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Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel. 571-272-7822
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`
`
`Paper 18
`Entered: March 5, 2018
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`MONOSOL RX, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ICOS CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`_______________
`
`
`Before SHERIDAN K. SNEDDEN, SUSAN L. C. MITCHELL, and
`ZHENYU YANG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`YANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`I.
`
`MonoSol Rx, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for an inter partes
`
`review of claims 112 of U.S. Patent No. 6,943,166 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the
`
`’166 patent”). Paper 4 (“Pet.”). We denied the Petition. Paper 11 (“Dec.”).
`
`Petitioner filed a request for rehearing of the Decision. Paper 12 (“Reh’g
`
`Req.”). With our authorization, ICOS Corporation (“Patent Owner”) filed
`
`an opposition to the request for rehearing (Paper 14), and Petitioner filed a
`
`reply (Paper 15 (“Reply”)).
`
`For the following reasons, we deny Petitioner’s request.
`
`II.
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the
`
`decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of
`
`discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of
`
`law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.”
`
`PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically,
`
`all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`Claim 1 of the ’166 patent is directed to a method of treating sexual
`
`dysfunction comprising “orally administering one or more unit dose
`
`containing about 1 to about 20 mg, up to a maximum total dose of 20 mg per
`
`day,” of tadalafil. In our Decision denying the Petition, we declined to
`
`institute inter partes review of the challenged claims as obvious over the
`
`teachings of Daugan, (1) alone, (2) in combination with the Guideline for
`
`Industry, or (3) in combination with the FDA Petition. Dec. 7–11.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`In its rehearing request, Petitioner argues that (1) we overlooked the
`
`Declaration of Dr. Roger Williams (Ex. 1010), “which provides clear
`
`guidance as to the form of the claimed invention and how a person of
`
`ordinary skill would achieve the claimed dose;” (2) our “factual findings
`
`with respect to the FDA petition and admitted prior art were not supported
`
`by substantial evidence;” and (3) “institution would be consistent with the
`
`Board’s prior decision in IPR2017-00323, which relied on the same
`
`evidence that Dr. Williams analyzed and that Petitioner had submitted in this
`
`Request.” Reh’g Req. 1–2. We are not persuaded.
`
`As a preliminary matter, we note the Petition improperly incorporates
`
`by reference a large amount of the Williams Declaration. For example,
`
`Petitioner argues that “a POSA would only need routine optimization to find
`
`that 1 to about 20 mg, up to a maximum total dose of 20 mg per day would
`
`be obvious even in view of Daugan ‘675 alone.” Pet. 9. As support, the
`
`Petition cites to 26 paragraphs and over 20 pages of the Williams
`
`Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 105, 131–155). Merely a paragraph
`
`later, still on page 9 of the Petition, Petitioner contends that “[t]o the extent
`
`it was not obvious based on Daugan ‘675 alone, it would have been obvious
`
`to a POSA to optimize the dose range to minimize adverse side effects while
`
`maintaining pharmaceutical efficacy, as was typical for the pharmaceutical
`
`industry.” Id. As support, the Petition cites to another over 30 paragraphs of
`
`the Williams Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1010, ¶¶ 158–188). By
`
`incorporating nearly 60 paragraphs of the Williams Declaration into one
`
`page of the Petition, Petitioner circumvents the page/word number limits.
`
`Our Rules do not permit this practice. See 37 C.F.R. § 42. 6(3) (“Arguments
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another
`
`document.”); § 42.24 (providing page/word number limits for the papers).
`
`Nevertheless, we did not, as Petitioner asserts, overlook the Williams
`
`Declaration. After all, Petitioner presents the Williams Declaration to
`
`support its arguments, which we addressed. See Dec. 8 (discussing the
`
`“routine optimization” argument), 9 (discussing the argument regarding
`
`optimizing the dose range to minimize adverse side effects while
`
`maintaining pharmaceutical efficacy). If we had not considered nearly 60
`
`paragraphs of the Williams Declaration as supporting evidence, we would
`
`have dismissed those contentions as unsupported attorney arguments. In
`
`other words, not explicitly citing the Williams Declaration at every turn in
`
`the Decision does not suggest we overlooked it.1
`
`Petitioner, in its rehearing request, also alleges that we overlooked the
`
`FDA Petition in view of admitted prior art. Reh’g Req. 10–11. According
`
`to Petitioner, we failed to account for the similarities between tadalafil and
`
`sildenafil, and tadalafil’s higher potency than sildenafil. Id. at 10–12. We
`
`disagree. In the Decision, we cited, in length, the disclosures of the FDA
`
`Petition (Dec. 7), and summarized it as addressing the side effects of
`
`
`1 In our Decision, we stated that “a claimed invention is not shown to be
`unpatentable where ‘the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular
`form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.’” Dec. 9 (citing In re
`O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Petitioner appears to contend that
`it is erroneous, or at least improper, that we cited In re O’Farrell because that case
`was from “1988, when [obvious to try] was still ‘improper grounds for a § 103
`rejection.’” See Reply 1. We disagree. As discussed in a 2009, a post-KSR
`decision, In re O’Farrell clarifies the meaning of obvious to try and differentiates
`between proper and improper applications of obvious to try. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d
`1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating KSR “actually resurrects [the Federal
`Circuit]’s own wisdom in In re O’Farrell”).
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`sildenafil (id. at 9). We addressed Petitioner’s argument that “in view of the
`
`FDA Petition, an ordinary artisan ‘would have known that based on the
`
`market pressure to compete with sildenafil, a drug manufacturer would have
`
`to market a drug that had the same or better efficacy, and in a dose that
`
`maintained efficacy but that also minimized adverse effects.’” Id. (citing
`
`Pet. 25) (emphasis added). We, however, found Petitioner’s argument
`
`unpersuasive because the FDA Petition only provided “general guidance” to
`
`identify a maximum daily dosage of tadalafil. Id. Petitioner may disagree
`
`with our analysis; that, however, does not mean we overlooked the evidence.
`
`Petitioner is correct that we previously instituted trial in
`
`IPR2017-00323. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. ICOS Corp., IPR2017-
`
`00323 (“Mylan IPR”) (PTAB June 12, 2017) (Paper 12). Petitioner is also
`
`correct that Dr. Williams analyzed the prior art asserted in Mylan IPR.2
`
`Reh’g Req. 12–13. Evidence of the record in the two cases, however, is not
`
`the same. As we explained in Mylan IPR,
`
`Petitioner points to SNDA for teaching that sildenafil is
`therapeutically effective in treating ED at doses as low as 5 mg
`and as high as 100 mg. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1008, 126–28).
`Citing the testimony of Dr. Grass, Petitioner argues that “these
`doses, adjusted for the increased potency of tadalafil, are
`expected to be approximately equivalent to tadalafil doses of
`2.8 mg and 57 mg, respectively.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79); see
`also Ex. 1002 ¶ 77 (calculating the predicted doses of tadalafil
`based on the doses of sildenafil and the ratio of IC50 values).
`
`Petitioner emphasizes the teaching of SNDA that a dose of 25 mg
`sildenafil “is already fairly high on the dose-response curve.”
`Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1008, 70). According to Petitioner, 25 mg of
`
`
`2 Petitioner in this case, however, challenges claims 1–12 of the ’166 based on
`grounds different from the one asserted in the Mylan IPR. Compare Pet. 6–7 with
`Mylan IPR, Paper 2, 27.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`sildenafil is approximately equivalent to 15 mg of tadalafil. Id.
`(citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–78). Relying on the testimony of
`Dr. Grass, Petitioner contends that an ordinary artisan “would
`have reasonably expected a 15 mg dose of tadalafil to be near the
`top of the tadalafil dose-response curve based on the PDE5
`inhibition results disclosed” in the SNDA. Id. (citing Ex. 1002
`¶ 78).
`
`Mylan IPR, Paper 12, 13.
`
`In Mylan IPR, the expert testimony provided detailed analysis of the
`
`tadalafil dosage. Petitioner in this case does not refer us to such evidence.
`
`Thus, we see no inconsistency in our disposition of the two cases.
`
`In sum, in the Petition, Petitioner did not establish a reasonable
`
`likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of the
`
`challenged claims. On rehearing, we see no error in our findings of fact or
`
`conclusions of law. Thus, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated
`
`that we abused our discretion in denying institution of the challenged claims.
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`Accordingly, it is
`
`ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for rehearing is denied.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00412
`Patent 6,943,166 B1
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Harold Fox
`hfox@steptoe.com
`
`Gretchen Miller
`gmiller@steptoe.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Mark Feldstein
`mark.feldstein@finnegan.com
`
`Joshua Goldberg
`joshua.goldberg@finnegan.com
`
`Yieyie Yang
`yieyie.yang@finnegan.com
`
`Maureen Queler
`maureen.queler@finnegan.com
`
`Mark Stewart
`stewart_mark@lilly.com
`
`Dan Wood
`wood_dan_l@lilly.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`

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