`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: March 6, 2017
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`SIERRA WIRELESS AMERICA, INC., SIERRA WIRELESS, INC.,
`and RPX CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`M2M SOLUTIONS LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01823
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318
`
`
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`IPR2015-01823
`Patent 8,648,717 B2
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`In this inter partes review, instituted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108, Sierra Wireless America, Inc., Sierra Wireless, Inc., and
`RPX Corp. (collectively, “Petitioner”) challenge the patentability of
`claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10–13, 15–24, and 29 of U.S. Patent No. 8,648,717 B2
`(“the ’717 patent,” Ex. 1001), owned by M2M Solutions LLC ( “Patent
`Owner”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written
`Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), addresses issues and
`arguments raised during trial. For the reasons discussed below, we
`determine that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
`claims 24 and 29 of the ’717 patent are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C.
`§ 316(e) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the
`petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability
`by a preponderance of the evidence.”). However, Petitioner has not proven
`by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10–13, and 15–23
`of the ’717 patent are unpatentable.
`A. Procedural History
`On August 26, 2015, Petitioner requested inter partes review of
`claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–24, 29, and 30 of the ’717 patent. Paper 1, “Pet.”
`Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 11. In a Decision on
`Institution of Inter Partes Review, we instituted trial of claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10–
`13, 15–24, and 29, but we denied institution as to claims 2, 7, 14, and 30.
`Paper 16, “Dec. on Inst.” Trial was instituted on the following grounds of
`unpatentability:
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`1. Whether claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10–13, 15, 18, 22–24, and 29 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as having been obvious
`over Whitley1 and the SIM Specification;2
`
`2. Whether claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as having been obvious over Whitley, the SIM
`Specification, and Kail;3 and
`
`3. Whether claim 21 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
`having been obvious over Whitley, the SIM Specification, and
`Eldredge.4
`Dec. on Inst. 32–33.
`During the trial, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 27, “PO
`Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 33, “Reply”).
`An oral hearing was held on December 5, 2016, a transcript of which
`appears in the record. Paper 37 (“Tr.”).
`B. Related Matters
`Petitioner and Patent Owner cite a number of judicial matters in the
`United States District Court for the District of Delaware involving the ’717
`patent, as well as matters involving ancestor patents of the ’717 patent. See
`Pet. 3; Paper 8. The ’717 patent is also the subject of Telit Wireless
`Solutions Inc. et al. v. M2M Solutions LLC, Case IPR2016-00055, in which
`the Board is issuing a Final Written Decision concurrently.
`
`
`1 WO 99/49680 A1, published Sept. 30, 1999 (Ex. 1003).
`2 Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the
`Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface
`(GSM 11.11 version 7.4.0 Release 1998) (1999) (Ex. 1004).
`3 US 5,959,529, issued Sept. 28, 1999 (Ex. 1005).
`4 WO 95/05609, published Feb. 23, 1995 (Ex. 1006).
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`C. Illustrative Claim
`The ’717 patent is generally directed to a “programmable
`communicator device.” Ex. 1001, Abstract. The ’717 patent has three
`independent claims—claims 1, 24, and 29. Claim 29 is reproduced below:
`
`29. A programmable communicator device comprising:
`a
`a
`programmable
`interface
`for
`establishing
`communication link with at least one monitored technical device,
`wherein the programmable interface is programmable by
`wireless packet switched data messages; and
`a processing module for authenticating one or more
`wireless transmissions sent from a programming transmitter and
`received by
`the programmable communicator device by
`determining if at least one transmission contains a coded number;
`wherein the programmable communicator device is
`configured to use a memory to store at least one telephone
`number or IP address included within at least one of the
`transmissions as one or more stored telephone numbers or IP
`addresses if the processing module authenticates the at least one
`of the transmissions including the at least one telephone number
`or IP address and the coded number by determining that the at
`least one of the transmissions includes the coded number, the one
`or more stored telephone numbers or IP addresses being numbers
`to which the programmable communicator device is configured
`to and permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions;
`wherein the programmable communicator device is
`configured to use an identity module for storing a unique
`identifier that is unique to the programmable communicator
`device; and
`wherein the one or more wireless transmissions from the
`programming transmitter containing instructions to program the
`stored number comprise one or more short message service
`(SMS) data messages; and
`wherein the programmable communicator device is
`configured to process data received through the programmable
`interface from the at least one monitored technical device in
`response to programming instructions received in at least one
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`incoming short message service (SMS) data message or packet
`switched data message.
`Ex. 1001, 16:1–38.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be
`given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of
`the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). In applying a broadest
`reasonable construction, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and
`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This presumption may be rebutted
`when a patentee, acting as a lexicographer, sets forth an alternate definition
`of a term in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner proposed constructions for the terms “coded number,”
`“identity module,” and “programming transmitter,” and Petitioner proposed
`“programmable interface” be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13–
`16. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contended that Petitioner’s
`proposed constructions for the terms “identity module” and “programming
`transmitter” were incorrect, but Patent Owner did not propose its own
`constructions for these terms in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 2–
`3. We determined in the Decision on Institution that, at that time, these
`terms did not require express constructions. Dec. on Inst. 6.
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`Based on the record developed during the trial, we provide the
`following additional analysis with respect to certain claim terms.
`1. “Programmable interface”
`In our Decision on Institution, we determined that the term
`“programmable interface” did not require an express construction. Dec. on
`Inst. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner does not advocate for a particular
`construction of “programmable interface,” other than to say that “a person of
`ordinary skill would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of
`‘programmable interface’ to be an interface that must itself be
`programmable.” PO Resp. 7. Although we agree with this proposition, we
`see no reason to adopt this as a claim construction as it does little more than
`restate the limitation.
`With its Response, Patent Owner also filed a Memorandum Opinion
`from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware addressing
`claim construction issues pertaining to two ancestor patents of the ’717
`patent—U.S. Patent No. 8,094,010 B2 (“the ’010 patent”) and U.S. Patent
`No. 7,583,197 B2. See Ex. 2009. In its Response, Patent Owner notes that,
`in construing the same “programmable interface” limitation in the ’010
`patent, the District Court determined the word “programmable” is “generally
`understood in the art to mean ‘capable of accepting instructions for
`performing a task or an operation.’” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2009, 11 (citing
`MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 360 (4th ed. 1999)). We agree
`that “programmable” in the context of the ’717 patent claims also has its
`plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., “capable of accepting instructions for
`performing a task or an operation.”
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`Patent Owner also notes that the District Court construed the term
`“programmable interface” to mean “an interface that is able to be directly
`programmed.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2009, 10). In this proceeding,
`however, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner advocates for this
`construction.5
`In its Petition, Petitioner argued that “programmable interface” should
`be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 15. In its Reply, Petitioner
`still argues that the plain and ordinary meaning should apply, but it argues
`that the plain and ordinary meaning of “programmable interface” is “a
`physical interface that may be attached to a remote sensor device to relay
`data in response to requests for information and that can pass programming
`instructions to the attached, remote sensor device.” Reply 3–4 (citing
`Ex. 1001, 9:2–6). Although the cited passage from the Specification of the
`’717 patent describes using a programmable interface “for the purpose of
`relaying data from external devices and sensors,” it also states that the
`interface “may” be used in that manner. Petitioner, therefore, has not
`persuaded us that the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term is so limited.
`We determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a
`“programmable interface” is an interface “capable of accepting instructions
`for performing a task or an operation.”
`2. “Processing module for authenticating”
`In our Decision on Institution, we also addressed the limitation of
`independent claims 1, 24, and 29 reciting “a processing module for
`
`
`5 When asked during oral argument what it means for an interface to be
`“directly programmed,” counsel for Patent Owner responded, “I think that
`means that it itself needs to be programmed.” Tr. 34:3–8.
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`authenticating one or more wireless transmissions sent from a programming
`transmitter and received by the programmable communicator device by
`determining if at least one transmission contains a coded number.” Dec. on
`Inst. 6–7. In particular, prior to institution, we authorized the parties to file
`supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether or not this limitation
`should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, paragraph 6, and Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339
`(Fed. Cir. 2015), and if so, how the limitation should be interpreted. Paper
`12. In their supplemental briefs, both parties argued that the limitation
`should not be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation under 35
`U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. See Paper 13; Paper 14 (citing Ex. 2002 (M2M
`Solutions LLC, v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc. et al., 1:12-CV-00030-RGA,
`Doc. 215 (D. Del., Oct. 2, 2015)), a district court decision regarding a
`similar term in a related patent). As such, we were not persuaded that the
`presumption against application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, had been
`overcome, and we determined that the limitation did not require an express
`construction at that time. Dec. on Inst. 6–7; see Williamson, 792 F.3d at
`1349 (“When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be
`overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that
`the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites
`function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”
`(internal quotations and citation omitted)).
`During the trial, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argued that the
`limitation should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation under
`35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. Based on the full record developed during
`trial, we do not change our prior determination that this limitation is not
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`governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, and does not require further
`construction.
`
`3. Single Transmission
`In our Decision on Institution, we addressed Patent Owner’s argument
`that there is a “single transmission” requirement in the independent claims,
`meaning that the “processing module” “perform[s] ‘coded number’
`authentication on an incoming ‘single transmission’ that includes both the
`‘coded number’ and the new telephone number or IP address intended for
`storing into the list.” Prelim. Resp. 24. According to Patent Owner, the
`scope of the independent claims does not encompass situations in which a
`“coded number” is in one transmission and a number for storing is in a
`separate transmission because they must be in a “single transmission.” See
`Prelim. Resp. 32–33. In our Decision on Institution, we determined that,
`although the scope of the claims encompasses Patent Owner’s proffered
`construction, the claims are not limited to Patent Owner’s construction.
`Dec. on Inst. 9.
`During the trial, both parties had the opportunity to address this claim
`construction issue. In its Response, Patent Owner stated:
`Patent Owner disagrees with the Board’s prior conclusion that
`the independent claims fail to require that a “single transmission”
`be authenticated that includes both the “coded number” and a
`new telephone number or IP address for storing into the calling
`list. (Decision, Paper 16, p. 9). . . . But because the “single
`transmission” requirement is unnecessary for purposes of the
`arguments presented in the text below, Patent Owner will adopt
`the “one or more” transmissions phraseology as a matter of
`convenience solely for purposes of its present Response.
`PO Resp. 16 n.6; see also Tr. 58:19–59:10 (counsel for Patent Owner
`confirmed that, for purposes of this proceeding, whether the “coded number”
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`and a number for storing are in the same transmission or in different
`transmissions is not an issue).
`Based on the full record developed during trial, we determine that our
`preliminary claim construction in the Decision on Institution is not the
`broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification, and we
`determine that the claim language requires both the coded number and the
`telephone number or IP address to be in the same transmission. The relevant
`claim language is reproduced below:
`wherein the programmable communicator device is configured
`to use a memory to store at least one telephone number or IP
`address included within at least one of the transmissions as one
`or more stored telephone numbers or IP addresses if the
`processing module authenticates the at least one of the
`transmissions including the at least one telephone number or IP
`address and the coded number by determining that the at least
`one of the transmissions includes the coded number.
`Ex. 1001, 12:44–52, 14:65–15:6, 16:11–19 (emphases added).
`In an example where the telephone number and the coded number are
`in different transmissions, there would be at least two transmissions. The
`transmission that includes the “at least one telephone number or IP address”
`is a single transmission and, therefore, the “at least one of the
`transmissions.”
`The independent claims recite that “the processing module
`authenticates the at least one of the transmissions including the at least one
`telephone number or IP address and the coded number by determining that
`the at least one of the transmissions includes the coded number.” Ex. 1001,
`12:48–52, 15:2–6, 16:15–19 (emphasis added). Here, the emphasized phrase
`“the at least one of the transmissions” takes antecedent basis from the first
`recitation of “at least one of the transmissions,” which is the transmission
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`within which the telephone number (or IP address) is included. Therefore,
`the processing module performs authentication “by determining that the at
`least one of the transmissions includes the coded number,” and “the at least
`one of the transmissions” is defined in the claim as the transmission within
`which the telephone number (or IP address) is included. As such, the
`independent claims require processing module authentication of one
`transmission that includes both the telephone number (or IP address) and the
`coded number. Certainly, the claims allow for the existence of more than
`one transmission, but there must be at least one transmission that contains
`both.
`
` Therefore, we determine that the claims require authentication of one
`transmission having both a coded number and a telephone number or IP
`address.6
`4. “numbers to which the programmable communicator device is
`configured to and permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions”
`
`Patent Owner contends that the limitation of the independent claims
`reciting “numbers to which the programmable communicator device is
`configured to and permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions” means
`that the “programmable communicator be configured to store in memory a
`list of telephone numbers or IP addresses that functions as an outbound
`restrictive calling list.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 38–397). Patent
`
`
`6 We adopt the same construction in related Case IPR2016-00055.
`7 This cited support for Patent Owner’s argument is the testimony of Patent
`Owner’s declarant, Joel R. Williams, that he “ha[s] been asked to assume by
`Patent Owner’s counsel that” this limitation requires an “outbound
`restrictive calling list.” Mr. Williams does not appear to testify separately as
`to why this claim interpretation is correct.
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`Owner contends that the “permitted to” language of the claims dictates this
`construction, as allegedly evidenced by the prosecution history of the ’717
`patent. PO Resp. 14 n.5 (citing Ex. 2014, 10 (Supplemental Amendment,
`Nov. 8, 2013)).
`We disagree that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “configured
`to and permitted to” is as limited as Patent Owner proposes. During
`prosecution, the applicant stated:
`Applicants would like to thank the examiner for the
`telephone interview of November 8, 2013. During the interview,
`Examiner Nguyen suggested that it was not clear from the claim
`language that the programmable communicator device was
`permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions to the stored
`telephone numbers or IP addresses. Applicant’s counsel and
`Examiner Nguyen then discussed amending the claims to add the
`language “and permitted to”. Examiner Nguyen indicated that
`the amendments would put the claims in condition for allowance.
`. . .
`As mentioned above, during the telephone interview of
`
`November 8, 2013, Examiner Nguyen suggested it was not clear
`from the claims that the programmable communicator device
`was permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions the stored
`number(s). Although Applicants believe that “configured to,” in
`the context of the claim, meant the device was capable of and
`permitted to send outgoing wireless transmission, to expedite
`prosecution, Applicants have amended independent claims 1, 27
`and 32 to read “the one or more stored telephone numbers or IP
`addresses being numbers
`to which
`the programmable
`communicator device is configured to and permitted to send
`outgoing wireless transmissions....”
`Ex. 2014, 10.
`According to the prosecution history, therefore, the applicant added
`the language “permitted to” because the Examiner did not believe it was
`“clear” in the claims as written that the language “configured to” meant that
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`the device was also “permitted to” call those numbers. There is no mention
`of restricting what numbers the device can call.
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s contentions implicitly
`acknowledge that the list must be restrictive. PO Resp. 15 (citing Pet. 32).
`However, Petitioner does not propose in this proceeding that the claim
`requires such a “restrictive” list. See Reply 5 (“Petitioners have merely
`stated that the FDN [fixed dialing number file] described in the prior art can
`function as a bar to limit calls to the list of numbers, but have not admitted
`that that is a requirement of the claims.”); see also Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1004,
`80–83; Ex. 1013 ¶ 78) (“In particular, [the SIM Specification] discloses the
`fixed dialing number (FDN) file, which is a list of numbers or IP addresses
`to which a device associated with the SIM card is configured to and
`permitted to send messages.”).
`Furthermore, Patent Owner argues that the parties in district court
`litigation have agreed that the list is restrictive in nature. PO Resp. 14–15
`(citing Ex. 2010, 6 (Joint Claim Construction Statement filed on August 14,
`2015)). Patent Owner’s proposed construction in litigation is “[t]he set of
`numbers to which the programmable communicator is limited to sending one
`or more types of outgoing wireless transmissions.” Ex. 2010, 6. By
`contrast, the defendants’ proposed construction in litigation is “[t]he
`exclusive set of numbers to which the programmable communicator is
`limited to send any outgoing wireless transmissions.” Ex. 2010, 6.
`Therefore, the parties in district court litigation are not in agreement as to the
`scope of this claim term. The district court has not issued a claim
`construction ruling in the litigation. See Tr. 75:12–15, 76:12–18 (counsel
`for Petitioner representing that the district court has not issued a claim
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`construction order in the litigation involving the ’717 patent and that the
`case is currently stayed).
`We have reviewed the Specification of the ’717 patent, and we do not
`find a definition of the “configured to and permitted to” language, nor do we
`find disclosure requiring this language to be interpreted as narrowly as
`Patent Owner proposes. For example, in the “Background of the Invention”
`section, the ’717 patent states: “Clearly there is a need to provide a means to
`limit the cost of calling and also to provide a means to prevent the child
`dialing overseas numbers for extensive periods of time.” Ex. 1001, 2:20–23
`(emphasis added). This passage describes a goal of controlling durations of
`calls to certain numbers, i.e., overseas calls, not completely blocking the
`sending of outgoing wireless transmissions to such numbers. Another
`passage states: “An improved child Hotlink communicator, which restricts
`the usage of the mobile phone and thereby does not generate high charges
`through uncontrolled calling, is clearly a solution to the family tariffing
`challenge.” Id. at 2:28–32. This also relates to “control” of calling, not
`necessarily blocking outgoing transmissions. We do not read these passages
`as the applicant acting as a lexicographer and defining the “configured to
`and permitted to” language in the claims.
`Other passages in the Specification of the ’717 patent describe
`rejecting incoming calls. Ex. 1001, Fig. 2 (step 4), 9:61–67, 10:8–11. For
`example, step 4 of Figure 2 states that, upon an incoming call,
`“programmable communicator is unable to verify that the caller is on the
`permitted callers list and the call is terminated.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2. Such
`functionality, however, is addressed by the authentication limitations of the
`independent claims, wherein the processing module “authenticat[es] one or
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`more wireless transmissions sent from a programming transmitter and
`received by the programmable communicator device.” The claims explicitly
`recite authentication of certain transmissions, i.e., those to store a telephone
`number or IP address as “numbers to which the programmable
`communicator device is configured to and permitted to send outgoing
`wireless transmissions.” These stored numbers may be a restricted list in the
`sense that they are only stored upon authentication of a single transmission
`having the telephone number or IP address and the coded number, as
`discussed above. However, the independent claims use permissive
`language—“permitted to”—rather than restrictive language to describe
`“outgoing wireless transmissions.”
`Based on the foregoing, we do not agree that Patent Owner’s proposed
`construction is the broadest reasonable interpretation of the phrase “numbers
`to which the programmable communicator device is configured to and
`permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions.” Consistent with the
`applicant’s statements during prosecution, we interpret “numbers to which
`the programmable communicator device is configured to and permitted to
`send outgoing wireless transmissions” to mean “numbers to which the
`programmable communicator device is capable of sending outgoing wireless
`transmissions and permitted to send outgoing wireless transmissions.”8 See
`Ex. 2014, 10.
`
`5. “process data”
`
`The phrase “process data” is recited in independent claims 1, 24, and
`29 and in various dependent claims. Patent Owner argues that “the ’717
`
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`8 We adopt the same construction in related Case IPR2016-00055.
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`patent teaches that what it means to ‘process data’ is that the programmable
`communicator have the ability to make intelligent determinations that
`interpret the meaning of the data so that responsive actions can be taken as
`the result of those determinations.” PO Resp. 46 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:54–59,
`5:16–31, 7:56–58, 9:1–2, 9:16–21, 11:33–35, 11:42).
`The ’717 patent does not provide a definition of what it means to
`“process data.”9 The passages of the ’717 patent cited by Patent Owner do
`not demonstrate that such a narrowing interpretation of “process data”
`should be imposed on the challenged claims. Several of the cited passages
`do not even use either the word “data” or the word “process.” See Ex. 1001,
`4:54–59, 7:56–58, 9:1–2, 11:42. One passage cited by Patent Owner as
`support for its proposed construction states: “This device comprises a novel
`combination of existing technologies and features, which make possible the
`existence of a new and improved communicating apparatus to address the
`communication needs of children and elderly persons and for programmable
`data tags for monitoring the status of associated technical equipment.” Ex.
`1001, 9:16–21 (cited at PO Resp. 46). This passage does not support Patent
`Owner’s interpretation.
`Furthermore, the intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s
`attempt to exclude particular activity from the scope of data processing. In
`particular, Patent Owner argues that “the performance of routine low-level
`tasks such as merely formatting or packetizing data to facilitate its
`transmission over a wireless cellular network does not rise to the level of
`
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`9 Counsel for Patent Owner confirmed that the ’717 patent does not provide
`a definition of processing data during the oral hearing in Case IPR2016-
`00055. IPR2016-00055, Paper 33, 57:11–16.
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`data ‘processing’ within the intended meaning of the ‘717 patent.” PO
`Resp. 46. Patent Owner argues that the ’717 patent’s description of
`“react[ing] to a status condition” supports its proposed construction. PO
`Resp. 46 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:42). The context of that quote is provided by
`the full sentence in which it appears, which states that “[t]he remote
`monitoring application comprises the use of a programmable communicator,
`which reacts to a status condition and then initiates a packet data
`transmission to the network.” Ex. 1001, 11:40–43 (emphasis added). To the
`extent this passage informs a person of ordinary skill in the art as to the
`meaning of data processing, it suggests that “formatting or packetizing data
`to facilitate its transmission” is within the scope of data processing because
`packet data transmission would require first packetizing the data.
`Furthermore, dependent claim 6 recites that the programmable
`communicator device is “further configured to transmit the processed data
`to an at least one monitoring device.” (Emphasis added). This suggests that,
`as part of the procedure of making the data “processed data,” the data had
`been formatted or packetized to facilitate its transmission. The claim does
`not recite that the device is “configured to format the processed data and to
`transmit the formatted processed data.”
`We also note that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unclear, as
`it does not explain in any detail what would or would not constitute
`“intelligent” determinations that “interpret” the meaning of data. We decline
`to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that “configured to process
`data” means “hav[ing] the ability to make intelligent determinations that
`interpret the meaning of the data so that responsive actions can be taken as
`the result of those determinations.” PO Resp. 46. Furthermore, we disagree
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`with Patent Owner’s contention that “routine low-level tasks such as merely
`formatting or packetizing data to facilitate its transmission over a wireless
`cellular network” are not within the scope of data processing. PO Resp. 46;
`see Reply 6–7. We determine that the phrase “process data” does not
`require further construction.
`6. Remaining Claim Terms
`We determine that no other claim terms require express construction
`in this proceeding.
`
`B. Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-
`obviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In our Decision on Institution, we determined, based on the record at
`that time, that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the
`relevant time for the ’717 patent (May 2000), would have been “at least an
`undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering and three years of experience
`working the development of wireless subscriber terminal systems or
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`components, or an equivalent combination of education and experience in
`related fields.” Dec. on Inst. 11 n.4 (citing Pet. 12; Ex. 1013 ¶ 31).
`In its Response, Patent Owner does not challenge this determination
`or offer its own proffered level of ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner’s
`declarant, Mr. Williams, testifies:
`I have been informed by Patent Owne