throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 36
`Entered: March 29, 2017
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`ALARM.COM INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VIVINT, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`In its Petition requesting an inter partes review, Alarm.com Inc.
`
`(“Petitioner”) asserted the unpatentability of claims 1–54 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,884,713 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’713 patent”), owned by Vivint, Inc. (“Patent
`
`Owner”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”), 4. The Petition identifies Alarm.com Inc. and
`
`Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. as real parties in interest. Id. at 1. On March 30,
`
`2016, we issued a Decision granting institution of inter partes review of
`
`claims 1–54 of the ’713 patent. Paper 12 (“Dec. on Inst.”), 36. Patent
`
`Owner then filed a Patent Owner Response to the Petition (Paper 19, “PO
`
`Resp.”), and Petitioner replied (Paper 21, “Pet. Reply”). A consolidated
`
`hearing for the instant proceeding and related Case IPR2015-01977 was held
`
`on November 30, 2016. A transcript (Paper 35, “Tr.”) of that hearing is
`
`included in the record.
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6, and this Final Written
`
`Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73,
`
`addresses issues and arguments raised during the review. For the reasons
`
`discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has met its burden to prove,
`
`by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–54 (“the challenged
`
`claims”) of the ’713 patent are unpatentable on the grounds upon which we
`
`instituted inter partes review.
`
`A. Applied References and Declaration
`
`Petitioner relies upon the following references, file history, and
`
`declaration in support of its grounds for challenging claims 1–54 of the ’713
`
`patent:
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`
`
`1006
`
`Exhibit References, File History, and Declaration
`1003
`File History of Patent No. US 7,884,713 B2
`1005
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0012611 A1,
`publ’d Jan. 20, 2005 (“Osman”)
`U.S. Patent No. 6,680,675 B1, filed June 21, 2000, and issued
`Jan. 20, 2004 (“Suzuki”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0230685 A1,
`publ’d Nov. 18, 2004 (“Seligmann”)
`Declaration of Vernon Thomas Rhyne, Ph.D., P.E., R.P.A.
`
`1008
`
`1010
`
`Pet. ii.
`
`B. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`We instituted inter partes review of the challenged claims based on
`
`the following grounds (Dec. on Inst. 36; see Pet. 5–6):
`
`Reference(s)
`Osman
`
`Claims Challenged
`Basis
`§ 102(b) 1–3, 7, 9–12, 14–21, 25, 27–30, 32–
`39,1 43, 45–48, and 50–54
`§ 103(a) 4–8, 22–26, and 40–44
`Osman and Suzuki
`Osman and Seligmann § 103(a) 13, 31, and 49
`
`C.
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`
`
`The ’713 patent is involved in a U.S. district court case captioned
`
`Vivint, Inc. v. Alarm.com Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00392-CW (D. Utah 2015).
`
`
`1 Although challenged in the Petition (Pet. 19, 33) and addressed in the
`Decision on Institution (Dec. on Inst. 1, 15), we inadvertently omitted claim
`39 from our listing of the claims on which we instituted this inter partes
`review. Id. at 36; see id. at 25. Despite this omission, both parties
`recognized that claim 39 was under review. PO Resp. 1 (“The Board
`instituted trial on claims 1-54 of U.S. Patent 7,884,713 (“’713 patent”) on
`anticipation and obviousness grounds.”); Pet. Reply 2 (“The Board should
`cancel claims 1-3, 9-16, 19-21, 27-34, 37-39 and 45-52. For the reasons set
`forth in the Petition and the Institution Decision, Osman alone or in
`combination with other references invalidates these claims.”).
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`Pet. 1; Paper 9, 2. Concurrently with the instant Petition, Petitioner filed a
`
`second petition, Case IPR2015-01967, challenging claims 1–54 of the ’713
`
`patent on different grounds. Pet. 1. We denied institution of an inter partes
`
`review in that proceeding. Alarm.com Inc. v. Vivint, Inc., Case IPR2015-
`
`01967 (PTAB Mar. 30, 2016) (Paper 12). Petitioner also filed other
`
`petitions challenging the patentability of certain subsets of claims in the
`
`following patents owned by Patent Owner: (1) U.S. Patent No. 6,147,601
`
`(Cases IPR2015-02004, IPR2016-00116, IPR2016-00155, and
`
`IPR2016-01080); (2) U.S. Patent No. 6,462,654 B1 (Cases IPR2015-02003,
`
`IPR2016-00161, IPR2016-01110, and IPR2016-01124); (3) U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,535,123 B2 (Cases IPR2015-01995, IPR2016-00173, and
`
`IPR2016-01126); (4) U.S. Patent No. 6,717,513 B1 (Cases IPR2015-01997,
`
`IPR2016-00129, and IPR2016-01091); and (5) U.S. Patent No. 6,924,727
`
`B2 (Cases IPR2015-01977 and IPR2015-02008). See Paper 17, 1–2; Paper
`
`18, 1–2.
`
`II. THE ’713 PATENT (EX. 1001)
`
`A.
`
`Subject Matter
`
`The ’713 patent relates generally to methods, systems, and computer
`
`program products for “processing an alert” (Ex. 1001, col. 6, l. 62), based on
`
`“location-aware information processing” (id. at col. 1, ll. 17–18). More
`
`specifically, the independent claims are directed to “techniques for alerting a
`
`user based in whole or in part on a location.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 18–20; claims
`
`1, 19, and 37. The claimed subject matter is directed to allowing a user to
`
`enter or to receive a message, such as a reminder, when the user is at or near
`
`a particular location. See id. Figs. 2–4.
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`Figure 2 of the ’713 patent is reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Figure 2 is a flow diagram of a method for creating an alert according to
`
`some of the disclosed embodiments. Id. at col. 1, ll. 42–43.
`
`An alert refers herein to a location and optional time specification
`at which a notification such as a reminder may be made, with
`optional metadata such as a message, a region such as a radius
`from a location, and/or an indication that a region associated with
`the alert has been left since the alert was created.
`
`Id. at col. 2, ll. 48–53 (emphasis added).
`
`As depicted in Figure 2, a method for creating an alert, according to
`
`some disclosed embodiments, may include receipt of an alert request in step
`
`201. Id. at col. 4, ll. 4–6. For example, receiving an alert request may
`
`involve presenting a user interface, such as a selectable menu item or a
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`button, and indicating that an alert, such as a reminder, should be issued
`
`“when the user is at or near the current location, for example by indicating
`
`‘next time I am here’ or similar text associated with a user interface element,
`
`and to receive a selection of a user interface element indicating a choice
`
`associated with the alert.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 6–13.
`
`A current location then may be determined in step 202. Id. at col. 4,
`
`ll. 20–29. For example, determining a current location may be achieved by
`
`sensing the current location using location sensor 103 of Figure 1, such as a
`
`global positioning system (“GPS”) receiver or a cellular receiver. Id. at
`
`col. 2, ll. 35–47. Moreover, in step 205, the user may adjust the location
`
`associated with the alert. Id. at col. 5, ll. 4–11. In particular, “a boundary of
`
`a region within which the alert may trigger may be displayed, and
`
`modifications such as dragging the boundary may be received and
`
`processed.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 11–14.
`
`One or more messages may be received in step 203. Id. at col. 4,
`
`ll. 30–37. For example, a message may consist of text or a voice recording,
`
`which may be shown or played when the alert is triggered. The message
`
`may be received in conjunction with the alert request (step 201). Id. In step
`
`204, various metadata may be received or determined. Id. at col. 4, ll. 38–
`
`58. For example, such metadata may include a minimum elapsed time
`
`specification after which the alert is to be checked and/or issued; a region
`
`associated with the current location within which the alert is to be checked
`
`and/or issued, such as a radius around the current location; a time of day or
`
`range of time of day, such as a starting and ending time; or a day of the
`
`week. Id.
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`In step 206, the location, message, and metadata may be associated
`
`together, for example, by storing them in memory (e.g., in alert store 104 of
`
`Figure 1). Id. at col 5, ll. 15–17. Thus, in step 207, the alert may be created
`
`using the associated location, message, and metadata, with or without
`
`modifications. Id. at col. 5, ll. 18–19.
`
`Figure 3 of the ’713 patent, in which the flow path of Figure 2
`
`continues, is reproduced below:
`
`Figure 3 depicts the portion of the flow path relating to the triggering of an
`
`alert. Id. at col. 1, ll. 46–47. In particular, in step 301, the current location is
`
`determined. Id. at col. 5, ll. 22–27. In step 302, it may be determined
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`whether any alerts match the current location. Id. at col. 5, ll. 28–32. For
`
`example, the stored alerts may be reviewed to determine whether the current
`
`location is within a region, such as those set in step 204 of Figure 2,
`
`associated with each alert. Id. at col. 5, ll. 32–33.
`
`If no alerts are identified that match the current location in step 305, a
`
`“wait” (step 304) may be performed. Id. at col. 5, ll. 45–54. After such a
`
`wait, a new current location may be determined and steps 302–305 may be
`
`repeated. Id. If one or more alerts match the current location, a matching
`
`alert may be selected from those matching alerts in step 306. Id. at col. 5,
`
`ll. 55–58. In steps 307–309, the alert’s metadata may be evaluated and, if
`
`specified metadata criteria are “fulfilled,” the alert may be triggered. Id. at
`
`col. 5, l. 59–col. 6, ll. 38.
`
`B.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 19, and 37 are independent.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 6, l. 62–col. 7, l. 10 (claim 1), col. 7, l. 64–col. 8, l. 15 (claim
`
`19), col. 9, ll. 5–22 (claim 37). Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced
`
`below:
`
`alert;
`
`1. A method for processing an alert, comprising:
`
`receiving a specification of a first location;
`
`creating an alert;
`
`associating the specification of the first location with the
`
`determining a first current location as a second location,
`wherein determining the second location follows receiving the
`specification of the first location and precedes determining a
`third location;
`
`determining that the second location does not match the
`specification of the first location;
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`determining a second current location as the third location;
`
`third
`the
`that
`determining
`specification of the first location; and
`
`location matches
`
`the
`
`presenting information relating to the alert.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 6, l. 62–col. 7, l. 10. Claim 1 is a method claim; claim 19 is a
`
`system claim, including a processor configured to perform steps
`
`substantially similar to those recited in claim 1; and claim 37 is a computer
`
`program product claim, including a computer readable storage medium
`
`comprising instructions for performing the steps of claim 1. Claims 2–18
`
`depend directly or indirectly from claim 1 (id. at col. 7, ll. 11–63); claims
`
`20–36 depend directly or indirectly from claim 19 (id. at col. 8, l. 16–col. 9,
`
`l. 4); and claims 38–54 depend directly or indirectly from claim 37 (id. at
`
`col. 9, l. 23–col. 10, l. 42).
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`
`patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed
`
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under the broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are generally given their
`
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic
`
`Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for
`
`a claim term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`
`precision. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the
`
`absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read from the
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`A. Level of Skill in the Art
`
`Petitioner argues that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art of
`
`computer messaging at the time of the alleged invention would have had at
`
`least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical or computer
`
`engineering, or equivalent coursework, and at least one year of experience
`
`in computer messaging systems.” Pet. 15 (emphasis added). This definition
`
`differs slightly from the definition provided by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr.
`
`Rhyne. Ex. 1010 ¶ 20 (“at least two years of experience in computer
`
`messaging systems” (emphasis added)).
`
`Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Williams, contends that “a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor of Science degree in
`
`Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or
`
`equivalent coursework, as well as at least two years of experience in
`
`location-aware information systems.”2 Ex. 2001 ¶ 24. Moreover, Patent
`
`Owner contends that experience in “location-aware information systems,” as
`
`opposed to “computer messaging systems,” is significant. PO Resp. 2–3.
`
`
`2 Mr. Williams testifies that location-based service systems for location-
`aware applications are included within alert-based systems, which we find to
`be subsumed within the broader field of computer messaging systems.
`Ex. 2001 ¶ 7; see id. ¶ 15 (“These books extensively discuss location-related
`alerts in a variety of contexts. For example, The Definitive Guide to GPS,
`RFID, Wi-Fi, and Other Wireless Location-Based Services (2006 version)
`has over two dozen references to various types of alerts in location-based
`services such as, for example, geo-fencing alerts, navigation alerts, medical
`alerts, amber alerts, campus alerts, telemetry alerts, child location alerts,
`group 911 alerts, and retail/product proximity alerts.”).
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`Consequently, Patent Owner contends that Dr. Rhyne’s testimony cannot be
`
`credited “because he has no experience with location-aware information
`
`processing—the general technology field of the ’713 patent.” Id.; see id. at
`
`30–31 (arguing the same). Although Patent Owner acknowledges that Dr.
`
`Rhyne has experience working with “GPS, Loran, Transit, and Omega”
`
`location determining systems (id. at 31; see Ex. 1010 ¶ 14; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 7–9),
`
`and that at least GPS is a location determining and sensing technology and
`
`service (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 25), Patent Owner notes that Dr. Rhyne’s experience
`
`occurred as much as twenty years before the filing of the application that
`
`issued as the ’713 patent (PO Resp. 31–32). Nevertheless, Patent Owner
`
`fails to explain why this timeframe of Dr. Rhyne’s experience is significant
`
`in the context of the challenged claims or the applied references in this
`
`proceeding, much less how the timeframe of Dr. Rhyne’s experience affects
`
`his qualifications to testify regarding what a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art would have understood at or around the time the application that issued
`
`as the ’713 patent was filed. Id.
`
`Thus, after considering the parties’ assessments of the level of skill in
`
`the art and the evidence of record, we do not observe a meaningful
`
`difference between the parties’ assessments. We further note that either
`
`assessment appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of
`
`the invention as reflected in the references applied in the instant
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`proceeding.3 See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2001). Moreover, after considering the qualifications of each party’s
`
`declarant, we are persuaded both declarants meet or exceed the
`
`qualifications set forth in either proposed assessment at the time in question,
`
`and our analysis in this Final Written Decision is supported by either
`
`assessment. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 6–18; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 7–9; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 7–16.
`
`Nevertheless, to the extent that it is necessary for us to determine a level of
`
`skill in the art, we accept Patent Owner’s assessment of the level of skill in
`
`the art, but note that our conclusions would be the same under Petitioner’s
`
`assessment.
`
`B. Previously Disputed Terms
`
`Petitioner proposes constructions based on the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation standard for two sets of terms: (a) “presenting information
`
`relating to the alert” (claims 1 and 37) and “present information relating to
`
`the alert” (claim 19); and (b) “receiving a message” (claim 8 and 44) and
`
`“receive a message” (claim 26). See Pet. 15–17. Patent Owner challenged
`
`Petitioner’s constructions in its Preliminary Response (see Paper 10 (“Prelim
`
`Resp.), 6–7), but did not renew those challenges in its Patent Owner
`
`
`3 E.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 3 (“The invention relates to a method of reminding a user
`subscribed to a communication network, as well as to a location reminder
`service architecture for reminding a user subscribed to a communication
`network.” (emphasis added)); Ex. 1006, col. 1, ll. 7–11 (“The present
`invention relates generally to electronic notification systems, and more
`particularly, to an electronic system and method for providing an alert of an
`entry in a to-do list when a user is within a pre-defined proximity location to
`perform the to-do list item.” (emphases added)); Ex. 1008 ¶ 1 (“The present
`invention relates to personal digital assistants in general, and, in particular,
`to reminders about tasks in a to-do list.”).
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`Response (see Paper 13, 3 (“The patent owner is cautioned that any
`
`arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed
`
`waived.”)). Therefore, on this record, we maintain the following
`
`constructions that we adopted for purposes of the Decision on Institution.
`
`See Dec. on Inst. 10–13.
`
`1. “presenting information relating to the alert” (claims 1 and 37)
`and “present information relating to the alert” (claim 19)
`
`We remain persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence
`
`regarding the construction of these terms and adopt our analysis of that
`
`construction as set forth in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 10–12.
`
`On this record, and in view of Patent Owner’s decision not to renew its
`
`challenge to the construction of these terms (Paper 13, 3), we maintain our
`
`determination that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term
`
`“presenting information relating to the alert” or “present information relating
`
`to the alert” is “(i) presenting/present an indication that an alert has
`
`triggered; (ii) presenting/present information relating to the alert; or
`
`(iii) presenting/present the indication that the alert has triggered and the
`
`information relating to the alert.”
`
`2. “receiving a message” (claim 8 and 44) and “receive a
`message” (claim 26)
`
`We remain persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence
`
`regarding the construction of these terms and adopt our analysis of that
`
`construction as set forth in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 12–13;
`
`see Paper 14, 1–2. On this record, and in view of Patent Owner’s decision
`
`not to renew its challenge to the construction of these terms (Paper 13, 3),
`
`we maintain our determination that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`the term “receiving a message” or “receive a message” is “delivering/deliver
`
`a message.”
`
`C. Currently Disputed Term
`
`1. “map”(claims 17, 18, 35, 36, 53, and 54)
`
`Challenged claims 17, 35, and 53 depend from independent claims 1,
`
`19, and 37, respectively; and each of these dependent claims recites
`
`“wherein receiving the specification of the first location includes displaying
`
`a map and enabling placement of a marker at a location thereon.” See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 56–58 (claim 17, emphasis added). Neither Petitioner
`
`nor Patent Owner proposed a construction for the term “map” during the
`
`preliminary proceeding. See Pet. 15–17; Prelim. Resp. 4–9. Nevertheless,
`
`we determined that construction of this term was appropriate. See Dec. on
`
`Inst. 23 (construing the term “map” consistent with at least one dictionary
`
`definition; citing Ex. 3001).
`
`As with any claim term, we begin our construction with the language
`
`of the claim. Here, the claims including the term “map” provide little to
`
`illuminate its construction. The claims merely recite (1) that the “map” may
`
`be displayed, (2) that a “marker” may be placed at a “location” on the
`
`“map,” and (3) that the displayed map may include a “boundary of a region
`
`thereon.” E.g., Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 56–62 (claims 17 and 18). None of these
`
`recitations defines the term “map,” other than to make clear that a map may
`
`have a “marker” and a “boundary” placed upon it. The claims further recite
`
`that the methods (claim 1), systems (claim 19), or computer program
`
`products (claim 37) may “receiv[e] modifications to the boundary.” Id. at
`
`col. 7, ll. 61–62 (claim 18), col. 9, ll. 3–4 (claim 36), col. 10, ll. 41–42
`
`(claim 54). However, this limitation does not require that the displayed
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`“boundary” is altered to reflect these modifications or that the received
`
`modifications are displayed on the “map.” The Specification of the ’713
`
`patent explains that “modifications such as dragging the boundary may be
`
`received and processed,” but this is only an exemplary means for receiving
`
`boundary modifications, and the claims do not require that the modifications
`
`be “processed,” in addition to being “received.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 13–14
`
`(emphases added).
`
`We next turn to the Specification for guidance in construing the term
`
`“map.” In construing this term, we apply the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation of the words “in their ordinary usage as they would be
`
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
`
`enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
`
`the written description contained in the . . . specification.” In re Morris, 127
`
`F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As noted in our Decision on Institution,
`
`the Specification of the ’713 patent does not provide a definition for the term
`
`“map” and, apart from the claims themselves, there is only a single reference
`
`to the term “map” in the Specification. Dec. on Inst. 23 (citing Ex. 1001,
`
`col. 5, ll. 8–11).
`
`The Specification of the ’713 patent describes that
`
`a map may be displayed with the current location indicated by a
`marker, and a drag event dragging the marker to an adjusted
`location may be received. In another example, a boundary of a
`region within which the alert may trigger may be displayed, and
`modifications such as dragging the boundary may be received
`and processed.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 8–14 (emphasis added). We further note that the
`
`Specification of the ’713 patent does not provide an exemplary depiction of
`
`a “map.” See id., Figs. 1–4. In addition, after reviewing the prosecution
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`history provided by Petitioner (Ex. 1003), we find no further discussion of
`
`the meaning of the term “map,” beyond that provided in the Specification
`
`and the challenged claims. Thus, neither the Specification of the ’713 patent
`
`nor the prosecution history of the ’713 patent significantly illuminates the
`
`construction of the term “map.”
`
`As noted above, when construing claim terms, we apply the broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation of the words in their ordinary usage, as those
`
`words would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Morris, 127
`
`F.3d at 1054. In the absence of a clear construction of the term “map” based
`
`on the intrinsic evidence, we noted in our Decision on Institution that a
`
`relevant dictionary broadly defines the word “map” as “a representation,
`
`usu. on a flat surface, of selected features of all or a part of the earth or a
`
`portion of the heavens, shown in their respective relationships according to
`
`some convention of representation” or “any maplike delineation or
`
`representation.” Dec. on Inst. 23 (citing RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S
`
`COLLEGE DICTIONARY 808 (2d Random House ed. 1999) (emphasis added)
`
`(Ex. 3001)); see Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (citations omitted)
`
`(admitting dictionaries to understand the ordinary meaning of terms “not as
`
`evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court”);
`
`Agfa Corp. v. Creo Products, Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`
`(noting that dictionaries may be helpful when claim construction involves
`
`“little more than the application of widely accepted meaning of commonly
`
`understood words”); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–
`
`23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[J]udges . . . may also rely on dictionary
`
`definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition
`
`does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`patent documents.” (citation omitted)). We found that the quoted dictionary
`
`definition is consistent with the use of the word “map” in the Specification
`
`of the ’713 patent. Id. Thus, for purposes of the Decision on Institution, and
`
`on the then-existing record, we found that the above-quoted definition is the
`
`broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “map,” consistent with usage
`
`of that tem in the Specification (Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 8–14); claims 17, 18, 35,
`
`36, 53, and 54; and prosecution history (Ex. 1003), and with the
`
`understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (see Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 20, 63,
`
`123–124, 126–127, 181–184, 228–229, 230–231; see also Ex. 1009 ¶ 46
`
`(describing “map” options)).
`
`In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner contends that our
`
`construction of the term “map” is too broad. PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Dec. on
`
`Inst. 23). In particular, Patent Owner contends that “[t]he maplike
`
`delineation or the maplike representation refers to scale information, which
`
`is required in all maps: ‘some indication of the scale must be included in the
`
`information presented on any map.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Ex. 2003, p. 92
`
`(emphasis added); citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 32–33). Patent Owner further
`
`contends that, “[f]or a map to be useful, the map must include scale
`
`information because maps are necessarily smaller than the areas mapped.”
`
`Id. (emphasis added; citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 33). According to Patent Owner,
`
`such scale information may be provided expressly, such as by means of a
`
`legend on the “map” or implicitly by the relative spacing of map elements,
`
`such that a scale may be estimated. Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–40). Thus,
`
`we understand that Patent Owner would construe the term “map” as
`
`essentially “a representation of selected features of all or a part of the earth
`
`or a portion of the heavens, shown in their respective relationships according
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`to some convention of representation including to an explicit or implicit
`
`scale.”
`
`In support of its contentions, Patent Owner relies on the teachings of
`
`Ex. 2003 (Robinson et al., ELEMENTS OF CARTOGRAPHY (6th ed. 1953)
`
`(“Robinson”)) and the testimony of Mr. Williams. Robinson states that:
`
`Maps, to be useful, are necessarily smaller than the areas
`mapped. Consequently, every map must state the ratio or
`proportion between measurements on the map to those on the
`earth. This ratio is called the map scale and should be the first
`thing the map user notices. Map scale is an elusive thing
`because, as we saw in Chapter 5, transformation from globe to
`map means that the map’s scale will vary from place to place. It
`can even vary in different directions at one place.
`
`Ex. 2003, p. 924 (emphasis added); see PO Resp. 5. Moreover, Robinson
`
`states that “[t]he scale of a map may be shown in many ways. It can be
`
`specifically indicated by some statement or graphic device. Or it may be
`
`shown indirectly by the spacing of parallels and meridians and even subtly
`
`by the size and character of marks on the map.” Ex. 2003, p. 92 (emphasis
`
`added).
`
`The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must be
`
`consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In
`
`re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Patent Owner relies on
`
`Mr. Williams’s testimony to link the statements in Robinson to the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4 All references to the pages numbers in Robinson are the original page
`numbers located in the top left-hand or right-hand corner of each page in
`Exhibit 2003.
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.5 In particular, Mr.
`
`Williams testifies that “[t]he maplike delineation or the maplike
`
`representation refers to scale information, which is required in all maps.”
`
`Ex. 2001 ¶ 32. Mr. Williams then quotes extensively from Robinson in
`
`support of his testimony. Id. ¶¶ 33–39; see also id. ¶ 6 (“All opinions are
`
`from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of
`
`the invention, whether I explicitly mention this or not and whether or not I
`
`provide my statements in the first person.”). Mr. Williams concludes that, if
`
`the “map” does not include an explicit scale, the scale may be “estimated”
`
`based on the known distance between points or the know area of a region.
`
`Id. ¶ 40; see Ex. 2003, p. 93 (“Sometimes you may want to determine the
`
`scale of a map on which no scale is given. Or, you may want to discover the
`
`scale of part of a map (since, as noted earlier, the scale is never the same
`
`over an entire flat map).”). Thus, Patent Owner contends that, based on the
`
`alleged understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, a “map” should
`
`be construed to require inclusion of an explicit or implicit scale.
`
`Petitioner argues that our construction proposed in the Decision on
`
`Institution is the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “map” (Pet.
`
`
`5 We note a certain degree of irony in Patent Owner’s reliance on a reference
`published more than fifty years (PO Resp. ii (Robinson first published in
`1953)) before the earliest filing date of the ’713 patent to demonstrate the
`knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, yet at the same time
`challenging the relevance of experience gained by Petitioner’s declarant
`twenty years before the earliest filing date (id. at 31–32). Here, we do not
`rely on the age of the reference or the experience, but rather its relevance
`(i.e., Dr. Rhyne’s experience with GPS and the Robinson reference’s focus
`on cartography) in assessing the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in
`the art.
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01965
`Patent 7,884,713 B1
`
`
`Reply 3) and that Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the term “map”
`
`improperly incorporates limitations into the claims (id. at 2–7). In
`
`particular, Petitioner argues that “Patentees import a non-existent ‘scale’
`
`requirement into the Board’s construction of ‘map’ but the Board’s
`
`construction was correct.” Id. at 3.
`
`Specifically, Petitioner presents three arguments against Patent
`
`Owner’s construction of the term “map.” First, Mr. Williams did not
`
`consider the broadest reasonable interpretation standard when considering
`
`the construction of the term “maps.” Id. at 4. We agree with Petitioner that
`
`“no part of the specification, claims or prosecution history mentions a scale
`
`requirement. In addition, adding the concept of scale to any constr

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket