J-A23035-20
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`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
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`
`COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`
`
`
`ALEX OTERO-SANCHEZ
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`
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`v.
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`
`
`Appellant
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
` PENNSYLVANIA
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`
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`
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` No. 3583 EDA 2019
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`
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`Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 8, 2019
`In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
`No(s): CP-51-CR-0005382-2018
`
`
`BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
`
`MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:
`
`FILED OCTOBER 23, 2020
`
`
`
`Alex Otero-Sanchez (Otero-Sanchez) appeals from the August 8, 2019
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`judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
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`County (trial court) following his convictions for first-degree murder and
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`possession of an instrument of crime. Otero-Sanchez argues that the
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`evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions
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`were against the weight of the evidence. He also challenges two of the trial
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`court’s evidentiary rulings. After careful review, we affirm.
`
`I.
`
`
`
`We glean the following facts from the trial court opinion:
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`Shortly before 4:00 a.m. on June 25, 2018, [Otero-Sanchez] and
`his then-girlfriend, Rachel Rodweller, left their home on 618 East
`Clementine Street in Philadelphia to buy cigarettes and drugs
`
`____________________________________________
`
`* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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`
`
`

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`J-A23035-20
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`nearby on the block. [Otero-Sanchez] was missing his left leg,
`but got around that morning using a bike. [Otero-Sanchez] and
`Rodweller headed down the street toward a drug dealer they knew
`named Will. Rodweller, who was ahead of [Otero-Sanchez], ran
`into the decedent, Jamie Robinson, and began to talk with him. A
`few minutes later, [Otero-Sanchez] arrived and asked Robinson
`why he was talking to [Otero-Sanchez’s] wife. In response,
`Robinson said, “That’s not your wife,” and Rodweller stated, “No,
`I’m not his wife, I’m his girlfriend.” This exchange prompted
`Robinson to start laughing and to mock [Otero-Sanchez]. In
`response, [Otero-Sanchez] lifted his shirt and pulled out a knife.
`He then went behind Robinson and stabbed him with the knife on
`the right side of his stomach, just below the rib cage. After
`[Otero-Sanchez] twisted the knife and pulled it out of Robinson’s
`stomach, Robinson fell to the ground. Robinson was able to pick
`himself up from the ground and run down to the end of the block.
`[Otero-Sanchez] initially began to follow Robinson, but after
`Rodweller started yelling at [Otero-Sanchez], he followed
`Rodweller back to their house on Clementine Street. Shortly
`thereafter, Rodweller asked [Otero-Sanchez] why he had stabbed
`Robinson. [Otero-Sanchez] responded, “He disrespected me and
`I'm a killer.”
`
`Meanwhile, Robinson made his way down Clementine Street,
`turned right onto F Street, and eventually collapsed in the area of
`F and Clearfield Streets. Officers, who responded to a report of a
`stabbing, found Robinson laying in a pool of his own blood and
`rushed him to Temple Hospital. Shortly after arrival, Robinson
`was pronounced dead. The cause of death was a 5 inch deep stab
`wound to the stomach.
`
`After returning home, [Otero-Sanchez] wrapped the knife he had
`used to stab Robinson in the clothing he was wearing at the time
`of the killing. He placed the clothing and knife in two plastic bags,
`and dropped them in a trash can on the corner of F and Clementine
`Streets. Two days later, [Otero-Sanchez] saw a man he knew
`named Angel who pushed around a cart and collected cans.
`[Otero-Sanchez] pointed to the trash can, told Angel that he had
`killed someone with a knife and the knife was in a bag in the trash
`can. He then asked Angel to get rid of the knife. Angel agreed
`and took the bag with the knife from the trashcan. Sometime
`later, [Otero-Sanchez] saw Angel and Angel gave him a thumbs
`up.
`
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`J-A23035-20
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`The day after the stabbing, Gloria Resto, who also lived with
`[Otero-Sanchez] and Rodweller at the Clementine Street home,
`overheard an argument between [Otero-Sanchez] and Rodweller
`in the home. When Resto attempted to calm [Otero-Sanchez]
`down, [Otero-Sanchez] said to Rodweller, “Tell her what I did, tell
`her what I did.” When Rodweller did not respond, [Otero-
`Sanchez] said to Resto, “Yeah, he disrespected [Rodweller], he
`touched her ass....I fucked him up and I fucked him up real bad.”
`Within a day or two of that conversation, [Otero-Sanchez] left the
`home and did not return.
`
`After Robinson’s death, Philadelphia police detectives conducted
`an investigation of the murder. Officers located and recovered
`surveillance video from around the location of the stabbing. Four
`days after the murder, on June 29, 2018, officers went to the
`Clementine Street home and requested that Rodweller come with
`them and give a statement about the stabbing. Rodweller agreed
`and gave a statement to detectives, in which she identified [Otero-
`Sanchez] as the individual who stabbed Robinson. Shortly
`thereafter, [Otero-Sanchez] was arrested. He later gave a video
`statement to detectives, in which he admitted to stabbing
`Robinson.
`
`Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2020, at 2-4 (citations & footnotes omitted).
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`
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`Following the reception of the evidence, the jury found Otero-Sanchez
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`guilty of the above-mentioned offenses and he immediately proceeded to
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`sentencing. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison on the count of
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`first-degree murder and a concurrent period of one to five years’ incarceration
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`on the count of possession of an instrument of crime. Otero-Sanchez filed a
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`timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. He timely
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`appealed, and he and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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`J-A23035-20
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`II.
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`Otero-Sanchez first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
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`his convictions.1 He argues that he should have been convicted of the lesser
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`offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder, because
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`he committed the killing while under serious provocation and in the “heat of
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`passion.” He further argues that his conviction for possession of an instrument
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`of crime should be vacated because he did not intend to use the knife
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`criminally when he was acting under the heat of passion.
`
`____________________________________________
`
`1 Our standard of review is well-settled:
`
`
`The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
`is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
`most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
`to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
`a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the
`evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
`addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
`the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
`innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
`resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
`inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
`drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
`may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
`beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
`evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
`must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
`considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
`credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
`is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
`
`Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 79 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
`omitted).
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`J-A23035-20
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`A person is guilty of first-degree murder if the Commonwealth
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`establishes beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) a human being was unlawfully
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`killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant
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`acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,
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`54 A.3d 332, 335 (Pa. 2012); 18 Pa.C.S. 2502(a). Both first-degree murder
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`and voluntary manslaughter require proof of a specific intent to kill.
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`Commonwealth v. Towles, 208 A.3d 988, 999-1000 (Pa. 2019). The heat-
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`of-passion defense reduces the charge of first-degree murder to voluntary
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`manslaughter if the accused committed the killing while “acting under a
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`sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.” 18 Pa.C.S.
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`§ 2503(a); Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 313 (Pa. Super.
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`2017).
`
`In order to successfully argue heat of passion, a defendant must
`prove (1) provocation on the part of the victim, (2) that a
`reasonable man who was confronted with the provoking events
`would become “impassioned to the extent that his mind was
`incapable of cool reflection,” and (3) that the defendant did not
`have sufficient cooling off time between the provocation and the
`killing.
`
`Williams, supra (citations omitted). “Emotions encompassed by the term
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`‘passion’ include ‘anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror which renders the
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`mind incapable of reason.’” Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277,
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`314 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 650 (Pa.
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`2009)). The standard for determining whether provocation was sufficient to
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`support the heat of passion defense is an objective one. Id.
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`J-A23035-20
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`
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`Otero-Sanchez argues that Robinson provoked him into the heat of
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`passion by talking to Rodweller and mocking Otero-Sanchez for referring to
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`her as his wife rather than his girlfriend.2 He points out that he is disabled
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`and that the victim was intoxicated at the time of the interaction. He contends
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`that the victim’s “disrespect” enraged him such that he lost his temper and
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`acted in the heat of passion and anger when he stabbed the victim. Finally,
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`he argues that the single stab wound shows that he lashed out in momentary,
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`uncontrollable anger.
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`
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`The brief interaction between the victim, Rodweller, and Otero-Sanchez
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`does not establish the type of provocation contemplated by the voluntary
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`manslaughter statute that would result in a reasonable person becoming
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`“impassioned to the extent that his mind was incapable of cool reflection.”
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`Williams, supra. Courts have previously rejected the heat-of-passion
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`defense in cases involving interpersonal conflicts when the evidence did not
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`establish that the conflict was so severe as to “render[] the mind incapable of
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`reason.” Hutchinson, supra (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth
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`v. Frederick, 498 A.2d 1322, 1325 (Pa. 1985) (no evidence to support heat-
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`____________________________________________
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`2 Otero-Sanchez also argues that Robinson “inappropriately touched”
`Rodweller during the exchange, contributing to his anger and causing him to
`lose his temper. See Otero-Sanchez’s Brief at 40. However, Rodweller denied
`that Robinson touched her during their interaction. Notes of Testimony,
`8/7/19, at 82. As our standard of review requires this court to view the
`evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Lopez, supra, we
`accept Rodweller’s version of events in our analysis.
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`J-A23035-20
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`of-passion defense when victim and defendant were engaged in a “stormy
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`love affair” and were seen arguing the day of the murder); Commonwealth
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`v. McFadden, 559 A.2d 58, 62 (Pa. Super. 1989) (defendant failed to
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`establish adequate provocation when the victim, the defendant’s paramour,
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`told the defendant that she was hosting a party for another man immediately
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`prior to the murder). The defense is more appropriate in situations where, for
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`example, the defendant or his or her family was threatened with bodily harm.
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`See Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262, 264-65 (Pa. 1975) (voluntary
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`manslaughter instruction was warranted when defendant came upon scene
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`where the victim had physically attacked the defendant’s mother);
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`Commonwealth v. Duffy, 512 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Pa. Super. 1986)
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`(provocation was established for conviction for voluntary manslaughter when
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`the victim slammed the defendant against a wall and fired three shots at him
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`before the defendant shot the victim).
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`
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`Here, Robinson approached Rodweller and began talking to her while
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`she was buying narcotics with Otero-Sanchez. Otero-Sanchez told Robinson
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`to stop talking to his “wife” and Rodweller responded by saying that she was
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`not his wife but his girlfriend. Robinson laughed at Otero-Sanchez and
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`mocked him for calling Rodweller his “wife” and Otero-Sanchez responded in
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`anger by stabbing Robinson in the torso. Under the objective test for
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`provocation, Hutchinson, supra, we conclude that this interaction was not
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`the type that would cause a reasonable man to become incapable of cool
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`J-A23035-20
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`reflection. There is no evidence to suggest that Robinson threatened either
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`Otero-Sanchez or Rodweller with bodily harm during the exchange or that
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`Robinson and Rodweller were engaged in a sexual relationship. The record
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`shows that Otero-Sanchez’s reaction to perceived “disrespect” was
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`disproportionate to Robinson’s actions, which were not the type of provocation
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`that would cause a reasonable person to become “incapable of cool reflection.”
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`Williams, supra. This claim fails.
`
`
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`Otero-Sanchez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
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`his conviction for possession of an instrument of crime hinges on his assertion
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`that he acted in the heat of passion. A person may be convicted of possession
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`of an instrument of crime if he or she “possesses any instrument of crime with
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`intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). Otero-Sanchez argues
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`that he could not intend to employ his knife criminally when he was acting
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`under the heat of passion as opposed to acting with malice and the specific
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`intent to kill. However, the record amply supports Otero-Sanchez’s conviction
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`for first-degree murder with evidence of malice and specific intent to kill.
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`Otero-Sanchez used a deadly weapon, his knife, on a vital part of Robinson’s
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`body, his torso. It is well-established that such actions are sufficient to
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`support a conviction for first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Cash, 137
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`A.3d 1262, 1269 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he specific intent to kill may be inferred
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`where . . . the accused uses a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s
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`body.”). As Otero-Sanchez intentionally used the knife to commit first-degree
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`J-A23035-20
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`murder, the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for possession of
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`an instrument of crime.
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`III.
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`Next, Otero-Sanchez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
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`denying his motion for a new trial and holding that the verdict was not against
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`the weight of the evidence.3, 4 In essence, he argues that the jury failed to
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`afford appropriate weight to Robinson’s actions toward Rodweller, which
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`provoked him into committing the murder in the heat of passion. He argues
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`that based on the provocation by the victim, his own disability, the size
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`difference between himself and the victim, and the victim’s inappropriate
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`actions toward Rodweller, the weight of the evidence supported a conviction
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`for voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder and possession of
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`an instrument of crime.
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`____________________________________________
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`3 Otero-Sanchez preserved this claim by raising it in his post-sentence motion.
`See Motion for New Trial and Arrest of Judgment, 8/16/19, at Paragraph 4.
`
` 4
`
` When evaluating a challenge to the weight of the evidence to support a
`conviction, this court does not reweigh the evidence presented at trial, but
`rather evaluates the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial for an
`abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa.
`2013). An abuse of discretion occurs “where the course pursued represents
`not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly
`unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
`the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation
`omitted). A trial court’s determination that the verdict was not against the
`weight of the evidence is “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting a
`new trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
`
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`“An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
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`addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan,
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`820 A.2d 795, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “Trial judges, in
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`reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not
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`sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine
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`that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight
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`that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
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`justice.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 2000)
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`(quotations omitted). A new trial is appropriate only when the verdict “is so
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`contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth
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`v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he
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`evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the
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`conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 326
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`(Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
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`Here, Otero-Sanchez contends that the trial court abused its discretion
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`in denying his motion for a new trial because he believes the jury should have
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`credited his version of events and found him guilty of the lesser offense of
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`voluntary manslaughter. However, in evaluating a challenge to the weight of
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`the evidence, the trial court may not “sit as a thirteenth juror” or grant a new
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`trial merely because the court would have weighed the evidence differently.
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`Widmer, supra. The evidence adduced at trial, including Rodweller’s
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`description of the murder and Otero-Sanchez’s boasting about the crime in
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`J-A23035-20
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`the days following, supported the jury’s finding that Otero-Sanchez committed
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`the murder with malice and the specific intent to kill. The only facts supporting
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`the theory of voluntary manslaughter were adduced from Otero-Sanchez’s
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`statement to police, which the jury was entitled to conclude was self-serving
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`and less reliable than Rodweller’s testimony. The facts supporting the
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`voluntary manslaughter defense were not so weighty and indisputable as to
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`clearly outweigh the evidence in support of the first-degree murder conviction.
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`No relief is due.
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`IV.
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`Finally, Otero-Sanchez argues that the trial court abused its discretion
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`in two evidentiary rulings: first, by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
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`a photograph of the victim’s stab wound into evidence, and second, by
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`allowing the medical examiner to testify outside the scope of his expert report.
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`We address each argument in turn.5
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`
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`____________________________________________
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`5 “The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court,
`and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an
`abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a
`mere error of judgment, but rather occurs where the court has reached a
`conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment
`exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
`or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 494 (Pa. 2015)
`(cleaned up).
`
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`J-A23035-20
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`A.
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`Prior to trial, the Commonwealth informed the trial court and the
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`defense that it intended to introduce two photographs of Robinson’s body into
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`evidence during the testimony of the medical examiner. The first depicted the
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`victim’s entire torso, including the stab wound, and the second was a close-
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`up of the stab wound. Otero-Sanchez objected to the admission of the second
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`photograph, arguing that it was inflammatory and irrelevant, as the first
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`photograph would adequately show the jury the nature of the wound. The
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`trial court held that the second photograph was admissible, finding that it was
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`not inflammatory and that it was relevant to the medical examiner’s
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`testimony. Notes of Testimony, 8/6/19, at 46-50. Even though it determined
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`that the photograph was not inflammatory, the trial court issued the standard
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`cautionary jury instruction for inflammatory photographs prior to the jury’s
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`deliberations. Notes of Testimony, 8/8/19, at 110-11.
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`When passing on the admissibility of photographs of a victim’s body, the
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`trial court must engage in a two-step analysis:
`
`First, the trial court must examine whether the particular
`photograph
`is
`inflammatory.
` If the photograph
`is not
`inflammatory, it may be admitted if it is relevant and can serve to
`assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case. If the
`photograph is inflammatory, the trial court must determine
`whether the photograph is of such essential evidentiary value that
`its need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds
`and passions of the jurors.
`
`Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494, 500-01 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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`J-A23035-20
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`
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`We agree with the trial court that the close-up photograph of the victim’s
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`wound is not inflammatory. While it does show a close angle, the single wound
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`is clean, not overly gruesome and does not show bleeding or internal organs.
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`Compare LeGares, 709 A.2d 922, 925 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that
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`photograph was inflammatory when it depicted “in gory detail the destruction
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`wreaked upon the victim’s skull by the 20-gauge shotgun blast”). The
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`photograph is not so grotesque as to inflame the jury and render it incapable
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`of fairly considering the evidence and facts of the case. Moreover, even
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`though the photograph was not inflammatory, the trial court issued a
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`cautionary instruction directing the jury not to allow the photographs to
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`prevent it from carefully and impartially considering all of the evidence.
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`Because the photograph is not inflammatory, it is admissible if it is
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`relevant to the facts of the case. Hutchison, supra. Evidence is relevant if
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`“it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
`
`without the evidence.” Pa.R.E. 401(a). “Since a jury can infer one acted with
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`an intent to kill when injuring a vital area of the body, photographs showing
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`that vital area are relevant to showing appellant had an intent to kill.”
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`Commonwealth v. Spell, 28 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. 2011). Such photographs
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`can be relevant to the jury’s determination of intent to kill even when the
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`medical examiner has already described the
`
`injuries
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`in testimony.
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`Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 502 (Pa. 2004) (quoting
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`Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1994)). “There is no need
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`J-A23035-20
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`to so overextend an attempt to sanitize the evidence of the condition of the
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`body as to deprive the Commonwealth of opportunities of proof in support of
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`the onerous burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
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`Here, the trial court determined that the photograph was relevant and
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`admissible because it would aid the medical examiner’s testimony and the
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`jury’s understanding of the facts. The trial court further held that the
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`photograph was “essential evidence of the defendant’s intent to kill, because
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`there was only a single stab wound.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2020, at 11.
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`While Otero-Sanchez did concede that he committed the stabbing, the crucial
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`question at trial was whether he did so with malice and the intent to kill. The
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`trial court correctly determined that the photograph of the wound would be
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`relevant to the jury’s determination of Otero-Sanchez’s mindset during the
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`killing, as it supported the Commonwealth’s argument that Otero-Sanchez
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`inflicted the wound on a vital part of the victim’s body because he harbored
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`malice and the intent to kill. Spell, supra; Robinson, supra. This court has
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`held that such photographs are not cumulative merely because the medical
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`examiner had already testified about the victim’s injury, as they can serve as
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`additional essential evidence of intent. Robinson, supra. The trial court did
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`not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph.
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`B.
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`Finally, Otero-Sanchez argues that the trial court abused its discretion
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`by allowing the medical examiner to testify outside the scope of his autopsy
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`J-A23035-20
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`report in response to a question posed by the Commonwealth. The medical
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`examiner testified during his direct examination that the stab wound could
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`have been inflicted by Otero-Sanchez while he stood behind the victim and
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`reached around to stab him in the front of his torso. He argues that this
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`opinion was not in the medical examiner’s report and that he did not have
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`adequate notice or the opportunity to retain his own expert to refute the
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`opinion. Otero-Sanchez contends that this testimony undermined his
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`voluntary manslaughter defense because it suggested that he had the time to
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`maneuver behind the victim before stabbing him,6 indicating that he was not
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`acting in a momentary fit of rage.
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`We agree with the Commonwealth that this argument is waived. At
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`trial, Otero-Sanchez did not provide any basis for his objection to this
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`testimony. Notes of Testimony, 8/8/19, at 31-32. He first raised his
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`argument that this testimony exceeded the scope of the medical examiner’s
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`report in his concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). A party
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`preserves a claim of evidentiary error for appellate review if he “makes a
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`timely objection” on the record and “states the specific ground, unless it was
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`apparent from the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A)-(B). We have previously
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`found waiver for failure to state the specific ground for the objection on the
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`____________________________________________
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`6 Otero-Sanchez has one leg and was using a bike as a scooter at the time of
`the murder.
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`J-A23035-20
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`record when counsel merely said “objection” without further explanation.7
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`Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81-82 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
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`omitted). Because Otero-Sanchez’s objection during the trial did not state a
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`specific ground for the trial court to consider when passing on the admissibility
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`of the medical examiner’s opinion, this argument is waived.
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`Even if we were to reach the merits of this claim, Otero-Sanchez is not
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`entitled to relief. To the extent that testimony is beyond the fair scope of an
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`expert’s report, the defendant must still establish that he was prejudiced by
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`the admission of the testimony. Commonwealth v. Ward, 188 A.3d 1301,
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`1311 (Pa. Super. 2018). Here, during direct examination, the medical
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`examiner testified that the path of the stab wound was consistent with the
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`victim being stabbed by someone standing behind him and reaching around
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`his torso. On cross-examination, the medical examiner testified that the
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`wound was also consistent with the victim being stabbed by someone standing
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`in front of him.
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`In its opinion, the trial court cited to Commonwealth v. Poplawski,
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`130 A.3d 697 (Pa. 2015), and concluded that Otero-Sanchez was not
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`____________________________________________
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`7 Conversely, we have held that a general objection is sufficient to preserve
`the issue for review when a party contends that the objected-to evidence is
`inadmissible for any purpose. See Commonwealth v. Vucich, 194 A.3d
`1103, 1107 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Cominsky v. Donovan, 846 A.2d
`1256, 1258 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Otero-Sanchez does not argue that the
`medical examiner’s opinion is inadmissible for any purpose; in fact, his
`argument concedes that the opinion could be relevant to the jury’s factual
`finding of malice and intent to kill.
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`J-A23035-20
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`prejudiced by this testimony because the medical examiner opined only that
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`the wound was consistent with both potential avenues of attack. Trial Court
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`Opinion, 2/3/2020, at 12-13. In Poplawski, the expert witness testified
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`regarding the order in which a victim sustained certain injuries, and the
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`defendant objected that the opinion was outside the scope of the expert’s
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`report. Our Supreme Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by
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`this opinion testimony when he elicited additional testimony on cross-
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`examination that the wounds “were just as likely caused in a manner
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`consistent with the Commonwealth’s hypothetical as they were with the
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`defendant’s alternate hypothetical.” Poplawski, supra, at 721. Similarly,
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`the medical examiner’s testimony here confirmed only that both the
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`Commonwealth and Otero-Sanchez had presented plausible theories
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`regarding where Otero-Sanchez was standing when he stabbed the victim,
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`and he did not credit either theory over the other. Because Otero-Sanchez
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`cannot establish that he was prejudiced by this testimony, this claim is
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`meritless.
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`Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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`Judge Kunselman joins the memorandum.
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`Judge Nichols did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
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`
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`
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`case.
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`J-A23035-20
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`Judgment Entered.
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`
`
`
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`Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
`Prothonotary
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`
`
`Date: 10/23/20
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