Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 1 of 15
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`CIVIL ACTION
`
`NO. 07-2498
`
`:
`
`::
`
`:
`:
`:
`:
`
`VERRON FIELDS,
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`JOHN SCHAFFER, et al.,
`Defendants
`
`M E M O R A N D U M
`
`STENGEL, J.
`
` October 6, 2008
`
`This is a pro se copyright case. The plaintiff, Verron Fields, alleges that the
`
`Defendants (John Schaffer, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PA DOC), Kay
`1
`
`Monigold, and Friendship Cable of Texas, Inc. (FCT)) have violated 17 U.S.C.A. §§
`2
`
`111(d), 119(b) (West 2008). These statutes requires certain cable systems and satellite
`3
`
`1
` Schaffer is the Executive Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. (Pl.’s Am.
`Compl. at 2).
`
`2
`
`3
`
` Monigold was the Vice President of Friendship Cable of Texas, Inc. (Id.).
`
` Section 111(d) provides, in pertinent part:
`
`Statutory License for Secondary Transmissions by Cable Systems. -
`(1) A cable system whose secondary transmissions have been subject to statutory licensing
`under subsection (c) shall . . . deposit with the Register of Copyrights . . .
`
`(A) a statement of account . . . specifying the number of channels on
`which the cable system made secondary transmissions to its subscribers,
`the names and locations of all primary transmitters whose transmissions
`were further transmitted by the cable system, the total number of
`subscribers, the gross amounts paid to the cable system for the basic
`service of providing secondary transmissions of primary broadcast
`transmitters, and such other data . . . . Such statement shall also include a
`special statement of account covering any nonnetwork television
`programming that was carried by the cable system in whole or in part . .
`. .
`
`(B) [A] total royalty fee for the period covered by the statement [as
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 2 of 15
`
`carriers to submit a statement of account and royalty fees to the Register of Copyrights.
`
`Fields alleges that these parties have failed to comply with these requirements.
`
`Schaffer and the PA DOC have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
`
`P. 12(b). Schaffer argues that Fields lacks standing and that the complaint fails to state a
`
`claim upon which relief can be granted; PA DOC, lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
`
`After reviewing the motions, responses, and pleadings, I will grant both motions and
`
`dismiss the complaint.
`
`I. Background
`
`Fields is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford,
`
`PA. After several attempts, Fields was finally able to file his complaint properly on
`
`November 16, 2007. Even before his complaint was filed, however, Fields submitted
`
`various motions for a preliminary injunction (August 7, 2007); clarification (August 29,
`
`computed under the subsection] . . . .
`
`§ 111(d) (emphasis added).
`
`Section 119(b) provides, in pertinent part:
`
`(1) Deposits with the Register of Copyrights. - A satellite carrier whose secondary
`transmissions are subject to statutory licensing under subsection (a) shall . . . deposit with the
`Register of Copyrights . . .
`
`(A) a statement of account . . . specifying the names and locations of all
`superstations and network stations whose signals were retransmitted . . .
`to subscribers[,] . . . the total number of subscribers that received such
`retransmissions, and such other data as . . . prescribe[d] by regulation; and
`
`(B) a royalty fee for that . . . period [as computed under the subsection]
`
`§ 119(b) (emphasis added).
`
`-2-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 3 of 15
`
`2007); and to search the record (October 10, 2007). All were denied. (Documents #8,
`4
`
`12, 15). The complaint was finally filed on November 16, 2007. The summons and
`5
`
`complaint were served on Schaffer and the PA DOC on February 22, 2008. The answers
`
`were due on March 13, 2008. No replies were received.
`
`The complaint alleges that Monigold and Schaffer, in their official capacities, had
`
`entered into a cable service contract for the PA DOC. (Pl.’s Amen. Compl. at 2). To
`
`receive cable service, the inmates must sign a subscription agreement authorizing the PA
`
`DOC to deduct a set amount from their accounts monthly. (Id.). As a result of this
`
`agreement between the FTC and the PA DOC, the complaint alleges that Monigold is
`
`operating as a “satellite carrier,” subjecting her to the requirements of section 119. (Id. at
`
`3). Under this section, Monigold would be required to provide statements of account,
`
`special statements of account, and royalty fees to the Register of Copyrights. Similarly,
`
`Schaffer is alleged to be operating as a “distributor and Cable System [sic].” (Id.). Under
`
`section 111, Schaffer would be required to provide substantially the same material. The
`
`complaint alleges that the defendants have not complied, but it does not provide any
`
`specific facts beyond general conclusions.6
`
`4
` Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his preliminary injunction motion. The case was dismissed for “failure
`to timely prosecute . . . .” (Document #21).
`
`5
` The docket report indicates that the court’s order denying the motion for clarification directed the plaintiff
`to file a complaint within ten days of the order. (Document #12). The amended complaint, however, was not filed
`until a month later.
`
`6
`
` I note that neither section provides Fields a private right of action. This is discussed in greater detail.
`
`-3-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 4 of 15
`
`Anticipating a challenge to his standing, Fields alleges that his liberty and property
`
`interests are at risk to collateral attack because he “[has been] made an accessory,
`
`accomplice and coconspirator in The Defendants [sic] criminal enterprise.” (Id. at 2).
`
`He cites 18 U.S.C. § 371:
`
`If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
`against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
`agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
`more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
`conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.
`
`Because Fields signed the cable subscription agreement with the PA DOC allegedly
`
`“[k]nowing, or highly suspecting The Defendants [sic] [were] not in compliance” with
`
`sections 111(d) and 119(b), he now believes his liberty and property interests are now at
`
`risk to collateral attack. (Pl.’s Amen. Compl. at 2).
`
`The complaint seeks $7,252,420 in monetary relief, “[a]n order for the Department
`
`of Justice to launch a full and formal investigation,” costs, and any appropriate punitive
`
`damages. (Id. at 4-5). A January 17, 2008, damages amendment increased the sought
`
`monetary relief to $21,757,260. (Document #16). On May 6, 2008, Fields filed an
`
`affidavit requesting that a default judgment be entered against Schaffer and the PA DOC
`
`for $10,786,140. (Document #19). On July 7, 2008, Fields motioned the court to order
`
`the clerk to enter the May 6 default judgment.
`
`On August 20, 2008, replies were finally filed. Schaffer’s motion argues that
`
`Fields has no standing to bring this suit because he has “no stake in the outcome” and that
`
`-4-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 5 of 15
`
`Fields’ alleged injury cannot be redressed. Schaffer also argues that Fields has failed to
`7
`
`state a claim upon which relief may be granted because any failure by the FCT to comply
`
`with federal law is not his responsibility and not attributable to him. The PA DOC filed a
`
`12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state
`
`agency. Fields has responded to both motions.
`
`II. Standard of review
`
`A. Standing
`
`Standing is a fundamental justiciability principle determining “whether the litigant
`
`is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”
`
`Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). It combines constitutional and prudential
`
`limitations on the exercise of judicial power. Id. The “irreducible constitutional
`
`minimum of standing” has three elements:
`
`First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” - an invasion of a
`legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
`“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must
`
`7
` It is not entirely clear as to which Rule 12(b) subsection Schaffer relies on for his standing argument. It
`seemingly exists independent of his subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) argument. Because the Third Circuit has recognized
`that standing is a jurisdictional requirement, see, e.g., Society Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168,
`175 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the challenge to plaintiffs’ standing was brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)), I will
`consider Schaffer’s standing argument as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
`It is worth noting that while this Circuit has expressed concerns about the potential prejudice to a plaintiff
`resulting from a court’s sua sponte “conversion” of a 12(b)(1) motion to a 12(b)(6) motion, they are not applicable
`here. See, e.g., Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-10 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that due to the
`lower threshold requirements for withstanding a 12(b)(1) motion as compared to a 12(b)(6) motion, “transforming a
`12(b)(1) motion into a 12(b)(6) motion would ‘deprive [] the plaintiffs of the procedural safeguards to which they
`were entitled.’” (quoting Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980)). Moreover, Fields was fully aware of
`the standing challenge.
`
`-5-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 6 of 15
`
`be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the
`injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
`defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
`party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely
`“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
`
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
`
`B. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
`
`Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for “lack of
`
`jurisdiction over the subject matter” of a case. The plaintiff has the burden of
`
`establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Imp. Ass'n,
`
`227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549
`
`F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any
`
`case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
`
`A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may present either a facial or a factual challenge to subject
`
`matter jurisdiction. “A challenge to a complaint for failure to allege subject matter
`
`jurisdiction is known as a ‘facial’ challenge, and must not be confused with a ‘factual’
`
`challenge contending that the court in fact lacks subject matter jurisdiction, no matter
`
`what the complaint alleges . . . .” N.E. Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp.,
`
`239 F.3d 333, 341 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
`
`C. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
`
`Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d
`
`-6-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 7 of 15
`
`1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987). The court may grant a motion to dismiss only where "it
`
`appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
`
`his claim that would entitle him to relief." Carino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir.
`
`2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The court must construe
`
`the complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all
`
`reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. See also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County
`
`Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984). In considering a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion,
`
`we do not inquire whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, only whether they are
`
`entitled to offer evidence to support their claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
`
`(1974).
`
`A plaintiff, however, must plead specific factual allegations. Neither "bald
`
`assertions" nor "vague and conclusory allegations" are accepted as true. See Morse v.
`
`Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pa.
`
`Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, a
`
`court is required to construe the complaint liberally and hold it to a less stringent standard
`
`because it is not drafted by an attorney. Lindsay v. Dunleavy, 177 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401
`
`(E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), Haines v. Kerner, 404
`
`U.S. 519, 521 (1972)).
`
`-7-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 8 of 15
`
`III. Discussion
`
`A. Schaffer’s motion to dismiss
`
`i. Fields’ standing
`
`I will grant Schaffer’s motion to dismiss on both grounds: lack of subject matter
`
`jurisdiction, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Turning
`
`first to the standing argument, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence
`
`of an injury (actual or imminent), causation, and redressability. Fields has failed to
`
`demonstrate a legally cognizable, redressable injury, and thus, has no standing.
`
`Fields has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered a legally cognizable,
`
`redressable injury. His claims are based on copyright statutes, but he does not claim to
`
`hold any copyrights to the broadcasted material. He was not entitled to receive any
`
`royalty fees. As a result, he has no stake in the outcome of this litigation because he has
`
`suffered no injury. It makes no difference to Fields whether the defendants had complied
`
`with 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d) and 119(b).
`
`To counter the standing objection, Fields alleges that he has suffered or will suffer
`
`from imminent injury because he has been made part of a conspiracy. This argument
`
`fails. “To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the government
`
`out of property or money, but also means to interfere with or obstruct the government by
`
`deceit, craft, trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.” United States v. McKee,
`
`-8-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 9 of 15
`
`506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S.
`
`182 (1924)). The existence of such an agreement can be drawn from circumstantial
`
`evidence and need not necessarily be proven by an express agreement. See United States
`
`v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that a written or spoken
`
`agreement among alleged co-conspirators is unnecessary; rather, indirect evidence of ‘[a]
`
`mere tacit understanding will suffice.’” (quoting United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136,
`
`1142 (7th Cir. 1984))).
`
`Even accepting all of the complaint’s allegations as true and drawing all
`
`reasonable inferences in Fields’ favor, I find that he has failed to show the existence of
`
`any agreement, explicit or tacit, between himself and any other entity to conspire against
`
`the United States. He points to the subscription agreement, but states no facts that could
`8
`
`reasonably support the inference that the contract was any sort of agreement to commit a
`
`conspiracy. (Pl.’s Amen. Compl. at 2). He has failed to show the existence of any intent
`
`of any defendant to violate federal law. Certainly, no facts are alleged to suggest the
`
`inference that Schaffer had any intent to violate the law. While the pleadings are to be
`
`liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, the dearth of any meaningful evidence tending
`
`to show a conspiracy is hard to ignore. Without a conspiracy, there would be no supposed
`
`injury. Without the injury, Fields has no standing to bring his suit.
`
`Assuming Fields has suffered an actual injury, he still lacks standing because there
`
`8
`
` I assume without deciding that this alleged injury is sufficient for standing purposes.
`
`-9-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 10 of 15
`
`is no remedy that will redress it. Fields has requested monetary relief, costs, and a
`
`judicial order directing the Department of Justice to launch an investigation. As
`
`Schaffer’s supporting memorandum indicates, “[e]ven assuming that FCT has in fact not
`
`paid the fees as alleged and it is a crime, the crime has already been committed. Any
`
`relief that this Court could provide will not benefit him.” (Def.’s Mem. at 3 (Document
`
`#24)). Indeed, it is unclear how any of the requested relief would redress this alleged
`
`injury.
`
`ii. Fields has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
`
`I also find that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
`
`granted. First, it does not identify an appropriate statute creating a private right of action
`
`under these facts. Second, Fields has failed to follow the proper procedures for filing a
`
`qui tam action, which may be the only way his claim can be properly considered.
`
`Fields has not identified what private right of action (if any) under Title 17 allows
`
`him to bring this suit. The only apparent right of action under section 111(d) is for
`
`“person[s] claiming to be entitled to statutory license fees for secondary transmissions . . .
`
`.” § 111(d)(4)(A). Fields does not claim to be entitled to any statutory license fees.
`9
`
`Similarly, section 119(b) provides a claim procedure for “those copyright owners whose
`
`works were included in a secondary transmission made by a satellite carrier . . . .” §
`
`9
` These would be the statutorily defined set of “copyright owners who claim that their works were the
`subject of secondary transmissions by cable systems during the relevant . . . period.” 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(3).
`
`-10-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 11 of 15
`
`119(b). As Fields does not claim to be a copyright owner entitled to any such fees, these
`
`sections provide no basis for his suit.
`
`Additionally, no other section of Title 17 providing a private right of action
`
`encompasses this action. See, e.g., § 501 (providing a right of action for any copyright
`
`owner whose exclusive rights have been infringed), § 502 (granting courts the power to
`
`order injunctive relief “to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright”), § 503
`
`(granting courts the power to impound, destroy, or other reasonable disposition of alleged
`
`infringing items), § 504 (establishing monetary liability and the appropriate calculation of
`
`such damages), § 505 (granting the court discretion to allow for the recovery of costs and
`
`attorney’s fees), § 506 (creating criminal liability for willful copyright infringement).
`
`While these are only a portion of the statutes setting forth copyright-based actions, it is
`
`clear that Fields’ claim is not based on any such statutes providing relief in this case.
`
`While Files may have intended to file a qui tam action,
`
`10
`
` he did not follow the
`
`proper procedures for filing his claim.
`
`11
`
` “A person . . . bring[ing] a civil action for a
`
`violation of section 3729 [the False Claims Act]” must provide “[a] copy of the complaint
`
`and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person
`
`10
` Although it alludes to being one, the complaint never labels itself as a qui tam action. The question is
`seemingly decided by the May 6, 2008, damages amendment, which specifically refers to the complaint as a qui tam
`complaint.
`
`11
` My October 3, 2007, memorandum and order denying Field’s motion for clarification briefly addressed
`his assertion that he was a qui tam relator. (Document #12). I clearly explained why he could not be considered the
`government’s representative at that time and provided a brief summary of the procedures he would have to follow.
`
`-11-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 12 of 15
`
`possesses” upon the government. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(a)-(b); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)
`
`(describing the procedure for serving the United States). When a prospective relator
`
`following this procedure, the injury to the government (if any does exist) devolves upon
`
`him, providing a cure for any potential standing issues. See Vermont Agency of Natural
`
`Resources v. United States ex rel Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (“[T]he assignee of a
`
`claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. The [False Claims
`
`Act] can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s
`
`damages claim.”). Nothing in Fields’ pleadings or memoranda indicate that he followed
`
`the procedures described above. Consequently, he shares in no injury to the government
`
`nor can he claim to be acting on its behalf.
`
`Fields has suffered no injury from any alleged failure on Schaffer's part to comply
`
`with any cited statute. Fields' only claim of personal injury is built on conclusory
`
`statements regarding an alleged agreement to defraud the government, let alone any intent
`
`to defraud. Fields has alleged no statutory section providing him a private right of action,
`
`nor does one appear to exist under these facts. His failure to properly serve the
`
`government forecloses the argument that he is acting as a qui tam representative. For the
`
`foregoing reasons, I will grant Schaffer’s motion.
`
`B. The PA DOC’s 12(b)(1) motion
`
`The PA DOC has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
`
`motion specifically raises an Eleventh Amendment defense of immunity to federal court
`
`-12-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 13 of 15
`
`suits by private parties. (PA DOC mem. at 2). It correctly states that Pennsylvania has
`
`expressly withheld its consent to be sued in federal court, and that “[n]o [federal] statute
`
`relied upon by plaintiff in bringing this suit expressly abrogates the Eleventh
`
`Amendment.” (Id. at 2-3).
`
`Although the PA DOC did not bring Fields’ standing into question in its motion, it
`
`can be granted on that basis alone; there is no need to analyze the Eleventh Amendment
`
`issue. Courts must “raise issues of standing sua sponte if such issues exist.” Addiction
`
`Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
`
`Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001)). As discussed above, Fields
`
`lacks standing to bring this suit.
`
`The standing analysis as to the PA DOC is the same as that for Schaffer. Fields
`
`has only made blanket allegations that the PA DOC is violating federal law.
`
`12
`
` He does
`
`not state any facts supporting an inference that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury
`
`due to the PA DOC’s actions. He has not identified any proper statute creating a private
`
`right of action for these facts. As there is no sufficient injury-in-fact or any appropriate
`
`redress, I will grant the motion.13
`
`12
` Fields’ complaint is not clear as to which statute the PA DOC is violating. (Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 2). His
`response to the PA DOC’s motion to dismiss is not illuminating either. (Pl.’s Resp. (Document #25)).
`
`13
` I note that neither Monigold nor FTC has responded to the Complaint. This failure to file
`notwithstanding, I will dismiss the claims against them because the problems with Fields' standing remain
`unresolved.
`
`-13-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 14 of 15
`
`C. Fields’ request for default judgment
`
`Fields has made several requests to have default judgment entered against the
`
`defendants for failure to reply. “The decision whether to grant default judgment is left to
`
`the sound discretion of the district court.” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Spring Mountain
`
`Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2008). The court must
`
`consider at least three factors in making its decision: (1) prejudice to the plaintiff if
`
`default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3)
`
`whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct. Id. (quoting Chamberlain v.
`
`Giampapa, 210 F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted)).
`
`In light of Fields' lack of standing to pursue this claim, I need not engage in the
`
`factor analysis and will dismiss the request for default judgment.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`For the foregoing reasons, I will grant both motions and dismiss the request for
`
`default judgment and the complaint.
`
`14
`
` An appropriate Order follows.
`
`14
` I am aware that Fields is a pro se plaintiff, but his allegations have been entertained twice; he already has
`had an opportunity to amend his complaint to make it jurisdictionally sufficient. Additionally, while Fields is quick
`to point out that Schaffer and the PA DOC’s motions were untimely, he glosses over his own failure to file his
`amended complaint in a timely fashion. (Compare Document #12 with Document #14 (showing that Fields’
`amended complaint was received more than one month after my order directing that it be filed within ten days of the
`order)).
`
`-14-
`
`

`
`Case 2:07-cv-02498-LS Document 27 Filed 10/06/08 Page 15 of 15
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`CIVIL ACTION
`
`NO. 07-2498
`
`:
`
`::
`
`:
`:
`:
`:
`
`O R D E R
`
`VERRON FIELDS,
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`JOHN SCHAFFER, et al.,
`Defendants
`
`STENGEL, J.
`
`AND NOW, this 6th day of October, 2008, upon consideration of the Pennsylvania
`
`Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss (Document #23), John Schaffer's Motion to
`
`Dismiss (Document # 24), and the Plaintiff's pleadings, it is hereby ORDERED that the motions
`
`are GRANTED. Any and all claims pending between the parties in the above-captioned case are
`
`DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Courts is directed to mark this case CLOSED for all
`
`purposes.
`
`BY THE COURT:
`
`/s/ Lawrence F. Stengel
`LAWRENCE F. STENGEL, J.