Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 1679
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`SOLOCRON MEDIA, LLC,
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`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., et al.
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`
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`Defendants.
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`
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`v.
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`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-1059-JRG-RSP
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`
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`SOLOCRON MEDIA, LLC’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
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`AT&T - Exhibit 1008
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 2 of 38 PageID #: 1680
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`It Is Generally Improper To Import Limitations From Exemplary Embodiments
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1  
`I.  
`II.   BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY ......................................... 1  
`III.   LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ................................................................... 2  
`IV.   RELEVANT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES .................................................... 2  
`A.   A Claim Term Should Generally Be Given Its Ordinary Meaning ............................ 2  
`B.  
`Into Broader Claim Language ................................................................................ 3  
`C.   A Term Should Not Be Construed So As To Exclude An Embodiment .................... 3  
`D.   A Term Is Indefinite Only When It Fails To Inform With Reasonable Certainty ..... 3  
`V.   DISPUTED TERMS IN MULTIPLE PATENTS .................................................................. 4  
`A.   “video file” / “the video file”/ “the selected video file” (651 Patent, claims 1,
`10, 12, 16, 17, 21, 23, 31-33; 759 Patent, claims 53, 56, 64, 65) ........................... 4  
`B.   “communications link” (395 Patent, claims 14, 22, 30, 39; 866 Patent, claim 10;
`651 Patent, claims 1, 12) ........................................................................................ 5  
`C.   “polyphonic” / “polyphonic audio file” / “polyphonic sound” (395 Patent,
`claims 39, 40; 864 Patent, claims 11-14, 16, 17, 19; 866 Patent, claim10) ........... 7  
`D.   “configured to [perform some function]” (651 Patent, claims 12, 31; 866 Patent,
`claim 10; 395 Patent, claims 22, 30) ...................................................................... 8  
`VI.   DISPUTED TERMS IN THE 759 PATENT ...................................................................... 10  
`A.   “allow a user to download the video file” (759 Patent, claim 53) ............................ 10  
`B.   “convert the video file to a native playback format usable by a playback device”
`(759 Patent, claim 53) .......................................................................................... 12  
`C.   “the native playback format” (759 Patent, claim 56) ............................................... 15  
`D.   “native playback format” (759 Patent, claims 53, 54, 56, 65) ................................. 15  
`VII.   DISPUTED TERMS IN THE 651 PATENT .................................................................... 18  
`A.   “link that identifies the converted file” (651 Patent, claim 40) ................................ 18  
`VIII.   DISPUTED TERMS IN THE 692 PATENT ................................................................... 19  
`
`ii
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 3 of 38 PageID #: 1681
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`A.   “user-defined audio file” (692 Patent, claims 1, 4, 5) .............................................. 19  
`B.   “A method for programming a user defined audio file into a telephone” (692
`Patent, claim 1) ..................................................................................................... 20  
`IX.   TERMS DEFENDANTS CONTEND ARE INDEFINITE ................................................ 21  
`A.   “enhanced performance speaker” / “enhanced performance speaker capable of
`30, 39; 866 Patent, claim 10) ................................................................................ 21  
`B.   “substantially full range of audio sounds” (395 Patent, claims 22, 30, 39; 866
`Patent, claim 10) ................................................................................................... 22  
`C.   “allowing” / “to allow” / “that allows” (692 Patent, claim 1; 395 Patent, claims
`22, 30, 39; 864 Patent, claims 11-13; 866 Patent, claim 10) ................................ 26  
`D.   “enabling the user of the telephone to program at least a portion of the user-
`communication” (692 Patent, claim 1) ................................................................. 28  
`X.   CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 30  
`
`providing a substantially full range of audio sounds” (395 Patent, claims 22,
`
`defined audio file into the telephone for use as an indicia of an incoming
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`iii
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 4 of 38 PageID #: 1682
`
`Cases  
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
`616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Alcon Research, LTD. v. Apotex Inc.,
`687 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
`299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Am. Med. Sys. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 20, 21
`
`Anchor Wall Sys, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
`340 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Ancora Techs. v. Apple, Inc.,
`744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 2
`
`Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Manuf. Co.,
`479 F. Supp. 2d 766 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ....................................................................................... 28
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`932 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ....................................................................... 22, 23, 24
`
`Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
`715 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
`359 F.3d 1367 (Fed Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
`728 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 6
`
`ChemFree Corp. v. J. Walter, Inc.,
`2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51677 (N.D. Ga. July 17, 2007) ......................................................... 28
`
`Ciena Corp. v. Nortel Networks, Inc., et al.,
`No. 2:05-cv-14-LED, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97450 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2006) .................... 10
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,
`339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Diego, Inc. v. Audible, Inc.,
`No. 2:05-cv-464, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22715 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2006) ...................... 10
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 5 of 38 PageID #: 1683
`
`Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,
`264 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................ 24
`Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs Corp.,
`508 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 17
`
`EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ 2, 3, 10
`
`Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
`909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................. 8
`
`Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ 2, 6, 10
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 3, 4, 6, 15
`
`Kernius v. International Electronics, Inc., et al.,
`No. 1:05-cv-1927, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24874 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2007) ............................ 10
`
`Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu A/S,
` 618 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................. 3
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
`355 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`742 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010) .......................................................... 12, 26, 30
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ......................................................................................................... 3, 25
`
`Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ....................................... 30
`
`Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp.,
`566 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 8
`
`Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`400 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 23
`
`Ring Plus, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless Corp.,
`2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16296 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2010) .......................................................... 28
`
`Seven Networks Inc. v. Visto Corp.,
`2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93870 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2006) ....................................................... 28
`
`v
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 6 of 38 PageID #: 1684
`
`TDM Am., LLC v. United States,
`85 Fed. Cl. 774 (Fed. Cl. 2009) .................................................................................................. 6
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc.,
`311 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Statutes  
`
`35 U.S.C. §282 ............................................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 7 of 38 PageID #: 1685
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to Local P.R. 4-5(a), Plaintiff Solocron Media, LLC (“Solocron”) submits its
`
`opening brief regarding the proper construction of disputed terms in six asserted patents: U.S.
`
`Patent Nos. 6,496,692 (692 Patent, Exh. 1); 7,257,395 (395 Patent, Exh. 2); 7,295,864 (864
`
`Patent, Exh. 3); 7,319,866 (866 Patent, Exh. 4); 7,742,759 (759 Patent, Exh. 5); and 8,594,651
`
`(651 Patent, Exh. 6) (the “Asserted Patents”)1.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY
`
`Two main technology areas are at issue in this case: (1) the browsing, selecting, and
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`downloading of cell phone ringtones; and (2) the converting of audio or video files (including
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`photos) sent to mobile devices as MMS (“Multimedia Messaging Service”) picture or video
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`messages. As explained in the Abstract (common to all the Asserted Patents), the Asserted
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`Patents are directed to systems and methods for programming information, such audio or video
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`information, into a programmable device, including devices such as wireless telephones and
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`personal digital assistants (PDAs). 692 Patent at Abstract. The programmed information may be
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`user-selected or user-customized and may be accessed over the Internet. Id. The claims of the
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`692, 395, 864, and 866 Patents (the “ringtone patents”) focus on searching for, browsing,
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`choosing, and delivering audio or video information to a device for use as an indicia of an
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`incoming communication (such as searching for and downloading an audio MP3 song file for use
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`as a ringtone on a wireless device). The claims of the 759 and 651 Patents (the “messaging
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`patents”) focus on systems and methods for converting audio or video files that are being
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`downloaded by a device or that are sent from one device to another (such as when sending and
`
`1 The Asserted Patents share a common specification. The parties have agreed to cite only the
`692 Patent when addressing the specification of any of the “ringtone” patents (692, 395, 864, and
`866 Patents) and to cite only the 651 Patent when addressing the specification of either of the
`“messaging” patents (651 and 759 Patents).
`
`1
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 8 of 38 PageID #: 1686
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`receiving an MMS picture or video message). Example files that may be downloaded, sent,
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`and/or converted include moving image files such as MPEG and AVI files (e.g., 759 Patent at
`
`claim 14; 651 Patent at claims 3, 14); still image files such as JPEG files (e.g., 651 Patent at
`
`claims 5, 16); and audio files such as MIDI, MP3, WAV, and WMA (e.g., 759 Patent at claim 4;
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`864 Patents at claims 7-8) among other examples.
`
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`A person of ordinary skill in the art in 1999 would have had a bachelor’s degree in
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`electrical engineering or computer science, at least two years of experience working in
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`communications software design, including familiarity with multimedia software, or would
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`possess equivalent education or experience. See Mangione-Smith Decl. at ¶15.
`
`IV. RELEVANT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES
`
`Given the Court’s familiarity with the principles of claim construction, Solocron will
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`discuss them only briefly.
`
`A.
`
`A Claim Term Should Generally Be Given Its Ordinary Meaning
`
`Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the
`
`art when read in the context of the intrinsic record, with “only two exceptions”: 1) when a
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`patentee acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee clearly and unmistakably
`
`disavows the full scope of the claim. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
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`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). An ordinary meaning is not overcome “by a few passing references” that
`
`do not amount to a redefinition or disclaimer. Ancora Techs. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 738
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`2
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 9 of 38 PageID #: 1687
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`B.
`
`It Is Generally Improper To Import Limitations From Exemplary
`Embodiments Into Broader Claim Language
`
`“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
`
`specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the
`
`intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” EPOS Techs. Ltd. v.
`
`Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Laryngeal Mask
`
`Co. Ltd. v. Ambu A/S, 618 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`C.
`
`A Term Should Not Be Construed So As To Exclude An Embodiment
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`“[W]here claims can reasonably [be] interpreted to include a specific embodiment, it is
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`incorrect to construe the claims to exclude that embodiment, absent probative evidence on the
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`contrary.” GE Lighting, 750 F.3d at 1311 (citation omitted); see also In re Katz Interactive Call
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`Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “A claim construction that
`
`excludes the preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly
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`persuasive evidentiary support.’” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d
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`1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also EPOS Techs., 766 F.3d at 1347.
`
`D.
`
`A Term Is Indefinite Only When It Fails To Inform With Reasonable
`Certainty
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`There is a heavy presumption that issued patents are valid and not indefinite. See 35
`
`U.S.C. §282, ¶1. Thus, “close questions of indefiniteness in litigation involving issued patents
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`are properly resolved in favor of the patentee.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
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`359 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed Cir. 2004). A patent is invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. §
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`112, ¶ 2 only “if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
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`prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
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`scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 10 of 38 PageID #: 1688
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`V.
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`DISPUTED TERMS IN MULTIPLE PATENTS
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`A.
`
`“video file” / “the video file”/ “the selected video file” (651 Patent, claims 1,
`10, 12, 16, 17, 21, 23, 31-33; 759 Patent, claims 53, 56, 64, 65)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“File with a visual presentation that is capable
`of showing motion or movement”
`
`Solocron’s Proposed Construction
`“video file” / “the video file”: Plain meaning.
`If construction is necessary, then:
`“A file including a video clip or image”
`
`“the selected video file”: Plain meaning.
`If construction is necessary, then:
`“A file including a video clip or image that has
`been selected”
`
`
`The terms “video file” and “the video file” should be given their plain meaning. If
`
`construction is necessary the terms should be construed as “a file including a video clip or image.”
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`Defendants seek to narrowly limit these terms to only include files with moving visual elements.
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`However, the specification contradicts this narrow reading; it explicitly provides that “video
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`files . . . include, but [are] not limited to . . . JPEG; MPEG; GIF; AVI . . ..” 651 Patent at 4:4-7.
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`JPEG is a static image without moving visual elements. See Mangione-Smith Decl. at ¶31.
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`Nevertheless, the specification clearly describes this static image as within the scope of “video
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`files.” Additionally, the specification provides that the video file can consist of a single frame.
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`651 Patent at 8:49-51 (describing “a video file containing a video clip or frame”). Moreover, the
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`dependent claims make clear that JPEG—a static image—is a video file. For example, 651
`
`Patent claim 5 recites that “the selected video file is a JPEG file.” See also id. at claims 16, 28,
`
`37. Similarly, the dependent claims explain that a video file can be a single frame. See id. at
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`claim 7 (“the selected video file includes a single image frame”); id. at claim 18. Defendants’
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`construction should be rejected because it would exclude disclosed embodiments and dependent
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`claims from the scope of independent claims. See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`4
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 11 of 38 PageID #: 1689
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`The term “the selected video file” should be given its plain meaning. If construction is
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`necessary then the term should be construed as “a file including a video clip or image that has
`
`been selected.” The specification emphasizes that the user selects or chooses the video file by
`
`describing the file as “the user-selected video file.” See 651 Patent at 10:21-46; 10:21 (“video
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`file is chosen”); 8:51-53 (“choosing a video file”).
`
`B.
`
`“communications link” (395 Patent, claims 14, 22, 30, 39; 866 Patent, claim
`10; 651 Patent, claims 1, 12)
`
`Solocron’s Proposed Construction
`Plain meaning. If construction is necessary,
`then:
`“a connection that enables data transfer”
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“a hard-wired link, e.g., a serial port, parallel
`port, universal serial bus (USB), RS 232, or
`GPIB”
`
`“Communications link” should be given its plain meaning, or, if the Court finds
`
`construction necessary, it should be construed as “a connection that enables data transfer.”
`
`Defendants’ attempt to limit this term to “a hard-wired link” is contrary to the claim language,
`
`the specification, and the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. Claim 12 of the 651
`
`patent claims a system that format converts a file sent between two wireless communication
`
`devices—limiting the “communications link” element to “a hard-wired link” would be directly
`
`contrary to the purpose of converting files sent between wireless devices. 651 Patent at claim 12.
`
`Defendants base their construction on a portion of the specification (underlined below)
`
`but ignore the surrounding context that expressly describes cellular and other wireless
`
`“communications links” (in bold below):
`
`In FIG. 1, links 31 and 32 may be, for example, communications links (e.g., serial
`ports, parallel ports, universal serial buses (USB), RS232, GPIB, etc.), modems
`(e.g., any suitable analog or digital modems, cellular modems, or cable modems),
`a network interface link (e.g., Ethernet links, token ring links, etc.), wireless
`communications links (e.g., cellular telephone links, wireless Internet links,
`infrared links, etc.), or any other suitable hard-wired or wireless Internet or
`communications links.
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 12 of 38 PageID #: 1690
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`Id. at 3:33-41. Use of exemplary language like “e.g.” in the specification should not be read to
`
`limit broader claim language to particular disclosed examples. See Bayer Cropscience AG v.
`
`Dow Agrosciences LLC, 728 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“the use of ‘e.g.,’ rather than
`
`‘i.e.’, strongly suggests” that the term is not limited to the particular disclosed example(s)); TDM
`
`Am., LLC v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 774, 791 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (“‘soil’ in the specification is . . .
`
`an example or preferred embodiment, as denoted with the use of ‘e.g.’”).
`
`The specification also makes clear that any of the exemplary forms of communication
`
`described in the above passage for link 32 (including both the subset pointed to by Defendants,
`
`and the other examples Defendants ignore) may be used to form “communications link 33,” and
`
`a preferred embodiment of communications link 33 allows for wireless communication:
`
`In operation, computer 90 . . . allows a user to select information, such as audio
`and/or video, that is available on the Internet or on a remote network computer,
`and program that information into device 20. This may be accomplished via
`communications link 33 (which may be any type of link previously described as
`suitable for link 32). For example, a user may wish to download video images
`from an Internet site to a hand-held computer, such as a PDA, or to a wireless
`telephone. The user may communicate with computer 90 via a wireless link 33
`and select information from Internet 80 . . .
`
`651 Patent at 6:30-43. Column 5 similarly confirms that the term “communications link” is not
`
`limited to “a hard-wired link” in the context of the Asserted Patents. Id. at 5:45-46 (describing
`
`that link 70 may be “any other suitable hard-wired or wireless communications link.”).
`
`Defendants’ construction should be rejected because it would exclude these wireless preferred
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`embodiments. See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1324; Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1371-75 (reversing the
`
`district court’s construction limiting “datalink” to a cable/wired datalink (as in a preferred
`
`embodiment) because the plain meaning of “datalink” includes wireless links that carry data.).
`
`Contemporaneous dictionaries further confirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would
`
`not understand “communications link” to be limited to “a hard-wired link” in the Asserted
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 13 of 38 PageID #: 1691
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`Patents, but would understand it to have its plain meaning (i.e., a connection that enables data
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`transfer). See Exh. 7 [MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY, 2nd ed. 1994] at
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`SCRN00010877 (defining “communications link” as “The connection between computers that
`
`enables data transfer.”); Exh. 8 [IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, 1994] at SCRN00010866-867
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`(defining “link” as “the connection between two systems” and “To interconnect items of data or
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`portions of one or more computer programs[.]”).
`
`C.
`
`“polyphonic” / “polyphonic audio file” / “polyphonic sound” (395 Patent,
`claims 39, 40; 864 Patent, claims 11-14, 16, 17, 19; 866 Patent, claim10)
`
`Solocron’s Proposed Construction
`Plain meaning. If construction is necessary,
`then:
`“polyphonic”: “having more than one sound ”
`
`“polyphonic audio file”: “audio file having
`more than one sound ”
`
`“polyphonic sound”: “audio having more than
`one sound”
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“polyphonic audio file”: “a synthesized
`representation of an audio composition having
`more than one sound”
`
`“polyphonic sound”: “a synthesized
`representation of audio having more than one
`sound”
`
`The terms “polyphonic” / “polyphonic audio file” / “polyphonic sound” should be given
`
`their plain meaning, or if construction is necessary, construed as “having more than one sound” /
`
`“audio file having more than one sound” / “audio having more than one sound,” respectively.
`
`Defendants improperly seek to narrow these terms to mean “synthesized” sounds such as “MIDI”
`
`audio files in contradiction of the intrinsic evidence. The dependent claims, specification, and
`
`prosecution history evince a clear intention that the terms not be limited to synthesized
`
`representations of audio sounds. Indeed, claims 7 and 27 of the 864 Patent explicitly provide for
`
`“polyphonic audio files selected from the group comprising MP3, MPEG, or WAV files”—none
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`of which is “synthesized.” See Mangione-Smith Decl. at ¶¶32-34. The specification explicitly
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`provides that audio files include WAV and MP3 files—neither of which is “synthesized.” 692
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 14 of 38 PageID #: 1692
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`Patent at 3:49-52; 4:21-22. During prosecution, the patentee stated, “MP3, WAV, MPEG, and
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`many MIDI files are polyphonic audio files.” Exh. 9 [395 Patent File History (7/8/2003)] at
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`SCRN00001858. Moreover, the prosecution history reveals the importance of “the use of high
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`fidelity ringtones such as polyphonic ringtones . . . that may be actual MP3 . . . songs.” Exh. 10
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`[866 Patent File History (5/4/2007)] at SCRN00002611-612; Exh. 9 [395 Patent File History
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`(3/18/2007)] at SCRN00002257-258. Nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that “polyphonic”
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`means synthesized. To the contrary, explicit references to non-synthesized audio files in the
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`intrinsic evidence establish that the term was not intended to be so limited.
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`D.
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`“configured to [perform some function]” (651 Patent, claims 12, 31; 866
`Patent, claim 10; 395 Patent, claims 22, 30)
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`Solocron’s Proposed Construction
`Plain meaning.
`
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Requires actual performance of action
`associated with the “configured” clause, as
`opposed to mere capability
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`
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`The parties dispute whether the term “configured to,” where recited in connection with
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`some function, requires actual performance of that function to satisfy the limitation, as
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`Defendants contend, or requires only that the apparatus or system be configured, or structured, to
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`perform the recited function. Solocron’s position—that the plain meaning should apply and that
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`actual performance is not required—should be adopted. System claims “cover what a device is,
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`not what a device does.”2 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468
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`(Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original).3 Thus, non-functional claim terms, such as “configured
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`to,” in system claims should not be construed to require actual performance. See Paragon
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`Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Construing a non-
`
`
`2 This approach to claim construction was endorsed in the concurring opinion to the unpublished
`decision in Superior Indus. v. Masaba, Inc., 553 Fed. Appx. 986 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`3 Throughout this brief emphasis has been supplied in quotations unless otherwise noted.
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 15 of 38 PageID #: 1693
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`functional term in an apparatus claim in a way that makes direct infringement turn on the use to
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`which an accused apparatus is later put confuses rather than clarifies, frustrates the ability of both
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`the patentee and potential infringers to ascertain the propriety of particular activities, and is
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`inconsistent with the notice function central to the patent system.”).
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`The intrinsic evidence supports a finding that this term has its plain meaning. As one
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`example, the term “configured to” appears in claim 12 of the 651 Patent as follows:
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`a first communications link configured to receive from a first wireless
`communications device a video file selected by a user of the first wireless
`communications device for transmission to a second wireless communications
`device having video playing capability;
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`651 Patent at 13:43-47. This portion of claim 12 illustrates that the system is configured, or
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`structured, to perform the function of receiving a video file in response to the input of the user.
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`The first communications link does not receive a video file unless and until a user selects a video
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`file. Whether a user selects a video file or not is thus a conditional stimulus. Construing the
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`term “configured to” in this context to require actual performance would be absurd because it
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`would be tantamount to a construction that requires a user to constantly select a video file.
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`The specification provides an additional example using the term “configure”:
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`the user may configure telephone 500 to play a certain user-defined audio file
`stored in alerting circuit 550 when receiving an incoming call. Thus, when a call
`is received, processor 530 may instruct alerting circuit 550 to play the selected file
`through speaker 540.
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`Id. at 10:16-21. Here, the system is configured to play an audio file, but the stimulus (“when a
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`call is received”) may never occur. Nevertheless, the system remains configured to perform the
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`function when or if the stimulus occurs.
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`Courts in multiple districts, including the Eastern District of Texas, have found the term
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`“configured to” to have its plain meaning or have construed it to mean “capable of” or words to
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`that effect. See Ciena Corp. v. Nortel Networks, Inc., et al., No. 2:05-cv-14-LED, 2006 U.S. Dist.
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 119 Filed 11/21/14 Page 16 of 38 PageID #: 1694
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`LEXIS 97450, at *39 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2006) (“configured to supply service channel optical
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`signals” construed as “programmed to supply service channel optical signals.”); Diego, Inc. v.
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`Audible, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-464, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22715, at *44 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27,
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`2006) (“configured to encrypt” construed as “capable of encrypting”); Kernius v. International
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`Electronics, Inc., et al., No. 1:05-cv-1927, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24874, at *26 (D. Md. Mar. 30,
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`2007) (finding “no further construction … necessary” for the term “configured to operate in
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`either the presence or absence of a bandwidth encompassing modem signal”).
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`Defendants improperly seek to limit “configured to” to require actual performance. But
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`such a construction would depart from the plain meaning of the term and would constitute legal
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`error abs