Filed on behalf of: Jaguar Land Rover Limited
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`Entered: July 24, 2020
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________________
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`BENTLEY MOTORS LIMITED
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`and
`BENTLEY MOTORS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________________
`Case IPR2019-01539
`Patent RE46828
`______________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE
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`Entered: July 24, 2020
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________________
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`BENTLEY MOTORS LIMITED
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`and
`BENTLEY MOTORS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________________
`Case IPR2019-01539
`Patent RE46828
`______________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`III.
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`I.
`II.
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`Page(s)
`Overview .......................................................................................................... 1
`Factor 1: There Is No Evidence The Court Will Stay If IPR Is
`Instituted .......................................................................................................... 2
`Factor 2: The Court’s Trial Date Is At Least Five Months Before a
`Final Written Decision ..................................................................................... 5
`IV. Factor 3: The Court And The Parties Are Heavily Invested In the
`Court Proceeding ............................................................................................. 6
`Factor 4: The Petition And The Court Case Substantially Overlap ................ 8
`V.
`VI. Factor 5: The Petitioner And The Defendant Are the Same Party .................. 9
`VII. Factor 6: Other Circumstances, Including the Merits, Warrant Denial .......... 9
`VIII. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 10
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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` Page(s)
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`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Mar. 20, 2020) .............................................. 2, 3, 8, 9
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 (May 13, 2020) ............................................... 2, 3, 5, 8
`Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.,
`IPR2020-00203, Paper 12 (July 6, 2020) ............................................................. 6
`
`Bentley Motors Ltd. v. Jaguar Land Rover Ltd.,
`IPR2019-01502, Paper 10 (Feb. 20, 2020) ..................................................... 5, 10
`Bentley Motors Ltd. v. Jaguar Land Rover Ltd.,
`IPR2019-01502, Paper 12 (Mar. 13, 2020) ........................................................ 10
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ........................................................................................ 10
`NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
`IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (Sept. 12, 2018) ............................................................ 9
`Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Grp-Trucking LLC,
`IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 (June 16, 2020) ....................................................... 2, 3
`Supercell Oy v. Gree Inc.,
`IPR2020-00215, Paper 10 (June 10, 2020) ........................................................... 6
`VIZIO, Inc. v. Polaris PowerLED Techs., LLC,
`IPR2020-00043, Paper 30 (May 4, 2020) ............................................................. 8
`REGULATIONS
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71 ....................................................................................................... 2
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`ii
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`Exhibit
`2001
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`2002
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`2003
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`2004
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`2005
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`2006
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`2007
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`2008
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`2009
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`2010
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`2011
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`2012
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`2013
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`Exhibit List
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`
`Description
`Defendants’ Preliminary Invalidity Contentions, Jaguar Land Rover
`Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-320 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5,
`2019)
`Reserved
`
`Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement, Jaguar Land Rover
`Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-320 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1,
`2018), ECF No. 31 (“Am. Compl.”)
`Reserved
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`Reserved
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`Reserved
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`Reserved
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`VCARS, Dual Queen’s Awards in Diamond Year, AA Cars (Apr.
`23, 2008)
`Kevin Hepworth, First Drive, The Daily Telegraph (Sydney
`Australia) (Oct. 9, 2004) (Exhibit D to Am. Compl., ECF No. 31-4)
`Land Rover Wins Two Queen’s Awards, The Manufacturer (June 27,
`2008) (Exhibit E to Am. Compl., ECF No. 31-5)
`Richard Russell, Seize Control of All Terrains, The Globe and Mail
`(May 19, 2005) (Exhibit F to Am. Compl., ECF No. 31-6)
`Jan Prins & David Armstrong, Terrain Response, Land Rover
`Official Magazine (Exhibit G to Am. Compl., ECF No. 31-7)
`Land Rover LR3 Wins Prestigious 2005 Motor Trend SUV of the
`Year, PR Newswire (Oct. 27, 2004) (Exhibit H to Am. Compl., ECF
`No. 31-8)
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`iii
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`Exhibit
`2014
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`2015
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`2016
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`2017
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`2018
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`2019
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`2020
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`2021
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`2022
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`2023
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`2024
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`2025
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`2026
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`Description
`David Booth, 2007 Range Rover A Masterpiece in the SUV Gallery,
`The Star Phoenix (Feb. 2, 2007) (Exhibit I to Am. Compl., ECF No.
`31-9)
`John LeBlanc, Nothing In Its Way: The Land Rover LR3 Can Go
`Anywhere You Want Thanks to the New Terrain Response System,
`The Gazette (Montreal) (Nov. 15, 2004) (Exhibit K to Am. Compl.,
`ECF No. 31-11)
`Terrain Response Wins Henry Ford Award: Land Rover Has Won a
`Henry Ford Technology Award for Its Patented Terrain Response
`System, PAGCMS (2005)
`Jaguar Land Rover Limited’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
`Dismiss, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-
`CV-320 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2018), ECF No. 38
`Motor Trend Names 2005 Sport/Utility of the Year Winner, Motor
`Trend (Oct. 27, 2004)
`Arthur St. Antoine, Long-Term Verdict: 2005 Land Rover LR3 HSE,
`Motor Trend (Oct. 1, 2006)
`John Kiewicz, 2005 SUV of the Year: Land Rover LR3, Motor Trend
`(Oct. 28, 2004)
`Opinion and Order, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd.,
`No. 2:18-CV-320 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2019)
`The Queen’s Awards for Enterprise, Background Note: Business
`Awards, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Enterprise
`Directorate
`The Queen’s Awards for Enterprise: Innovation, Winner’s List
`(2006-2010)
`Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley
`Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-320 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2019), ECF No.
`55
`U.S. Patent No. 5,366,041 (“Shiraishi”)
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`Reserved
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`iv
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`Exhibit
`2027
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`Reserved
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`Description
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`2028
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`2029
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`2030
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`2031
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`2032
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`2033
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`2034
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`2035
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,247,831 (“Fioravanti”)
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`Bentley Motors Limited and Bentley Motors, Inc.’s Opening Claim
`Construction Brief, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd.,
`No. 2:18-CV-320 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2020), ECF No. 238
`Jaguar Land Rover Limited’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief,
`Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-320
`(E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2020), ECF No. 273
`Order, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-
`320 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2020), ECF No. 337
`Ryan Davis, Cisco Patent Trial Kicks Off Over Zoom Without a
`Hitch, Law360 (May 6, 2020)
`General Order No. 2020-20, In re: Court Operations Under the
`Exigent Circumstances Created by the Outbreak of Coronavirus
`Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Modified Jury Summons Packet (E.D.
`Va. July 7, 2020)
`Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Extend Deadlines,
`Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. Bentley Motors Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-320
`(E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2020), ECF No. 332
`Volkswagen Group, https://www.volkswagenag.com/en/group.html#
`(last updated Dec. 31, 2019)
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`I.
`
`Overview
`The Board should deny Petitioner’s rehearing request. The district court trial
`is scheduled for February 23, 2021—at least five months before the Board’s final
`decision, Petitioner admitted in its Ranking Statement that this petition is weaker
`than the one this Board already denied on the merits, and the court never suggested
`that it would stay the case. The Board also correctly found “substantial overlap in
`patent claims” and “overlap in the obviousness theories and references” between
`the two venues. Further, on March 10, 2020, the Board correctly found that the
`litigation was already at an “advanced stage” with “significant investment by the
`Court and the parties”—before the court completed, a technical tutorial and a claim
`construction hearing including invalidity arguments. Inst. Dec. 15.
`Petitioner argues that the court case will be further delayed because
`Petitioner seeks to add a new inequitable conduct defense. Petitioner fails to
`mention that the court already denied this motion as futile, and Petitioner is only
`appealing the Magistrate’s denial. Ex. 2031. Petitioner also argues that the parties
`agreed to a three-month extension, but Patent Owner agreed to join Petitioner’s
`motion only because Petitioner’s outside counsel claimed it was experiencing
`significant hardships due to COVID-19. Patent Owner is frankly shocked that
`Petitioner is now trying to use that sympathetic extension to gain a tactical
`advantage. Petitioner also has no basis to suggest that the court would stay the case
`at this late stage after it has invested significant resources. Petitioner also argues
`that it named other real-parties-in-interests (RPIs), but that is irrelevant. They are
`not only not unrelated; they are all commonly owned by the VW Group. Ex. 2035.
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`As the requesting party, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the
`Board abused its discretion, and must identify the relevant matters the Board
`overlooked or misapprehended and where the Petitioner previously addressed each
`matter in its previous briefing. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal
`Grp-Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 4 (June 16, 2020) (informative)
`(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.71) (“Sand Revolution”). Here, Petitioner never even tried to
`show that the Board abused its discretion or misapprehended or overlooked
`anything in Petitioner’s briefs. It cannot because Petitioner never addressed
`discretionary denial until now. Regardless, five of the six Fintiv factors weighed
`strongly in favor of denial at the time of the Board’s decision and weigh even more
`heavily towards denial now, and the remaining factor is neutral. Patent Owner will
`now address each Fintiv factor in turn.
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`II.
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`Factor 1: There Is No Evidence The Court Will Stay If IPR Is Instituted
`There is no evidence that the court would stay the case if an IPR is
`instituted. To the contrary, the court has already invested significant resources,
`including conducting a technical tutorial and claim construction hearing and
`scheduling trial for February 2021. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence to the
`contrary. “In the absence of specific evidence, [the Board] will not attempt to
`predict how the district court in the related district court litigation” would rule on a
`hypothetical stay motion. Sand Revolution at 7; Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-
`00019, Paper 15 at 12 (May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv DI”); Apple Inc. v.
`Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6-7 (Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)
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`(“Fintiv Order”) (requiring specific “guidance from the district court” that is
`“made of record”). As a result, this factor was (and still is) neutral, and the Board
`did not overlook or misapprehend anything, much less abuse its discretion.
`Petitioner invites the Board to speculate what the court might do if presented
`with a stay motion, but the Board has repeatedly declined to engage in such
`speculation. Sand Revolution at 7; Fintiv DI at 12. The Board instead uses Factors
`2 and 3 to inform the Board how much weight to give this factor if the court
`specifically addressed if it would grant a stay. Fintiv Order at 7-8, n.12.
`Furthermore, Petitioner points to no authority showing any Eastern District of
`Virginia court staying a proceeding after holding a claim construction hearing and
`while expert discovery is underway, as here. Pet’r Br. 5.
`Petitioner states that the court indicated that it might grant a stay at an early
`stage, but the court made the cited statement back in September 2019 at the initial
`Case Management Conference—before document discovery, before depositions in
`the US and UK, before the close of fact discovery, before the technical tutorial and
`claim construction hearing, and before expert discovery. Pet’r Br. 4-5 (citing Ex.
`1068). That statement is completely irrelevant to what the court would do now
`after the case has progressed to such a late stage. Further, the transcript reveals that
`Petitioner told the court it would decide whether to seek a stay after Patent Owner
`served its infringement contentions on October 1, 2019—at the beginning of
`discovery. Ex. 1068 at 2-3, 11-12, 17 (“THE COURT: So are you suggesting that
`we … wait for the infringement contentions date to pass before you decide whether
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`you want to stay? Is that sort of where you are? MR. HAUG: Yes, Your Honor.”).
`Patent Owner served its infringement contentions in October, but Petitioner never
`moved to stay. And to be clear, the court did not suggest that it would grant a stay,
`especially after the close of fact discovery or after the claim construction hearing.
`Rather, the court stated only that Petitioner would not be precluded from seeking a
`stay “if [Petitioner] decided [it] wanted to do that after [Patent Owner served its]
`contentions” less than two weeks later. Ex. 1068 at 30.
`Further, Patent Owner would be prejudiced by a stay. Patent Owner has
`invested significantly in this case—defeating Petitioner’s § 101 motion, defeating
`Petitioner’s first IPR, and defeating Petitioner’s attempt to add inequitable conduct
`to the case. Patent Owner has earned its day in court. Petitioner argues that the
`parties agreed to extend the schedule. Pet’r Br. 2, 6. But, Petitioner fails to mention
`that it requested this extension, not Patent Owner, and that Patent Owner only
`agreed as an accommodation for Petitioner’s counsel at a difficult time. “[L]ead
`counsel for [Petitioner] has experienced particularly severe hardships related to the
`current crises, including the loss and hospitalization of members of lead counsel’s
`law firm.” Ex. 2034 at 3 (emphasis added). Petitioner should not be allowed to use
`Patent Owner’s compassion as a procedural weapon here.
`Petitioner also argues that it moved to add an inequitable defense. Pet’r Br.
`4-5. But, Petitioner fails to mention that its motion has already been denied as
`“futile.” Ex. 2031 at 3-9. Petitioner is now only appealing this denial. Ex. 1069.
`Further, Petitioner’s inequitable conduct claim alleges that Patent Owner withheld
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`the Porsche 959 art from the Office—the same art that this Board found was not
`likely to invalidate even a single claim of this patent. See Bentley Motors Ltd. v.
`Jaguar Land Rover Ltd., IPR2019-01502, Paper 10 (Feb. 20, 2020).
`At bottom, there is no evidence that the court would stay this case at this
`advanced stage, and Petitioner has not submitted any evidence to the contrary.
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`III. Factor 2: The Court’s Trial Date Is At Least Five Months Before a Final
`Written Decision
`This factor weighed (and still weighs) heavily in favor of denial because the
`court’s trial date was about four months before a final written decision would
`issue—and is now at least five months earlier. Ex. 3005 (setting trial on February
`23, 2021); Inst. Dec. 14. And despite Petitioner’s dilatory tactics and the pandemic,
`this gap is far larger than in Fintiv, where the Board found this factor weighed
`“somewhat in favor” of denial even though the trial date was scheduled to occur
`just two months before the final written decision—also during the pandemic. Fintiv
`DI at 13. In addition, the timing here is entirely due to Petitioner delaying its IPR
`until just one week before the one-year bar date—despite having the prior art for
`years. POPR 49-50.
`Importantly, the Board “generally take[s] court’s trial schedules at face value
`absent some strong evidence to the contrary.” Fintiv DI at 13 (finding no such
`“strong evidence” despite the ongoing pandemic). Petitioner presents no such
`“strong evidence” that contradicts Judge Davis’s order setting trial for February 23,
`2021. Rather, Petitioner speculates that the trial date “may very well be” postponed
`in view of Judge Davis’ statements encouraging settlement and the district’s
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`COVID-19 general orders (also written by Judge Davis). Pet’r Br. 2-4 (citing Exs.
`1065-1067). But importantly, Judge Davis did not move the trial date and has still
`not moved the trial date now months later. Judge Davis, as many trial judges do,
`was simply encouraging the parties to try to settle the case. Further, the cited
`orders—and the later-issued general order of July 7, 2020—demonstrate that the
`court has defined a realistic “operational path forward” during the pandemic for its
`“phased expansion of Court Operations,” including jury trials. Ex. 1067 at 23; Ex.
`2033 at 1. Indeed, the Eastern District of Virginia has been innovative in its
`approach to the pandemic and held the nation’s first patent bench trial in May with
`fact and expert witnesses appearing by video. Ex. 2032.
`In any event, “even a delayed trial may precede a final written decision in
`this proceeding,” as the five-month (or larger) difference between the trial date and
`any final written decision cushions any potential further postponement. Apple Inc.
`v. Maxell, Ltd., IPR2020-00203, Paper 12 at 10 (July 6, 2020) (denying institution
`despite the “real possibility” of additional delays during the pandemic); Supercell
`Oy v. Gree Inc., IPR2020-00215, Paper 10 at 11-12 (June 10, 2020) (finding the
`court’s trial date before any final written decision outweighs “generalized
`speculation as to trial dates universally (e.g., due to impacts of COVID-19)”).
`
`IV. Factor 3: The Court And The Parties Are Heavily Invested In the Court
`Proceeding
`This factor weighed towards denial when the Board issued its original
`decision, and does so even more today. The Board recognized that “the Court
`denied a substantive motion to dismiss” under § 101 “[i]n a 31-page Order” that
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`“provided a comprehensive analysis of the patented technology, the claims, and
`other evidence, and concluded that the claims were patent-eligible.” Inst. Dec. 14;
`POPR 50. Further, fact discovery (which involved extensive overseas depositions)
`and claim construction briefing were complete, and thus “the District Court has
`invested substantial resources adjudicating the same issues as are presented in this
`IPR proceeding.” Inst. Dec. 15.
`Since then, the court and parties have made significant additional
`investments in the court case, including conducting a technical tutorial, claim
`construction hearing, a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to add inequitable conduct
`(denied), and deciding several motions to compel. The court is also in a better
`position to decide validity because it has conducted a technical tutorial, heard
`argument on Petitioner’s § 112 indefiniteness positions not raised in the Petition,
`and heard argument on Petitioner’s claim construction positions not raised in the
`Petition that relate to its prior art invalidity positions. Ex. 1065 at 38:25-40:8
`(showing Bentley’s prior art arguments); Ex. 2029 at 7, 14 (Petitioner relying on its
`invalidity contentions in claim construction); Ex. 2030 at 2, 3, 9 (Patent Owner
`explaining that Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions improperly raise an
`“invalidity dispute that requires a factual determination”). Further, the parties have
`and continue to invest in expert discovery with opening reports due August 13,
`2020. In short, the parties will be ready for trial in December 2020 with the
`exception of the court’s pre-trial procedures. Ex. 3004 at 2.
`In addition, denial is favored when “petitioner cannot explain the delay in
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`filing its petition.” Fintiv Order 11-12. The only reason this issue is before Board
`today is Petitioner’s unexplained delay in seeking IPR just one week before its
`statutory deadline. POPR 49-50. Indeed, Petitioner admits that it has been in
`possession of the asserted prior art—Lancer and GB ’580—for years before it filed
`its IPR. See POPR 49-50.
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`V.
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`Factor 4: The Petition And The Court Case Substantially Overlap
`This factor weighed (and still weighs) in favor of denial because Petitioner
`presented the same art to challenge most of the same claims in court as in the IPR.
`Inst. Dec. 9-12; Fintiv Order 12 (favoring denial “if the petition includes the same
`or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in
`the parallel proceeding”); VIZIO, Inc. v. Polaris PowerLED Techs., LLC,
`IPR2020-00043, Paper 30 at 10-11 (May 4, 2020) (denying institution where “over
`half of the twelve claims from the Petition are also challenged in the District
`Court” because Petitioner did not provide a “meaningful distinction” between the
`claims).
`Petitioner does not point to anything that the Board overlooked or
`misapprehended, but instead argues that Petitioner presented the court with
`additional prior-art systems and § 101 and § 112 defenses. Pet’r Br. 7. “Petitioner’s
`assertion of additional invalidity contentions in the District Court,” however, “is
`not relevant to the question of the degree of overlap for this factor.” Fintiv DI at
`15. Further, the court has already denied Petitioner’s § 101 challenge (Ex. 2021)
`and all of its § 112 challenges were already briefed and argued during the claim
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`construction hearing Ex. 1065 at 96-137; Ex. 1071 at 66-71. Finally, Petitioner’s
`only evidence of any alleged prior-art systems relies on the same documents it
`proffered to the Board. See Ex. 1071, at 9, 12-51.
`
`VI. Factor 5: The Petitioner And The Defendant Are the Same Party
`Petitioner argues that it named additional RPIs. Pet’r Br. 6-7. These RPIs are
`irrelevant to this factor. The Board explained in its precedential Fintiv Order that
`“[i]f a petitioner is unrelated to a defendant,” this factor might weigh against
`denying institution. Fintiv Order 13-14 (emphasis added). Here, the petitioner is
`the defendant, so this factor weighs against institution. Further, the RPIs are all
`commonly owned with Petitioner (Ex. 2035), and thus related to the defendant.
`Petitioner also fails to show that the RPIs would be harmed by denial. Petitioner
`instead demonstrates just the opposite, explaining that the RPIs would avoid the
`IPR estoppel if the Board denies institution. Pet’r Br. 6-7. And if the named RPIs
`did not wish to be impacted by the one-year bar, they should have avoided
`controlling this IPR.
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`VII. Factor 6: Other Circumstances, Including the Merits, Warrant Denial
`This factor weighed (and still weighs) strongly in favor of denial. The POPR
`demonstrated why this petition fails on the merits and that denial is also
`appropriate under § 325(d), just as in NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
`IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential). POPR 17-41 (merits), 41-
`49 (substantially similar prior art/arguments as during prosecution); see also Paper
`8 (explaining the overlap between the two petitions).
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`Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that the merits of this Petition weigh towards
`institution. Petitioner, however, admitted this Petition is weaker than its previous
`petition, which was directed at the same claims of the same patent (Paper 3), that
`was denied on its merits and denied on rehearing. IPR2019-01502, Papers 10 and
`12.
`
`Petitioner also argues that the Board lacks the statutory authority to issue a
`discretionary denial. Petitioner is wrong. “[T]he agency’s decision to deny a
`petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion,” and § 314(a)
`contains “no mandate to institute review.” Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
`2131, 2140 (2016). The Director has given Board panels binding guidance
`regarding the exercise this statutory discretion in the precedential Fintiv Order and
`NHK Spring decisions. And as explained in Board’s original decision, the POPR,
`and herein, the Board properly followed this guidance.
`
`VIII. Conclusion
`A balanced assessment of the Fintiv factors in this case—especially (1) the
`five-month gap between the court’s trial and the earliest possible final written
`decision, (2) the advanced state of the overlapping court case, (3) the court’s and
`parties’ significant investments in invalidity issues and claim construction, (4) the
`Petitioner’s delay in filing its IPR, (5) Petitioner’s admission that this Petition is
`weaker than the one already denied on its merits, and (6) the fact that this Petition
`also warrants denial under § 325(d)—reveals that denial of this case under § 314(a)
`was, and still is, strongly warranted.
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`10
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`Dated: July 24, 2020
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: / Jonathan M. Strang /
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`Jonathan M. Strang (Reg. No. 61,724)
`jonathan.strang@lw.com
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW, Ste. 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
`Telephone: 202.637.2200
`Fax: 202.637.2201
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`Clement Naples (Reg. No. 50,663)
`clement.naples@lw.com
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`Telephone: 212.906.1200
`Fax: 212.751.4864
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Jaguar Land Rover Limited
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`11
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`IPR2019-01539 (USP RE46,828)
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`PO’s Supplemental Response
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I certify that on this 24th day of July, 2020,
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`a true and correct copy of the foregoing Patent Owner’s Supplemental Response
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`and Exhibits were served by electronic mail on Petitioner’s lead and backup
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`counsel at the following email address:
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`Edgar H. Haug (Reg. No. 29,309)
`Brian P. Murphy (Reg. No. 34,986)
`Robert E. Colletti (Reg. No. 76,417)
`Georg C. Reitboeck (pro hac vice to be requested)
`Christopher F. Gosselin (pro hac vice to be requested)
`Haug Partners LLP
`745 Fifth Avenue
`NY, NY 10151
`Tel. 212.588.0800
`Fax 212.588.0500
`BentleyIPR@haugpartners.com
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`By: / Jonathan M. Strang /
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`Jonathan M. Strang (Reg. No. 61,724)
`jonathan.strang@lw.com
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW, Ste. 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
`Telephone: 202.637.2200
`Fax: 202.637.2201
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Jaguar Land Rover Limited
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