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`NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
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`ALLEN BICKEL, DIANE BICKEL AND
`EMILY BICKEL
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`DANIEL J. DUGAN
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`v.
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`Appellant
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` IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
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` No. 1331 WDA 2019
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`Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2019,
`in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County,
`Civil Division at No(s): 2017-1826-CD.
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`BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
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`JUDGMENT ORDER BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
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`FILED JUNE 12, 2020
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`Defendant, Daniel J. Dugan, appeals from the order partially granting
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`summary judgement to Plaintiffs, Allen, Diane, and Emily Bickel (“the
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`Bickels”), in this property dispute between neighbors. As the learned trial
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`court correctly recognized in its letter to this Court, and as the Bickels contend
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`in their brief, Mr. Dugan’s appeal is premature. We therefore quash it.
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`Briefly, the Bickels own a landlocked residence in Clearfield County,
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`which Mr. Dugan’s farm surrounds. The Bickels sued Mr. Dugan in a multiple
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`count complaint. The first count alleges that the Bickels own a perpetual
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`easement over Mr. Dugan’s land, via Rabbit Lane. The Bickels produced a
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`written instrument, which the prior owners of the neighboring properties
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`____________________________________________
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`* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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`J-A12040-20
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`executed and recorded. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
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`judgment on the issue of whether the language of the recorded document was
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`legally sufficient to create an easement and to establish its location and scope.
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`The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, the document sufficiently
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`evidenced the prior owners’ desires to create an easement over Mr. Dugan’s
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`farm for the benefit of the Bickels’ dominant estate. The court granted partial,
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`summary judgment to the Bickels on the question of whether there was an
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`easement of some sort. However, that only disposed of half of their first
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`count; the trial court made clear that the Bickels’ motion was denied “as to
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`the exact location and scope of the right of way. There is insufficient evidence
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`. . . for this decision to be made, i.e., there remain material issues of fact.”
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`Trial Court Order, 8/6/19.
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`Three weeks later, Mr. Dugan filed a notice of appeal from the partial
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`denial of summary judgment. The trial court, sua sponte, wrote a letter to
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`this Court expressing its opinion that Mr. Dugan’s appeal was premature. This
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`Court then issued a rule to show cause why we should not quash. In response,
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`Mr. Dugan explains that the grant of partial, summary judgment “finally and
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`conclusively determined a key issue.” Mr. Dugan’s 9/9/19 Letter (emphasis
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`added).
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`Generally, an order disposing of only an issue at summary judgment
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`does not constitute a final, appealable order. See, e.g., Swift v. Milner, 442
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`A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 1982); Rohr v. Keystone Insurance Co., 439 A.2d
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`809 (Pa. Super. 1982). A final, appealable order is “any order that disposes
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`J-A12040-20
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`of all claims and of all parties; or is entered as a final order . . . .” Pa.R.A.P.
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`341 (emphasis added). Given Mr. Dugan’s admission that the order granting
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`partial, summary judgment only determined “a” key issue, it is not a final,
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`appealable order.
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`In fact, he immediately appealed as a precaution, because he knew of
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`a case where we had entertained an appeal from an order granting partial,
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`summary judgment — specifically, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Urban
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`Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, 603 A.2d 618 (Pa.
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`Super. 1992), affirmed, 683 A.2d 972 (Pa. 1994). In Resolution Trust, we
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`declined an appellee’s request to quash, because the partial denial of summary
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`judgment determined “finally that fraudulent misrepresentations made by the
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`[plaintiff] may not be asserted as a defense in this action to impose liability
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`on the insurer pursuant to its contract.” Id. at 620. In other words, the trial
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`court’s order put an affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation out
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`of court. The order was therefore final as to that affirmative defense.
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`Here, by contrast, the trial court did not put an affirmative defense out
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`of court. It merely granted judgment as a matter of law to the Bickels on half
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`of their first count. Hence, Resolution Trust does not apply; the general rule
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`requiring complete finality to appeal does. Finality is lacking.
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`Appeal quashed.
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`J-A12040-20
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`Judgment Entered.
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`Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
`Prothonotary
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`Date: 6/12/2020
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