`571-272-7822
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` Paper 14
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` Entered: September 27, 2019
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`AQUESTIVE THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`
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`v.
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`NEURELIS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`Before ZHENYU YANG, JON B. TORNQUIST, and JAMIE T. WISZ,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`WISZ, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`
`DECISION
`Denying Patent Owner’s Request on Rehearing of Decision on Institution
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Neurelis, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) requests rehearing of the Board’s
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`Decision (Paper 8) (“Decision”) instituting inter partes review of claims 1–
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`36 of U.S. Patent No. 9,763,876 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’876 patent”). Paper 10
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`(“Request for Rehearing” or “Req. Reh’g”). For the reasons that follow,
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`Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d):
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`A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for
`rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The
`burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the
`party challenging the decision. The request must specifically
`identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously
`addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.
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`When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an
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`abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion exists
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`where a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
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`erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus.
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`Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1988).
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`Patent Owner contends that we (1) misapprehended the statutory
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`requirements for claiming priority, (2) misapprehended the scope and
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`applicability of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57, and (3) overlooked the due-process
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`requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57. Req. Reh’g 1. We need only address the
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`first argument below for purposes of this Decision.
`2
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`Patent Owner asserts that we misapprehended the statutory
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`requirements for claiming priority because, rather than addressing the
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`statutory written description requirement, we sua sponte applied 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 1.57. Id. at 3. In making this argument, Patent Owner contends that “the
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`merits of the priority claim are unchallenged” and the Petition does not even
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`suggest that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have failed to
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`understand the provisional specification . . . or appreciate from the
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`specification what the inventors had invented.” Id. at 1, 3. As discussed
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`below, we are not persuaded by this argument.
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`First, Petitioner did challenge the ’876 patent priority claim in
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`contending that “the presence of any alkyl glycosides (either generally or
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`particularly) – regardless of amount – was not disclosed, described, or
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`enabled by [the] ’558 Provisional.” Petition 20. Furthermore, with
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`supporting testimony from Dr. Nicholas A. Peppas, Petitioner further
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`asserted that the ’558 provisional’s “generic disclosure of ‘surface active
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`agents (especially non-ionic materials)’ . . . does not disclose, describe,
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`and/or enable alkyl glycosides in general (or dodecyl maltoside in
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`particular).” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 152; Ex. 1041 ¶ 68).
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`Second, Patent Owner’s argument appears to misapprehend the
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`burden of showing entitlement to priority. Although the petitioner has the
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`ultimate burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability, a patent owner must
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`demonstrate entitlement to a priority date when the patent owner relies on
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`that priority date to overcome an anticipation or obviousness argument. See
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`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80
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`3
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing burdens in inter partes review to show
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`entitlement to provisional filing dates and relying on infringement cases
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`involving continuation-in-part applications); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268,
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`1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] patent’s claims are not entitled to an earlier
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`priority date because the patentee claims priority. Rather, for a patent’s
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`claims to be entitled to an earlier priority date, the patentee must
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`demonstrate that the claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120.”
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`(citations omitted)); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627
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`F.3d 859, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
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`545 F.3d 1316, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T–Mobile
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`USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`As explained in Dynamic Drinkware, a petitioner has the initial
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`burden of going forward to show that there is invalidating prior art.
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`Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. As discussed in our Decision,
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`Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production on the issue of whether
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`Gwozdz is prior art by establishing that Gwozdz is entitled to the effective
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`filing date of the Gwozdz provisional. Decision 7. Therefore, Gwozdz is
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`prior art to the ’876 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) unless Patent Owner
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`can show that the ’876 patent is entitled to the effective filing date of its
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`provisional application (“the ’558 provisional”). Id. Thus, the burden of
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`production shifts to Patent Owner, who must show not only the existence of
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`earlier applications, but also how the written description in the earlier
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`applications supports the challenged claims. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d
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`at 1379–80. “[T]o gain the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application
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`4
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 120, each application in the chain leading back to the
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`earlier application must comply with the written description requirement of
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`35 U.S.C. § 112.” Zenon Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370,
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`1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d
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`1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 609
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`(CCPA 1977) (“[T]here has to be a continuous chain of copending
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`applications each of which satisfies the requirements of § 112 with respect to
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`the subject matter presently claimed.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re
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`Schneider, 481 F.2d 1350, 1356 (CCPA 1973))). Thus, as discussed in our
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`Decision, Patent Owner must show that each application in the priority
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`chain1 makes the requisite disclosure of subject matter; otherwise, the ’876
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`patent is not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’558 provisional.
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`Decision 7 n.6.
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`On this record, Patent Owner fails to satisfy its burden of production
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`to show entitlement to an earlier filing date. All of Patent Owner’s
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`arguments are focused on the alleged deficiencies with Petitioner’s
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`contentions regarding the disclosure of alkyl glycosides in the ’558
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`provisional. Prelim. Resp. 24–27. Patent Owner offers no analysis
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`demonstrating that every patent application along the priority chain conveys
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`with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventors were in
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`possession of each limitation of each of the challenged claims, as well as the
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`1 In this case, the priority chain for the ’876 patent includes a provisional
`application and a continuation-in-part application. Decision 6.
`5
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`claimed invention as a whole. See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572. Therefore,
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`on this record, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the claims of the
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`’876 patent are entitled to the priority date of the ’558 provisional.
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`Given Patent Owner’s failure to satisfy its burden of production to
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`show that all of the ’876 patent claims are supported throughout the priority
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`chain, we need not address Patent Owner’s additional arguments regarding
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`the application of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 at this time. The parties are invited to
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`address these issues further during trial, to the extent necessary.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons given, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that we
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`abused our discretion in instituting inter partes review of claims 1–36 of the
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`’876 patent.
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`Accordingly, it is
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`IV. ORDER
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`ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
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`6
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`IPR2019-00451
`Patent 9,763,876 B2
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`PETITIONER:
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`Daniel Scola
`dscola@hbiplaw.com
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`Michael Chakansky
`mchakansky@hbiplaw.com
`
`James Harrington
`jfhdocket@hbiplaw.com
`
`Matthew Solow
`msolow@hbiplaw.com
`
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`PATENT OWNER:
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`Jeffrey Guise
`jguise@wsgr.com
`
`Richard Torczon
`rtorczon@wsgr.com
`
`Lorelei Westin
`lwestin@wsgr.com
`
`Lee Johnson
`ljohnson@wsgr.com
`
`Nathaniel Leachman
`nleachman@wsgr.com
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`7
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