throbber
IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CHRIMAR SYSTEMS, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2018-01511
`Patent 8,902,760 B2
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY
`RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 3
`II.
`III. CLICK-TO-CALL DOES NOT BAR INSTITUTION .................................... 4
`IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 7
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Cisco Sys., Inc. et al v. ChriMar Sys., Inc.,
`15-cv-10817, Dkt. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2015) ................................................... 3
`Cisco Sys., Inc. et al v. ChriMar Sys., Inc.,
`15-cv-10817, Dkt. 16 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2018) ............................................... 3
`Click-To-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................passim
`Clio USA, Inc.,
`No. IPR2013-00438, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2014) ..................................... 2, 7
`RaceTires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.,
`674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................. 5
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 315 .................................................................................................passim
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) ................................................................................................... 1
`Other Authorities
`157 Cong. Rec. S1023 (March 1, 2011) .................................................................... 6
`9 Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. and Proc. § 2367 (3d. ed. 2018) ........................... 6
`Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ................................................................... 2
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1001 Declaration of George Zimmerman Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 in
`Support of Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent
`Nos. 8,155,012, 8,902,760; 9,049,019; and 9,812,825
`1002 Curriculum Vitae of George Zimmerman
`1003 U.S. Patent No. 8,155,012
`1004 U.S. Patent No. 8,902,760
`1005 U.S. Patent No. 9,049,019
`1006 U.S. Patent No. 9,812,825
`1007
`Final Written Decision regarding U.S. Patent No. 8,155,012,
`Juniper Networks, Inc. v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., IPR2016-01389,
`Paper No. 69 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2018)
`Final Written Decision regarding U.S. Patent No. 8,942,107,
`Juniper Networks, Inc. v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., IPR2016-01391,
`Paper No. 66 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2017)
`Final Written Decision regarding U.S. Patent No. 9,019,838,
`Juniper Networks, Inc. v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., IPR2016-01397
`Paper No. 66 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2017)
`Final Written Decision regarding U.S. Patent No. 8,902,760,
`Juniper Networks, Inc. v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., IPR2016-01399
`Paper No. 73 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2018)
`1011 Oral hearing transcript, August 31, 2017, Juniper Networks,
`Inc. v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., IPR2016-01389, 1391, 1397, 1399.
`1012 Opinion, ChriMar Holding Company, LLC, ChriMar Systems,
`Inc. dba CMA Technologies, Inc v. ALE USA Inc., fka Alcatel-
`Lucent Enterprise USA, Inc., 17-1848, Dkt. No. 55 (May 8,
`2018)
`1013 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Chrimar Sys., Inc., et al. v.
`Alcatel-Lucent S.A. et al., Civil Action No. 6:15-cv-163-JDL,
`Eastern District of Texas, Dkt. No. 122, March 28, 2016
`1014 Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Jury Demand and
`Counterclaim to First Amended Complaint, Cisco Sys., Inc. v.
`ChriMar Sys. Inc., 2:17-cv-13770, Dkt. 22 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
`16, 2018)
`
`1008
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Description
`
`iii
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`X
`
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`Description
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1015
`1016
`1017
`1018
`1019
`1020
`1021
`1022
`1023
`
`List of Pending Cases Involving U.S. Patent No. 8,155,012
`List of Pending Cases Involving U.S. Patent No. 8,902,760
`List of Pending Cases Involving U.S. Patent No. 9,049,019
`List of Pending Cases Involving U.S. Patent No. 9,812,825
`IEEE 802.3-1985
`IEEE 802.3i-1990
`IEEE 802.3u-1995
`IEEE International Standard ISO/IEC 8802-3: 1993
`IEEE Standards Association News & Events: Press Releases
`“IEEE 802.3 Standard for Ethernet Marks 30 Years of
`Innovation and Global Market Growth”
`1024 Declaration of Jennifer A. Babbitt
`1025 U.S. Patent No. 4,173,714 to Bloch et al.
`1026 U.S. Patent No. 4,823,070 to Nelson
`1027 U.S. Patent No. 5,089,927 to Bulan et al.
`1028 U.S. Patent No. 5,994,998 to Fisher
`1029 U.S. Patent No. 6,115,468 to De Nicolo
`1030 U.S. Patent No. 6,140,911 to Fisher
`1031 U.S. Patent No. 6,247,058 to Miller et al.
`1032 U.S. Patent No. 6,865,152 to Luhmann
`1033 WO 96/23377 to Hunter
`1034
`Swiss Patent No. CH 643 095 A5 to Peguiron, Certified Copy
`of an English Translation Version of CH 643 095 A5, and
`Declaration of John E. Dawson
`Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate for U.S. Patent No.
`8,902,760, September 18, 2017
`Ex Parte Reexamination Advisory Action for U.S. Patent No.
`8,155,012, June 14, 2017
`1037 Dan Blacharski, “Maximum Bandwidth: A Serious Guide to
`High-Speed Networking”, Que Corporation (1997)
`1038 Michael Nootbar, “Why Power Over Signal Pairs?” (March
`2000)
`
`1035
`
`1036
`
`iv
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`Previously
`Submitted
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`X
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1039 Randy H. Katz “High Performance Network and Channel-
`Based Storage”, Report UCB/CSD 91/650, September 1991
`1040 Robert Muir, “DTE power over MDI - DTE Discovery
`Process Proposal” (November 1999)
`1041 Definitions of “10Base-T” and “100Base-T”, Microsoft
`Computer Dictionary, Microsoft Press 5th ed. 2002
`Standard Microsystems Corp. Data Catalog (1982)
`http://www.bitsavers.org/components/standardMicrosystems/_
`dataBooks/1982_StandardMicrosystems.pdf
`1043 UART Datasheet (2008)
`https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/data-sheet/SCC2691.pdf
`1044 What is a DC-DC converter?
`https://www.rohm.com/electronics-basics/dc-dc-
`converters/what-is-dc-dc-converter
`1045 What is the Difference Between Linear and Switching
`Regulators? https://www.rohm.com/electronics-basics/dc-dc-
`converters/linear-vs-switching-regulators
`1046 Declaration of Matthew B. Shoemake
`1047 Declaration of Michael W. De Vries in Support of Motion to
`Appear Pro Hac Vice on Behalf of Petitioner Cisco Systems,
`Inc.
`1048 Cisco Sys., Inc. et al v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., No. 15-cv-10817,
`Dkt. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2015)
`1049 Cisco Sys., Inc. et al v. ChriMar Sys., Inc., No. 15-cv-10817,
`Dkt. 16 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2018)
`
`1042
`
`
`
`Description
`
`v
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The Board should deny ChriMar’s request to dismiss Cisco’s petition.
`
`ChriMar argues that, under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1), Cisco is barred from seeking IPR
`
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,902,760 (the “’760 patent”) because Cisco filed and voluntarily
`
`dismissed a declaratory-judgment complaint alleging invalidity of the ’760 patent.
`
`But Cisco voluntarily dismissed that complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)
`
`before any substantive activity occurred in that proceeding and before filing its
`
`petition. Cisco is not proceeding in both a district court and before the Board, and
`
`its prior complaint is not a bar to proceeding here. Under controlling Board
`
`precedent, Cisco is not precluded from seeking IPR of the ’760 patent.
`
`ChriMar relies on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Click-To-Call Techs., LP
`
`v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018), to argue that the Board should
`
`overturn its prior § 315(a)(1) decisions. But as ChriMar concedes, Click-To-Call
`
`interpreted a different statutory provision. (POPR at 2.) Those provisions have very
`
`different language and purposes. Click-To-Call’s holding that voluntary dismissal of
`
`a patent-infringement complaint under Rule 41(a) does not toll the one-year petition-
`
`filing deadline under § 315(b) was based on interpretation of the specific statutory
`
`language appearing in 315(b)—“served with a complaint”—which does not appear
`
`in 315(a)(1). In contrast to that language, under 315(a)(1), “[a]n [IPR] may not be
`
`instituted if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`petitioner…filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.”
`
`Congress’ decision to tie § 315(a)(1) to filing a civil action, rather than to serving a
`
`complaint, indicates that the triggering circumstance for 315(a)(1) is not merely the
`
`procedural act of filing a complaint. Had that been the case, Congress would have
`
`used the phrase “filed a complaint” in § 315(a).1 Its decision cannot be disregarded.
`
`Rather, consistent with the plain meaning of “action” as a “proceeding,” the
`
`Board has properly interpreted § 315(a)(1) to require existing substantive litigation
`
`in district court over a patent’s validity for the bar to apply. Clio USA, Inc., IPR2013-
`
`00438, Paper 9 at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2014) (holding that a voluntarily-dismissed
`
`declaratory-judgment action for invalidity did not bar IPR under § 315(a)(1), where
`
`the patent owner did not file an answer to the declaratory-judgment complaint).
`
`Click-To-Call does not justify ignoring the actual language of § 315(a)(1) or
`
`overturning the Board’s settled precedent interpreting it. Indeed, this is consistent
`
`with § 315(a)’s legislative history likewise making clear that its purpose is to prevent
`
`serial invalidity challenges of the same patents by a party. That concern does not
`
`
`1 “Complaint” and “civil action” are not synonyms. Quite the contrary. Black’s
`
`Law Dictionary defines “complaint” as “[t]he initial pleading that starts a civil
`
`action,” whereas “action” is defined as “an ordinary proceeding in a court of
`
`justice . . . .” See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`exist where, as here, a declaratory-judgment complaint was dismissed without
`
`prejudice such that no action remains, becoming a nullity as a matter of law.
`
`Further, the point of a dismissal without prejudice is to preserve the ability of
`
`the plaintiff to sue the defendant again on the same claim. Thus, although Click-To-
`
`Call found that this anti-preclusion principle had no application to § 315(b), which
`
`is essentially a statute of limitations, it is certainly applicable to § 315(a)(1), which
`
`is a preclusion statute. In sum, Cisco’s petition is fully consistent with both the letter
`
`and intent of § 315(a)(1), and the Board should reject ChriMar’s misguided request
`
`that the Board overturn settled precedent based on a decision regarding a different
`
`statutory provision with different language and a different purpose.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`On March 5, 2015, Cisco filed a declaratory-judgment complaint in Michigan
`
`for non-infringement and invalidity of the ’760 patent. Cisco Sys. v. ChriMar Sys.,
`
`15-cv-10817, Dkt. 1 (E.D. Mich.) (Ex. 1048). That never progressed substantively
`
`as a civil action. Instead, the Michigan court administratively closed the case for
`
`roughly 29 months while the parties awaited substantive rulings from a different
`
`district court case over a related patent to the ’760 patent in the Northern District of
`
`California. On February 17, 2018, Cisco voluntarily dismissed the Michigan
`
`declaratory judgment complaint without prejudice, before there was any substantive
`
`litigation on the validity of the ’760 patent, rendering that action a nullity. Id. at Dkt.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`16 (Ex. 1049). ChriMar did not file an answer to Cisco’s declaratory-judgment
`
`complaint before Cisco dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
`
`III. CLICK-TO-CALL DOES NOT BAR INSTITUTION
`As ChriMar concedes, Click-To-Call does not address 315(a)(1), but is instead
`
`narrowly limited to § 315(b). ChriMar nevertheless argues that the Board should
`
`extend Click-To-Call to 315(a)(1), so as to preclude IPR whenever a petitioner
`
`completed the procedural act of filing a declaratory-judgment complaint for
`
`invalidity, even if the action that complaint gave rise to was dismissed before any
`
`substantive litigation on the issue of invalidity occurred. But unlike § 315(b), whose
`
`bar arises based on service of a complaint, the bar of 315(a)(1) arises based on filing
`
`of an action. Accordingly, neither the holding nor logic of Click-To-Call applies to
`
`§ 315(a)(1), and the Board should not reconsider its interpretation of § 315(a)(1).
`
`Click-To-Call explicitly focused on the operative phrase of § 315(b), “served
`
`with a complaint,” and relied on “[t]he ordinary, contemporary, common meaning”
`
`of that phrase in arriving at its conclusion that “§ 315(b)’s time bar is implicated
`
`once a party receives notice through official delivery of a complaint in a civil action,
`
`irrespective of subsequent events.” Click-To-Call at 1330. But § 315(a)(1) does
`
`not have this language, or even mention service of a complaint or any one-year time
`
`bar. Despite these differences, ChriMar incorrectly asserts that “[t]he relevant text
`
`of § 315(a)(1) parallels that of § 315(b).” POPR at 3. But no such parallel exists
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`and ChriMar’s contrary suggestion leaves no doubt its argument is incorrect.
`
`First and foremost, Congress purposely focuses on the “civil action,” and not
`
`procedural service of a complaint, in § 315(a)(1). Had Congress wanted the
`
`preclusive effect of § 315(a)(1) to be triggered by the mere filing of a complaint—
`
`regardless of whether any actual litigation on the issue of invalidity ensued—it
`
`would have used the words “files a complaint,” as it did in § 315(b) with respect to
`
`“service of a complaint.” Instead, § 315(a)(1)’s use of the different term “civil
`
`action” indicates a different intent on the part of Congress. See, e.g., RaceTires Am.,
`
`Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (“It is a well-
`
`established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms
`
`within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning
`
`for those words.”).
`
`Moreover, the legislative history confirms the importance of the actual
`
`language—“civil action”—that Congress selected for § 315(a)(1) in comparison to
`
`§ 315(b): the clear purpose of the former is coordination of IPR with litigation, and
`
`more specifically to prevent a challenger from getting two bites at the invalidity
`
`apple, one in a district court “civil action” and a second before the Board:
`
`The 2009 Minority Report also recommended that the bill restrict
`serial administrative challenges to patents and require coordination of
`these proceedings with litigation. . . . The present bill does coordinate
`inter partes and post-grant review with litigation, barring use of these
`proceedings if the challenger seeks a declaratory judgment that a patent
`is invalid . . . .
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S1023 at S1041 (March 1, 2011). Thus, consistent with that fact
`
`that “action” refers to a “proceeding,” as described above, § 315(a)(1)’s reference to
`
`“civil action” is properly interpreted to require the pendency of a litigation where
`
`the petitioner actually had a bite at the apple. But here, Cisco and ChriMar never
`
`engaged in any litigation over the validity of the ’760 patent. Instead, Cisco
`
`voluntarily dismissed its complaint before any substantive activity took place.
`
`ChriMar never even answered the declaratory-judgment complaint before it was
`
`dismissed without prejudice. Cisco is therefore not seeking the proverbial second
`
`bite at the apple that § 315(a)(1) is designed to address, and ChriMar is not engaged
`
`in multiple proceedings over the patent requiring any coordination.
`
`Second, § 315(a)(1) uses the term “filed,” while § 315(b) uses the term
`
`“served.” Filing and service are obviously not the same, and it is well-settled that
`
`the voluntary dismissal of a complaint without prejudice nullifies the act of filing.
`
`See, e.g., 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. and Proc. § 2367 (3d. ed. 2018) (“[A]s
`
`numerous federal courts have made clear, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice .
`
`. . leaves the situation as if the action never had been filed.”). Indeed, even in Click-
`
`To-Call, the Federal Circuit recognized that dismissal of an action without prejudice
`
`leaves the action as if it had never been filed for at least certain purposes. See Click-
`
`To-Call at 1334–36. In particular, in the case of a voluntary dismissal without
`
`prejudice, issue and claim preclusion do not apply to later actions. “[T]he point of
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`a dismissal ‘without prejudice’ is to preserve, rather than eliminate, the ability of the
`
`plaintiff to sue the defendant again on the same claim.” Click-To-Call at 1348
`
`(Taranto, C.J., concurring). Thus, although Click-To-Call found that this anti-
`
`preclusion principle had no application to § 315(b), which is essentially a statute of
`
`limitations, it is certainly applicable to § 315(a)(1), which is a preclusion statute.
`
`For this reason, the Board has routinely recognized that a petitioner can elect
`
`to “unmake” its choice to file a declaratory-judgement action through a voluntary
`
`dismissal without prejudice, without being subjected to claim or issue preclusion.
`
`See Clio USA, Inc., IPR2013-00438, Paper 9 at 8 (“[W]hen a court permits the
`
`challenger to dismiss the declaratory judgment action voluntarily and without
`
`prejudice, the petitioner effectively unmakes that choice, because the action is
`
`considered never to have existed”). Dismissal without prejudice of a claim
`
`challenging the validity of a patent preserves, and does not eliminate, the ability of
`
`an accused infringer to challenge a patent before the Board rather than in district
`
`court. Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Click-To-Call simply cannot and
`
`should not be extended to § 315(a), and the Board should not reconsider its long-
`
`standing interpretation of that statute.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Cisco respectfully request that the Board institute
`
`Cisco’s Petition for IPR of the ’760 patent.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`Date: December 28, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ James Marina
`James Marina (Reg. No. 41,969)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`601 Lexington Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`Telephone: (212) 446-4800
`Fax: (212) 446-4900
`james.marina@kirkland.com
`
`Robert Kang (Reg. No. 59,609)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`555 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Telephone: (415) 439-1400
`Fax: (415) 439-1500
`robert.kang@kirkland.com
`
`Eugene Goryunov (Reg. No. 61,579)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`300 North LaSalle
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Telephone: (312) 862-2000
`Fax: (312) 862-2200
`eugene.goryunov@kirkland.com
`
`Attorneys For Petitioner Cisco
`Systems, Inc.
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01511
`Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing is being served
`
`on December 28, 2018, via email directed to counsel of record for the Patent Owner
`
`at the following:
`
`
`
`
`CHRMC0121IPR@brookskushman.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ James Marina
`James Marina
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`

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