UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________
`
`T-MOBILE US, INC., T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC., ERICSSON INC., and
`TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`TRACBEAM, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`__________________
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00745
`Patent 7,764,231
`__________________
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`
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`
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`
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JOINDER
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`
`
`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________
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`T-MOBILE US, INC., T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC., ERICSSON INC., and
`TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`TRACBEAM, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`__________________
`
`Case No. IPR2016-00745
`Patent 7,764,231
`__________________
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JOINDER
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`Exhibit List
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`Exhibit No.
`2001
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`2002
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`Description
`Order, dkt. #75, TracBeam, LLC., v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et. al.,
`Case No. 6:14-CV-678 (E. D. Tx. June 2, 2015)
`Notice of Compliance regarding Reasonable Number of Asserted
`Claims, dkt. #88, TracBeam, LLC., v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et. al.,
`Case No. 6:14-CV-678 (E. D. Tx. June 24, 2015)
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Petitioners seek to join a Petition that presents a single ground challenging
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`claim 17 of the ‘231 Patent as obvious based on combining Loomis and Wortham.
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`In IPR2015-01687, Petitioners previously challenged claim 17 of the ‘231 Patent
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`and likewise asserted obviousness based on combining Loomis and Wortham.
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`They lost on this issue. Paper 10 at 19 (“[W]e are not persuaded that Petitioner has
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`established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to claim 17 as
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`obvious over Loomis and Wortham.”). Petitioners now seek a second bite at the
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`apple using the Board’s guidance from its prior Decision to try to correct
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`deficiencies in their original Petition. Petitioners’ Motion and second-try Petition
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`should be rejected.
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`The controlling statute, 35 U.S.C. Section 315(c), provides:
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`If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or
`her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any
`person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the
`Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or
`the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines
`warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.1
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`Based on this statute, the Board should reject Petitioners’ Motion and
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`corresponding Petition for two independent reasons:
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`Reason 1: Petitioners cannot join their own Petition.
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`1
`Emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`1
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Reason 2: Relevant factors that the Board considers before exercising its
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`discretion to grant Petitioners’ Motion and institute Petitioners’ second-try Petition
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`demonstrate that the Board should not exercise its discretion here.
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`Each reason is addressed in turn.2
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`Petitioners cannot circumvent Section 315(b)’s one-year statutory bar
`by filing a new Petition and then joining it to their own Petition.
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`PTAB panels have correctly determined, based on persuasive reasoning, that
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`I.
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`
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`“35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not permit the joinder of a party to a proceeding in which
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`it already is a party.” Eizo Corporation v. Barco N.V., IPR2014-00778, Paper 18
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`at 8 (Oct. 10, 2014) (McKone concurring); SkyHawke Technologies, LLC. v. L&H
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`Concepts, LLC, IPR2014-01485, Paper 13 at 3 (March 20, 2015) (“A person
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`cannot be joined as a party to a proceeding in which it is already a party”).
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`As explained in detail in these (and other) decisions, precluding a party from
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`joining its own petition:
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`• is consistent with “the plain language of § 315(c)” and “harmonious with the
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`plain language of § 315(b)” (Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.,
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`IPR2014-00508, Paper 18 at 11 (Sept. 25, 2014));
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`• is supported by the legislative history (SkyHawke, IPR2014-01485, Paper 13
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`2
`For purposes of this Opposition, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioners’
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`Facts 1-9 but disputes Facts 10 and 11.
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`2
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`at 4 (“the legislative history supports our view that § 315(c) provides for
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`joinder of only a person who is not already a party to the proceeding”));
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`• “reduces Patent Owner harassment” (Target, IPR2014-00508, Paper 18 at
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`10); and
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`• “reduces the burden on Office resources” (Target, IPR2014-00508, Paper 14
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`at 10-11).
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`Because Petitioners are seeking to join “a proceeding in which [they] already [are]
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`a party” (Eizo, IPR2014-00778, Paper 18 at 8), this Motion should be denied.
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`III. The Board should not exercise its discretion and permit Petitioners’
`Motion and second-try Petition.
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`The Director “in his or her discretion, may join” someone to an IPR. 35
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`
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`U.S.C. 315§(c); Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti Inc., IPR2015-01054, Paper 10 at 7
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`(Oct. 22, 2015) (“the decision to grant joinder is discretionary”). As the moving
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`parties, Petitioners have the burden of demonstrating that joinder is justified and
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`that the Board should exercise its discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (“The moving
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`party has the burden of proof.”).
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`In determining whether to exercise its discretion to permit joinder, the Board
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`considers whether the petition that is proposed to be joined to an instituted IPR is
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`one “that warrants the institution of an inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. §315(c)).
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`When evaluating whether institution is warranted for second-try petitions—
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`3
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`petitions that challenge claims that were previously challenged in a prior petition
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`by the same party where the Board did not institute with respect to these claims—
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`the Board considers four factors described in a series of seven Informative
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`Opinions.3 Because only a petition that should be instituted can be joined to an
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`existing IPR, as demonstrated below, the Board considers these same four factors
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`when a joinder motion arises in in the context of such second-try petitions. The
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`four factors are: (1) whether the proposed joining petition attempts to use the
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`Board’s prior decision as a roadmap to remedy deficiencies; whether the same or
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`substantially the same (2) prior art, and (3) arguments were previously presented;
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`and (4) whether the petitioner provides persuasive justifications for filing the
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`3
`These Informative Opinions, all denying institution, are: Medtronic, Inc. v.
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`Nuvasive, Inc., IPR2014-00487, Paper 8 (Sep. 11, 2014); Unified Patents, Inc. v.
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`PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC and Level 3 Communications, LLC, IPR2014-
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`00702, Paper 13 (July 24, 2014); Prism Pharma Co. v. Choongwae Pharma Corp.,
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`IPR2014-00315, Paper 14 (July 8, 2014); Unilever v. The Procter & Gamble
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`Company, IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (July 7, 2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert
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`Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc., IPR2014-00436, Paper 17 (June 19, 2014);
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`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd., IPR2013-00324, Paper
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`19 (Nov. 21, 2013); and ZTE Corp. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2013-
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`00454, Paper 12 (Sept. 25, 2013).
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`4
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`second-try petition. Here, each factor weighs against granting this Motion.
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Factor 1: The first factor is whether the second petition “uses our prior
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`Decision … to bolster challenges that were advanced, unsuccessfully, in the [prior]
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`Petition.” Unilever, IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 at 8; LG Electronics, Inc. v. ATI
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`Technologies ULC, IPR2015-01620, Paper 10 at 7-8 (Feb. 2, 2016) (rejecting
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`Motion for Joinder “where our Decision to Institute has been used as a roadmap to
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`remedy deficiencies in an earlier petition.”).
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`The Board has observed that permitting challengers to use a second petition
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`to correct defects from an earlier petition would improperly enable a petitioner to
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`circumvent an earlier Board ruling. Butamax Advanced v. Gevo, IPR2014-00581,
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`Paper 8 at 10, 13 (Oct. 14, 2014) (second petition “is effectively an attempt to
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`request rehearing of a prior decision” and improperly seeks to “use our prior
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`decision as a roadmap to remedy [petitioner’s] prior, deficient challenge”). And it
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`would remove incentives for petitioners to thoroughly address each claim
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`limitation in a first petition. ZTE, IPR2013-00454, Paper 12 at 5-6 (“The Board is
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`concerned about encouraging, unnecessarily, the filing of petitions which are
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`partially inadequate.”); see Conopco, Inc. v. The Procter & Gamble Co. IPR2014-
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`00628, Paper 23 at 5 (March 20, 2015) (Petitioners’ approach “would allow
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`petitioners to file ‘follow-on’ second petitions in order to ‘correct deficiencies
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`noted’ by the Board in decisions that deny a first petition. … That approach would
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`5
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`allow petitioners to [file] serial petitions, using our decisions on institution as a
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`roadmap, until a ground is advanced that results in review—a practice that would
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`tax Board resources, and force patent owners to defend multiple attacks.”).
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`The single ground Petitioners present in their second-try Petition attempts to
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`correct deficiencies identified by the Board in their prior Decision:
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`The Board’s previous decision not to institute review of this claim
`was based solely on a limitation from Claim Element 17.9 …The
`analysis below for Claim Element 17.9 explains how that limitation is
`indeed satisfied by the Loomis-Wortham combination.
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`Pet. at 41;
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`[Petitioner’s second Petition] provides further clarification on how the
`Loomis-Wortham combination satisfies the claim limitations relied on
`in the Board’s prior decision not to institute review of this claim.
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`Pet. at 8; Mot. at 10.
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`Petitioners’ second-try Petition improperly “seeks to revive and augment
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`challenges that were rejected in the [‘1687] proceeding[s], [a]rmed with the
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`Board’s guidance as to the flaws in the [prior Petition].” Unilever, IPR2014-
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`00506, Paper 17 at 8. Accordingly, this Motion (and corresponding Petition)
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`should be denied because “the present Petition is directed at addressing
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`shortcomings in the [‘1687] Petition that we identified in the [‘1687] Institution
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`Decision.” Microsoft, IPR2015-01054, Paper 10 at 15.
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`6
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`Factors 2 and 3: The second and third factors that the Board considers are
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`whether the petition includes the same or substantially the same art and arguments
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`that were previously presented. 35 U.S.C. Section 325(d) provides:
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`In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding … the
`Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or
`request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or
`arguments previously were presented to the Office.
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`Asserting art and arguments that were previously presented unsuccessfully are
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`strong signals that a petitioner improperly seeks “second bites at the apple.”
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`Butamax, IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 at 12-13. Accordingly, the Board regularly
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`uses its discretion to deny second-try petitions if they include the same art and
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`arguments:
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`[W]e reject the Petition … based on our exercise of discretion under 35
`U.S.C. § 325(d) because the “same or substantially the same prior art or
`arguments previously were presented to the Office.”
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`Medtronic, IPR2014-00436, Paper 17 at 3 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)); SAS
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`Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-00581, Paper 15 at 4 (Dec. 30,
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`2013) (same); Prism, IPR2014-00315, Paper 14 at 13 (same); Unilever, IPR2014-
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`00506, Paper 17 at 6, 8 (same); Conopco v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., IPR2014-
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`00628, Paper 21 at 6 (Oct. 20, 2014) (same).
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`The single ground asserted in the current Petition is based on the same art
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`7
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`and arguments that Petitioners previously asserted in their ‘1687 Petition. Mot. at
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`10 (“The grounds of invalidity in the New ’231 Petition are the same as those
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`advanced in IPR2015-01687 (i.e., that Claim 17 is obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103
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`over Loomis in view of Wortham).”). Accordingly, the Board should deny this
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`Motion “because the ‘same or substantially the same prior art or arguments
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`previously were presented to the Office.’” Medtronic, IPR2014-00436, Paper 17 at
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`3 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)); ATopTech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., IPR2015-00760,
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`Paper 15 at 8 (July 21, 2015) (denying Motion for Joinder where “Petitioner is
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`requesting a second chance to address the unpatentability of claims 5 and 6 over
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`the same prior art at issue in the First Petition.”)
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`Factor 4: The fourth factor is whether petitioner provides persuasive
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`justifications for filing the second-try petition. As explained above, “[a]llowing
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`similar, serial challenges to the same patent, by the same petitioner, risks
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`harassment of patent owners and frustration of Congress’s intent in enacting the
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`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.” Butamax, IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 at 13.
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`Accordingly, the Board considers whether petitioner provides “persuasive
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`reasoning” (rather than manufactured justifications) for the second-try petition.
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`Medtronic, IPR2014-00487, Paper 8 at 7; Intelligent Bio-Systems, IPR2013-00324,
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`Paper 19 at 6. Each of Petitioners’ three alleged justifications for its second-try
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`Petition fails and is addressed in turn.
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`8
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`Alleged justification 1: “Patent Owner strategically asserted an
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`unreasonable number of claims solely to prejudice Petitioners’ ability to utilize the
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`inter partes review process.” Pet. at 8. This manufactured justification fails.
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`First, the necessary premise underlying Petitioners’ first justification is that
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`if a patent owner has asserted an “unreasonable” number of claims in a parallel
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`litigation, a petitioner is justified in bringing a second-try petition if its first-try
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`petition fails to persuade the Board. There is no legal or logical support for this
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`premise. When a patent owner asserts multiple claims in a co-pending litigation, a
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`petitioner may be justified in filing multiple petitions, allowing it to sufficiently
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`challenge the asserted claims and remain within the 60-page limit per petition. See
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`e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 48612 at 48635 (to address the page limit, “the filing of multiple
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`petitions directed to subsets of related claims should be considered”). This is the
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`approach Petitioners took here, filing 10 Petitions including five challenging the
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`‘231 Patent. However, a patent owner’s assertion of multiple claims in litigation
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`cannot possibly justify using follow-up petitions as “a feedback loop by which a
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`petitioner may perfect its challenges through a subsequent filing.” Travelocity.com
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`et al. v. Cronos Technologies, CBM2015-00047, Paper 7 at 13 (June 15, 2015).
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`Similarly, Petitioners incorrectly contend that the number of asserted claims
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`“made it unrealistic to proactively address each of Patent Owner’s conceivable
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`arguments in the original IPRs.” Mot. at 8. Even when only one claim is asserted
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`9
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`in district court litigation and challenged in an IPR, the petition is not the place to
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`address Patent Owner’s arguments. That is the place of the reply. See 77 Fed.
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`Reg. 48767. The petition is the place to establish a prima facie case. 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found
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`in the prior art”). Petitioners’ failure to establish a prima facie case for claim 17 in
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`its first-try Petition does not justify a second try.
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`Second, Petitioners provide zero factual support for their assertion that
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`Patent Owner strategically asserted an unreasonable number of claims solely to
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`prejudice Petitioner in these IPRs. Facts omitted by Petitioners in their Statement
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`of Material Facts (Mot. at 3-6) are:
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`1. The District Court required Patent Owner to “elect a reasonable number of
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`asserted claims” by June 23, 2015—more than six weeks before Petitioners’
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`IPR petition deadline. Ex. 2001 at 2.
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`2. Patent Owner timely complied with the Court’s Order, serving a narrowed
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`set of asserted claims. Ex. 2002.
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`3. After Patent Owner served its narrowed set of asserted claims, Petitioners
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`never went to the Court to complain that the narrowed set of asserted claims
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`was not “reasonable” and did not seek to require Patent Owner to further
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`reduce the number of asserted claims.
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`4. Petitioners never argued to TracBeam or the Court that the number of
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`10
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`asserted claims hampered their ability to prepare IPR Petitions; Petitioners
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`never even suggested that they were preparing Petitions before filing them.
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`Only now, after the Board rejected their Petitions as to certain challenged claims,
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`do Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by the number of asserted claims.
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`Alleged justification 2: deposition testimony from the inventor that “was not
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`available” when Petitioners filed their first-try Petition “confirms the teachings of
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`Loomis and Wortham.” Mot. at 1; 9. This is another manufactured justification.
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`First, the necessary premise underlying this justification is that, if the Board
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`rejects a first-try petition, a petitioner can justify a second-try petition by creating
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`“a more complete record” (Mot. at 2; 7) in an attempt to backfill holes in its prior
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`petition. There is no legal or logical support for such a premise, which, as
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`described above, is inconsistent with Board decisions that reject “‘second bites at
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`the apple,’ which use our prior decision as a roadmap to remedy [petitioner’s]
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`prior, deficient challenge[s].” Butamax, IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 at 12-13.
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`Second, to the extent that an inventor’s testimony regarding the prior art is
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`relevant, the inventor’s testimony cited by Petitioner does not address “the prior
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`art”—Loomis and Wortham. Rather, the inventor suggested that there “probably
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`was” a version of cell tower triangulation somewhere in the prior art—“it may or
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`may not be in certain circumstances.” See Pet. 6-7 (quoting Ex. 1027 at 332:11-
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`333:4, 334:2-12). Accordingly, the testimony cited by Petitioners, does not
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`11
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`address Loomis and Wortham, and thus does not “confirm[] the teachings of
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Loomis and Wortham.” Mot. at 9.
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`Third, “Petitioner had control of how it gathered and presented other
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`evidence regarding” the missing elements—e.g., to the extent such evidence
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`existed, they could have included it in their expert’s declaration or sought to
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`depose the inventor prior to filing their initial Petition.4 Microsoft, IPR2015-
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`01054, Paper 10 at 16. Their reliance on the recent deposition is pure pretext;
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`Petitioners are simply trying to point to something that happened recently to justify
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`their second-try Petition. Accordingly, the Board should “exercise [its] discretion
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`to deny Petitioner’s Joinder Motion.” Id.
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`
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`Alleged justification 3: granting this Motion and allowing Petitioners’
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`second-try Petition is consistent with the “public interest.” Mot. 1. The premise
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`underlying Petitioners’ argument is that any time a petition fails to satisfy its
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`4 Moreover, prior to filing their initial Petitions, Petitioners had access to the
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`full record from prior cases involving TracBeam’s patents. That record includes
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`multiple days of deposition testimony from the co-inventors. Contrary to
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`Petitioners’ suggestion, the recent deposition of one inventor was not the first time
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`that the inventors were questioned about the state of the art. The co-inventors were
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`questioned extensively on this topic in the prior cases and provided substantively
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`identical testimony that Petitioners decided not to include in their initial Petitions.
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`12
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`burden as to some but not all claims, the petitioner should be permitted to use the
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Board’s guidance to circumvent the statutory one-year bar and file a second-try
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`petition. This premise is contrary to the public interest:
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`Although Petitioner argues that there are efficiencies to gain from
`addressing the same claims in the inter partes review that are at issue
`in the pending district court proceeding…, we are mindful that
`permitting second chances without constraint undermines judicial
`efficiency by expending the Board’s limited resources on issues that
`were not presented adequately the first time around.
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`ATopTech, IPR2015-00760, Paper 14 at 8–9.
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`Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s use
`of our Decision as a roadmap for a second attempt secures “the just,
`speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See ZTE
`Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., Case IPR2013-00454, 2013
`WL 8595746, at *3 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2013) (“A decision to institute
`review on some claims should not act as an entry ticket, and a how-to
`guide . . . for filing a second petition to challenge those claims which
`it unsuccessfully challenged in the first petition.”). The instant
`Petition simply presents arguments that reasonably could have been
`made in IPR2014-001145, but were not.
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`ATopTech, IPR2015-00760, Paper 14 at 9.
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`
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`Moreover, the statutory one-year window establishes the appropriate balance
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`between: (a) “ensur[ing] the …. speedy … resolution of a proceeding” (Office
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`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48758 (Aug. 14, 2012)) that is co-
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`pending with underlying litigation, and (b) providing a defendant a reasonable
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`opportunity to understand the patent claims and develop arguments before filing an
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`IPR. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (“the [one-year] deadline
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`afford[s] defendants a reasonable opportunity to identify and understand the patent
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`claims that are relevant to the litigation.”).
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`To maintain this proper balance, the Board should only permit joinder after
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`the one-year statutory bar if there is a change of circumstance or other good cause.
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`For example, if a patent owner asserts new claims in the co-pending litigation and
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`the petitioner diligently files a motion for joinder after, such changed circumstance
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`may justify the exception (e.g., to allow the new claims to be included in an IPR).
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`There are no such changed circumstances here. See Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
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`et al. v. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, IPR2015-00820, Paper 12 at 4 (May 15, 2015)
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`(“Thus, we do not consider this to be a case of changed circumstances—such as
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`new claims being asserted during district court litigation or new threats of
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`infringement—that would make joinder an equitable remedy…. This appears,
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`instead, to be a case where Petitioner seeks to use our Decision to Institute… as a
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`guide to remedy deficiencies in the earlier filed petition, i.e., a ‘second bite at the
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`apple.’”).
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`
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`Petitioners rely on Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Virginia Innovations Scis.,
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`Inc., IPR2014-00557, Paper No. 10 (June 13, 2014) as support for its proposition
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`14
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`that, based on public interest, “other panels have joined newly field IPRs in similar
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`circumstances.” Mot. at 10. Recent decisions, however, reject such second-try
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`petitions as being inconsistent with the public interest, especially in situations like
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`this one where a petitioner uses the prior Board’s decision as a roadmap:
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`While in some cases, we have permitted joinder as an expedient way
`to obtain a just resolution of all issues, e.g., Samsung v. Virginia, Case
`IPR2014-00557, slip op. at 18 (PTAB June 13, 2014) (Paper 10), in
`others, particularly where our Decision to Institute has been used as a
`roadmap to remedy deficiencies in an earlier petition, we exercised
`our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and declined to grant joinder.
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`LG, IPR2015-01620, Paper 10 at 7-8; see also ATopTech, IPR2015-00760, Paper
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`14 at 9 (“we also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s citations to Samsung.”).
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`IV. Conclusion
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`Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder should be rejected for the reasons set forth
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`above.
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`
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`Date: April 7, 2016
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
`
`/Sean Luner/
`Sean Luner, Esq.
`Registration No. 36,588
`DOVEL & LUNER
`201 Santa Monica Blvd, Suite 600
`Santa Monica, CA 90401
`Telephone (310) 656-7066
`sean@dovel.com
`Counsel for Patent Owner
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`By:
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Certificate of Filing and Service
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`I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing OPPOSITION
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`TO MOTION FOR JOINDER and EXHIBITS 2001 and 2002 are being filed
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`via PRPS and served by electronic mail this 7th day of April 2016 on counsel for
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`Petitioners as follows:
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`Brian W. Oaks
`BAKER BOTTS, LLP,
`98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
`Austin, TX 78701
`Telephone (512) 322-5470
`Facsimile (512) 322-3621
`brian.oaks@bakerbotts.com
`
`Douglas M. Kubehl
`BAKER BOTTS, LLP,
`2001 Ross Avenue
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone (214) 953-6486
`Facsimile (214) 661-4486
`doug.kubehl@bakerbotts.com
`
`Chad C. Walters
`BAKER BOTTS, LLP,
`2001 Ross Avenue
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone (214) 953-6511
`Facsimile (214) 661-4511
`chad.walters@bakerbotts.com
`
`Ross G. Culpepper
`BAKER BOTTS, LLP,
`2001 Ross Avenue
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone (214) 953-6543
`16
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`Case No. IPR2016-00745
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`Facsimile (214) 661-4543
`ross.culpepper@bakerbotts.com
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`/Sean Luner/
`Sean Luner, Esq.
`Registration No. 36,588
`DOVEL AND LUNER
`201 Santa Monica Blvd, Suite 600
`Santa Monica, CA 90401
`Main Telephone (310) 656-7066
`sean@dovel.com
`Counsel for Patent Owner
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`17
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`Date: April 7, 2016
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