Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 6049
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00553-JRG
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 1 of 38
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1005
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 2 of 38 PageID #: 6050
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`
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`THE ‘908 PATENT .............................................................................................................1
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`“KEYFACT” (ALL CLAIMS) .............................................................................................2
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`A.
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`B.
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`As a Coined Term, “Keyfact” Must be Defined by the Specification .....................2
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`The Specification’s Definition Of “Keyfact” As an “Important Fact”
`Renders the Term Indefinite ....................................................................................3
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`C.
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`Uniloc’s Construction Omits Key/Important from “Keyfact” .................................6
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`“KEYWORD” (CLAIM 6)....................................................................................................8
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`“EXTRACTING KEYWORDS WITHOUT PART-OF-SPEECH AMBIGUITY”
`(CLAIM 6) .........................................................................................................................12
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`V.
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`STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION TERMS ...................................................................................14
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`A.
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`B.
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`“KEYFACT EXTRACTING STEP FOR ANALYZING A DOCUMENT
`COLLECTION AND A USER QUERY, AND EXTRACTING KEYWORDS
`WITHOUT PART-OF-SPEECH AMBIGUITY FROM SAID DOCUMENT
`COLLECTION AND SAID USER QUERY, AND RESPECTIVELY
`EXTRACTING KEYFACTS OF SAID DOCUMENT COLLECTION AND
`SAID USER QUERY FROM SAID KEYWORDS” (CLAIM 6) .............................15
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`“KEYFACT INDEXING STEP FOR CALCULATING THE FREQUENCY
`OF SAID KEYFACTS OF SAID DOCUMENT COLLECTION AND
`GENERATING A KEYFACT LIST OF SAID DOCUMENT COLLECTION
`FOR A KEYFACT INDEX STRUCTURE” (CLAIM 6) .........................................19
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`C.
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`“KEY FACT RETRIEVING” ELEMENTS ..........................................................22
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`“Keyfact retrieving step for receiving said keyfact of said user
`query and said keyfacts of said document collection” (Claim 6) ..............22
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`“Keyfact retrieving step for . . . defining a keyfact retrieval model
`in consideration of weigh factors according to a keyfact pattern”
`(Claim 6) ....................................................................................................24
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`“Keyfact retrieving step for . . . generating a retrieval result”
`(Claim 6) ....................................................................................................26
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`VI.
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`ORDERING DISPUTES ...................................................................................................27
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`A.
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`B.
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`ORDER OF METHOD STEPS (CLAIM 6) ...........................................................27
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`ORDER OF METHOD STEPS (CLAIM 11) .........................................................29
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`i
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 3 of 38 PageID #: 6051
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Page
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`Agere Sys., Inc. v. Atmel Corp.,
`No. CIV.A. 02-864, 2003 WL 21652264 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2003) .................................. passim
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`Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`No. 17-509-TBD, 2018 WL 6304351 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2018) .................................................... 8
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`Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc.,
`262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................... 9
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006)............................................................................................... 7, 14
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`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................... 5
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`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009).......................................................................................... passim
`
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................. 3, 8
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`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................... 6
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`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................... 3, 4
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`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`564 F. App’x 599 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................. 6
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`Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG,
`745 F.3d 490 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................... 6
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`Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................. 11
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`Fran Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc.,
`744 F.3d 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................... 7, 14
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`Function Media, LLC v. Google, Inc.
`708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................. 29
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`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 2
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`Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp.,
`754 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 7
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`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`902 F.3d 1372 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 4
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`ii
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 4 of 38 PageID #: 6052
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`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................... 2, 3, 4, 5
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`Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,
`617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................... 2
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`Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
`933 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................... 2, 3
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`Masco Corp. v. United States,
`303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................. 14
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................. 19
`
`Mobile Telecommc’ns Techs., LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`Nos. 2:12-CV-832-JRG-RSP, 2;13-CV-258-JRG-RSP, 2:13-CV-259-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL
`10726788, (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2014) ........................................................................................... 6
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................. 18
`
`Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................... 9
`
`O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., Inc.,
`115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................. 15
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`O2 Micro Int’l v. Beyond Innovation Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................... 12, 14, 29
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................... 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................... 3, 7, 8
`
`Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const.,
`172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................. 14, 16, 17, 18
`
`Secure Web Conf. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`640 F. App’x 910 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................. 9
`
`Sinorgchem Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`511 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................... 8
`
`Skin Medica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc.,
`727 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 9
`
`Spreadsheet Automation Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 2:06-CV-127-DF, 2006 WL 6143063 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2006)....................................... 29
`
`TALtech Ltd. v. Esquel Apparel, Inc.,
`279 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 27, 28, 30
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`
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`iii
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 5 of 38 PageID #: 6053
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`
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`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................... 5
`
`United States v. Jackson,
`426 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 7
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`Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
`520 U.S. 17 (1997) ................................................................................................................ 7, 14
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................. 20
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 ........................................................................................................................ 2
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`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 ............................................................................................................... passim
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`Other Authorities
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`The Fact Extraction Using the Keyfact, 140 ................................................................................... 2
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`iv
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 6 of 38 PageID #: 6054
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`NOTE ON CITATIONS
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` References to Plaintiff Uniloc 2017 LLC’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. 128)
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`are indicated by the abbreviation “Br.,” followed by the page number being cited. “Br. at
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`5” therefore refers to page 5 of Plaintiff’s opening brief.
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` The patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 6,366,908, is attached as Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff Uniloc
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`2017 LLC’s Opening Claim Construction Brief. U.S. Patent No. 6,366,908 is referred to
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`as “the ’908 patent.”
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` References to the patent-in-suit are indicated by column and line number, or by claim
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`number. All references are to the specification of the ’908 patent unless otherwise stated.
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`A reference to “1:15-16” therefore means column 1, line 15 through line 16 of U.S.
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`Patent No. 6,366,908 (Dkt. 128-1).
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` References to The Fact Extraction Using the Keyfact (1996), authored by Mi-Seon Jun,
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`Se-Young Park, and Man-Soo Kim and excerpts of which are attached as Exhibit A of
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`this brief, are noted as Fact Extraction.
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` References to the Declaration of Jonathan Tse in Support of Defendant Google LLC’s
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`Responsive Claim Construction Brief are noted as Tse Decl.
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`v
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 7 of 38 PageID #: 6055
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`Google’s proposed constructions are consistent with the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
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`and comply with established patent law precedent. In contrast, Uniloc’s proposed constructions,
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`are divorced from context of the ’908 patent, going so far as to deviate from the patentee’s explicit
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`lexicography. Moreover, Uniloc purports to offer “plain and ordinary meaning” constructions
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`while arguing against that plain meaning in an effort to read out claim limitations. Google’s
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`constructions should be adopted.
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`I.
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`THE ’908 PATENT
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`The sole patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 6,366,908 (“’908 patent”), is entitled “Keyfact-
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`Based Text Retrieval System, Keyfact-Based Text Index Method, and Retrieval Method.” In the
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`Background of the Invention, the patentee described the shortcomings of prior art keyword-based
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`retrieval methods, including that because keywords are nouns in such methods, searches that share
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`the same nouns will produce the same results. ’908 patent at 1:20-38, 2:3-7. For example, the
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`specification states that a “keyword-based retrieval method doesn’t recognize the conceptual
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`difference between ‘the retrieval of the information’ and ‘the efficient retrieval of the
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`information,’” because retrieval results from both would be based on the nouns “retrieval” and
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`“information,” ignoring “efficient” because it is not a noun. Id. at 2:3-7. Thus, “users are not able
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`to retrieve the exact document that is desired.” Id.
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`While keywords are still used to extract keyfacts from the documents and a user query, the
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`proposed “new approach” of the ’908 patent uses “keyfacts,” rather than keywords, to index and
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`retrieve documents. Id. at 1:50-59, 2:10-13. The specification states that a keyfact “means an
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`important fact contained in sentences which constitute a document.” Id. at 1:15-16. The patent,
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`however, does not explain how to distinguish “important facts” from “unimportant facts.” The
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`specification recites a keyfact extraction process that uses morphological analysis, i.e., analysis of
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`the structure of words and parts of words, including parts of speech, and part-of-speech tagging to
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`1
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`assign part-of-speech to the words in a document and query. Id. at 4:40-46, 5:20-60. Words tagged
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`as nouns are used as “objects” in generating a list of keyfacts. Id.at 5:55-6:55. Keyfact indexing
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`calculates both the frequency of the extracted keyfacts in each document and the number of
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`documents containing the keyfact, then stores them within an index. Id. at 6:58-7:34. Keyfact
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`retrieval uses the computed keyfact index to retrieve documents by comparing the keyfacts within
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`the index to keyfacts in the incoming query. Id. at 7:35-8:34. The details of this claimed process
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`are discussed further below.
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`II.
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`“KEYFACT” (ALL CLAIMS)
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`Google
`Indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2)
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`Uniloc
`“fact contained in sentences”; not indefinite
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`A.
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`As a Coined Term, “Keyfact” Must be Defined by the Specification
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`There is no dispute that “keyfact” is a coined term. (Br. at 6 (“The ’908 patent explains
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`what a keyfact is . . . .”).)1 As a coined term “has no ordinary and customary meaning,” one must
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`look to the intrinsic evidence to determine the “objective boundaries to the scope of the term.”
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`Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 933 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing
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`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); Intervet Inc. v. Merial
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`Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]erms coined by the inventor are best understood
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`by reference to the specification.”). Here, the specification of the ’908 patent “clearly set forth a
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`definition of the disputed claim term” and “clearly express[ed] an intent to define the term.” GE
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`Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation
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`marks omitted). It explicitly states that “[a] keyfact means an important fact contained in sentences
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`which constitute a document.” ’908 patent, 1:15-16. If “the specification . . . reveal[s] a special
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`1 In a 1996 article, two of the named inventors acknowledged that they had “introduced an
`extended concept of a keyword, called keyfact.” The Fact Extraction Using the Keyfact, 140.
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`2
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 9 of 38 PageID #: 6057
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`definition given to a claim term by the patentee . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips
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`v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S.
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`Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he inventor’s written description of the
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`invention, of example, is relevant and controlling insofar as it provides clear lexicography . . . .”)
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`(emphasis added)).
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`B.
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`The Specification’s Definition Of “Keyfact” As an “Important Fact” Renders
`the Term Indefinite
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`“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
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`delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
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`skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
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`U.S. 898, 901 (2014). Terms of degree, like “important,” are indefinite unless the specification
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`provides “objective boundaries” for what does or does not fall within the scope of the
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`term. Iridescent Networks, 933 F.3d at 1353 (citing Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371 (Fed. Cir.
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`2014)). They cannot “depend solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular
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`individual purportedly practicing the invention.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417
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`F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`The Federal Circuit has found subjective terms of degree, including “important,” to be
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`indefinite based on the lack of sufficient guidance in the specification. For example, in Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit found the term of degree “QoS
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`requirements” to be “entirely subjective and user-defined” where the asserted patent “analogized
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`QoS to ‘a continuum, defined by what network performance characteristic is most important to a
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`particular user,” and therefore indefinite. 902 F.3d 1372, 1381 (emphasis added). Further, in
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`Interval Licensing, the Federal Circuit found the term of degree “unobtrusive manner” to be
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`indefinite, as it is subjective on its face and the specification failed to provide objective boundaries,
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`3
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 10 of 38 PageID #: 6058
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`“leaving the skilled artisan to ‘consult the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.’”
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`Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371-74 (citing Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350).
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`Here, the specification provides no disclosure for one of ordinary skill in the art to ascertain
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`what facts would be “important” or not “important.” Thus, just like as with the terms in Intellectual
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`Ventures and Interval Licensing, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be able to ascertain
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`the objective boundaries of an “important fact” as opposed to an “unimportant fact.” Instead, what
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`facts are “important” is entirely subjective and depends “on the unpredictable vagaries of any one
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`person’s opinion.” Intellectual Ventures I, 902 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350-
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`51). As the patentee’s definition of “keyfact” is indefinite, the term “keyfact” must be as well.
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`Uniloc does not dispute that “important” is a term of degree. Nor does Uniloc assert that
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`the specification provides guidance as to the scope of “important” such that a person of skill in the
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`art would understand the objective boundaries with reasonable certainty. Even the portions of the
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`specification of the ’908 patent that Uniloc briefly discusses, by Uniloc’s own words, do not
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`provide any such boundaries as to what is or is not an “important fact.” Uniloc says they disclose
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`how a keyfact can be “represented” or how it may be “used”: “The ’908 patent explains . . . how
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`[keyfact] can be represented (e.g., 1:16-17), how a keyfact can be extracted (e.g., 5:15-18), how it
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`can be used to retrieve documents (e.g., 5:7-14), and how it can be used to create an index (e.g.,
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`6:58-64).”2 (Br. at 6.) Uniloc does provide a further string cite to other portions of the specification
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`(id.), but does not discuss them at all. None provide any guidance as to what an “important” fact
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`2 Column 1, lines 16 to 17 explains that “keyfact is represented by an object and property
`information through syntactic analysis of the sentence” but does not explain what facts are
`“important” in a sentence. Column 5, lines 15 to 18 merely states that keyfacts are “generate[d] . .
`. through the processes of morphological analysis, part-of-speech tagging, keyfact pattern
`extraction, and keyfact generation.” Column 5, lines 7 to 14 describes the process for retrieving
`documents based on the query and also does not disclose which “important” facts are used for the
`retrieval process. And column 6, lines 58 to 64 only discusses indexing the keyfacts and provides
`no guidance as to what facts are “important.”
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`4
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 11 of 38 PageID #: 6059
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`is or how to distinguish “important facts” from facts that are not “important.” (See id.)
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`Rather than address the indefiniteness issues head on, Uniloc argues that Google has
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`“effectively waived” indefiniteness by not identifying expert testimony in its Patent Rule 4-2 and
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`4-3 disclosures. (Id.) This is a non-sequitur. Patent Rule 4-2 and 4-3 of course have disclosure
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`requirements in the event expert testimony is used, but provide no requirements that such
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`testimony be used. Uniloc really is arguing that proving indefiniteness requires extrinsic expert
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`evidence, but that is incorrect as a matter of law. “[G]eneral principles of claim construction apply”
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`to allegations of indefiniteness which is an issue of law. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
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`783 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335,
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`1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, the Federal Circuit has routinely found indefiniteness based on the
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`intrinsic evidence alone, with no extrinsic evidence provided by the defendant, and even in spite
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`of the submission of a patentee’s expert declaration. See, e.g., Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1370
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`n.6 (“We note that the district court’s indefiniteness determination rests only on intrinsic evidence,
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`and that there are no disputes about underlying questions of fact. Although the Defendants point
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`to the testimony of [patentee’s] expert in support of their argument that the ‘unobtrusive manner’
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`phrase [i.e., term of degree] is indefinite, . . . we find it unnecessary to rely on that testimony (or
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`any other extrinsic evidence) to reach our conclusion. Like the district court, we find the claims
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`indefinite based on the claims, the written description, and the prosecution history.”); Personalized
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`Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal
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`citation omitted) (“The expert testimony relied upon by the parties does not alter this conclusion.
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`Extrinsic evidence may not be relied upon during claim construction when the intrinsic evidence
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`unambiguously defines the disputed claim language. Accordingly, because the meaning of the term
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`‘digital detector’ is unambiguously set forth in the specification, the expert testimony on this issue
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`5
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`Case 2:18-cv-00553-JRG Document 134 Filed 01/23/20 Page 12 of 38 PageID #: 6060
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`is irrelevant to the issue of indefiniteness and cannot serve to inject ambiguity where none exists.”).
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`None of Uniloc’s cases hold otherwise. For example, Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
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`does not even concern claim construction. 390 F.3d 1361, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal
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`Circuit merely found that the patentee failed to meet its burden of proving infringement where the
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`art was complex by failing to offer its own expert testimony in response to the accused infringer’s
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`expert testimony negating infringement.3 Id. Uniloc’s other case, Mobile Telecommc’ns Techs.,
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`LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., concerned the sufficiency of disclosure of the proposed structure in a
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`means-plus-function claim, not at issue here, and faulted the accused infringer for not providing
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`any evidence as to what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand. Nos. 2:12-CV-832-
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`JRG-RSP, 2;13-CV-258-JRG-RSP, 2:13-CV-259-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL 10726788, at *29 (E.D.
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`Tex. May 2, 2014). MTel further relied on Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014) in support, whose judgment was vacated in Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F.
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`App’x 599, 599 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and where the Federal Circuit held that the presumption of patent
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`validity cannot be overcome where the district court “repeatedly asked for evidence of what [one
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`skilled in the art] would understand in this particular setting” and was given none. 745 F.3d at 505-
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`06. The Federal Circuit still took care to note “[w]e do not of course hold that expert testimony
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`will always be needed for every situation.” Id. at 506.
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`C.
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`Uniloc’s Construction Omits Key/Important from “Keyfact”
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`Uniloc identifies the same passage Google relies on to show that the patentee acted as its
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`own lexicographer, acknowledging that “the ’908 patent plainly states: ‘A keyfact means an
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`important fact contained in sentences which constitute a document.’ ’908 patent, 1:15-16.” (Br. at
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`6.) Uniloc’s proposed construction, however, removes the term “important” from the patentee’s
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`3 Even for infringement, the Court said, “[w]e do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is
`required to prove infringement when the art is complex.” Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1369.
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`own lexicography of “keyfact.” Uniloc claims this definition “hews closely to Uniloc’s proposed
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`construction” (id.), but provides no explanation in its brief as to why it has conspicuously dropped
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`“important” from this definition. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316; C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 862. During
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`the parties’ P.R. 4-2(c) meet and confer, Uniloc acknowledged that it had dropped “important”
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`from the patent’s definition to avoid indefiniteness, but could provide no support in the intrinsic
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`record (or otherwise) for doing so. (Tse Decl. ¶ 2.) It does not do so in this brief either. For this
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`reason alone, Uniloc’s proposed construction should be rejected as to this defined, coined term.4
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`Further, Uniloc’s removal of “important” effectively construes a “keyfact” as a “fact.” It is
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`axiomatic that “the claims cannot be of broader scope than the invention that is set forth in the
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`specification.” Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation and
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`quotation marks omitted). Yet, by removing “important” from the specification’s definition of
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`keyfact, the term would now capture any facts contained in sentences, regardless of their
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`importance, in direct contradiction to the specification’s definition of keyfact. Fran Nooren
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`Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[I]n patent
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`claims as elsewhere, the construction of a clause as a whole requires construction of the parts, with
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`meaning to be given to each part so as to avoid rendering any part superfluous”); Bicon, Inc. v.
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`Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“claims are interpreted with an eye toward
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`giving effect to all terms in the claim”); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
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`Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed
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`material to defining the scope of the patented invention.”). Uniloc provides no support for its
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`argument that “keyfact” can be any facts represented in a document or query. Thus, Uniloc’s
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`4 Having not provided an explanation for the omission of “important” in their opening brief,
`Uniloc should not be allowed to address this point for the first time in its Reply. See, e.g., United
`States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a
`reply brief . . . are waived.”)
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`attempt to expand the meaning of “keyfact” and render “key” meaningless should be rejected.
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`III.
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`“KEYWORD” (CLAIM 6)
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`Google
`“a noun used to retrieve documents”5
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`Uniloc
`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`The parties dispute whether the term “keyword” should be limited to nouns based on the
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`patentee’s own lexicography and the repeated and consistent use in the specification. Google’s
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`proposed construction is consistent with the patentee’s special definition as well as the remainder
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`of the specification. Uniloc provides no construction or support for its argument in specification.
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`Unlike the coined term “keyfact,” “keyword” was used in the art at the time of the
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`invention. For example, Uniloc cites a dictionary definition defining a keyword as “word used in
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`a text search” or “word in a text document that is used in an index to best describe the contents of
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`the document.” (Br. at 7, Ex. 2.) Albeit not being a coined term like “keyfact,” the patentee acted
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`as its own lexicographer for “keyword” too. In the Background of the Invention, the patentee
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`explained when discussing the use of keywords for document retrieval: “the meaning of the
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`document is not precisely represented and the representativeness of document expression is low
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`because the document is represented by keywords, which are nouns.” ’908 patent at 1:22-25
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`(emphasis added). At least one district court has found that the use of the term “are” “‘signif[ied]
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`that a patentee is serving as its own lexicographer.’” Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 17-509-
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`TBD, 2018 WL 6304351, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Sinorgchem Co. v. Int’l Trade
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`Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The patentee’s clear intent to set forth an
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`alternative definition that keywords are nouns is controlling. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316; C.R. Bard,
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`5 Google has revised its proposed construction to remove the “expressed with a query” language
`in order to streamline the primary dispute for resolution by the Court, i.e., whether the “keyword”
`is a noun. Uniloc’s issue with the “query” aspect of Google’s construction was expressed to Google
`for the first time in Uniloc’s opening brief. (Tse Decl. ¶ 3.) Google will work with Uniloc to submit
`a revised P.R. 4-3 statement pursuant to the Court’s standing orders and local rules.
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`388 F.3d at 862.
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`Moreover, even were the Court to find that the specification did not define that keywords
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`are nouns, “when a patentee uses a claim term throughout the entire patent specification in a
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`manner consistent with only a single meaning,” the Federal Circuit has found that such term has
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`been defined by implication. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262
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`F.3d 1258, 1271-73 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Skin Medica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187,
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`1202-04 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that the patentee “without express redefinition, disclaimed a
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`potential embodiment from the ordinary scope of a claim term through clear, repeated, and
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`consistent statements in the specificati