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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`____________________________________________________________
`
`))
`
`))
`
`))
`
`)
`HTC AMERICA, INC., a
`Washington corporation, HTC )
`CORPORATION, a Taiwanese
`)
`corporation,
`)
`)
`Markman Hearing
`)
`March 5, 2021
` ) 9:00 a.m.
`____________________________________________________________
`
` Defendants.
`
`VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
`BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`____________________________________________________________
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
`
`MARC LORELLI
`Brooks Kushman PC
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`mlorelli@brookskushman.com
`
`DUNCAN MANVILLE
`Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP
`1425 Fourth Avenue, Suite 800
`Seattle, WA 98101-2272
`dmanville@sbwllp.com
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
` vs.
`
`No. 2:16-cv-01919-RAJ
`
`Seattle, WA
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`HTC v. Ancora
`IPR2021-00570
`HTC Exhibit 1020
`
`

`

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`FOR THE DEFENDANTS: BRIAN CLAASSEN
` IRFAN A. LATEEF
` DANIEL KIANG
` COLIN BARRY HEIDEMAN
`Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear
`2040 Main Street, 14th Floor
`Irvine, CA 92614
`2bcc@knobbe.com
` irfan.lateef@knobbe.com
` 2dck@knobbe.com
`2cbh@knobbe.com
`
`Andrea Ramirez, CRR, RPR
`Official Court Reporter
`United States District Court
`Western District of Washington
`700 Stewart Street, Suite 17205
`Seattle, WA 98101
`andrea_ramirez@wawd.uscourts.gov
`(206)370-8509
`
`Reported by stenotype, transcribed by computer
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`THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Ericksen. Please call
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`the case.
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`THE CLERK: Good morning, Your Honor. We are here in
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`the matter of Ancora Technologies, Inc. vs. HTC America, Inc.,
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`et al., Cause Number C16-1919, assigned to this Court.
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`If counsel, first for the plaintiff, could make your
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`appearance for the record.
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`MR. LORELLI: Good morning. Mark Lorelli, from
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`Brooks Kushman, on behalf of plaintiff Ancora Technologies,
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`Inc.
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`THE COURT: Good morning.
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`THE CLERK: And counsel for defendants, please.
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`MR. LATEEF: Good morning, Your Honor. Irfan Lateef,
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`of Knobbe Martens, for defendants, and with me is my partner,
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`Brian Claassen.
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`THE COURT: Good morning.
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`THE CLERK: Your Honor, we're also joined by our
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`court reporter, Andrea Ramirez, today.
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`THE COURT: Good morning. We are here for the
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`Markman hearing. And, Counsel, the Court has set aside the
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`next two hours. And we will take a break, after the first
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`hour, to accommodate the needs for convenience breaks and so
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`that we stay attentive. I know it's difficult to stay in these
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`Zoom proceedings and the longevity that some of them have been
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`taking. But, nonetheless, you'll have full opportunity to be
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`

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`able to present your case. The Court's understanding is that
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`you've agreed on some claim construction, but that you have
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`disputes regarding six, and that you'll be addressing those six
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`this morning.
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`Now, one of the things I want to make sure that you
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`address during your presentation to the Court is, we have two
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`different courts, two different judges, who have already made
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`claim construction determinations in two different cases. And
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`I hope that you can point to the distinctions and differences
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`as to why this Court shouldn't follow those claim
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`constructions, because that would be most beneficial to the
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`Court. It's not my practice just to choose the easiest pathway
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`and say what did some other judge do, but this Court also looks
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`to precedent to see if there's value in what has already been
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`previously decided by another court. It's also the Court's
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`understanding that a significant amount of work went into those
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`decisions by those two judges, so I don't take that lightly, as
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`well.
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`I'll give you a heads-up that there appears to be, of the
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`six disputed claims, two areas of significant dispute. So you
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`may wish to spend, and I expect that you will be spending, your
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`time on those two areas. And that would begin with the one of
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`using an agent to set up a verification structure in the
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`erasable, nonvolatile memory area of the BIOS. And the second
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`one that appears to be hotly contested between the two parties
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`

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`is a license authentication bureau, which does not have prior
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`input from the two noted judges.
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`Now, regarding the using an agent, et cetera, issue, I'll
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`note that HTC filed two notices of supplemental authority. And
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`I'm not going to read those into the record, because the
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`parties should have the benefit of those, and I want to
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`maximize the time that you have; and, again, addressing similar
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`or same type issues. So it would be helpful, in your
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`presentations, to address those cases.
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`I will interrupt, if I need to interrupt, to ask a
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`question of clarification, but I also prefer to give you the
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`opportunity to be able to free-flow in your presentation. It
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`looks as though each of you have PowerPoint presentations that
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`you wish to use for purposes of your statements to the Court.
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`It would have been my earlier preference, before I saw those,
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`to go claim by claim, so that we can finish a claim and then go
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`to the next one, with both sides. But if it's easier to make
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`your presentation by taking the ball and running with it, the
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`Court has no objection to that as well.
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`Again, the time will be split evenly, as soon as I stop
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`speaking this morning, and my in-court deputy will be keeping
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`the time. And, again, we've set aside two hours. And it may
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`go past one 11:00, 11:00 Pacific time, so don't worry about
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`that. But I need to keep a balance of opportunity for both
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`sides to present their case.
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`

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`I don't necessarily require opening statement. I think
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`you need to dedicate your time to going after the claim
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`construction. If you believe it's appropriate to give a
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`general overview, that's fine as well. I've spent quite a bit
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`of time reviewing what you've previously submitted. So if it's
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`a question of just reading your briefs or cross-referencing
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`what's in your brief, you need to hit the power points, the
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`power punches, and go from there. That's most beneficial for
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`the Court. And I've identified for you already the two areas
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`where I think you need to spend most of your time.
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`So with that, counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Lorelli,
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`you'll be going first.
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`MR. LORELLI: Thank you, Your Honor. And I
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`appreciate the guidance as we lead into this hearing.
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`Would it be preferential for the Court if I shared the
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`PowerPoint?
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`THE COURT: Absolutely.
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`MR. LORELLI: Okay. I believe you should be able to
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`see that.
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`THE COURT: We can, Counsel.
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`MR. LORELLI: Thank you.
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`And good morning, Your Honor, and welcome to everybody
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`here.
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`As Your Honor noted, this is a patent that has a long
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`history. It's actually been construed by three courts, the
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`

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`Northern District of California, prior to the HTC case, and the
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`Western District of Texas, and the Central District of
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`California, subsequent to the briefing in this case.
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`I'd like to just start with a very quick overview of the
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`patent. It is a very straightforward patent, one patent and
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`just a few claims that are at issue here. Most of the terms,
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`as Your Honor noted, have been construed by other courts, and
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`all of those appear in Claim 1 of the '941 patent. The
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`un-construed term, "license authentication bureau," is the lone
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`term that is not in Claim 1 and that is in Claim 2.
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`The '941 patent was filed in 1998. Claims priority to a
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`foreign case. And it was invented by two individuals, Miki
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`Mullor and Julian Valiko. And both of them had kind of a
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`unique background. Mr. Mullor worked in software. Mr. Valiko
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`worked in hardware. And they came together on a solution that
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`was fairly straightforward and was quite sophisticated in
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`its -- at its time.
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`Now, really what the patent is all about is a way to --
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`which -- a way in which unauthorized software can be identified
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`and certain actions can be taken. There was ways in the prior
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`art of doing this. There was hardware ways. There was
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`software ways. The '941 patent has -- teaches a better way.
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`And that better way has already been reviewed by the Federal
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`Circuit a couple of times, and I'd like to -- here's some of
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`the -- Slide 7, some of the hardware-based solutions; Slide 8,
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`

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`some of the prior art software-based solutions. But the '941
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`patent had a better way, and its better way is its interaction
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`with BIOS.
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`The Federal Circuit has taken this case up twice already,
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`once after claim construction from the Northern District of
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`California. And it addressed several terms in Claim 1. And
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`when the Federal Circuit talked about it in that appeal --
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`that's the Ancora vs. Apple case, from the Federal Circuit --
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`it talked about how the applicants explained their invention;
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`how it differed from the prior art, in that it operated as an
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`application running through an operating system and used the
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`BIOS level for data and storage. It was a combination that had
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`not been previously taught.
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`This patent went up to the Federal Circuit a second time,
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`in this case, the HTC case. And, again, the Federal Circuit
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`talked about how the claimed invention was an improvement over
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`the prior art. It talked about how BIOS memory was used for
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`verification in that it interacts with distinct computer memory
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`to perform this software verification function. That was in
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`the case that was appealed from this court, Ancora Technologies
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`vs. HTC America. And the citation is on Slide 11.
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`But as Your Honor noted, as we get into this case, we have
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`three comprehensive claim construction decisions, all which
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`construe numerous terms, all in Claim 1 of the '941 patent.
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`The only term that has not been addressed previously by a court
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`

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`is the "license authentication bureau," which is in Claim 2 of
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`the patent. And we'll spend some time with that. But the
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`three orders -- and, again, as Your Honor noted, some of them
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`are quite extensive. Some of them have multiple orders. And,
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`in fact, some of the recent submissions by HTC, our case law,
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`has already been addressed by the Western District of Texas in
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`supplemental briefing, and the claim construction order has not
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`been amended.
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`So with that, I'd like to turn to the construed terms of
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`Claim 1. Specifically, we have five terms. And they're listed
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`here, on Slide 14, "license," "BIOS," "using an agent" -- which
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`Your Honor indicated would like to have some attention placed
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`to that -- "license record," "acting on the program"; and then
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`Claim 2 term, "license authentication bureau."
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`If we start with "license," it's in the claim twice but
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`only once with regard to "license" by itself. So that's what
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`we're going to address first, "license," by itself.
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`Here's the dispute, Your Honor. Ancora believes it's --
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`the preamble is non-limiting, and HTC proposes a construction
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`for it. This issue was addressed specifically by Judge
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`Albright, in the Western District of Texas, same briefing, same
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`law. Judge Albright came to the conclusion that the Court
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`finds the portion of the preamble to be non-limiting. Then he
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`has an extensive discussion, over Pages 11 to 14 of his order,
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`which is filed in this case as Docket Number 65-1.
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`

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`Keeping with the judge's direction, I'd like to move
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`quickly through this term, but just make one point; that the
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`preamble in this case is nearly identical to the preamble in
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`the TomTom Federal Circuit case, similar language and should be
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`similar result. The TomTom case is -- the important portion of
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`it is noted on Slide 19.
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`We then turn to the term "BIOS." "BIOS" is also in
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`Claim 1. "BIOS" has been construed several times. It appears
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`twice in Claim 1, in the body of the claim, where it talks
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`about the erasable, nonvolatile memory of the BIOS; and then
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`later on, the erasable, nonvolatile memory of the BIOS.
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`The dispute is multifaceted, but the parties generally
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`agree that "BIOS" is an acronym for the basic input/output
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`system, which is a set of essential start-up operations. And
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`then HTC layers a bunch of additional limitations on the term
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`"BIOS," which I'll address very quickly.
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`But before I do that, I would like to address the three
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`times that this term has been construed already. The first
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`time was in the Northern District of California, Judge Rogers.
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`And this was the case before it went up to appeal at the
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`Federal Circuit. And Judge Rogers' construction is the same
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`construction that we propose for "BIOS." And here it is,
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`highlighted from that order from the Northern District of
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`California, on Slide 23. And in that decision, Judge Rogers
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`explained what "BIOS" is, and that it's software code. And no
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`

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`Ancora v. HTC, 3/5/21
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`one can really dispute that.
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`The second time "BIOS" was construed was in the face of
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`very similar, if not identical, arguments from HTC. And that
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`was in the Western District of Texas. The Western District of
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`Texas construed the term, said it did not require construction,
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`and, in fact, didn't write further on that because of at least
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`that Court's belief that the dispute was not that significant.
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`The third time that BIOS was construed was by the Central
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`District of California, Judge Wu. And it's important to note
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`that here, it's not just "BIOS" that was construed. It was
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`"memory of the BIOS." And the parties had a dispute. It's
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`pretty close to the exact same dispute, again, that's here.
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`And Judge Wu, from the Central District of California,
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`explained that he construed the term "memory of the BIOS," in
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`accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, to mean a
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`memory that stores the BIOS. That's on Slide 27.
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`THE COURT: And, Counsel, it's itself a memory? Is
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`that what you're arguing?
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`MR. LORELLI: BIOS is not a memory, Your Honor.
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`"Memory of the BIOS" is a memory. But just "BIOS," itself, is
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`not a memory.
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`THE COURT: Okay.
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`MR. LORELLI: And that's the first dispute that I'd
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`like to turn to, Your Honor, is, they want to say "BIOS" is a
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`memory. The claim says "memory of the BIOS." The BIOS itself
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`is not a memory. In fact, this was made exceptionally clear in
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`the intrinsic record.
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`On Slide 29 is a snippet from the prosecution history
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`where the examiner, during a reexamination brought by
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`Microsoft, explained that BIOS is not a memory. It is a set of
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`essential software routines that test hardware at start-up. So
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`it's pretty hard to say that BIOS is a memory when the claim
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`says otherwise, and the intrinsic record says otherwise, and
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`several courts have already said otherwise.
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`In fact, the Federal Circuit is another court that has
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`said otherwise. It talks about the specification of the '941
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`patent and said that it discloses using memory space associated
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`with the BIOS. Well, if BIOS was memory, that sentence by the
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`Federal Circuit wouldn't make any sense.
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`Now, after we get past their position that BIOS is a
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`memory, they add a bunch of additional limitations into their
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`proposed constructions. And those limitations come from the
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`prosecution history. Judge Wu, in the Central District of
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`California, went through those statements in great detail and
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`also went through the law in great detail, in that in order to
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`limit your invention in the prosecution history, such
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`limitation must be clear and unmistakable. And context
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`matters. You can't just pick and choose statements without
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`understanding where they come from, which is what I believe HTC
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`does here.
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`

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`And particularly important here is, the prosecution
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`disclaimer doesn't apply when an applicant is talking about the
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`prior art and how your invention, you know, is an improvement
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`over the prior art. So that's exactly what happened here.
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`What HTC doesn't show in its briefing is some of the
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`statements that are made in the context around the quotes that
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`are snipped, things like, "The present invention proceeds
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`against conventional wisdom in the art." So what it's talking
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`about -- you know, the existing BIOS is talking about what BIOS
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`is and how we use it differently, how we proceed against
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`conventional wisdom. That's on Slide 33 of our slide show.
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`But these -- the two limitations that they want to import from
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`the prosecution history into the claim is that "BIOS" is not
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`recognized by the OS as a storage device, and it doesn't have a
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`file system. Well, the claims themselves basically also show
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`that such a construction would be wrong. The claim itself
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`talks about using an agent to set up the verification
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`structure. Well, the agent is from the operating system that
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`uses the memory of the BIOS as a storage device. That's what
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`the claim says. And then the claim says it puts in a
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`verification structure, which is a file. It's a storage
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`concept. And their attempts to argue prosecution disclaimer
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`run contrary to the claims, which is exactly what Judge Wu
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`found in his extended decision in the Central District of
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`California a few months ago.
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`

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`I'm going to move to the next term, which is the "using an
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`agent" term, which Your Honor wanted the parties to pay
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`particular attention to.
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`The term "using an agent to set up a verification
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`structure in the erasable, nonvolatile memory of the BIOS" is a
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`term that HTC has disputed. It's a term that was not disputed
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`before Judge Wu. It was not a term that was disputed before
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`Judge Rogers. It was a term that was disputed before Judge
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`Albright, in the Western District of Texas.
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`The dispute is identical to the dispute before Judge
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`Albright. Judge Albright concluded that the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of "agent" should apply, which is a software program.
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`And importantly -- excuse me -- he issued a detailed order,
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`spanning nine pages, addressing this term and concluded that
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`the plain and ordinary meaning of "agent" should be applied,
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`which is a software program or routine.
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`It's important here to know that the claim does not use
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`the word "means." And when the claim does not use the word
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`"means," there's a presumption invoking this 112, Paragraph 6
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`should not happen. And the first thing that you must keep in
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`mind is that whether there's a reasonably well-understood
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`meaning in the art for the term that's used. And here, there
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`is. "Agent" is well understood as a program. It's in the
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`technical dictionaries repeatedly. It's in the prosecution
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`history repeatedly. The examiner equates the agent to the
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`

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`program. It is in the spec, where the spec talks about how the
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`agent is E2PROM manipulation commands. It's in the prosecution
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`history, again, which is shown in our Slide 49, Docket
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`Number 59-3, which is the prosecution history, where it talked
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`about writing to E-PROMs, through software, with no additional
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`hardware requirement.
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`I turn to the next slide, and it's really an encapsulation
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`of what I wanted to argue today, because this is maybe a little
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`bit where HTC and Samsung and LG differ. HTC's expert in this
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`case submitted a declaration to the patent office that said
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`"agent" can mean anything. It can mean hardware, software, or
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`a combination of both. And in LG and in Samsung, they had an
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`expert that said the exact same thing.
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`Why this case is different is that HTC's expert changed
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`his testimony from what he said before the patent office to
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`what he said before this Court. Before this Court, he said
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`"agent" is known as a software program. It's a known term; and
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`that it does not include hardware or a combination of hardware
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`and software. It's a known term. It's understood as a
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`software program or routine. That is a significant admission,
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`Your Honor, and makes this term very easy to deal with, much
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`easier than it was dealt with by Judge Albright, in Texas.
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`THE COURT: Counsel, if I could get you to back up
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`just a second.
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`Could you go back and explain exactly "verification
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`structure"? And more generally, can you give the Court a quick
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`summary of how the key license record and verification
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`structure work together?
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`MR. LORELLI: I believe, Your Honor, the
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`"verification structure" was an agreed term in this case. And
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`let me just look to make sure I have it correct.
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`THE COURT: The "verification" was agreed. It was
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`agreed, Counsel.
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`MR. LORELLI: Okay. Yes. It was agreed as a data
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`structure. So, basically, it's a location. It's a location
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`where data will be stored. And the license record is that data
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`that goes into that location in the memory area of the BIOS.
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`So the verification structure is kind of where something is
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`stored. License record is what is stored.
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`THE COURT: Okay.
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`MR. LORELLI: And, actually, that leads us into the
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`next slides, Your Honor, so thank you very much for that
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`question.
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`But before I do get to that, I wanted to just reiterate,
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`all the cases, including the supplemental cases that HTC
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`provided to you, they always talk about a nonce word for
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`"means," which means -- no pun intended -- it could mean
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`anything. The cases that they cite to, Your Honor, talk about
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`the term "module." And oftentimes, there's an agreement where
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`all the experts agree that it's a generic description for
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`

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`software, or hardware, or a combination thereof.
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`The three cases that HTC submitted to Your Honor recently,
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`Egenera -- I believe I'm pronouncing that right -- there was an
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`agreement that the term referred to software, firmware,
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`circuitry, or any combination thereof; again, a nonce word for
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`meaning anything. In Rain Computing, it was a user
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`identification module, which the parties agreed had no common,
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`understood meaning. The next case was Synchronoss vs. Dropbox,
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`user interface module; again, a nonce word that had no meaning
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`in the art. "Agent" is not such a word. "Agent" is known as a
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`program, in the art.
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`And I think what's most telling, Your Honor, is, when you
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`go through HTC's brief, they keep on saying "agent" is a nonce
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`word for "software." Well, it's a nonce word for "software."
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`It's not a nonce word for "means." They have to paint that
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`argument, because their expert changed his testimony, and why I
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`believe that this case, particularly in HTC, is easily
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`distinguishable.
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`I'd like Your Honor to pay particular attention, though,
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`to the ZeroClick case. We spent a lot of time on ZeroClick, in
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`our brief, because I think it's very important.
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`ZeroClick held that "program" and "code" are not nonce
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`words for "means." "Agent," "program" is not a nonce word for
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`"means." And particularly important in ZeroClick is, those
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`words work for a placeholder to mean anything, but it was a
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`

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`reference to a conventional program or code. And really that's
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`what we have here is a conventional program or code. In fact,
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`HTC's expert told the patent office that E-PROM manipulation
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`commands, as set forth in the specification, are conventional
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`software. They're conventional -- it's a conventional item.
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`THE COURT: Does "software" itself have sufficient
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`structure?
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`MR. LORELLI: Your Honor, it does in this instance,
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`and that's our next slide.
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`THE COURT: Okay.
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`MR. LORELLI: Because the claim talks about setting
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`up a verification structure, or storing a verification
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`structure. The claim itself talks about: What is stored?
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`That's a verification structure -- I'm sorry. The slide is
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`incorrect, Slide 53. The "what" and "where" should be
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`reversed. Where it's stored, which is the verification
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`structure. Where it is stored is in the nonvolatile memory
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`area of the BIOS. And then, of course, the license record is
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`the data.
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`The algorithm here, if you think about what is being
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`performed, what is being claimed, storing data, it's: Tell me
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`what's stored. Tell me where it's stored. Tell me how you
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`store it. I don't know of any algorithm that could be required
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`to be any more detailed than that. And so the claim and the
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`specification answer all those questions, and they answer it in
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`

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`great detail. And as Your Honor will see from the cases, when
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`the specification discloses exactly what somebody would need to
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`do in order to perform the function, there's no reason to even
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`consider 112, Paragraph 6.
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`But the specification here actually goes a little bit
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`further, Your Honor. And this is kind of what came up at the
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`Federal Circuit argument and the decision in the HTC case.
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`It's why. Not only did the applicant describe storage, where
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`it's stored, what is stored, how it's stored, the specification
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`also tells -- includes why that's important. And it talks
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`about that that adds a level of security over prior art,
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`anti -- unauthorized software usage solutions. It's why the
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`invention was explained to the -- as by the Federal Circuit.
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`It's why you do something. So not only do we have the
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`algorithm, we have the explanation as to why one skilled in the
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`art would want to do it.
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`As far as algorithms go, though, in addition to the one
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`that's in the claim and that portion of the spec, there's
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`examples in the prosecution history about the agent being a DMI
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`specification, or a driver. It's basically that it can be a
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`conventional activity. That's in -- on Slide 54. It's our
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`Docket Number 59-3. And then there's other portions of the
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`spec, too, that talk about other step-wise processes. And
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`they're noted on Slide 55.
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`I'd like to just spend a moment on the reference at
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`

`

`Ancora v. HTC, 3/5/21
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`Column 6, 18 to 28. The reason why that's important is
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`because, in the Samsung LG case before Judge Albright, Samsung
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`LG said: Well, there's the algorithm. They admitted that
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`there's an algorithm there. HTC doesn't go that far. But the
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`point is, is that the specification talks about setting up the
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`verification structure. And, really, all it's doing is talking
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`about that storage. It's talking about how you're going to
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`store the license record, or the key in the license record
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`location, in the verification structure.
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`I'm turning to the next term, which is "license record,"
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`but I thought I'd give Your Honor a second on "agent," as I
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`know that was one of the areas that you did have some questions
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`or --
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`THE COURT: That was helpful, Counsel. Thank you.
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`MR. LORELLI: Thank you.
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`The next term is "license record." Again, "license
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`record" is one of those terms that has been construed a number
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`of different times. The dispute here is, HTC wants to
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`incorporate the term "another entity" into the construction.
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`License record, again, has been construed three times. The
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`Northern District of California construed it, not -- without
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`any such added limitation, as HTC proposes here. Judge
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`Albright, in the Western District of Texas, construed it;
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`again, without the added limitation that HTC proposes here.
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`The -- there's the order. "License record is data associated
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`

`

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`with a licensed program with information for verifying that
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`licensed program." No discussion of another entity. Judge Wu,
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`in the Central District of California, similarly construed
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`license record. "A record from a licensed program with
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`information for verifying that licensed program."
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`There's no discussion anywhere, in the spec or otherwise,
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`of another entity. In fact, it doesn't make a lot of sense in
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`this case. In fact, when you look through the prosecution
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`history, at Docket 59-2, it talks about how the software
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`program verifies its authenticity using a license for the
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`verification structure. It never talks about another entity.
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`And that's important. Basically, what I think HTC is trying to
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`do is to require two entities in order to infringe this patent.
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`And I think that that attempt has been rejected by multiple
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`courts, or at least by multiple other defendants that wouldn't
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`put forward such a position.
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`THE COURT: Counsel, I don't think you've addressed
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`how Judge Rogers handled this, in your analysis. And I think
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`hers was different.
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`MR. LORELLI: Judge Rogers addressed the analysis
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`about -- she talked about for verifying a licensed program.
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`That was the focus. It wasn't about who verified it. It's
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`just what it was for. And that's what she was focused on. She
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`did not address "another entity." Neither did the other two
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`judges, because none of the other defendants have ever asked
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`

`

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`for "another entity" language to be placed into the claims,
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`because there's no support in the specification, no support in
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`the prosecution history.
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`I'd like to turn to the last clause in Claim 1, "acting on
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`the program according to the verification." We propose plain
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`and ordinary meaning. HTC proposes a very limiting
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`construction, where allowing use if it's licensed and
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`restricting operation if not licensed.
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`And our main objection here, Your Honor, is that it's
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`contrary to the specification, their detailed construction.
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`Judge Albright, in the Samsung LG case, addressed very similar
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`arguments. He concluded that the plain and ordinary meaning
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`should be applied, and that it may include many things, but
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`it's not limited to those many things. But one I'd like to
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`note here, "restricting operation with predetermined
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`limitations," that's probably included in HTC's construction.
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`"Informing the user of the unlicensed status," that's something
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`that would be excluded from HTC's construction but is included
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`by Judge Albright's. Or this last one, "asking for additional
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`user interactions," again, something that's included in Judge
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`Albright's construction and excluded in HTC's.
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`Let me tell you why HTC's is wrong, is because, if you go
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`to the specification, those examples that Judge Albright
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`expressly stated must be included in the construction are from
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`the specification, and it's error to construe a claim such that
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`

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`it doesn't include the breadth of the specification. Here,
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`on -- Column 6 talks about "restricting includes warning the
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`license applicant or user." Warning. It doesn't mean halting
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`operation. "Placing a fine." Again, doesn't mean halting
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`operation. There'

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