throbber
Paper: 7
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: February 27, 2018
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`BARCO, INC., X2O MEDIA INC., and BARCO N.V.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`T-REX PROPERTY AB,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01915
`Patent 6,430,603 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, and
`DANIEL N. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MEDLEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01915
`Patent 6,430,603 B2
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Barco, Inc., X2O Media Inc., and Barco N.V. (“Petitioner”) filed a
`Petition for inter partes review of claims 13–16, 23, 42, 43, and 48 of U.S.
`Patent No. 6,430,603 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’603 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). T-
`Rex Property AB (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6
`(“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by
`statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any
`response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration
`of the Petition and Preliminary Response, we conclude the information
`presented does not show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner
`would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of claims 13–16, 23,
`42, 43, and 48 of the ’603 patent.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’603 patent is the subject of several court
`proceedings. Pet. 1–5; Paper 3, 2–5. The ’603 patent was also the subject of
`Board proceeding CBM2017-00008, but no review was instituted. Id.
`
`B. The ’603 Patent
`The ʼ603 patent describes a system “for direct placement of
`commercial advertisements, public service announcements and other content
`on electronic displays.” Ex. 1001, 2:50–53, Fig. 1. According to the ’603
`patent, the system includes a network comprising a plurality of electronic
`displays that “are located in high traffic areas in various geographic
`locations,” such as “areas of high vehicular traffic, and also at indoor and
`outdoor locations of high pedestrian traffic, as well as in movie theaters,
`
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`restaurants, sports arenas.” Id. at 2:54–60. “In preferred embodiments, each
`display is a large (for example, 23 feet by 331/2 feet), high resolution, full
`color display that provides brilliant light emission from a flat panel screen.”
`Id. at 2:62–65.
`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges claims 13–16, 23, 42, 43, and 48 of the ’603
`patent.1 Claims 13 and 48, reproduced below, are the only challenged
`independent claims.
`13. A system for presenting video or still-image content at
`selected times and locations on a networked connection of
`multiple electronic displays, said system comprising:
`a network interconnecting a plurality of electronic
`displays provided at various geographic locations;
`means for scheduling the presentation of video or still-
`image content at selected time slots on selected electronic
`displays of said network and receiving said video or still-image
`content from a content provider;
`transmission means in communication with said
`receiving means for communicating scheduled content to
`respective server devices associated with corresponding
`selected electronic displays of said network, each said
`associated device initiating display of said video or still-image
`content at selected times on a corresponding selected electronic
`display of said network.
`Id. at 8:47–62.
`48. A method for presenting video or still-image content at
`selected times and locations on a networked connection of
`multiple electronic displays, said method comprising:
`
`1 Claims 1–12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 28–33, 45–47, 49, 51–55, and 58–74 of the
`’603 patent were statutorily disclaimed. Prelim. Resp. 2; CBM2017-00008,
`Ex. 2001.
`
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`a) providing a network interconnecting a plurality of
`electronic displays at various geographic locations;
`b) enabling a content provider to schedule presentation of
`video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected
`electronic displays of said network and receiving said video or
`still-image content from a content provider;
`c) providing a plurality of server devices, each server
`device associated with a corresponding electronic display;
`d) communicating received video or still-image content
`to the associated server devices of corresponding selected
`electronic displays of said network; and
`e) said server device initiating display of said video or
`still-image content at selected times on an associated electronic
`display of said network.
`Id. at 11:34–53.
`
`D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts that claims 13–16, 23, 42, 43, and 48 are
`unpatentable based on the following grounds (Pet. 15–59):
`Reference(s)
`Basis
`Challenged Claim(s)
`Nakamura2
`§ 102(b)
`13–16, 42, 43, and 48
`Nakamura and Cho3
`§ 103(a)
`23
`Hylin4
`§ 102(b)
`13–16 and 48
`Hylin and Cho
`§ 103(a)
`23
`Hylin and Nakamura
`§ 103(a)
`42 and 43
`
`
`2 Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication H07-168544,
`published July 4, 1995 (Ex. 1003) (“Nakamura”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 5,566,353, issued Oct. 15, 1996 (Ex. 1004) (“Cho”).
`4 PCT International Publication No. WO 97/41546, pub. Nov. 6, 1997
`(Ex. 1006) (“Hylin”).
`
`4
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`II. DISCUSSION
`
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`construed according to their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under
`that standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249,
`1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`“means for scheduling”
`Independent claim 13 recites “means for scheduling the presentation
`
`of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic
`displays of said network and receiving said video or still-image content from
`a content provider.” The parties agree that the “means for scheduling”
`limitation recited in claim 13 is a means-plus-function limitation and should
`be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Pet. 11–13; Prelim.
`Resp. 5–10.
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), Petitioner must propose a
`construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, for any means-plus-
`function limitation, “identify[ing] the specific portions of the specification
`that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed
`
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`function.”5 Petitioner argues that there are two functions for the “means for
`scheduling,” which are “scheduling the presentation of video or still-image
`content at selected time slots on selected electronic displays of said network”
`and “receiving said video or still-image content from a content provider.”
`Pet. 11.
`Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure for the first
`functional phrase is the Review Schedule and Purchase Time module 60,
`which would be a special purpose server computer programmed to enable
`scheduling at a desired time slot. Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:9–13; Ex.
`1002 ¶ 27). Petitioner contends that with respect to the function of
`“receiving said video or still-image content from a content provide,” which
`is performed on the system’s Video & Still Image Review and Input module
`70, a special purpose server computer (e.g., the same one that performs the
`first function) programmed to receive content on-line is the corresponding
`structure. Id. at 11, 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:13–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28, 29).
`
`Patent Owner argues that although Petitioner recognizes that for a
`computer-implemented invention an algorithm must be identified,
`Petitioner’s proposed construction “fails to identify any actual algorithms
`and instead merely recites a computer programmed in a functional manner,”
`and, therefore, we should deny the petition for failing to comply with 37
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Prelim. Resp. 5–7. Moreover, Patent Owner argues
`that the corresponding structure for the “means for scheduling” is identified
`
`5 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) refers to § 112(f). Section 4(c) of the Leahy-
`Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
`(“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, as 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(f). Because the ’603 patent has a filing date before September 16,
`2012 (effective date of AIA), we use the citation § 112, sixth paragraph.
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`in the ’603 patent as a sequence of steps performed on a computer using
`language indicating a logical ordering of operations (i.e., an algorithm). Id.
`at 7–9 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:66–3:17, Fig. 1; Ex. 2001, 20).
`We agree with the parties’ contentions that the “means for
`scheduling,” recited in claim 13 should be construed according to 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, sixth paragraph. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d
`1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[T]he use of the word ‘means’ in a
`claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies.”).
`We further agree with the parties that a computer programmed to perform
`the two recited functions is included as part of the corresponding structure
`for the “means,” and, thus, agree that the corresponding structure includes
`software (i.e., an algorithm). For purposes of this discussion, we focus on
`the first claimed function “for scheduling the presentation of video or still-
`image content at selected time slots on selected electronic displays of said
`network.” Patent Owner argues that the corresponding structure for the
`algorithm for this claimed function is found at column 2, line 66 to column
`3, line 17 of the ’603 patent, which is reproduced as follows. Prelim. Resp.
`9.
`
`A customer of system 20, for example an in-house or agency
`representative of a consumer products company, may access a
`central information processing station of the system via the
`Internet through a Customer Interface Web Server 40. The
`customer interface web server has a commerce engine and
`permits the customer to obtain and enter security code and billing
`code information into a Network Security Router/Access module
`50. Alternatively, high usage customers of the system may
`utilize a high speed dedicated connection to module 50.
`Following access, the customer reviews available advertising
`time/locations through a Review Schedule and Purchase Time
`module 60 that permits the customer to see what time is available
`
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`on any display throughout the world and thereafter schedule and
`purchase the desired advertising time slot. Next, the customer
`transmits the advertising content on-line through the Internet, a
`direct phone line or a high speed connection (for example, ISDN
`or DSL) for receipt by the system’s Video & Still Image Review
`and Input module 70.
`Ex. 1001, 2:66–3:17 (emphasis added).
`Patent Owner argues that the above passage “recites a sequence of
`steps performed on a computer using language clearly indicating a logical
`ordering of operations (i.e., an algorithm)” that satisfies the “Federal
`Circuit’s requirements for disclosing an algorithm in the specification.”
`Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner points to the italicized sentence from the
`above passage and argues that such sentence describes the means (e.g.,
`algorithm in the form of the italicized “step”) as performing the function
`“for scheduling the presentation of video or still-image content at selected
`time slots on selected electronic displays of said network.” Id. at 9.
` We disagree with Patent Owner. The highlighted “step” from the
`above passage describes the actions of the user, not the steps the computer
`takes to perform the function “for scheduling the presentation of video or
`still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic displays of
`said network.” That a user looks at a display to see what times are available
`and then selects a time has not been shown to be actions or steps of the
`computer “for scheduling the presentation of video or still-image content at
`selected time slots on selected electronic displays of said network.”
`Importantly, the parties agree that claim 13 should be interpreted such that it
`is a computer that does the scheduling of the presentation at selected time
`slots on selected displays on a network. To us, that would necessarily
`
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`include some algorithm for performing the function, which is absent from
`the above passage.
` In sum, the corresponding structure for the “means for scheduling” is
`software with no sufficiently described algorithm for the software. It is well
`established that “the corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a
`computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the
`specification.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. vs. Int’l Game Tech., 521
`F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417
`F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Both parties’ proposed structure includes
`software, but “[s]imply reciting ‘software’ without providing some detail
`about the means to accomplish the function is not enough.” Finisar Corp. v.
`DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, 574 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`(holding disclosed “access control manager” insufficient structure to
`perform “means for assigning access to and control of the data”). Neither
`party directs us to any description, whether in prose, flow chart, or any other
`manner, that provides sufficient structure for scheduling as claimed. See
`Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340. Nor is it enough that a hypothetical person of
`ordinary skill in the art would know how to design software for scheduling a
`presentation or still-image as claimed. See Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385–
`86. Some type of algorithm would be required to complete the function of
`scheduling a presentation or still-image, but neither party has identified such
`an algorithm in the Specification.
`For these reasons, the parties have not sufficiently identified a
`structure (e.g., algorithm) corresponding to the function “for scheduling the
`presentation of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected
`
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`electronic displays of said network” recited in claim 13 as required for such
`a computer-implemented function. Thus, we are unable to construe
`independent claim 13, or any of claims 14–16, 23, 42, and 43 that depend
`from claim 13, for purposes of this Decision. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d
`1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia
`Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014)
`(Paper 65) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) for the
`proposition that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro
`forma, because they are based on speculative assumption[s] as to the
`meaning of the claims”). Because we are unable to construe any of claims
`13–16, 23, 42, and 43, we determine that there is not a reasonable likelihood
`that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of those
`claims, and, therefore, deny institution with respect to those claims.
`“time slot”
`Claim 48 recites “enabling a content provider to schedule presentation
`of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic
`displays of said network and receiving said video or still-image content from
`a content provider.” Patent Owner argues that the term “time slot” should be
`construed to mean a portion of time allocated to a particular customer’s
`content, and not to a general time frame where any number of customers’
`content may appear. Prelim. Resp. 12–14 (citing Ex. 2002, 139; Ex. 1001,
`3:8–14, 7:8–12). We determine that no express construction of the term
`“time slot” is necessary and that the plain meaning of the term would be
`sufficiently clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of the
`analysis.
`
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`For purposes of this decision we need not expressly construe any
`other claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
`795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed
`that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean
`Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs.
`in the context of an inter partes review).
`
`B. Anticipation of Claim 48 over Nakamura
`Petitioner contends claim 48 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
`as anticipated by Nakamura. Pet. 31–38.
`
`1. Nakamura
`Nakamura describes a control system that allows a registered user to
`input information at any location without constraints to display
`advertisements and information on the preregistered display devices
`selected. Ex. 1003, Abstract. Figure 1 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1(A) of Nakamura shows a system configuration and layout
`diagram.
`
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`Figure 1(A) shows slave stations 1, master station 2, and terminal
`devices 3. Id. ¶ 15. Slave station 1 is connected to terminal device 3 via
`master station 2 using a communication network. Id. Slave station 1 is
`equipped with a display device 1a and a storage means 7 accompanied by a
`transceiver 7a, and can receive and store transmissions from master station
`2. Id. Display devices comprise outdoor display panels for general public,
`including train stations, stadiums and sport facilities, electronic billboards,
`TV monitors, and cable broadcasting devices in airplanes, ships, and trains.
`Id. ¶ 14.
`An end user registers with the system, shows financial backing for the
`display reservation, prepares storage medium n for making a copy of the
`product and inputs the display reservation information m. Id. ¶ 18. After an
`end user reserves a display location, e.g., using slave station(s) 1, available
`times are displayed for the selected slave station(s). Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. End user
`selects the posting time frame T to be reserved along with display durations
`t. Id. ¶¶ 8, 22. Master station receives reservations for a posting time frame
`T and edits all reservations received during a posting time frame T into time
`slots. Id. ¶¶ 17, 25.
`
`2. Discussion
`To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged
`as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference.
`See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
`2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed.
`Cir. 2001). Although the elements must be arranged or combined in the
`same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis
`test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d
`
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`1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); accord In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed.
`Cir. 1990).
`Independent claim 48 recites “enabling a content provider to schedule
`presentation of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected
`electronic displays of said network.” Although Petitioner asserts that
`Nakamura describes “enabling a content provider to schedule presentation
`of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic
`displays of said network,” Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how that is
`so. Pet. 33–35.
`For the disputed limitation, Petitioner argues that master station 2
`includes posting software 5 that performs the function of scheduling the
`presentation of video or still-image content. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 9,
`16). Petitioner further argues that master station 2 schedules the content “at
`selected time slots on selected electronic displays,” since content is
`scheduled for display at slave station(s) for set conditions that include time
`slots. Id. at 34–35.
`As Patent Owner points out, however, it is Nakamura’s system (e.g.,
`master station 2) that schedules presentation of video or still-image content
`at selected time slots, not the content provider (which Petitioner contends is
`Nakamura’s “end user”). Prelim. Resp. 23–24. We agree with Patent
`Owner that Nakamura’s end user (e.g., content provider) schedules
`presentation of video or still-image content at selected posting time frames.
`Id. at 24. In particular, Nakamura describes that end user selects posting
`time frame T to be reserved along with display durations t. Id. ¶¶ 8, 22.
`Based on the record before us, it is the master station 2 of Nakamura that
`then receives reservations for a posting time frame T and edits all
`
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`reservations received during a posting time frame T into time slots. Id. ¶¶
`17, 25.
`Moreover, Nakamura’s description and usage of the term time frame
`means something different from its description and usage of the term time
`slot. Id. ¶¶ 8, 17, 25. Nakamura does not use those two terms
`interchangeably, but to mean two different things. Id. For example,
`Nakamura discloses the end user to “decide the major specifications for
`providing the information, such as display contents, posting time frame,
`display durations, and display facilities.” Id. ¶ 8. By contrast, Nakamura
`discloses that master station 2 fills time slots within a time frame based on
`reservation requests for particular time frames received from an operator.
`Id. ¶ 17. Petitioner does not explain, with supporting evidence, why an end
`user scheduling presentation of video or still-image content at selected
`posting time frames meets the disputed limitation of “enabling a content
`provider to schedule presentation of video or still-image content at selected
`time slots on selected electronic displays of said network.” Indeed,
`Petitioner appears to recognize that in Nakamura, it is the system, e.g.,
`master station 2 that includes posting software that performs the function of
`scheduling content “at selected time slots on selected electronic displays.”
`Pet. 33–35. Petitioner, however, has not shown how such a description
`meets a “content provider” doing the same, as the claim requires.
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has established a
`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge to claim
`48 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Nakamura.
`
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`C. Anticipation of Claim 48 over Hylin
`Petitioner contends claim 48 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
`as anticipated by Hylin. Pet. 52–55.
`
`1. Hylin
`Hylin describes a digital information system for displaying
`information on at least one display means with the aid of a projector. Ex.
`1006, Abstract. Figure 1 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 of Hylin shows a system configuration and layout diagram.
`
`
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`Figure 1 shows system 10 with control center 126 having
`communication interface 14 that connects a number of computerized devices
`16, 18, 20 placed at desired distances from another for the control of
`projectors 22. Id. at 8:15–19. External information mediator 24 is
`connected to control center 12 through computer 24 and modem 26. Id. at
`8:21–22, 9:19–22.
`Central computer 28 includes servers 1, 2, and 3, where server 1
`receives material from external information mediators 24 via modems 26.
`Id. at 12:19–21. Server 3 functions as an exposure handler (also referred to
`as item “3”) to process information and control instructions received from
`information mediator 24. Id. at 12:26–28. Exposure handler 3 organizes
`information delivered to stations 16, 18, and 20 via an exposure list. Id. at
`13:1–5. Exposure handler 3 creates an exposure list that covers a twenty-
`four hour period for information exposure or display via projectors 22. Id. at
`13:10–12. Exposure handler 3 collects and processes information relating
`to projector control instructions, wherein information from external
`information mediator is sorted into the exposure list in accordance with the
`wishes of the mediator 24 or its instructions when available space is found in
`the exposure list or in alternative places in the exposure list given by the
`information mediator. Id. at 13:12–19. Information mediators that have
`access to the same program used by computer 28, can email complete
`picture series/films that can be processed automatically and inserted into the
`exposure list. Id. at 15:8–18.
`
`
`6 Figure 1 refers to element 12 as “control central.” Element 12 also is
`described as “control centre.” Id. at 8:15. For purposes of this decision, we
`refer to element 12 as “control center.”
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`2. Discussion
`Independent claim 48 recites “enabling a content provider to schedule
`presentation of video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected
`electronic displays of said network.” Although Petitioner asserts that Hylin
`describes “enabling a content provider to schedule presentation of video or
`still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic displays of
`said network,” Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how that is so. Pet.
`52–53.
`Petitioner argues that Hylin describes an embodiment in which
`external information mediators have their own version of the software used
`by server 3 to create an exposure list that enables the mediators to create
`their own exposure lists remotely, and then deliver the finished exposure
`lists to the central computer by e-mail. Id. at 53 (citing Ex. Ex. 1006, 14:10–
`13, 14:18–22, 15:8–18, 20:26–21:1; Ex. 1002 ¶ 112). Petitioner further
`contends that after the exposure list is received by server 1, an exposure
`handler 3 on server 3 uses the information to create its own exposure list. Id.
`(citing Ex. 1006, 13:12–19). Petitioner concludes that “server 3 uses the
`exposure list created by the ‘external information mediator’ to perform
`scheduling, thereby enabling a content provider to schedule presentation of
`video or still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic
`displays of said network.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 113).
`We agree with Patent Owner, however, that Petitioner has not shown
`that it is the external information mediator (e.g., content provider) that
`schedules presentations at selected time slots. Hylin describes that the
`exposure handler creates an exposure list. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 13:10 (“the
`server or exposure handler 3 has set-up or created an exposure list”). Hylin
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`further describes that the external information mediator may deliver
`picture/films using its own version of software that exposure handler uses to
`introduce the pictures/films into the exposure list. Ex. 1006, 14:18–22,
`20:26–21:1. Hylin further describes that an exposure list is sent from control
`center 12 to station computer 34 that includes a series of instructions as to
`what shall be shown, where it shall be shown, when it shall be shown, and
`for how long. Ex. 1006, 18:1–5. That description, however, is with respect
`to the exposure list (with the series of instructions) being sent by control
`center 12 to station computer 34. Such description, however, does not mean
`that the content provider (external information mediator) sends an exposure
`list to the control center with the same information. Id.
`Importantly, Petitioner does not show, with sufficient supporting
`evidence, that the emailed information from the content provider (external
`information mediator) contains, for example, a schedule of selected time
`slots. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Hylin meets the disputed
`limitation of “enabling a content provider to schedule presentation of video
`or still-image content at selected time slots on selected electronic displays of
`said network.” Indeed, Petitioner appears to recognize that it is Hylin’s
`server 3 that performs the scheduling at selected time slots on selected
`electronic displays. Pet. 53. Petitioner, however, has not shown that the
`“content provider” performs the scheduling at time slots on selected
`electronic displays. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has
`established a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its
`challenge to claim 48 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
`anticipated by Hylin.
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01915
`Patent 6,430,603 B2
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the
`unpatentability of the challenged claims of the ’603 patent.
`
`IV. ORDER
`For the foregoing reasons, it is
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims, and
`no trial is instituted.
`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Edward K. Runyan
`Michael Neustal
`Neustal Law Offices, LTD
`edward@neustel.com
`michael@neustal.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Steven R. Daniels
`Gurtej Singh
`Farneu Daniels PC
`sdaniels@farneydaniels.com
`tsingh@farneydaniels.com
`
`19
`
`

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