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`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
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`IN THE INT. OF: T.L., A MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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` No. 1953 MDA 2019
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`Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,
`in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
`Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000004-2018.
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`IN THE INT. OF: A.L., A MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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` No. 1954 MDA 2019
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`Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,
`in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
`Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000005-2018.
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`IN THE INT. OF: A.L., A MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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` No. 1955 MDA 2019
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`J-S41007-20
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`Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,
`in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
`Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000006-2018.
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`BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
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`MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
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`FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2020
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`In this consolidated matter, Appellant T.L. (Mother) appeals from her
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`dependent children’s respective permanency review orders issued by the York
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`County Court of Common Pleas – Juvenile Division. At issue is one of the 16
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`requisite findings a dependency court must render during each permanency
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`review hearing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1-12); (f.2). Specifically, the
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`Juvenile Act requires the court to determine the extent to which the parent
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`has progressed toward alleviating the conditions which necessitated the
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`original placement of her children. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(3). Following
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`a November 4, 2019 permanency review hearing, the court determined
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`Mother made minimal progress and recorded this finding in the children’s
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`respective orders; Mother appealed. After review, we conclude that the
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`issuance of the ensuing termination decrees and our affirmance of the decrees
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`under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) rendered moot the specific issue of
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`Mother’s progress. Consequently, we dismiss.
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`This consolidated appeal concerns three of Mother’s four children: 5-
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`year-old T.L (born 2014); 6-year-old A.L. (born 2013); and 9-year-old A.L.
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`____________________________________________
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`* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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`J-S41007-20
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`(born 2010).1 We briefly note the procedural history of the dependency cases,
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`as discussed in the dependency court’s opinion:
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`On January 4, 2018, an application for emergency protective
`custody was filed by [the] York County Office of Children,
`Youth and Families after receiving a referral due to
`allegations of sexual abuse. On January 29, 2018, a
`dependency hearing was held, at which time the children
`were placed in foster care placement together. In April
`2018, another hearing was held and it was agreed that the
`children would all be moved to a different foster care home.
`In October 2018, the children’s foster parents were no[t]
`able to be a resource, so the children were moved to
`alternative placements. These alternative placements of the
`children took place between the months of November 2018
`and January 2019.
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`A permanency review hearing was held on May 7, 2019, and
`a status review hearing was held on August 12, 2019.
`Another permanency review hearing, and the hearing in
`question, was held on November 4, 2019. At this hearing,
`both Mother and Father were present, and testimony was
`taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an
`order with findings that there has been minimal progress
`and compliance by Mother. Mother filed [timely] notice[s]
`of appeal.
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`See Trial Court Opinion, dated 1/6/20, at 2 (some superfluous capitalization
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`omitted).
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`After Mother filed this consolidated appeal, the lower court proceeded
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`with termination hearings in February 2020 concerning all four children and
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`their three respective parents. The court subsequently terminated the
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`parents’ rights. T.L. (Mother) and T.L. (Father) appealed their terminations;
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`____________________________________________
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`1 These children were born to T.L. (Father), who does not appeal. Mother has
`another child, 11-year-old A.L. (born 2008), who is not a part of this appeal.
`The father of A.L. is R.V., who is also not party to the instant matter.
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`J-S41007-20
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`R.V. (Father of A.L.) did not. Those appeals are separately listed before this
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`panel. See 436, 437, 438, 439 MDA 2020 (relating to Mother); see also 545,
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`546, 547 MDA 2020 (relating to Father).
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`Mother presents one issue for our review:
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`Did the lower court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
`discretion in finding [Mother] had made minimal progress
`and there was minimal compliance?
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`Mother’s Brief at 5.
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`Before we may address any substantive issue, we must determine
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`whether the issue is appealable, because appealability implicates our
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`jurisdiction. See In Interest of N.M., 186 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2018)
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`(quoting Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[Since we]
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`lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order, it is incumbent on us to
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`determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an
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`appealable order.”)). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate
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`standard of review is de novo and the scope of review plenary.” Barak v.
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`Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
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`In order to be appealable, the order must be: (1) a final order, Pa.R.A.P.
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`341-342; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42
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`Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a)-(b); Pa.R.A.P. 311-312; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P.
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`313. Mother seems to suggest that her appeal fits neatly into the second
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`category. Though she wholly sidesteps any real discussion of appealability,
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`she does cite Pa.R.A.P. 311 in the Statement of Jurisdiction section in her
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`J-S41007-20
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`Brief. See Mother’s Brief at 1. Our Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 provides
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`that an interlocutory appeal as of right may be taken if “an order that is made
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`final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not
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`dispose of all claims and of all parties.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8). This Rule
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`does not provide us with jurisdiction, however. Mother has not sought
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`permission, nor are these orders appealable as of right by law. See Interest
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`of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that Rule 311
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`did not convey by right of law the ability of a mother to appeal from a
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`permanency review order). Thus, whether the order is appealable would
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`depend on either the final order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 341 or the collateral
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`order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313.2
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`But in this case, we need not decide whether the issues involved render
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`the permanency review orders appealable. Even if the issue of Mother’s
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`progress were appealable, we conclude the effect of the subsequent
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`termination decrees renders the issue moot.
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`____________________________________________
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`2 Determining if a permanency review order is a final or interlocutory order
`has been a question of considerable perplexity. In the context of dependency
`proceedings, appealability often depends on the precise issue. On one hand,
`the order could be final and appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). See
`also In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908 (Pa. 2003). If not, the order is likely
`interlocutory, which is generally not appealable. But even if the permanency
`review order is interlocutory, it might still otherwise be appealable under the
`collateral order doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313. This dichotomy was thoroughly
`addressed in our recent decision of Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645 (Pa.
`Super. 2019).
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`J-S41007-20
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`“[A]n actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial
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`process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” Interest of J.L., 216 A.3d 233,
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`237 (Pa. Super. 2019). “The concept of mootness focuses on a change that
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`has occurred during the length of the legal proceedings.” Id. (quoting In re
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`Cain, 590 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. 1991)). “If an event occurs that renders
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`impossible the grant of the requested relief, the issue is moot and the appeal
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`is subject to dismissal.” Id. (quoting Delaware Ricer Preservation Co., Inc.
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`v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 1177, 1183 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007)).
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`Here, there is no longer an actual case or controversy, by virtue of the
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`termination order and subsequent appeal. The question presented in this
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`appeal is the extent Mother progressed toward her reunification goal at the
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`time of the November 2019 permanency review hearing. Because this Court
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`has determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
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`that the agency put forth sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental
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`rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, the
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`question of Mother’s progress circa November 2019 is no longer relevant.
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`Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot, because the relief Mother requests
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`would not have any legal force or effect.
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`J-S41007-20
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`Appeal dismissed.
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`Judgment Entered.
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`Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
`Prothonotary
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`Date: 11/19/2020
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