legal interests and
`best interest. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 1-2. We do not comment
`on the quality of the GAL/Counsel’s representation of Child. See In re:
`Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 669 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (filed
`September 13, 2019) (holding that this Court has authority only to raise sua
`sponte the issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel for the child,
`and not the authority to delve into the quality of the representation) (affirmed,
`___ A.3d___ (Pa., filed November 10, 2020).
`
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`J-S55043-20
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`The trial court set forth the following factual background and procedural
`
`history of this appeal.
`
`3. CYS started services in December of 2017 for the following
`reasons:
`
`A. [Mother] was then 16 years old and a dependency
`petition had been filed in the interest of [Mother] on that
`date.
`
`B. [Mother] refused to take her prescribed mental health
`medication.
`
`C. [Mother] refused to meet with and cooperate with the
`potential service providers.
`
`D. [Mother] was relying upon her caregivers (her great-
`grandfather and her mother) to provide basic care for the
`child, refusing to take the initiative to do such basic tasks
`as feeding the baby or changing her diaper.
`
`E. The bond between [Mother] and the child appeared to
`be weak and [Mother] appeared content to have others
`care for the child.
`
`F. [Mother] had allowed inappropriate individuals to be
`around the child.
`
`G. There were reports that during visits with the child[,
`Mother] spoke on the phone with others while others cared
`for the child.
`
`H. [Father] lived in Florida and CYS had attempted to make
`contact with him without success (Petitioner’s Exhibit 5).
`
`4. Pursuant to a petition averring dependency, the Juvenile Court
`held a hearing on January 29, 2018 and issued an order that same
`date finding the child to be dependent, placing the child and her
`biological mother, a minor, in foster care together in the same
`home. The placement goal was return child to parent. [Mother]
`was ordered to actively participate, regularly attend, and
`successfully complete parenting skills classes and demonstrate
`her understanding of the skills and recommendations learned in
`
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`

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`J-S55043-20
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`the parenting classes by using them within the home, and she was
`to fully cooperate with Teen Parenting, Justice Works Nurturing
`Parent, Nulton Diagnostic Family Based, and Northwestern Human
`Services.
`[Father] was, and remained, in Florida and had no
`contact with the child.
`
`5. Dennis Kashurba, a licensed psychologist, evaluated [Mother]
`on February 19, 2018. The purpose of the evaluation was to
`gather information pertinent to ascertaining what
`types of
`services would be appropriate
`to
`facilitate
`the possible
`reunification of [Mother] with her infant daughter (at that time
`eight months old).
`After reviewing [Mother’s] records, Mr.
`Kashurba noted in his report that:
`
`“In mid-December 2017, [Mother] refused to take the
`medication she was prescribed at Nulton Diagnostic. She
`was subsequently discharged unsuccessfully from Nulton
`Diagnostic.
`She
`reportedly had prior
`trials of
`antidepressant medication. Her history is also significant
`for engaging in self-mutilation in the form of cutting her
`left wrist and forearm. Numerous superficial scars were
`observed during the course of the evaluation today. As a
`result of these concerns, the custodial grandfather was
`described at [sic] being at his “wits end” with [Mother].
`This led to his indicating he can no longer control her since
`she engaged in tantrum behavior and would sometimes
`become physically aggressive to those in the home. Of
`additional concern was the interaction and the bond
`between [Mother] and [Child], which was described as
`being “very minimal” and typically lasted only for short
`durations.
`[Mother’s]
`tantrum behaviors reportedly
`occurred whenever she was not permitted go to her
`friend’s house or was requested to do something of a
`responsible nature or to refrain from engaging in some
`activity.
`
`the recipient of numerous
`[Mother] has been
`interventions, including the aforementioned medication
`management at Nulton Diagnostic, as well as Family Based
`services through Nulton Diagnostic. However, CYS records
`indicate that it was the opinion of the Family[-]Based
`service providers that the mother and the child both need
`to be placed. Additionally, [Mother] has received services
`from Nurse Family Partnership and Justice Works Nurturing
`
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`

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`J-S55043-20
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`Parent Program. Both of these have documented that
`[Mother] rarely cares for the needs of [Child] and often
`hands the child over to others to care for her needs.”
`
`Mr. Kashurba administered several standardized tests to
`[Mother]. She has an IQ of 77. Her scores on the standardized
`tests showed that she had a normal 9-
`to 10-year-old
`development and within the upper half of the borderline range.
`On the Parent Behavior rating scale, the foster mother rated
`[Mother] as being significant across all six of the measurements
`of that instrument.
`In his conclusion, Mr. Kashurba opines that
`“the total information available at the present time indicates that
`[Mother’s]
`cognitive and academic deficiencies make the
`prognosis poor for her learning and independently implementing
`appropriate parenting strategies to guarantee the best interests
`of her daughter.”
`
`Mr. Kashurba’s diagnostic impressions list Parent/Child
`Relational Problem, Relational Problem NOS [Not Otherwise
`Specified], Unspecified Disruptive Impulse Control Disorder, High
`Expressed Emotional Level within Family, Borderline Intellectual
`Functioning, Borderline Personality Traits with Dependent
`Features (Petitioner's Exhibit 8).
`
`6. The Juvenile Court conducted a Permanency Review Hearing on
`July 25, 2018 and issued its order on August 7, 2018[,]
`determining that [Mother] had been only minimally compliant with
`the Permanency Plan in that she had not been able to demonstrate
`that she was able to independently manage her mental health or
`maintain her mental health. Further, she had not been able to
`demonstrate that she is learning and maintaining parenting skills.
`She had made minimal progress towards alleviating the
`circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
`
`. . . The goal remained return to parent with a concurrent
`placement plan of adoption.
`
`7. A Permanency Review Hearing was held on December 19, 2018,
`with the Juvenile Court’s order entered on January 2, 2019.
`Again, the [trial court] found that [Mother] had only minimal
`compliance with the Permanency Plan, and had made only minimal
`progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
`the original placement. . . . The current placement goal was to
`
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`J-S55043-20
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`return the child to parent. The concurrent placement plan for the
`child was adoption.
`
`8. Another Permanency Review Hearing was held on June 10,
`2019, with the Juvenile Court's order entered on June 19, 2019.
`The [trial court] noted that the child appeared to be happy in her
`foster home and was bonded to her foster family. Further, [the
`court noted] that she was too young to share her views in any
`coherent way. This time the [trial court] found that [Mother]
`made moderate compliance with the Permanency Plan and that
`she now attends visits with her daughter, but still struggles to
`effectively care for her. The [trial court] also found moderate
`progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
`the original placement as to [Mother].
`
`. . . The child had now been in placement for 17 months.
`The [trial court] determined that [Mother] should continue to be
`compliant with her mental health treatment at Nulton Diagnostic
`and to continue to actively participate, regularly attend, and
`successfully complete the parenting skills classes.
`
`9. Mr. Kashurba again evaluated [Mother] on September 23,
`2019. After noting [Mother’s] prior treatment at Nulton Diagnostic
`and prior diagnoses, he noted a reference to [Mother’s] having
`experienced possible dissociative episodes, as well as claiming a
`29-year-old alter ego named Sally was responsible for rough
`treating of her daughter while in [Mother’s] care. Of particular
`note is the April 24, 2018 comment by her treating psychiatrist at
`Nulton Diagnostic that she “continues to seemingly dissociate at
`times, bordering on psychosis.” The psychiatrist also noted that
`she had “significant concerns about her safety around the infant
`and the foster mother confirmed she is doing all of the direct
`care.”
`
`[Mother] was given the Basic Personality Inventory,
`Parenting Stress Index, and Aggression Questionnaire.
`There
`were no significant elevations on the Parenting Stress Index, nor
`the Aggression Questionnaire.
`However, two areas on the
`Personality Inventory showed significant elevation: Denial and
`Thinking Disorder. Mr. Kashurba noted that this area of elevation
`tends to be consistent with some of the aforementioned concerns
`from her prior mental health treatment.
`He noted in his
`conclusion that [Mother] has adequate intellectual ability to learn
`appropriate parenting strategies to ensure the best interests of
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`J-S55043-20
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`the child, and at that time appeared to be free of any major
`affective spectrum disorder symptomology that had been the case
`prior to her resuming psychiatric treatment. He goes on to state:
`
`“Thus, this would seem to be the optimal opportunity
`for providing [Mother] with the types of services that will
`give her the best opportunity to demonstrate her ability to
`function at some time in the future as a primary figure for
`her daughter” (Petitioner's Exhibit 9).
`
`* * *
`11. The last Permanency Review Hearing was held on November
`27, 2019, with an order entered on December 18, 2019. The
`Juvenile Court found that the parents had made only minimal
`progress with the Permanency Plan and that neither consistently
`attend[ed] visits nor followed through with the services provided.
`. . . The placement goal was changed to adoption. The child had
`now been in placement for 22 months. The [trial court] further
`found that CYS had made reasonable efforts to finalize the
`Permanency Plan in effect for this child[,] and that CYS need not
`make any further reasonable efforts to return the child to her
`parents. The Juvenile Court found that reunification of the child
`with her parents was not an appropriate option[,] as it would not
`be in the child’s best interest to make further attempts at
`reunification.
`
`12. Services rendered to the parents, primarily to [Mother], as
`[Father] was for most of this time in Florida, include:
`
`* CYS caseworker services;
`
`* Nulton Diagnostic medication management and
`counseling;
`
`* Merakey Family Finding and Engagement;
`
`* Justice Works Nurturing Parenting;
`
`* Merakey foster care;
`
`* Psychological evaluations by Dennis Kashurba;
`3).
`
`* Johnstown Christian Home independent living;
`
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`J-S55043-20
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`* The Meadows psychiatric hospitalization;
`
`* CYS Social Work Services (Petitioner’s Exhibit 3).
`
`Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 2-11.
`
`On June 1, 2020 and June 3, 2020, the trial court held evidentiary
`
`hearings on the petition. At the hearing on June 1, 2020, CYS presented the
`
`testimony of Kathy Pitman, CYS social worker; Dennis Kashurba, a
`
`psychologist who testified as a stipulated expert in psychology and who
`
`performed psychological evaluations of the Parents; Brooke Schreyer, the
`
`program director for JusticeWorks Youth Care; Jessica Mills, a CYS social
`
`worker; and Dorothy Wyatt, who is employed by Christian Home of Johnstown
`
`and worked with Mother on everyday living skills. N.T., 6/1/20, at 5, 46-48,
`
`81-82, 99-100, and 115. Father testified on his own behalf, questioned by
`
`the trial court on direct examination. Id. at 123. Mother testified on her own
`
`behalf. Id. at 146.
`
`At the hearing on June 1, 2020, CYS social worker, Ms. Pitman, testified
`
`that Mother: has been unable or unwilling to rectify any of her mental health
`
`needs and adequately be trained in her parenting abilities; does not have
`
`housing for herself; has been unable to care for herself, although she has
`
`become an adult; and has no plan. N.T., 6/1/20, at 29. Ms. Pitman believed
`
`that the severance of any bond between Mother and Child would not
`
`detrimentally impact Child. Id. at 29-30. In fact, Ms. Pitman testified that
`
`severing any bond between Child and Mother would promote Child’s
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`J-S55043-20
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`developmental, physical and emotional needs, because Child would have
`
`consistency in her life and her pre-adoptive foster family would meet those
`
`needs. Id. at 30. Ms. Pitman testified that Child will have the ability to bond
`
`with her pre-adoptive foster family in the future, as she had been placed with
`
`them for more than two years, and she is currently bonded with the family.
`
`Id.
`
`CYS’s expert psychologist, Mr. Kashurba, testified that Mother has
`
`adequate intellectual ability to learn appropriate parenting strategies. Id. at
`
`67. He stated that Mother appeared to be free from any major affective
`
`spectrum symptomatology that had been the case prior to her resuming
`
`psychiatric treatment.
`
`Id. Mr. Kashurba further testified that Mother’s
`
`emotion and behavior appear to have stabilized considerably since she
`
`resumed psychiatric treatment and since Father had returned to Pennsylvania
`
`after living in Florida for a few years. Id. Mr. Kashurba testified that there is
`
`an optimal opportunity to provide Mother with services that would give her
`
`the best opportunity to demonstrate her ability to function at some point in
`
`the future as the primary caregiver for Child. Id. Mr. Kashurba stated that
`
`Mother does not appear to have any drug/alcohol use disorder that would
`
`adversely affect her ability to benefit from the services provided to her. Id.
`
`Mr. Kashurba testified that Mother had a diagnostic impression of parent-child
`
`relational problem, borderline
`
`intellectual
`
`functioning, and borderline
`
`personality traits. Id. Mother also had a diagnosis, by history of treatment
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`- 9 -
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`J-S55043-20
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`at Nulton Diagnostic, of major depressive order, generalized anxiety, and
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`post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 67-68. Mr. Kashurba recommended
`
`Mother should be treated with medication and psychotherapy. Id. Since
`
`Mother has borderline personality features and traits, he also recommended
`
`that Mother should have social skills training.
`
`Id. at 68. Further, Mr.
`
`Kashurba recommended that Mother should have intensive outpatient services
`
`including both individual and group therapy on a weekly basis in addition to
`
`the medication. Id. at 69.
`
`On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, Mr. Kashurba testified that,
`
`when he first evaluated Mother on February 19, 2018, he observed Mother
`
`interact with Child, and that they seemed to be affectionate and to share a
`
`bond. Id. at 77. Mr. Kashurba deferred to the personnel who conducted the
`
`parenting training classes with regard to Mother’s ability to parent Child, and
`
`whether her ability had improved with training, over time. Id. at 75, 78.
`
`JusticeWorks Youth Care program director, Ms. Schreyer, testified that
`
`she worked with Mother and provided family services to her, consisting of
`
`working on parenting, primarily in the goal areas of building a bond with Child,
`
`learning different parenting skills, and having appropriate interactions and
`
`observations, with the assistance of visit coaching.
`
`Id. at 82-84. Ms.
`
`Schreyer testified that, when Mother completed the services, Ms. Schreyer
`
`would not have been comfortable leaving Mother with Child if someone were
`
`not there to prompt Mother. Id. at 88-89. Ms. Schreyer testified that Mother
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`J-S55043-20
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`and Child have a strong bond when they are together for the visitation, but
`
`she is familiar with reports that Mother often misses her phone contact with
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`Child. Id. at 89. Ms. Schreyer has observed Child with her foster family, and
`
`finds that they meet Child’s needs and that Child is bonded with them. Id.
`
`Ms. Schreyer opined that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is
`
`in Child’s best interests. Id. at 89-90. Ms. Schreyer opined that, when she
`
`worked with Mother, there were still areas that remained for Mother to address
`
`and work on before Mother could multi-task and have full-day visits with Child,
`
`let alone safely and successfully parent Child on her own. Id. at 90.
`
`CYS social worker, Ms. Mills,
`
`testified that Parents had goals of
`
`increasing parenting skills; obtaining housing; and improving decision-making
`
`skills. Id. at 100. Prior to the goal change hearing, Ms. Mills scheduled
`
`sixteen supervised visits and fourteen social work sessions with Mother, but
`
`Mother attended only eleven visits and eight social work sessions. Id. Ms.
`
`Mills utilized the parent-child interaction model known as the “Safe Care
`
`Program”. Id. at 101. This module has a goal of learning basic hands-on
`
`parenting skills to increase positive interactions with Child and increase
`
`Parents’ bond with Child by teaching new ways to help Child learn, grow, and
`
`develop.
`
`Id. at 101-102. Mother was able to provide basic hands-on
`
`parenting, such as changing Child’s diaper and comforting Child when she was
`
`crying, but she had difficulty in decision-making for Child’s daily activities,
`
`such as planning ahead. Id. at 102. Mother also had difficulty focusing on
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`J-S55043-20
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`Child for an extended period of time, such as following Child to Child’s next
`
`activity. Id. at 102-103.
`
`Ms. Mills stated that the level of parenting ability that Mother
`
`demonstrated while she worked with Mother did not reflect the level of
`
`parenting ability Ms. Mills would have expected, given Mother’s prior parenting
`
`training. Id. at 103. Ms. Mills testified that Mother appeared to have the
`
`ability to use basic hands-on parenting skills and was able to comfort Child
`
`when Child was crying, and there appeared to be a bond between Child and
`
`Mother; however, ongoing extensive parenting was difficult for Mother, as she
`
`had difficulty in focusing on Child. Id. at 104. Ms. Mills testified that Child
`
`would not be safe in Mother’s care, because Mother would have difficulty
`
`caring for Child on an extended basis and required prompting from Ms. Mills
`
`in caring for Child during the two-hour visits. Id. at 104-105. Mother did not
`
`bring the necessary materials with her when she attended the visits. Id. at
`
`105. Mother had difficulty retaining the skills she learned from week-to-week,
`
`as well as difficulty answering open-ended questions regarding why particular
`
`skills were important. Id.
`
`Ms. Mills testified that Mother did not have the level of ability to make
`
`progress in a reasonable amount of time, given her extensive training prior to
`
`working with Ms. Mills and her lack of motivation to show up to visits and to
`
`practice her skills while working with Ms. Mills. Id. at 106-107. Although Ms.
`
`Mills noted that Mother and Child are bonded to some degree, she opined that
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`J-S55043-20
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`the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests and
`
`that Child would not be emotionally harmed. Id. at 107.
`
`Next, Dorothy Wyatt, of Christian Home of Johnstown, testified
`
`regarding her work with Mother in the independent living program. Id. at
`
`115. Ms. Wyatt stated that, in particular, she focused with Mother on possibly
`
`pursuing post-secondary education and securing housing. Id. at 115-116.
`
`Ms. Wyatt testified that, while Mother was in foster care, Ms. Wyatt met with
`
`her twice a month, but, when Mother was no longer in foster care, she met
`
`with Mother only once a month. Id. at 116. During the entire time while Ms.
`
`Wyatt met with Mother, Mother did not obtain a job or housing, and Mother
`
`did not establish that she could parent a child. Id. at 117-118. Mother only
`
`showed an interest in working with Ms. Wyatt in August and September of
`
`2019, and, after that date, Ms. Wyatt did not have any more contact with
`
`Mother, despite her attempts to continue to work with Mother. Id. at 117-
`
`120.
`
`At the hearing on June 3, 2020, the trial court heard the remainder of
`
`Mother’s testimony. During her testimony, Mother raised serious allegations
`
`regarding an adult male. Id. at 29-39. CYS then presented the testimony of
`
`Melissa Raho, the CYS social work supervisor, concerning what CYS would do
`
`to address and investigate Mother’s allegations which, to her knowledge,
`
`Mother was raising for the first time. N.T., 6/3/20, at 39-41. Ms. Raho stated
`
`that CYS would investigate the allegations per its protocol. Id. Mother’s
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`J-S55043-20
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`counsel requested the trial court take her allegations into consideration and
`
`stay its decision on the petition until an investigation was concluded.
`
`Id. at
`
`42-43. At the close of the hearing, the GAL/Legal Counsel recommended that
`
`the Parents’ paternal rights to the almost three-year-old Child should be
`
`terminated so that Child may be adopted by her foster family, with whom she
`
`has lived for almost two and a half years and is bonded, and have permanency
`
`and stability in her life. Id. at 47-49. The GAL/Legal Counsel stated that the
`
`termination of Mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Child’s
`
`emotional welfare.
`
`Id. The court declined Mother’s request to stay the
`
`proceedings, and asked counsel to keep it apprised of any developments. Id.
`
`at 49.
`
`In the decree entered on June 12, 2020, the trial court terminated the
`
`Parents’ parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (5), (8),
`
`and (b). On July 10, 2020, Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise
`
`statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
`
`1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
`
`In her brief, Mother raises the following issues:
`
`A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or
`manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency
`sustained its burden of proving the termination of Natural Mother,
`N.S.K.’s, parental rights is warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1),
`2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
`
`B. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused
`its discretion by terminating the natural mother’s rights before the
`completion of an investigation into an allegation which was
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`J-S55043-20
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`revealed during the hearing and which directly relates to the
`reason the natural mother and child were initially separated?
`
`Mother’s Brief, at 7.
`
`In her brief, Mother argues:
`
`[T]he Agency failed to establish the statutory factors necessary to
`terminate her parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1),
`2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act by
`clear and convincing evidence. Even in the event this Court were
`to conclude the Agency established grounds for the termination of
`Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, Mother
`argues the [t]rial [c]ourt nevertheless erred in concluding the best
`interests of the Child would be served by terminating her parental
`rights.
`
`Mother also argues the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of
`law or abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental
`rights before the completion of an investigation into an allegation
`which was revealed during the hearing and which directly relates
`to the reason the natural mother and child were initially
`separated.
`
`[c]ourt’s decision
`[t]rial
`the
`that
`requests
`Mother
`terminating her parental rights be reversed and, upon the
`conclusion of the investigation by Agency of the allegation made
`by the [m]other, the record be updated.
`
`Mother’s Brief, at 11, 14.
`
`Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion with regard to section
`
`2511(b), stating:
`
`Even in the event this Court were to conclude the Agency
`established one (1) or more statutory grounds to support the
`termination of Mother’s parental rights, the Agency failed to
`demonstrate the best interests of the [c]hild would be served by
`terminating Mother’s parental rights at this time.
`In the instant
`case, the [C]ourt should be guided by the fact that there was not
`any evidence presented which disputes the fact that the [c]hild
`has a bond with the [m]other. Mother is pregnant with another
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`J-S55043-20
`
`child and she desires to be reunified with the [c]hild [M.L.K.] and
`maintain a family bond.
`
`The [m]other has experienced many issues which have
`impeded her efforts at reunification. However, Mother has stable
`housing and her mental health has improved, all of which were
`the primary reasons which lead [sic] to the [c]hild being removed.
`When Mother has been able to attend visits with the child, she was
`attentive to her needs and tended to her needs. Agency witness,
`Jessica Mills,
`testified that Mother exhibited basic hands-on
`parenting skills (T. 104). There was no testimony offered to
`dispute the bond that the [c]hild has with Mother. To the contrary,
`several of Agency witnesses testified that there is a bond between
`Mother and Child.
`The Agency failed to meet its burden to
`establish that Mother does not have a bond with the [c]hild.
`Furthermore, the [t]rial [c]ourt failed to fully consider the effect
`terminating Mother’s parental rights will have on the emotional
`needs and welfare of the [c]hild pursuant to Section 2511(b).
`Accordingly, even if this Court concludes the Agency established
`one or more statutory grounds terminating Mother’s parental
`rights, the [t]rial [c]ourt nevertheless erred in concluding the
`termination of Mother’s rights serves the needs and welfare of the
`[c]hild. Mother contends that it is in the [c]hild’s best interest to
`be reunified with Mother and to establish a relationship with her
`sibling.
`
`Id. at 22-23.3
`
`Moreover, with regard to the second issue in her brief, Mother asserts
`
`that, in her testimony on June 3, 2020, she raised serious allegations involving
`
`____________________________________________
`
`3 We find the issue regarding section 2511(b) discussed in Mother’s brief was
`not subsumed into the first issue in her concise statement and statement of
`questions involved, which specified CYS’s failure to sustain its burden of proof
`with regard to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Thus, Mother waived any
`challenge to section 2511(b) for our review. See Krebs v. United Refining
`Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve
`issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors complained of
`on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal
`results in a waiver of those issues); see also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339
`n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66
`(Pa. Super. 2017).
`
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`

`J-S55043-20
`
`an adult male. Mother claims these allegations are the basis for her emotional
`
`outbursts and her subsequent admission into a psychiatric facility and
`
`separation from Child. Mother states that she reported the incident to a social
`
`worker, Kristin Caro, but the Agency’s witness, Melissa Raho, testified that
`
`she was never made aware of the allegations. Mother’s Brief, at 24 (citing
`
`N.T., 6/3/20, at 40).
`
`In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
`
`adhere to the following standard:
`
`[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
`standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
`petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
`cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
`the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
`if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
`A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
`appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
`error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275,
`284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has
`been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
`because the reviewing court might have reached a different
`Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors
`conclusion.
`America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
`Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634
`(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
`discretion
`only
`upon
`demonstration
`of manifest
`unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
`
`As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
`applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
`We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
`equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
`record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
`relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
`hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-
`30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
`support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
`
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`J-S55043-20
`
`termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
`second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
`determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
`judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
`and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
`law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539
`Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
`
`In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).
`
`The burden is upon the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing
`
`evidence, that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
`
`rights are valid.
`
`In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
`
`Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
`
`evidence is defined as