J-S23001-20
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`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
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`
`IN THE INTEREST OF: K.D.A, A
`MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: A.A., FATHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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` No. 446 EDA 2020
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`Appeal from the Order Entered January 27, 2020
`In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
`No(s): CP-51-AP-0000396-2019
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`IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.A, A
`MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: A.A., FATHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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` No. 447 EDA 2020
`
`Appeal from the Order Entered January 27, 2020
`In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
`No(s): CP-51-AP-0000397-2019
`
`IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A, A MINOR
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`APPEAL OF: A.A., FATHER
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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`
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`
`
` No. 448 EDA 2020
`
`Appeal from the Order Entered January 27, 2020
`In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
`No(s): CP-51-AP-0000398-2019
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`BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
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`

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`J-S23001-20
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`MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:
`
`FILED JULY 22, 2020
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`
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`A.A. (Father) appeals from the orders involuntarily terminating his
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`parental rights to K.D.A., born in August 2010, K.K.A., born in July 2011, and
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`K.A., born in April 2015 (collectively, Children), under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)
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`and (b).1 We affirm.
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`
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`We summarize the procedural history of this matter from the record.
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`On February 15, 2017, DHS received a child protective services (CPS) report
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`alleging Mother’s and Father’s medical neglect of Children’s sibling (Sibling).2
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`At that time, Mother was living with a relative, and Father was in prison for
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`charges of robbery and related offenses in Philadelphia.3 During the
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`investigation into the CPS report, Children came to DHS’s attention because
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`their medical checkups were not up to date.
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`____________________________________________
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`1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of K.B. (Mother). Mother
`has not appealed.
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` 2
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` The trial court found aggravated circumstances in the case involving Sibling
`and adjudicated Sibling dependent on May 1, 2017. The trial court terminated
`Parents’ rights to Sibling on March 27, 2019. N.T., 1/27/20, at 18.
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`In addition to Children and Sibling, Mother gave birth to another child in May
`2018. Father was not the biological father of the fifth child, and that child is
`not subject to this appeal.
`
` 3
`
` Father pled guilty to the Philadelphia charges, and in October 2017, the trial
`court sentenced him to two-and-one-half to five years’ imprisonment and
`three years’ probation in one case and two-and-one-half to five years’
`imprisonment in another case. See DHS Ex. 1. We refer to Father’s
`Philadelphia criminal cases as
`the Philadelphia convictions
`in
`this
`memorandum.
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`- 2 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`DHS took Sibling into protective custody the same day it received the
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`CPS report. Children remained in Mother’s care with Mother’s relatives
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`providing supervision. As part of Sibling’s case, the trial court ordered
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`referrals for Father to (1) the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for
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`parenting, housing, and employment issues, (2) Menergy for anger
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`management issues, and (3) the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for drug
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`screens, as well as substance abuse and mental health issues.
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`On April 11, 2017, DHS filed dependency petitions regarding Children.4
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`On April 27, 2017, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent. Children
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`remained with Mother on the condition that Mother remain in her relative’s
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`home. The trial court maintained its referrals of Father to ARC, Menergy, and
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`CEU, although Father remained incarcerated on the Philadelphia convictions.
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`See Orders, 4/11/17 & 10/18/17.
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`Following a March 7, 2018 meeting to revise the single case plan (SCP),
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`Father’s goals were to (1) cooperate with services, (2) make himself available
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`and participate in a community umbrella agency (CUA) case management
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`services, (3) complete and follow recommendations of a CEU evaluation, and
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`(4) submit three court-ordered random drug screens. In April 2018, Father
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`failed to participate in a CUA meeting despite being invited to do so.
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`____________________________________________
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`4 K.A. was approximately two years old when DHS removed her from Mother’s
`care.
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`- 3 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`Following Mother’s arrest for retail theft and endangering the welfare of
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`children,5 the trial court committed Children to DHS’s custody on May 24,
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`2018. On November 19, 2018, the trial court permitted Father to have
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`monthly supervised visits with K.D.A. and K.K.A. in prison, or supervised visits
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`at a CUA if he was released from prison. On March 6, 2019, Father was
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`released from prison for the Philadelphia convictions. At a March 7, 2019
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`hearing, the trial court ordered that Father have supervised visits with
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`Children and undergo a paternity test with respect to K.A.
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`On May 30, 2019, DHS filed petitions seeking the involuntary
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`termination of Father’s rights to Children under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
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`(5), (8), and (b). At the next permanency review hearing held on June 6,
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`2019, the trial court granted Father weekly supervised visits and referred
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`Father to CEU for assessments and drug screens. The trial court appointed a
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`child advocate attorney as legal counsel for K.D.A. and K.K.A.6 Father’s drug
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`____________________________________________
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`5 DHS alleged that Mother and a companion left Children in a running car while
`they committed the thefts.
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`6 The guardian ad litem (GAL) from the dependency proceedings continued to
`represent Children’s best interests after DHS filed the petitions to terminate
`Father’s parental rights. The records and dockets do not contain orders
`appointing legal counsel for K.D.A. and K.K.A. However, based on the
`notations of the individuals who appeared at continuance hearings, it appears
`that the trial court appointed legal counsel at some time between June 6, 2019
`and September 25, 2019. The trial court later noted that it did not appoint
`legal counsel for K.A. because K.A. “didn’t really understand the process and
`couldn’t make an informed decision.” N.T. at 59.
`
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`- 4 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`tests in June 2019 and October 2019 were positive for opiates. In November
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`2019, Father was incarcerated on felony-two retail theft charges in Blair
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`County.7
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`The trial court held a hearing on the petitions to terminate on January
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`27, 2020. Father’s counsel appeared at the hearing, and Father participated
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`by telephone from Blair County prison. Father stipulated to the statement of
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`facts in DHS’s petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial court
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`also admitted into evidence a report of Father’s convictions.
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`Thereafter, DHS presented the testimony of Tiana Dixon, a CUA
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`caseworker, regarding the history of the case, Father’s incarcerations, and
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`Father’s contacts with Children. Ms. Dixon noted that Father’s compliance
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`with the SCP was minimal throughout the case, even when Father was not
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`incarcerated. Father submitted two drug screens that were positive for
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`opiates. Ms. Dixon testified that the bond among Father and Children was
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`more like a sibling bond than a parent-child bond. She opined that termination
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`would be in the best interests of Children and that severing their relationship
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`with Father would not result in irreparable harm to Children.
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`Father testified on his own behalf. Father acknowledged failing the drug
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`tests, but asserted that he was in an accident and was going to therapy.
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`____________________________________________
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`7 Counsel for DHS asserted that Father was arrested in November 2019.
`Father did not dispute that assertion, and in his appellate briefs, he has
`repeated the November 2019 date when referring to the date of his
`incarceration for the Blair County charges.
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`- 5 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`Father indicated that he had a prescription for opiates. He testified that he
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`took the prescription “to the courthouse, and they had it.” N.T., 1/27/20, at
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`32. Later, when he was required to show a copy to “Tiana,” apparently
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`referring to the CUA caseworker, he “never got a chance to.” Id. Father
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`admitted he did not complete a drug treatment program and did not take
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`anger management or domestic violence classes. Father noted he was
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`employed following his release from prison in March 2019 until his arrest in
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`November 2019.
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`Father testified that during his incarceration on the Blair County
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`charges, he was unable to contact Children by telephone, either through his
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`sister or through the prison counselor. Id. at 35. Father indicated that his
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`earliest release date was “maybe in about two months” referring to a court
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`date at which the criminal case against him was “supposed to be getting
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`thrown out.” Id. at 31. Father anticipated living in an apartment upon his
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`release that his sister would help locate. Father further testified that his sister
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`was holding $15,000, which he obtained from a settlement related to his civil
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`case regarding his accident. Id. at 33.
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`Father testified that he visited Children every Tuesday and that he had
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`a “very good bond with them.” Id. at 34-35. He stated that he was present
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`with Mother for a dental surgery and helped comfort Children.
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`- 6 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`K.D.A. and K.K.A.’s legal counsel then presented expert testimony from
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`Roya Paller,8 a forensic social worker. Ms. Paller testified that K.D.A. and
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`K.K.A. preferred adoption. Ms. Paller noted that when she informed K.D.A.
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`and K.K.A. that adoption would mean that they might not get to see Mother
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`or Father until they were older, they replied, “That’s fine.” Id. at 42.
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`At the conclusion of the hearing regarding Father, the trial court granted
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`DHS’s petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights based on Section
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`2511(a)(2) and (b) and set forth its findings and conclusions of law on the
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`record. Id. at 52-56. That same day, the trial court entered the order
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`terminating Father’s parental rights to Children.
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`Father timely appealed and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and
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`(b).9 The trial court filed opinions referring to and summarizing its statements
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`at the January 27, 2020 hearing.
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`____________________________________________
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`8 Although the transcript of the termination hearing spelled Ms. Paller’s last
`name as “Pollard,” it appears that the correct spelling is “Paller,” See Ex. CA1,
`and we will use the latter spelling throughout this memorandum.
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` 9
`
` Father filed separate notices of appeals at each trial court docket
`corresponding to Children. Father’s errors complained of in the Rule 1925(b)
`statements attached to each appeal were identical. In his Rule 1925(b)
`statements, Father challenged the trial court’s ruling under 23 Pa.C.S. §
`2511(a)(2) asserting that he “substantially met his [family service plan] goals
`and thereby remedied his situation” and that DHS did not provide reasonable
`effort to reunite him with Children. See, e.g., Father’s Rule 1925(b)
`Statement, CP-51-AP-0000396-2019, at ¶ 1. Father also challenged the trial
`court’s ruling under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) asserting that “DHS failed to provide
`clear and convincing evidence that involuntary terminat[ion] of his parental
`rights best served the needs and welfare of [Children].” See, e.g., id. at ¶ 2.
`As discussed further in this memorandum, Father did not object to the
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`J-S23001-20
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`Father presents the following issues for review:
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`1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
`terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S.
`§] 2511 (a)(2) where [Father] presented evidence that he has
`remedied his situation by meeting his goals of consistent visitation
`with his children, Parenting classes, attending medical
`appointments, maintaining employment and remaining drug free
`and he has the present capacity to care for [Children] in his home
`with the help of his sister.
`
`2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
`terminating the parental rights of [Father] pursuant to 23 Pa.[C.S.
`§] 2511(b) [were] NOT MET. NEITHER THE CHILD ADVOCATE
`ATTORNEY NOR THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM EVER MET WITH
`ANY OF THE THREE CHILDREN, WHO WERE 9 YEARS OLD, 8
`YEARS OLD AND 4 YEARS OLD, TO DETERMINE THEIR
`DESIRED OUTCOMES. Additionally, evidence was presented
`that established that [Father] and [Children] had a close bond.
`DHS undermined [Father] in his relationship with [Children] by
`not permitting visits with [Father] once he was incarcerated. The
`best interests of the children should be to incorporate [Father]
`back into the lives of [Children].
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`Father’s Briefs at 7 (emphasis in original). DHS, the GAL, and legal counsel
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`for K.D.A. and K.K.A. have submitted briefs supporting the order to
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`termination Father’s parental rights.
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`Father first contends that he “substantially completed all his [family
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`service plan] goals and additional requirements of the [trial c]ourt. . . . [He]
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`has done and continues to perform all that was ever asked of him.” Father’s
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`Brief at 14. Father notes:
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`____________________________________________
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`adequacy of legal counsel’s representation of K.D.A. and K.K.A., or the trial
`court’s decision not to appoint legal counsel for K.A. in the trial court.
`Moreover, Father did not preserve issues related to legal counsel for Children
`in his Rule 1925(b) statements.
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`- 8 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`Father’s objectives for the life of the case were to have a CEU
`evaluation and follow recommendations and to take random drug
`screens. Father was also to take parenting classes, attend a
`domestic violence program, attend supervised visits and to obtain
`appropriate housing. Father had several drug screens where he
`tested positive for opiates, for which [Father] indicated he had a
`prescription for, due being in an accident. Father completed a
`parenting class while incarcerated. Prior to his incarceration
`[Father] provided the social worker with pay stubs to verify his
`employment.
`
`to his
`Father visited consistently with [Children] prior
`incarceration in November of 2019. Father had requested an
`[individualized education plan] for one child and attended all
`[Children’s] dental and medical appointments prior to his
`incarceration. Father sent photographs to his children while
`incarcerated. The social worker for the city[, Ms. Dixon] testified
`inconsistently regarding the dates of [Father’s] period of
`incarceration.
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`Additionally, Father testified that he may be released from prison
`in two months and would be getting an apartment using the
`settlement funds he got from his accident.
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`Throughout the case [Father] attended supervised visits at various
`locations and was always present. Since [Father] was
`incarcerated in November of 2019, he was never provided with
`any visitation with his children.
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`Id. at 8-9. In sum, Father asserts that the trial court erred in terminating his
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`parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). Id. at 15.
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`
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`DHS contends that the trial court’s properly terminated Father’s parental
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`rights under Section 2511(a)(2).10 DHS’s Brief at 23. DHS asserts that the
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`trial court properly considered Father’s incarceration when concluding that
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`Father was absent from Children’s lives. Id. at 20. DHS further notes that
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`____________________________________________
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`10 The GAL also filed a brief in support of terminating Father’s parental rights
`to Children. GAL’s Brief at 8-9.
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`- 9 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`the trial court was entitled to rely on Father’s repeated incarcerations when
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`concluding that Father was incapable of parenting Children. Id.
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`
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`Additionally, DHS notes that the trial court properly found that there
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`was no guarantee that Father would be released from prison within two
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`months of the hearing. Id. DHS emphasizes that Father failed to make
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`meaningful progress with his SCP, failed to address substance abuse issues,
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`did not address his anger management and domestic violence issues, and did
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`not address housing or employment to support Children. Id. at 21-22. DHS
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`notes that Father made only minimal progress with parenting and visitation,
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`had limited contact with Children during his incarcerations, and argues that
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`he did not develop a parental relationship with Children. Id. In sum, DHS
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`asserts:
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`Clearly, Father was not in a position to be a full-time parent for
`Children. The record reflects that Father’s repeated incarceration
`with no clear release date and failure to meaningfully achieve his
`SCP objectives left Children without a dedicated parent. As such,
`termination under § 2511(a)(2) was proper and should be
`affirmed.
`
`Id. at 23.
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`In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
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`apply the following standard of review:
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`[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
`when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
`termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
`standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
`findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
`they are supported by the record. [In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
`1190 (Pa. 2010)]. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
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`- 10 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
`or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of
`discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
`might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision
`may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
`demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
`prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
`
`As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
`abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
`observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
`equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
`record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
`relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
`hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where
`the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
`dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
`the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own
`credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
`to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by
`the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
`an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
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`In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations
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`omitted).
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`
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`The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
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`evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
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`rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
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`have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
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`defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
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`enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
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`truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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`Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
`must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
`rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
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`- 11 -
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`J-S23001-20
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`party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
`evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
`for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
`determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
`or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
`the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) . . . .
`
`In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
`
`Initially, we review the trial court’s ruling under Section 2511(a)(2)
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`which provides:
`
` §
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` 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
`
`
`(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
`be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
`grounds:
`
`* * *
`
`(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect,
`or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
`essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for
`his physical or mental well-being and the condition and
`causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
`will not be remedied by the parent.
`
`23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
`
`In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
`2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
`repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
`such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
`be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
`necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
`causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
`not be remedied.
`
`In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
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`omitted).
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`J-S23001-20
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`Further, “[t]he grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
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`cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
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`contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
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`perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216
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`(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent
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`efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of
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`full parental
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`responsibilities.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
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`and quotation marks omitted).
`
`Instantly, the trial court stated:
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`[W]ith respect to [Section 2511(a)(2)11], I am going to terminate
`involuntarily [Father’s] parental rights. The testimony is the
`repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
`the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
`care, control, or subsistence necessary for his or her physical or
`mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of the
`incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
`remedied by the parent.
`
`The testimony of CUA -- which, again, I’ve already indicated I
`found credible -- is that, for at least the first year and a half,
`almost two years that [Children] were court-involved and then in
`placement, [Father] was absent because he was incarcerated.
`
`CUA did testify that once [Father] was released in March of 2019,
`he did make attempts to be actively involved in [Children’s]
`li[ves]. He was visiting consistently. CUA testified he completed
`a parenting class, even though [Father] indicated he didn’t
`complete a parenting class. But CUA indicated that there’s
`documentation in there, [Father], he did complete a parenting
`class.
`
`____________________________________________
`
`11 The trial court specifically rejected Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) as grounds
`to terminate Father’s parental rights. See N.T. at 52.
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`J-S23001-20
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`Father indicated that the opiates that were in his system were due
`to medication, however, there’s no documentation to substantiate
`that claim. And in fact, there were two positive screens for
`opiates, given about four months apart, which leads me to believe
`that there wasn’t any documentation actually provided to CEU,
`otherwise, they would not have noted [Father] as positive for
`opiates. They would have indicated that he actually had a
`prescription for the opiates.
`
`That being said, DHS -- let me make sure I have the right exhibit
`-- 1 is [Father’s] court summary, and it indicates that [Father] is
`in and out of prison, and that, in and of itself, especially given the
`length of time [Children] have been in care, [Father] has been in
`prison more than he’s been out of prison. And as such, he’s been
`unable to parent [Children].
`
`Quite frankly, his incarceration has left [Children] -- and I’ll read
`[Section 2511(a)(2)] -- the repeated and continued incapacity,
`abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
`without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
`for his or her physical or mental well-being, and the conditions
`and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or
`will not be remedied by the parent.
`
`Father has been in prison more than he’s been out of prison. And
`that incapacity or refusal, however you choose to look at it, has
`caused [Children] to be without the essential parental care,
`control, or subsistence necessary for each of their physical, mental
`well-being. Father indicates that he’ll be out in two months, but
`there’s no guarantee. He’s still in pretrial status, or trial status.
`
`And I am not convinced, given that he was, in fact, released from
`prison in March of 2019 by his own admission and by CUA’s
`testimony, and within six months, re-incarcerated. So, this Court
`has no reason to believe that [Father] can or will remedy the
`causes of his incapacity that has caused [Children] to be without
`proper parental care and control.
`
`Id. at 52-54.
`
`Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in
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`the trial court’s ruling that DHS established grounds for terminating Father’s
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`parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). The record established that Father
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`J-S23001-20
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`partially complied with the SCP by completing a parenting class while
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`incarcerated for his Philadelphia convictions. See N.T. at 22. When out of
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`prison, Father did visit once per week with Children, attended one medical
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`appointment, and obtained employment. See id. at 23, 25-26, 34, 35.
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`Nevertheless, Father’s compliance was minimal. See id. at 26. Father
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`did not enroll in a drug and alcohol program or address his anger management
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`issues. See id. at 21-22, 32. Father also failed two drug screens. See id.
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`at 20-21. Although Father testified that he had a prescription for opiates to
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`explain his positive drug screens, see id. at 32, the trial court was entitled to
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`reject Father’s generalized and unsubstantiated assertions. See S.P., 47 A.3d
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`at 826-27. Father did not progress beyond a weekly supervised visit with
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`Children, and with the exception of one medical appointment, he did not
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`consistently attend Children’s medical appointments. Id. at 26, 30.
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`Moreover, as emphasized by the trial court, Father’s repeated incarcerations
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`also evidenced his inability to provide meaningful, stable parental care to
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`Children. Indeed, following his most recent incarceration for the Blair County
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`charges, Father had only minimal contact with Children, sending pictures to
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`Children once and participating in one individualized education program (IEP)
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`matter. Id. at 25, 35. Accordingly, the record contains no indication that
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`Father made diligent efforts toward a reasonably prompt assumption of full
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`parental responsibilities. See A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340.
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`In sum, having reviewed the parties’ arguments and the record, we find
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`no basis to disturb the trial court’s findings of fact, which were supported by
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`J-S23001-20
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`the record. Moreover, we discern no error in the trial court’s legal conclusions
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`that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity to parent caused Children to
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`be without essential parental care and that Father could not or would not
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`remedy the incapacity. See C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1216; M.E.P., 825 A.2d at
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`1272. As this Court has stated, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be put on hold
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`in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the
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`responsibilities of parenting.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507
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`(Pa. Super. 2006) (citation and footnote omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the
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`trial court’s ruling to terminate Father’s parental rights under Section
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`2511(a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
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`Father’s next claim involves two arguments. First, Father contends that
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`the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights under Section 2511(b).
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`Father’s Brief at 16. Second, Father argues that Children did not have
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`adequate representation of their legal interests. Id. We address these
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`arguments separately.
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`First, as to the existence of a bond with Children, Father notes that he
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`visited regularly with Children following his release from prison for the
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`Philadelphia convictions. Id. He emphasizes that he was present for
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`Children’s oral surgery and that he participated in an IEP. Id. He adds that
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`he did not have opportunities to visit Children when in prison for the Blair
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`County offenses. Father asserts there was a parental bond with Children and
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`Children “looked to [Father to fulfill] their emotional, medical, and educational
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`need.” Id. at 16-17.
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`J-S23001-20
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`DHS responds that the trial court properly terminated Father’s parental
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`rights under Section 2511(b) “because the record reflected that Children did
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`not share parent-child bonds with him.”12 DHS’s Brief at 26. DHS notes that
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`the record supported the trial court’s finding that termination best suited
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`Children’s needs and welfare. Id. Specifically, DHS states that Father did not
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`progress past supervised vitiations on a weekly basis, and that Ms. Dixon
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`testified that Father and Children had more a sibling-type bond than a parent-
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`child bond. Id. According to DHS, Ms. Dixon testified that when Father began
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`regular visits with Children after his release from prison on the Philadelphia
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`convictions, Children had to warm back up to him over time because of the
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`lack of contact with Father, and they did not complain or act out when their
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`visits with Father ended. Id. at 26-27. Additionally, DHS notes that Ms. Paller
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`opined that there was no bond between Father and K.D.A. and K.K.A, because
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`they told her that they did not “really see him.” Id. at 27.
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`Section 2511(b) states:
`
`
`(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
`of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
`physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
`of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
`environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
`income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
`control of the parent.
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`23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
`
`____________________________________________
`
`12 The GAL also argued that the trial court properly terminated Father’s
`parental rights under Section 2511(b).
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`J-S23001-20
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`This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
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`Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus of Section 2511(b) is on the
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`child. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008). In reviewing
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`the evidence in support of termination under Section 2511(b), our Supreme
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`Court has stated as follows:
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`[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
`court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
`physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
`§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
`been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
`comfort, security, and stability.” In In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481,
`485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the
`child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
`bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
`should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently
`severing the parental bond.
`
`In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations omitted).
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`When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
`
`expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
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`well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
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`evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
`
`omitted). Further, “in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a
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`parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re Adoption
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`of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
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`Instantly, the trial court considered