UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner
`v.
`ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC, and MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
`OF TECHNOLOGY,
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case: IPR2019-01400
`U.S. Patent No. 8,069,839
`____________
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §312 AND 37 C.F.R. §42.104
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`US Patent and Trademark Office
`PO Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`LIST OF EXHIBITS ............................................................................................... v
`I.
`GROUNDS FOR STANDING UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.104(a) ................. 1
`II.
`PAYMENT OF FEES .................................................................................. 1
`III. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES AND RELIEF REQUESTED ........... 1
`IV. BACKGROUND OF ’839 PATENT AND STATE OF THE ART ......... 2
`V.
`PRIOR ART REFERENCES ...................................................................... 8
`B.
`JPS63230920 (“TAKEHIKO”) .................................................................. 9
`C.
`JP2002227697 (“KINJIRO”)...................................................................10
`D. DE19853799 (“RUBBERT”) ...................................................................10
`E.
`BOSCH AUTOMOTIVE HANDBOOK (“BOSCH”) .......................................10
`VI. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ..................................... 11
`VII. HOW THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE ........ 11
`A. GROUND 1: CLAIMS 1, 2, AND 5-8 ARE ANTICIPATED BY TAKEHIKO
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §102(B) .....................................................................13
`B. GROUND 2: CLAIMS 3 AND 4 ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER PRE-AIA
`35 U.S.C. §103(A) OVER TAKEHIKO IN VIEW OF KOBAYASHI ................22
`C. GROUND 3: CLAIMS 1-4, 6, AND 7 ARE ANTICIPATED BY KINJIRO
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §102(B) .....................................................................29
`D. GROUND 4: CLAIM 5 IS UNPATENTABLE UNDER PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C.
`§103(A) OVER KINJIRO IN VIEW OF KOBAYASHI ....................................36
`A. GROUND 5: CLAIMS 1-5 AND 8 ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER PRE-AIA
`35 U.S.C. §103(A) OVER RUBBERT IN VIEW OF BOSCH ..........................43
`B. NO GROUND IS REDUNDANT ..................................................................54
`VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 55
`IX. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.8 .............................. 55
`A. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.8(B)(1) ......................55
`B.
`RELATED MATTERS UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.8(B)(2) ...............................55
`C. DESIGNATION OF COUNSEL UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.8(B)(3) ....................56
`D.
`SERVICE INFORMATION..........................................................................57
`
`ii
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,
`908 F.3d 765 ....................................................................................................... 14
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., Inc.,
`Nos. 18-1520, 1521, 919 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................ 13
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 13
`Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc., v. Monsanto Co.,
`948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991) .................................................................... 16, 19
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.,
`800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 4
`Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC et al v. Ford Motor Company, LLC,
`Case No. 1:19-cv-00196-CFC (Del. Dist. Ct.) ................................................... 55
`Ninebot Tech. Co. v. Inventist, Inc.,
`No. IPR2018-00134, Paper No. 11 (P.T.A.B. April 23, 2018) ...................... 9, 10
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 5
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 13
`35 U.S.C. §102(a) and §102(b) ...................................................................... 9, 10, 11
`35 U.S.C. §102(b) ............................................................................................ 1, 2, 29
`35 U.S.C. §102(e) ...................................................................................................... 9
`35 U.S.C. §102(e)(1) .................................................................................................. 9
`35 U.S.C. §103(a) .................................................................................... 2, 22, 36, 43
`
`iii
`
`

`

`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`35 U.S.C. §112 ........................................................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. §112 ........................................................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. §282(b) ...................................................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. §282(b) ...................................................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. §§311–319 ................................................................................................. 1
`35 U.S.C. §§311—319 ................................................................................................. 1
`35 U.S.C. §312(a)(5) ............................................................................................ 9, 10
`35 U.S.C. §312(a)(5) ............................................................................................ 9, 10
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`37 C.F.R. §42 ............................................................................................................. 1
`37 CPR. §42 ............................................................................................................. 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 55
`37 CPR. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 55
`37 C.F.R. §42.8(b)(1) ............................................................................................... 55
`37 CPR. §42.8(b)(1) ............................................................................................... 55
`37 C.F.R. §42.8(b)(2) ............................................................................................... 55
`37 CPR. §42.8(b)(2) ............................................................................................... 55
`37 C.F.R. §42.8(b)(3) ............................................................................................... 56
`37 CPR. §42.8(b)(3) ............................................................................................... 56
`37 C.F.R §42.10(b) .................................................................................................. 57
`37 CPR §42.10(b) .................................................................................................. 57
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(1) .............................................................................................. 1
`37 CPR. § 42.22(a)(1) .............................................................................................. 1
`37 C.F.R. §42.63(b) ............................................................................................. 9, 10
`37 CPR. §42.63(b) ............................................................................................. 9, 10
`37 C.F.R. §42.104(a) .................................................................................................. 1
`37 CPR. §42.104(a) .................................................................................................. 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(1)–(2) ..................................................................................... 1
`37 CPR. § 42.104(b)(1)—(2) ..................................................................................... 1
` (37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(3)) ......................................................................................... 5
`(37 CPR. §42.104(b)(3)) ......................................................................................... 5
`
`iv
`
`iV
`
`

`

`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit
`Ex. 1001
`
`Short Name
`’839 Patent
`
`Description
`U.S. Patent No. 8,069,839
`
`Ex. 1002
`
`’839 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 8,069,839
`
`Ex. 1003
`
`Ex. 1004
`
`Ex. 1005
`
`Ex. 1006
`
`Ex. 1007
`
`Clark
`Declaration
`
`Declaration of Dr. Nigel N. Clark under 37
`C.F.R. §1.68
`
`Clark CV
`
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Nigel N. Clark
`
`Kobayashi
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,188,607
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`Rubbert
`
`German Patent Application No.
`DE19853799
`
`Ex. 1008
`
`Kinjiro
`
`Japanese Patent Application Publication No.
`JP2002227697
`
`Ex. 1009
`
`Ex. 1010
`
`Ex. 1011
`
`Ex. 1012
`
`Ex. 1013
`
`Ex. 1014
`
`Ex. 1015
`
`Ex. 1016
`
`Ex. 1017
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`Ex. 1018
`
`’572 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,971,572
`
`v
`
`

`

`Exhibit
`
`Short Name
`
`Description
`
`Ex. 1019
`
`’233 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,762,233
`
`Ex. 1020
`
`’004 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,740,004
`
`Ex. 1021
`
`’033 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,314,033
`
`Ex. 1022
`
`Complaint
`
`Ex. 1023
`
`Defendant’s
`Answer
`
`Ex. 1024
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Answer
`
`Ex. 1025
`
`Heywood
`
`Complaint for Patent Infringement, Ethanol
`Boosting Sys LLC v. Ford Motor Co., D.I. 1,
`C.A. No. 19-cv-196-CFC (D. Del. Jan. 30,
`2019)
`
`Defendant’s Answer, Defenses,
`Counterclaims and Jury Demand, Ethanol
`Boosting Sys LLC v. Ford Motor Co., D.I. 1,
`C.A. No. 19-cv-196-CFC (D. Del. March 25,
`2019)
`
`Answer to Defendant’s Counterclaims,
`Ethanol Boosting Sys LLC v. Ford Motor
`Co., D.I. 1, C.A. No. 19-cv-196-CFC (D.
`Del. April 15, 2019)
`
`John B. Heywood, Internal Combustion
`Engine Fundamentals (1988)
`
`Ex. 1026
`
`’735 File History File History of U.S. Patent No. 8,082,735
`
`Ex. 1027
`
`Ex. 1028
`
`Ex. 1029
`
`Ex. 1030
`
`’157 File History File History of U.S. Patent Application No.
`11/758,157
`
`Kreikemeier
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,681,752
`
`Takehiko
`
`Japanese Patent Application Publication No.
`JP63230920
`
`’717 File History File History of U.S. Patent Application No.
`13/591,717
`
`Ex. 1031
`
`Bosch
`
`Bosch Automotive Handbook (3rd Ed.)
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Exhibit
`
`Ex. 1032
`
`Short Name
`
`Stokes
`
`Description
`
`J. Stokes et al. “A gasoline engine concept
`for improved fuel economy—the lean-boost
`system,” SAE paper 2001-01-2902, 1-12
`
`Ex. 1033
`
`Ex. 1034
`
`Ex. 1035
`
`Ex. 1036
`
`Ex. 1037
`
`Ex. 1038
`
`Ex. 1039
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`Csere
`
`Csere, C. “A Smarter Way to use Ethanol to
`Reduce Gasoline Consumption,” (2007),
`https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a151
`47006/a-smarter-way-to-use-ethanol-to-
`reduce-gasoline-consumption/
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`Infringement
`Contentions
`
`MIT’s/EBS’s Preliminary Infringement
`Chart (Ex. A – U.S. Patent No. 8,069,839),
`Ethanol Boosting Sys LLC v. Ford Motor
`Co., D.I. 35, C.A. No. 19-cv-196-CFC (D.
`Del. July 1, 2019)
`
`Mullins
`Declaration
`
`Declaration of Dr. James L. Mullins under
`37 C.F.R. §1.68
`
`Mullins CV
`
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. James L. Mullins
`
`RESERVED
`
`RESERVED
`
`vii
`
`

`

`Ford Motor Company (“Petitioner” or “Ford”) hereby petitions for Inter
`
`Partes Review (“IPR”) under 35 U.S.C. §§311–319 and 37 C.F.R. §42 of Claims
`
`1-8 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,069,839 (“the ’839 Patent”).
`
`Petitioner respectfully submits that IPR should be instituted and the challenged
`
`claims canceled.
`
`I.
`
`GROUNDS FOR STANDING UNDER 37 C.F.R. §42.104(a)
`
`Petitioner certifies that the ’839 Patent is available for IPR and that
`
`Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting an IPR.
`
`II.
`
`PAYMENT OF FEES
`
`Petitioner authorizes the Patent Office to charge Deposit Account No. 16-
`
`0605 for any additional fees.
`
`III. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES AND RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Pursuant to Rules 42.22(a)(1) and 42.104(b)(1)–(2), Petitioner requests
`
`cancellation of the challenged claims in view of the grounds set forth below. Detail
`
`on how the claims are construed and where each element can be found in the cited
`
`prior art is provided herein. Additional support for each ground is provided in Ex.
`
`1003– Declaration of Nigel Clarke (“Clarke”). ¶9 et seq.
`
`Ground 1: Claims 1, 2, and 5-8 are anticipated by Takehiko under pre-AIA
`
`35 U.S.C. §102(b).
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`Ground 2: Claims 3 and 4 are unpatentable under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
`
`§103(a) over Takehiko in view of Kobayashi.
`
`Ground 3: Claims 1-4, 6, and 7 are anticipated by Kinjiro under pre-AIA 35
`
`U.S.C. §102(b).
`
`Ground 4: Claim 5 is unpatentable under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over
`
`Kinjiro in view of Kobayashi.
`
`Ground 5: Claims 1-5 and 8 are unpatentable under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
`
`§103(a) over Rubbert in view of Bosch.
`
`IV. BACKGROUND OF ’839 PATENT AND STATE OF THE ART
`
`A. The ’839 Patent
`
`The ’839 Patent describes an engine that relies specifically on an antiknock
`
`agent to eliminate knock, with the antiknock agent being a liquid fuel with a higher
`
`octane number than gasoline, such as ethanol, to improve engine efficiency. Ex.
`
`1001, 1:14-17, 1:66-2:15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶35-39.
`
`B. ’839 Patent Prosecution History
`
`The ’839 Patent was granted from the fifth in a family of U.S. patent
`
`applications. Ex. 1003, ¶54. The US applications are all continuations of U.S.
`
`Application No. 10/991,774 (“the ’774 Application”), filed November 18, 2004.
`
`The prosecution histories of the ’839 Patent and its ultimate parent, U.S.
`
`Patent No. 7,314,033 (“the ’033 Patent”), which resulted from the ’774
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`Application, provide useful information regarding claim construction and a general
`
`history of how the challenged claims developed. Ex. 1003, ¶¶54-88.
`
`No Office Actions were issued for the ’839 Patent following Patent Owner’s
`
`submission of two Preliminary Amendments with new claim sets after filing. Ex.
`
`1002, 1-5, 61-65, 73-79.
`
`However, in the ’033 Patent prosecution history, Patent Owner repeatedly
`
`characterized the alleged invention in Examiner Interviews. For example, in
`
`response to the first Office Action, Patent Owner amended Claims 1 and 30 to
`
`emphasize that the fuel/ethanol is a liquid and that DI of the liquid fuel/ethanol is
`
`“for vaporization in the cylinder to provide charge cooling.” Ex. 1021, 83, 85; Ex.
`
`1003, ¶81. In an Interview, the inventors distinguished the Cantwell reference by
`
`arguing that “alkali metal compounds are not a fuel and are not introduced in the
`
`liquid state,” water is not a fuel, and the reference only teaches introducing a
`
`vaporized material rather than a liquid into the combustion chamber, which would
`
`not provide the change-of-state cooling effect. Ex. 1021, 89; Ex. 1003, ¶81. The
`
`inventors distinguished the Krauja reference by arguing that the reference did not
`
`teach an anti-knock agent because it operated on 100% ethanol. Id. To overcome
`
`the Payne reference, the inventors argued that the Examiner had not shown that the
`
`recitation of “‘any other liquid preparation to suppress auto-ignition’ includes any
`
`liquid fuel” rather than water. Ex. 1021, 90; Ex. 1003, ¶81. Finally, to overcome
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`the Coakwell reference, the inventors argued that hydrogen peroxide is introduced
`
`to provide free oxygen and “is not itself a fuel.” Id. In the Final Office Action, the
`
`Examiner cited new references, and, in response, Patent Owner identified new
`
`limitations, namely “means for port fuel injection of gasoline from the first source”
`
`and “means for direct fuel injection of liquid denatured alcohol from the second
`
`source,” that distinguish over the prior art. Ex. 1021, 129; Ex. 1003, ¶¶82-83.
`
`Patent Owner also argued that none of the cited references teach the combination
`
`of port fuel injection of gasoline and direct injection of liquid denatured ethanol.
`
`Ex. 1021, 129; Ex. 1003, ¶83. The Examiner agreed, and, after some additional
`
`prosecution, the ’033 Patent was granted. Ex. 1021, 129-91; Ex. 1003, ¶¶83-88.
`
`C. ’839 Patent Priority Date
`
`The ’839 Patent issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 13/117,448 (“the
`
`’448 application”), filed May 27, 2011. As discussed above, the ’839 Patent
`
`ultimately claims the benefit of the ’774 application, filed on November 18, 2004.
`
`A claim of priority deserves no presumption of correctness because “the PTO does
`
`not examine [priority claims] as a matter of course.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v.
`
`Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The challenged claims
`
`are not entitled to the priority date of the priority applications because their
`
`disclosures do not demonstrate that Patent Owner was in possession of the alleged
`
`invention in these claims.
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`D. Claim Construction (37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(3))
`
`Claim terms in a patent are interpreted according to the same claim
`
`construction standard used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
`
`customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`(“POSITA”) under Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and its
`
`progeny. Petitioner reserves all rights to take a different position with respect to
`
`claim construction in any other proceeding.
`
`1. “Selected Torque Value” / “Some Value of Torque”
`
`The terms “selected torque value” and “some value of torque” (“selected
`
`torque value”) are used throughout the challenged claims to define one or more
`
`values at which the engine changes operation from reliance on PI alone to reliance
`
`on PI and DI or the engine changes operation from reliance on PI and DI to
`
`reliance on DI alone. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Claims 1, 7, and 8; Ex. 1003, ¶92. The
`
`“selected torque value” terms, however, are undefined.1 Ex. 1003, ¶93.
`
`“Selected torque value” never appears in the ’839 Patent specification. For
`
`the purposes of this proceeding only, a POSITA, however, would have understood
`
`1 Petitioner reserves the right to assert 35 U.S.C. §112 challenges in the co-pending
`
`litigation.
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`that torque is a measure of the work performed by the engine, and engine load is a
`
`proportional indicator of torque in the range from minimum torque to maximum
`
`torque. Ex. 1003, ¶94. Indeed, the higher the torque, the higher the load, such that
`
`the terms “selected torque value” and “selected load value” would have the same
`
`operational meaning. Id. Indeed, Patent Owner admitted torque and load are the
`
`same. Ex. 1036, 2. Where a first specified value of torque and a second specified
`
`value of torque fall on a torque-speed map, a first percentage of load and a second
`
`percentage of load would similarly fall on a load map. Ex. 1003, ¶94. A POSITA
`
`would understand that a “selected torque value” is a value of torque representative
`
`of engine load. Id. For example, a POSITA would equate moving from one
`
`selected torque value to a different torque value to moving from one load value on
`
`a load map to a different load value on a load map. Id. Patent Owner confirms this
`
`interpretation. See, e.g., Ex. 1036, 2, 4.
`
`Accordingly, Petitioner adopts Patent Owner’s construction that “selected
`
`torque value” should be construed to equate to “selected load value” and mean “a
`
`specified value of torque on a torque-speed map” consistent with the ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of the term. Ex. 1003, ¶¶94-95.
`
`2.
`
` “Port Injection” / “Direct Injection”
`
`Petitioner also advances a construction of “port injection,” “direct injection,”
`
`and variants thereof. “Port injection” (PI) should be construed to mean “injection
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`of fuel through a manifold,” and “direct injection” (DI) should be construed to
`
`mean “injection of fuel into the cylinder,” consistent with their respective ordinary
`
`and customary meanings. Ex. 1003, ¶96. In construing these terms, Petitioner
`
`adopts Patent Owner’s implicit construction and does not limit the type of PI or DI
`
`fuel used. Id., ¶¶96-101.
`
`The challenged claims themselves do not recite the type of actual fuel(s)
`
`injected. Ex. 1003, ¶96. The specification, however, discloses and limits the ’839
`
`Patent to two distinct fuel sources, a gasoline tank and a tank containing an
`
`antiknock agent (e.g., ethanol).2 Ex. 1001, FIG. 1; Ex. 1003, ¶97. The ’839 Patent
`
`appears to use the term “antiknock agent” to describe a different fuel than the PI
`
`fuel and, further, uses “antiknock agent” to describe fuels such as ethanol,
`
`methanol, etc. Ex. 1001, 1:66-2:6; Ex. 1003, ¶97. The ’839 Patent explicitly states
`
`that each “antiknock agent” can be characterized as either being high octane fuel or
`
`a fuel additive. Ex. 1001, 6:60-67; Ex. 1003, ¶97. Regardless, the ’839 Patent
`
`2 The ’839 Patent also discloses an alternative configuration in which a single tank
`
`is used. In that embodiment, however, two separate streams are produced by
`
`separation from that tank. Ex. 1001, 5:39-41.
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`identifies DI of ethanol as the object of the present invention.3 Ex. 1001, 1:54-56;
`
`Ex. 1003, ¶98. Patent Owner confirmed this interpretation of the identity of the
`
`fuel(s) in the ’033 Patent prosecution history. See supra §IV(B); Ex. 1021, 88-90,
`
`129; Ex. 1003, ¶99.
`
`Despite the disclosures in the specification and the ’033 Patent prosecution
`
`history (Ex. 1021, 88-90, 129), in the litigation, Patent Owner is asserting its
`
`claims against certain Ford EcoBoost engines, which are known to use a single
`
`fuel, e.g., gasoline, where the same single fuel is used by both the PI and DI
`
`system. Ex. 1022, ¶64; Ex. 1003, ¶101. Accordingly, Petitioner adopts Patent
`
`Owner’s broad construction for the purposes of this proceeding, and the challenged
`
`claims should be construed to be broad enough to include a system using DI and PI
`
`of the same fuel from the same fuel source. Ex. 1003, ¶101. Petitioner’s
`
`construction of “port injection” as meaning “injection of fuel through a manifold,”
`
`and “direct injection” as meaning “injection of fuel into the cylinder” without
`
`further limiting the fuel identity is consistent with Patent Owner’s implicit
`
`construction.
`
`V.
`
`PRIOR ART REFERENCES
`
`3 Petitioner reserves the right to assert that the claims are limited to the direct
`
`injection of an antiknock agent alone, such as ethanol.
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`A. U.S. Patent No. 7,188,607 (“Kobayashi”)
`
`Kobayashi was filed on June 27, 2003, in the United States and issued on
`
`March 13, 2007. Therefore, Kobayashi is prior art under at least pre-AIA 35
`
`U.S.C. §102(e)(1) if the claims are deemed entitled to a priority date of November
`
`18, 2004. Kobayashi is cited on the face of the ’839 Patent but was not relied upon
`
`by the Examiner during the ’839 Patent’s prosecution.4
`
`B. JPS63230920 (“Takehiko”)
`Takehiko is a Japanese patent application published in Japan on September
`
`27, 1988. Takehiko is therefore prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(a) and
`
`§102(b). Takehiko is accompanied by a certified translation and the original
`
`Japanese language document. Ex. 1029; 37 C.F.R. §42.63(b); 35 U.S.C.
`
`§312(a)(5); Ninebot Tech. Co. v. Inventist, Inc., No. IPR2018-00134, Paper No. 11
`
`at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. April 23, 2018).
`
`4 Kobayashi was cited during prosecution of related abandoned U.S. Application
`
`No. 13/591,717 (“the ’717 Application”), where the Examiner rejected Claims 43-
`
`45 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Kobayashi. Ex. 1030, 54.
`
`Rather than addressing the rejection, Patent Owner merely canceled Claims 43-45.
`
`Ex. 1030, 97-100.
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`C. JP2002227697 (“Kinjiro”)
`Kinjiro is a Japanese patent application published in Japan on August 14,
`
`2002. Kinjiro is therefore prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(a) and §102(b).
`
`Kinjiro is accompanied by a certified translation and the original Japanese
`
`language document. Ex. 1008; 37 C.F.R. §42.63(b); 35 U.S.C. §312(a)(5); Ninebot
`
`Tech. Co., No. IPR2018-00134, Paper No. 11 at 10-11.
`
`D.
`
`DE19853799 (“Rubbert”)
`Rubbert is a German patent application published in Germany on May 25,
`
`2000. Rubbert is therefore prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(a) and §102(b).
`
`Rubbert is accompanied by a certified translation and the original German
`
`language document. Ex. 1007; 37 C.F.R. §42.63(b); 35 U.S.C. §312(a)(5); Ninebot
`
`Tech. Co., No. IPR2018-00134, Paper No. 11 at 10-11.
`
`E.
`
`Bosch Automotive Handbook (“Bosch”)
`Bosch was published in 1993 and was publicly accessible prior to November
`
`18, 2004. See Ex. 1037. Indeed, Dr. Mullins located Bosch at the Massachusetts
`
`Institute of Technology (MIT) Libraries and Purdue University Libraries and
`
`identified that MIT Libraries had added a receipt date of 1993, and Purdue
`
`University Libraries had added a receipt date of 1997. Ex. 1037, ¶¶44-50. Dr.
`
`Mullins confirmed the accessibility of Bosch at at least MIT and Purdue well
`
`before the priority date of the patent at issue. Ex. 1037, ¶¶51-60. Bosch is therefore
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(a) and §102(b). Bosch is a well-known
`
`text on which a POSITA would have relied. Ex. 1003, ¶¶11, 192.
`
`VI. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`A POSITA at the time of the invention would be expected to have at least a
`
`bachelor’s degree in engineering and at least five years of experience in the field of
`
`internal combustion engine design and controls. Ex. 1003, ¶10. Individuals with
`
`different education and additional experience could still be of ordinary skill in the
`
`art if that additional experience compensates for a deficit in their education and
`
`experience stated above. Id. Additional education might substitute for some of the
`
`experience, and substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational
`
`background. Id.
`
`VII. HOW THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE
`
`At the time of the earliest possible priority date, the automobile industry was
`
`facing immense pressure to improve fuel economy and to reduce emissions. Ex.
`
`1032, 3; Ex. 1003, ¶31. By early 2000, it was clear to engineers that regulations
`
`would soon require manufacturers to develop more environmentally friendly
`
`vehicles with more efficient engines. Ex. 1032, 3. Market forces had already led to
`
`the development of high specific output, low swept volume “downsized” engines.
`
`Ex. 1032, 3.
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`The ’839 Patent outlines that high compression ratio operation and engine
`
`downsizing can improve energy efficiency of spark ignition engines. Ex. 1001,
`
`1:14-20; Ex. 1003, ¶36. The ’839 Patent discloses that engine downsizing is made
`
`possible by the use of substantial pressure boosting to obtain the same performance
`
`in a significantly smaller engine. Ex. 1001, 1:20-24; Ex. 1003, ¶36. However, the
`
`drawback of increased engine efficiency is the onset of engine knock, which “is the
`
`undesired detonation of fuel and can severely damage an engine.” Ex. 1001, 1:27-
`
`30; Ex. 1003, ¶37.
`
`Understanding that knock was the sole problem the ’839 Patent sought to
`
`solve, a POSITA would have understood that there were a finite number of
`
`techniques to prevent knock in spark ignition engines—retarding the ignition
`
`timing and octane enhancement. Ex. 1003, ¶33.
`
`To address knock, the ’839 Patent relies on an antiknock agent (e.g.,
`
`ethanol), which the ’839 Patent states provides benefits that could not be achieved
`
`with gasoline or a gasoline/ethanol mixture. Ex. 1001, 3:54-57, 4:19-23. Patent
`
`Owner likewise advocated for such a system utilizing DI of an antiknock agent in
`
`the press. Ex. 1034. However, in an effort to assert its patents and by pursuing an
`
`aggressive continuation strategy, Patent Owner appears to have abandoned its
`
`ethanol-based innovation, opting instead for generic claims that Patent Owner
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`

`purports cover a system that relies on PI and DI of the same fuel. Ex. 1022, ¶¶64-
`
`70.
`
`As a result of claims that pivoted away from the specification, the ’839
`
`Patent broadly claims the well-known concept of DI as a method for reducing
`
`knock. That is, the ’839 Patent only claims what Stokes (admitted prior art in the
`
`’839 Patent) and others had already realized—DI eliminates knock in boosted
`
`“downsized” engines—nothing more. Ex. 1032. Indeed, engines that relied on both
`
`PI and DI had already been developed well in advance of the ’839 Patent. As
`
`evidenced by the prior art discussed below and the knowledge of a POSITA, the
`
`’839 Patent claims recite nothing more than use of the known technique of DI for
`
`knock-free operation in an engine that enabled both PI and DI. Ex. 1003, ¶33. The
`
`claims of the ’839 Patent therefore must be canceled.
`
`A. Ground 1: Claims 1, 2, and 5-8 are Anticipated by Takehiko Under
`35 U.S.C. §102(b)
`1. Claim 1: [1.Pre] A spark ignition engine that is fueled both by
`direct injection and by port injection
`
`It is well-understood that the preamble of a claim is generally not limiting,
`
`particularly “where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the
`
`claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the
`
`invention.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., Inc., Nos. 18-
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`

`1520, 1521, 919 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Moreover, this and other claims
`
`do not include a transitional phrase to indicate where the preamble of the claim
`
`ends and the body of the claim begins. The Federal Circuit has been clear that
`
`“poor claim drafting will not be an excuse for it to infuse confusion into its claim
`
`scope.” Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770.
`
`Here, “that is fueled both by direct injection and port injection” clearly modifies “a
`
`spark ignition engine. Accordingly, “that is fueled both by direct injection and port
`
`injection” is effectively part of the preamble and not limiting.
`
`To the extent the preamble of Claim 1 is limiting, Takehiko discloses a spark
`
`ignition engine that includes two fuel injection valves, one for PI and one for DI
`
`for fueling an engine (Fig. 1 below). Ex. 1029, 3; Ex. 1003, ¶¶106-08.
`
`- 14 -
`
`

`

`Spark
`Plug 23
`
`PI (Sub-injector
`21)
`
`DI
`(Main injector 22)
`
`2. Claim 1: [1.A] wherein above a selected torque value the ratio
`of fuel that is directly injected to fuel that is port injected
`increases;
`
`Takehiko discloses that, in operation, its engine prevents knock from
`
`occurring. Ex. 1029, 2; Ex. 1003, ¶109. Specifically, Takehiko discloses that at low
`
`loads, PI alone may be used. Ex. 1029, 4; Ex. 1003, ¶109. At higher loads, DI may
`
`be used, either alone or in combination with PI depending on the injection volume
`
`of main injector 22. Id. As such, Takehiko implicitly discloses wherein above a
`
`- 15 -
`
`

`

`selected torque value the ratio of fuel that is directly injected to fuel that is port
`
`injected increases. Ex. 1003, ¶110.
`
`According to the Federal Circuit, inherent anticipation exists when “the
`
`missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the
`
`reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Cont’l
`
`Can Co. USA, Inc., v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A
`
`POSITA would understand that Takehiko implicitly teaches the use of open loop
`
`control to manage its engine operation, as Takehiko necessarily has a load or
`
`torque value whereby its engine begins to rely on DI to prevent knock. Ex. 1003,
`
`¶110. Indeed, Takehiko is silent on the use of knock detectors but instead discloses
`
`that knock is prevented by using PI alone at low loads and DI, either alone or in
`
`combination with PI, at higher loads. See, e.g., Ex. 1029, 4 (stating that “generation
`
`of knocking in the area around exhaust valve 15 is prevented” and “there is no
`
`danger of knocking”); Ex. 1003, ¶110. In doing so, the engine of Takehiko is
`
`necessarily programmed to switch from PI only to DI at a predetermined (i.e.,
`
`selected) threshold computed