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`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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`
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` No. 359 MDA 2020
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`
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`Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2020,
`in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County,
`Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000995-2019.
`
`
`BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
`
`MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
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`FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
`
`Joseph Spencer appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing an
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`aggregate term of fourteen months to seven years’ incarceration in the
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`Schuylkill County Prison, after a trial judge convicted him of driving under the
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`influence (DUI, controlled substances);1 possession of marijuana;2 possession
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`of drug paraphernalia;3 and related summary offenses. We affirm.
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`On January 31, 2019, Officer James Bonner of Coaldale pulled Spencer
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`over for running a stop sign. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled burnt
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`____________________________________________
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`* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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` 75 Pa.C.S.A § 3802(d)(1)(iii).
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` 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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` 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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` 1
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` 2
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` 3
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`
`
`COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`
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`
`
`JOSEPH SPENCER
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`
`
`v.
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`
`
`Appellant
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`J-S38008-20
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`marijuana emanating from Spencer’s car, observed signs that Spencer was
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`DUI, and arrested him.
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`Initially, the public defender’s office represented Spencer. A magisterial
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`district court arraigned him on August 30, 2019. Generally, defendants have
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`30 days after their arraignments to move for suppression of evidence. See
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`Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B); Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). Spencer’s motion to suppress was
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`therefore due September 29, 2019. The public defenders’ office did not file
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`any pretrial motions.
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`Private counsel began representing Spencer on December 10, 2019.
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`Counsel then waited another month to file an omnibus, pretrial motion on
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`January 8, 2020. Hence, counsel filed the motion two days before a scheduled
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`status hearing on whether the parties were ready for trial.
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`One section of Spencer’s omnibus, pretrial motion was entitled “Motion
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`for Extension of Time to File Additional/Amended Claims.” That portion
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`followed the section entitled “Motion to Suppress Evidence.” See Spencer’s
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`Omnibus, Pretrial Motion at 2, 4-5. The second section of the omnibus motion
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`dealt with the purported failure of the Commonwealth to provide Spencer with
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`discovery, not the suppression issue. Indeed, the only reason for the delayed
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`omnibus, pretrial motion that Spencer offered was “discovery has not been
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`completed.” Id. at 5 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A)). He therefore pleaded no
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`facts or reasoning to justify the tardiness of his motion to suppress evidence,
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`nor did that part of the motion ask for leave to file it “in the interest of justice.”
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`Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A)
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`- 2 -
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`J-S38008-20
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`Regarding the motion to suppress, Spencer alleged the following facts:
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`9.
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`Officer Bonner indicated that he observed [Spencer’s]
`vehicle traveling east on West Phillips Street in
`Coaldale Township.
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`10. However, a third-party witness subsequently informed
`[Spencer] and his counsel that [the witness] observed
`the location from which Officer Bonner was observing
`traffic on the evening of January 31, 2019.
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`11. This third-party witness indicated that Officer Bonner
`was sitting stationary behind a dumpster to conceal
`the location of his patrol car from bypassing traffic.
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`inhibited Officer Bonner’s
`12. This dumpster also
`complete view of the intersection . . . .
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`Id. at 2. Notably absent from those allegations is any indication of when that
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`unidentified third party first provided this information to Spencer.
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`At the status hearing, counsel immediately referenced the omnibus,
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`pretrial motion when the trial court called this case. “Yeah, but it’s late,” the
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`trial court replied. N.T., 1/10/20, at 2.
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`[Attorney]:
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`It has to be heard. There [are] grounds.
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`The Court:
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`No, it doesn’t have to be heard. It’s waived
`when it’s late.
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`[Attorney]:
`
`The rule says if there was evidence that
`wasn’t discovered previously - - I had just
`entered my appearance for Mr. Spencer. I
`went to Coaldale. I looked at the evidence.
`And there is new evidence that needs to be
`discovered, and I should have some time to
`do that . . . It has to do with a stop. I filed
`[the motion] as quickly as I could.
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`The Court:
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`No. You entered your appearance a month
`before you filed it.
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`- 3 -
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`J-S38008-20
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`[Attorney]:
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`I didn’t have all that time to devote to it.
`When I did - -
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`The Court: Well, it was already late when you entered
`your appearance. Now you wait another
`month to file it on the eve of trial, on the eve
`of trial.
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`[Attorney]: Well, I’m just asking that it be heard.
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`The Court:
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`I don’t think it’s going to be heard. So is [this
`case] going to trial?
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`[Attorney]:
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`Yeah.
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`Id. at 2-3.
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`Three days later, the trial court entered an order denying the omnibus,
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`pretrial motion as untimely. The court convicted Spencer and sentenced him
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`as described above. This timely appeal followed.
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`Spencer raises one issue on appeal. He asks whether the trial court
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`abused its discretion by deeming his omnibus, pretrial motion untimely “where
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`that motion alleged that the claims were based on a witness who provided
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`new information subsequent to present counsel entering her appearance and
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`that discovery had not yet been provided?” Spencer’s Brief at 4.
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`This Court has said:
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`The “interests of justice” exception provides a trial judge
`with discretion to excuse a party’s tardy presentation of a
`suppression motion. We review the court’s decision on
`these matters for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of
`discretion is not a mere error of judgment. Rather, it exists
`where the judge acts manifestly unreasonably, misapplies
`the law, or acts with partiality, bias, or ill will.
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`Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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`- 4 -
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`J-S38008-20
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`As mentioned above, and contrary to Spencer’s framing of the issue, he
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`made no allegation in his motion to suppress that his “claims were based on
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`a witness who provided new information subsequent to present counsel
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`entering her appearance . . . .” Spencer’s Brief at 4 (emphasis added).
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`Nothing in his motion to suppress indicates when this unidentified, third-party
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`witness told him and his counsel about “new information.” Id. The motion
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`only alleges that this third party informed Spencer of Officer Bonner’s location
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`subsequent to Officer Bonner indicating that he observed Spencer driving on
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`the night in question. Thus, as far as the motion to suppress is concerned,
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`Spencer could have spoken with the unidentified witness any time between
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`February 1, 2019 and January 8, 2020. On its face, the motion fails to
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`establish the newness of the information to justify the grounds for the late
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`suppression motion. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
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`by refusing to indulge Spencer’s facially untimely omnibus, pretrial motion.
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`The trial court’s refusal to grant such an indulgence was not
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`unreasonable. Spencer’s new counsel waited from December 10, 2019 until
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`January 8, 2020 to seek suppression, rather than moving to suppress with
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`reasonable promptness once she learned of the witness. She also failed to
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`offer a sufficiently specific justification for the delay. We cannot declare that
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`the trial court’s refusal to postpone Spencer’s trial based on such indefinite
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`information is either arbitrary or capricious.
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`And, we may not substitute our judgment for a trial court’s regarding
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`dispensations from Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). To invoke the “in the interest of
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`- 5 -
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`J-S38008-20
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`justice” exception under the timeliness rules on pretrial motions, a defendant
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`needs to allege something of substance in his motion that, at a minimum,
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`explains why he did not request suppression sooner than two days prior to a
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`status hearing. Spencer’s motion fails in this regard. Thus, the trial court did
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`not abuse its discretion by taking his unjustified, untimely motion at face
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`value.4 Spencer’s only appellate issue warrants no relief.
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`Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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`Judgment Entered.
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`
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`Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
`Prothonotary
`
`
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`Date: 9/15/2020
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`
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`____________________________________________
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`4 Spencer also makes a tangential argument regarding due process into his
`appeal. See Spencer’s Brief at 13-17 (citing, e.g., Application of Gault, 387
`U.S. 1 (1967)). He suggests that the trial court’s discussion of the omnibus,
`pretrial motion at the status hearing was not preceded by proper notice under
`the Due Process Clause. U.S. Const. amnd. XIV.
`
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`Spencer’s counsel – not the trial court – brought up the omnibus, pretrial
`motion at the status hearing. Thus, he was not a victim of unfair surprise.
`Further, counsel for Spencer failed to interpose any objection or argument
`before the trial court based upon either the state or federal constitutions.
`Accordingly, Spencer has waived all constitutional claims. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
`“[I]ssues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in
`the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884
`(Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019).
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`- 6 -
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