`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 9
`Date: February 19, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SUPERCELL OY,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`GREE, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before LYNNE H. BROWNE, HYUN J. JUNG, and
`RICHARD H. MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`JUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`A. Background and Summary
`Supercell Oy (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”)
`requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–11 of U.S. Patent
`No. 9,079,107 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’107 patent”). GREE, Inc. (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”). With our
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (Paper 7, “Reply”), and Patent
`Owner filed a Sur-Reply to Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response (Paper 8, “Sur-reply”).
`After considering the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record, we
`exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny inter partes review.
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner identifies only Supercell Oy as a real party in interest.
`Pet. 2. Patent Owner identifies only GREE, Inc. as a real party in interest.
`Paper 4, 2.
`C. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’107 patent has been asserted in GREE,
`Inc. v. Supercell Oy, 2:19-cv-00311 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 2; Paper 4, 3. The
`parties also indicate that a related patent is at issue in IPR2020-001628.
`Pet. 2; Paper 4, 2.
`D. The ’107 patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’107 patent issued on July 14, 2015 from an application filed on
`March 5, 2014 that, in turn, claims priority to foreign applications, the
`earliest of which was filed on March 12, 2013. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (30),
`(45), 1:8–11.
`According to the ’107 patent, it addresses reduced motivation for low
`level players when playing a social game with guilds or groups of players
`that may be of higher level. See id. at 1:22–24, 1:56–59, 2:14–15, 2:17–22.
`In one embodiment, while the game is being played, certain game pieces
`appear based on the level of the user. See id. at 21:32–38, 23:50–53. When
`players in a guild collect all the required game pieces, a reward is given. See
`id. at 23:62–64. Thus, the appearance of some of the required game pieces
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`to only users of a particular level encourages players to form a guild with
`high level and low level players. See id. at 23:50–57.
`E. Illustrative Claim
`The ’107 patent includes claims 1–11, all of which Petitioner
`challenges. Of those, claims 1, 9, and 10 are independent, and claim 1 is
`reproduced below.
`A game control method carried out by a game
`1.
`control device for providing a game to a plurality of
`communication terminals respectively used by a plurality of
`users, the game control device communicating with the plurality
`of communication terminals and having a storage unit, the
`method comprising the steps of:
`(a) storing skill level information indicative of skill levels
`of each of the plurality of users of the game, in the storage unit;
`(b) grouping the plurality of users into one or more
`groups;
`(c) providing one or more of a plurality of game pieces to
`a first plurality of users in a first group of said one or more
`groups, based on the skill level information, while the first
`plurality of users are at certain events in the game;
`(d) storing allocation information indicating which game
`piece has been provided to which user with a respective skill
`level, and a number and type of game pieces required to obtain
`a game item as a reward, in the storage unit;
`(e) determining whether all of the game pieces required
`to obtain said game item have been provided to the first group,
`based on the allocation information stored in the storage unit;
`and
`
`(f) allocating in a memory, the game item to the first
`group or at least one of the first plurality of users, when it is
`determined that all the required game pieces have been
`provided.
`Ex. 1001, 24:65–25:24.
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`F. Asserted Prior Art and Proffered Testimonial Evidence
`Petitioner identifies the following references as prior art in the
`asserted grounds of unpatentability:
`Exhibit
`Name
`Reference
`1007
`Thompson
`US 7,824,253 B2, issued Nov. 2, 2010
`1006
`Schulhof
`US 8,376,838 B2, issued Feb. 19, 2013
`1004
`Englman
`US 2011/0300926 A1, published Dec. 8, 2011
`1005
`Ronen
`US 2013/0190094 A1, published July 25, 2013
`Pet. 3; see also id. at 4 (arguing that the effective filing date is no earlier
`than March 12, 2013). Petitioner also provides a Declaration of Emmet J.
`Whitehead, Jr., Ph.D. (Ex. 1003).
`G. Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–11 would have been unpatentable on
`the following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–7, 9–11
`8
`
`References/Basis
`Englman, Ronen, Schulhof
`Englman, Ronen, Schulhof,
`Thompson
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`103(a)1
`103(a)
`
`
`
`II. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`Patent Owner argues that “the Board should exercise its discretion
`under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny the Petition because Petitioner raises
`substantially the same prior art and arguments in a parallel district court
`proceeding filed more than one year ago and scheduled for trial in
`approximately two months (March 1, 2021).” Prelim. Resp. 1.
`
`
`1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”),
`Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), took effect on March 16,
`2013. Because the ’107 patent claims priority to an application filed before
`that date, our citations to 35 U.S.C. § 103 are to its pre-AIA version.
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`A. Legal Standards
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) states that
`[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be
`instituted unless the Director determines that the information
`presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response
`filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
`The language of § 314(a) expressly provides the Director with
`discretion to deny institution of a post-grant review. See Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision
`to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”);
`Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019 (“TPG”) at 55 (available
`at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated).
`In exercising the Director’s discretion under § 314(a), the Board may
`consider “events in other proceedings related to the same patent, either at the
`Office, in district court, or the ITC.” TPG at 58. NHK Spring explains that
`the Board may consider the advanced state of a related district court
`proceeding, among other considerations, as a “factor that weighs in favor of
`denying the Petition under § 314(a).” NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs.,
`Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential).
`Additionally, the Board’s precedential order in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5‒6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“the
`Fintiv Order”) identifies several factors for analyzing issues related to the
`Director’s discretion to deny institution, with the goal of balancing
`efficiency, fairness, and patent quality.
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`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`B. Applying the Fintiv Factors
`1. Whether the Court Granted a Stay or Evidence Exists that one
`may be Granted if a Proceeding is Instituted
`Petitioner argues that it “has not yet sought a stay but will do so
`should the IPR be instituted.” Pet. 65; see also Reply 3 (stating that “though
`no stay has yet been sought, Petitioner stipulates it will seek a stay in the
`parallel litigation should the IPR be instituted”) (replying to Prelim. Resp.
`7).
`
`Patent Owner responds that “Petitioner has not filed any motion to
`stay the parallel district court proceeding” and “there is little evidence here
`to suggest that the district court will grant a stay.” Prelim. Resp. 7. Patent
`Owner argues that a stay is “extremely unlikely” because stays are denied
`before institution and an institution decision is “not due until after the jury
`trial in the parallel district court proceeding.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 2013, 1).
`Patent Owner further replies that Petitioner’s stipulation “is not sufficient
`evidence that a stay will, in fact, be granted upon institution.” Sur-reply 1
`(citing Prelim. Resp. 7–9; Reply 3).
`Because the district court has not yet granted a stay and the record
`does not include any evidence that a stay, if requested, would be granted, we
`determine that the facts underlying this factor are neutral.
`2. Proximity of the Court’s Trial Date to the Board’s Projected
`Statutory Deadline for a Final Written Decision
`Petitioner argues that “[w]hile the trial date is currently scheduled to
`occur before the statutory deadline for the [final written decision], this factor
`should be afforded little weight, as the date is very likely to change.”
`Pet. 65. Petitioner also argues that trial dates reset when review is instituted
`and significantly slip after institution has been denied. Id. at 65–66 (citing
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`Ex. 1014, 2; Ex. 1015, 3); see also Reply 3–4 (arguing similarly) (citing
`Ex. 1014, 2; Ex. 1015, 3).
`Patent Owner responds that a “jury trial in the parallel district court
`proceeding is set to begin on March 1, 2021” and thus, “scheduled to
`conclude more than twelve months before a final written decision would be
`due in this proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner lists several
`proceedings where the Board has denied institution based on a smaller gap
`between trial date and due date for a final written decision. Id. at 9–10.
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner does not present any evidence that
`trial will not proceed as currently scheduled, the trial date should be taken at
`“face value,” and both fact discovery and expert discovery have closed. Id.
`at 12–14 (citing Ex. 2002, 1; Ex. 2012, 3; Ex. 2013, 4). Patent Owner
`further argues that, “even if trial is ultimately delayed by a few months, it
`will still likely conclude well before a final written decision would be due in
`this proceeding, if the Board were to institute.” Id. at 15; see also Sur-reply
`2 (presenting similar argument).
`Petitioner replies the district court has postponed all in-person trials
`through February 2021 and the “pause is likely to have a downstream impact
`on the court’s schedule and delay the trial schedule in the parallel litigation.”
`Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1016, 1; Ex. 1017, 1). Patent Owner replies that the
`Board has previously rejected arguments that a trial date is uncertain based
`on articles and the district court did “not modify, let alone, continue the jury
`trial in the parallel proceeding, which is still scheduled for March 1, 2021.”
`Sur-reply 1–2 (citing Prelim. Resp. 12 n.3; Reply 4).
`The present record shows that, if review were instituted in this
`proceeding, a final written decision would be due twelve months after the
`currently scheduled trial date in the parallel district court proceeding.
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`IPR2020-01633
`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`Ex. 2013, 1 (Eighth Amended Docket Control Order in the parallel district
`court case setting jury selection for March 1, 2021). Given the considerable
`overlap in claims, prior art, and arguments as described below, institution
`would create a potential for the district court proceeding and the review to
`arrive at inconsistent results spaced approximately one year apart.
`As for possible trial date adjustments due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
`the record shows all in-person trials have been postponed through February
`2021. Ex. 1016, 1 (Order continuing all in-person jury trials). The record
`also shows that the trial date for the parallel district court proceeding is still
`scheduled for March 2021. Ex. 2013, 1. Even if we accepted that the pause
`in all in-person trials from December 2020 through February 2021 would
`delay the related district court proceeding, we agree with Patent Owner that
`the trial would still finish many months before the due date for a final
`written decision in this proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. 15; Sur-reply 2.
`Thus, we determine that this factor weighs in favor of denying
`institution.
`3. Investment in the Parallel Proceeding by the Court and the
`Parties
`Petitioner argues that “[t]he district court proceeding . . . is only in its
`initial stages, and the court has not made any substantial investments in the
`merits of the invalidity positions.” Pet. 66. Patent Owner responds that the
`district court has issued its order on claim construction and, by the time
`institution is considered, will have completed, at least, fact discovery, expert
`discovery, briefing on dispositive and Daubert motions and pretrial
`conference. Prelim. Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2001, 1; Ex. 2002; Ex. 2012;
`Ex. 2013, 1–4). Patent Owner, thus, argues that the parallel district court
`proceeding is at an advanced stage and that the district court and parties will
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`Patent 9,079,107 B2
`have invested substantial resources by the time institution is decided. Id. at
`19.
`
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner did not file its Petition until
`twelve months after the parallel district court proceeding was initiated and
`contends, with citations to other Board decisions, that the unexplained delay
`weighs in favor of denying institution. Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing
`Ex. 2004). Patent Owner further argues that the delay shows Petitioner must
`be using this proceeding “as a second-bite at the apple” to relitigate validity
`in a different venue, not as an alternative to district court litigation. Id. at 20.
`Patent Owner notes that Petitioner served the same grounds and asserted the
`same references in the same way more than five months before filing its
`Petition in this proceeding. Id. (citing Exs. 2005–2007).
`Petitioner replies that, because of difficulties during fact discovery,
`“the district court entered a revised schedule extending many of the
`deadlines by several weeks” and “has yet to substantively address [the
`challenged claims’] validity.” Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1018). Petitioner also
`argues that “[b]y the time the Board decides whether to institute, it will have
`already invested significant resources into considering the validity of the
`’107 patent.” Id. Petitioner further replies that “the timing of the filing
`enabled the Petition to take into account GREE’s amended infringement
`contentions and the court’s tentative claim constructions in the parallel
`litigation, which resulted in a more focused and thorough petition” and
`Patent Owner does not identify any unfair costs due to the timing of the
`filing of the Petition. Id. at 4–5 (citing Ex. 1019, Ex. 1020).
`Patent Owner replies that Petitioner cannot dispute the substantial
`resources expended in the parallel district court proceeding. Sur-reply 3
`(citing Prelim. Resp. 16–19). Patent Owner also argues that the due dates
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`that were extended have passed and “[f]orcing Patent Owner to re-litigate
`Petitioner’s same invalidity challenges . . . in this forum necessarily imposes
`unfair costs to Patent Owner.” Id. (citing Reply 4).
`In the parallel district court proceeding, a Claim Construction
`Memorandum Opinion and Order has been issued and by this time, the
`parties have, inter alia, completed expert discovery, filed dispositive
`motions and motions to strike expert testimony, served pretrial disclosures,
`and attended a pretrial conference. Ex. 2011; Ex. 2013, 1–4. The district
`court and the parties have made substantial investments in the parallel
`proceeding. The parties still have to expend significant resources to conduct
`the trial itself, as well as potential post-trial proceedings.
`Based on the record, weighing the investments thus far made and yet
`to be made, we determine that substantial investments have been made in the
`parallel proceeding, and thus, this factor weighs in favor of denying
`institution.
`4. Overlap Between Issues Raised in the Petition and in the Parallel
`Proceeding
`Petitioner argues that the Petition asserts a combination of references
`that includes a reference not raised in the parallel district court litigation,
`raises a ground not before the district court, and brings forth significant
`issues related to the claims that would be unaddressed if institution is denied.
`Pet. 66.2 Petitioner, thus, argues there are no significant concerns regarding
`duplicative efforts or potentially conflicting outcomes. Id.
`
`
`2 Petitioner also argues that the “patent ineligibility standard” at the Office
`“is different” from the standard for jury trials. Pet. 66. However, because
`patent ineligibility has not and cannot be asserted in the present Petition, we
`do not need to address this argument.
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`Patent Owner responds that “[t]here is substantial overlap between the
`claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence presented in the Petition and what
`has been, and continues to be, litigated in the parallel district court
`proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 21; see also Sur-reply 3 (arguing similarly).
`According to Patent Owner, Petitioner asserts the same prior art against the
`same claims with substantially the same arguments in the district court
`proceeding; Petitioner challenges one additional dependent claim in this
`proceeding that would not preclude finding substantial overlap; and any
`additionally cited prior art is immaterial to this factor. Prelim. Resp. 22–26
`(citing Pet. 1, 3, 20–28, 30–57; Ex. 2005, 1, 3, 8–9, 12; Ex. 2006; Ex. 2007;
`Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 221–228, 283–292, 404–471). Patent Owner argues the
`inclusion of another reference (Schulhof) that is not asserted in the district
`court proceeding does not differentiate meaningfully the arguments in this
`proceeding from the arguments in district court. Id. at 28–30 (citing Pet. 34–
`37, 47–51, 66; Ex. 2005, 8–9; Ex. 2006; Ex. 2007; Ex. 2008).
`Petitioner replies that the Board has declined to exercise discretion
`when a reference asserted in the Petition is not at issue in the related
`litigation. Reply 1 (citing, inter alia, Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology LLC,
`IPR2020-00820, Paper 15 at 15 (PTAB Oct. 21, 2020) (precedential)).
`Petitioner contends that Patent Owner minimizes a crucial distinction
`between this proceeding and the parallel district court litigation because
`Schulhof is cited for teaching the purported solution of the ’107 patent. Id.
`at 1–2 (citing Pet. 25–27, 36–37, 47–51, 56–60; Prelim. Resp. 29).
`Petitioner also argues that including Schulhof and Thompson in this
`proceeding obviates concerns of duplicative efforts and potentially
`conflicting decisions and denying institution would leave claim 8
`unaddressed. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner further “stipulates that, should IPR be
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`instituted, Petitioner will not pursue the same grounds in the litigation.” Id.
`at 3.
`
`Patent Owner replies that “[t]his factor expressly does not require
`complete duplication of grounds and evidence.” Sur-reply 3 (citing Prelim.
`Resp. 29–30). Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s challenges are
`substantially similar to those in district court. Id. at 3–4 (citing Prelim.
`Resp. 28–30; Reply 1–2). Patent Owner also argues that, in Snap, the
`district court proceeding was stayed, and that “Petitioner’s stipulation is
`meaningless, as the parties will likely have completed a jury trial by the
`time this Board decides whether to institute a trial” and does not extend to
`any ground raised or that could have reasonably been raised in this
`proceeding. Id. at 4–5 (citing Prelim. Resp. 17; Reply 2–3).
`The record shows that the same statutory grounds, substantially the
`same arguments, and substantially the same prior art evidence are at issue
`with respect to claims 1–7 and 9–11. “[I]f the petition includes the same or
`substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as
`presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial” because
`“concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions [are]
`particularly strong.” Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 12. We agree with Patent
`Owner that Petitioner’s stipulation does not address effectively concerns
`about duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions because the
`stipulation may have no effect until the parties complete nearly all work on
`these issues in the parallel proceeding, including a potential jury trial. Sur-
`reply 4–5.
`On this record, we determine that this factor slightly weighs in favor
`of denying institution.
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`5. Whether Petitioner and the Defendant in the Parallel Proceeding
`are the Same Party
`Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner and Patent Owner are the
`defendant and plaintiff, respectively, in the parallel district court
`proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Pet. 2; Exs. 2001–2005, 2012, 2013).
`Petitioner replies that “[t]he ‘same party’ factor should be given little
`weight, as the petitioner-defendant is the party most motivated to challenge
`the patent.” Reply 5. Patent Owner replies that this argument has been
`rejected as inconsistent with Fintiv. Sur-reply 5.
`The record shows that Petitioner and defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of denying
`institution.
`6. Other Circumstances that Impact the Board’s Exercise of
`Discretion, Including the Merits
`Regarding the merits, Petitioner challenges claims 1–7 and 9–11 as
`unpatentable over Englman, Ronen, and Schulhof with citations to the
`asserted references and declarant testimony. Pet. 29–60. Petitioner relies on
`Thompson to teach the limitations of claim 8. Id. at 60–61. Petitioner also
`asserts a rationale for combining these references. Id. at 62–64.
`Based on the present record, Petitioner adequately makes an initial
`showing that these references teach or suggest the limitations of the
`challenged claims and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
`combined the asserted references. The record indicates sufficient argument
`and evidence for instituting trial, but the merits do not appear
`overwhelmingly strong on this preliminary record.
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`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s reason for combining the
`references is insufficient. Prelim. Resp. 36–44. The dispute would be best
`decided on a full record, not the preliminary record before us.
`For at least the foregoing reasons, based on the incomplete record
`before us, an initial review of the merits of Petitioner’s two grounds suggests
`that the merits are neither weak nor strong. Thus, we determine that this
`factor is neutral.
`7. Holistic Analysis of Fintiv Order Factors
`We undertake a holistic analysis of the Fintiv Order factors,
`considering “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served
`by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 6. As discussed
`above, factors 1 and 6 are neutral, but factors 2–5 weigh toward denying
`institution.
`The evidence in the record indicates that duplication of efforts and
`potential for inconsistent results exist, because both the district court and the
`Board would consider substantially identical issues and the district court will
`reach trial many months before we would reach a final decision. We
`determine that the facts underlying factors 2–5 collectively outweigh the
`facts underlying factors 1 and 6. Accordingly, we determine that the
`circumstances presented weigh in favor of denying institution under
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`Based on our application of the precedential Fintiv Order factors to
`the record before us, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`and deny institution of inter partes review.
`
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`IV. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims, and
`no trial is instituted.
`
`FOR PETITIONER:
`Rajiv P. Patel
`Brian Hoffman
`Jennifer R. Bush
`Kevin X. McGann
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`RPatel-ptab@fenwick.com
`
`
`FOR PATENT OWNER:
`John C. Alemanni
`Andrew Rinehart
`Joshua H. Lee
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
`jalemanni@kilpatricktownsend.com
`arinehart@ kilpatricktownsend.com
`jlee@ kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Scott A. McKeown
`ROPES & GRAY
`Scott.McKeown@ropesgray.com
`
`15
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